LEADING    AMERICAN    SOLDIERS 


BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR. 

THE      ROMAN      THEOCRACY     AND 

THE  REPUBLIC,  1846-1849. 

London,  Macmillan  and  Co.     1901. 
NAPOLEON:   A  SHORT  BIOGRAPHY. 

London,  Macmillan  and  Co.;  New  York, 

Barnes  and  Co.     1904. 

THE  NAPOLEONIC  EMPIRE  IN 
SOUTHERN  ITALY  AND  THE 
RISE  OF  THE  SECRET  SOCIETIES. 
2  vols.  London,  Macmillan  and  Co.  1904. 

MEMOIRS  OF  "MALAKOFF"  : 
Being-  Extracts  from  the  Correspondence 
and  Papers  of  the  late  'WILLIAM  EDWARD 
JOHNSTON,  edited  by  his  son  R.  M.  JOHN 
STON.  2  vols.  London,  Hutchinson  and 
Co.  1907. 


of  Leasing  3mertcan$ 

Edited  by  W.  P.  TRENT 


LEADING    AMERICAN 
SOLDIERS 


BY 


R.    M.    JOHNSTON,    M.A.  Cantab. 

Lecturer  in  History  at  Harvard  University 


WITH    THIRTEEN    PORTRAITS 


NEW  YORK 

HENRY    HOLT    AND    COMPANY 
1907 


Copyright,  1907 

BY 

HENRY   HOLT  AND  COMPANY 


ROBERT    DRUMMOND,    PRINTER,   NKW   YORK 


TO 

E.   M.  J, 


159756 


PREFACE 

To  write  a  book  on  war  at  the  present  day  is  to  launch 
out  against  a  stream  that  has  been  flowing  pretty  steadily 
in  one  direction  since  Green  coined  his  famous  phrase 
concerning  the  drum  and  trumpet.  Public  opinion,  never 
before  so  active,  is  set  on  peace  and  disarmament,  and 
finds  in  this  plausible  shibboleth  the  only  practical  basis 
for  international  co-operation.  The  peace  movement  has 
become  a  fashion,  and  one  that  enrolls  among  its  followers 
the  most  humane  and,  in  some  respects,  the  most  pro 
gressive  section  of  every  community.  And  so  the  writer 
of  such  a  book  as  this,  after  recording  the  overwhelmingly 
attested  fact  that  men  whose  vocation  was  the  battle-field 
must  be  ranked  among  the  greatest  of  mankind,  rubs  his 
eyes  and  wonders  for  a  moment  whether  he  is  dreaming, 
or  whether  he  is  out  of  tune  with  what  passes  for  the  most 
advanced  thought  of  the  day.  Were  these  men  the  leaders 
of  their  race,  an  example  to  their  descendants? — or  were 
they  only  extreme  representatives  of  the  decaying  traditions 
of  barbarism? 

Is  not  the  truth  this?  One  of  the  most  obvious  facts 
of  history  is  the  evil  aspect  of  warfare,  its  hardships,  its 
cruelty,  its  injustice  to  the  innocent.  These  are  things 
which  even  those  who  have  not  seen  war  can  realize,  these 
are  things  which  lead  good  men  to  cry,  though  perhaps  with 
insufficient  reflection,  Down  with  war.  There  is  another 
fact,  however,  equally  demonstrated  by  history,  but  un- 

vii 


vni  PREFACE 

fortunately  far  from  equally  obvious,  which  is  that  war  does 
at  times  carry  with  it  certain  benefits,  and  benefits  not  so 
much  material  as  moral.  Shakespeare,  with  his  amazing 
instinct  for  the  profounder  realities,  well  put  the  case  when 
he  wrote  of 

"The  cankers  of  a  calm  world  and  long  peace." 

The  study  of  history  leaves  many  students  firmly  per 
suaded  that  although  war  in  excess,  war  as  a  habit,  is 
brutalizing  and  degrading,  the  occasional  war  that  has  a 
right  cause  behind  it,  a  struggle  for  religion,  for  principle, 
for  national  existence,  marks  the  healthy  and  vital  stage 
in  a  people's  development,  while  the  long  periods  of  peace 
are  invariably  attended  by  materialism  and  moral  loss.^  And 
is  not  materialism  at  the  present  day  more  closely  associated 
with  the  outcry  against  war  than  is  generally  realized? — 
materialism  now  busy  constructing  a  new  civilization,  but  that 
will  later  turn  to  the  mere  enjoyment  of  it  ?  There  is  doubt 
less  an  exaggeration  in  the  indifference  to  death  displayed  by 
so  many  Asiatics ;  is  it  not  possible,  however,  that  there  is 
some  excess  of  materialism  in  our  present  extreme  fear  of  it  ? 
The  battle-field  takes  life,  it  is  true,  but  it  does  not  take  that 
which  otherwise  we  would  retain.  The  hour  is  advanced,  and 
that — why  hesitate  to  say  it? — is  often  best.  Would  it  not 
have  been  better  to  have  stood  among  our  soldiers  on  the 
banks  of  the  Rappahannock  furiously  cheering  our  great 
opponent  Stonewall  Jackson  as  he  inspected  his  pickets  on 
the  further  side,  than  to  have  lived  twenty  years  longer  to 
mingle  with  football  mobs  hurrahing  at  the  disablement  of  a 
successful  adversary  ?  Or  to  have  followed  Sherman  to  the 
sea  among  waves  of  uplifted  slave  faces  fondly  dreaming 
liberty  and  righteousness  had  come,  rather  than  spend  a 
lengthened  life  in  the  lucrative  but  dubious  routine  of  mer 
cantile  affairs?  Which  is  the  better  part? 

And  if  it  is  the  case  that  there  is  much  to  urge  for  war 
on  ethical  grounds,  as   a  tonic  or  stimulus  for  the  moral 


PREFACE  ix 

fibre  of  a  nation,  it  is  also  true,  as  a  matter  of  historical 
deduction,  that  the  best  way  to  obtain  peace  is  not  that 
which  is  so  widely  popular  at  the  present  time  under  the 
alluring  label  of  disarmament.  Disarmament  is  a  vast 
subject  of  which  only  one  small  aspect,  one  that  arises 
directly  from  the  lessons  of  military  history,  can  be  touched 
on  here. 

Hf  military  operations  during  the  period  of  improved 
firearms  be  carefully  considered  no  principle  can  be  deduced 
of  more  general  application  than  this:  that  the  duration 
and  decisiveness  of  a  struggle  will  vary  directly  as  the 
numbers  engaged.  In  other  words,  when  large  armies  are 
opposed  the  result  is  longer  delayed  and  less  decisive  than 
when  small  ones  are  engaged.  Even  those  who  have  not 
studied  military  history  may  well  perceive  this  by  con 
sidering  an  extreme  illustration.  Take  two  cases.  In 
the  first  five  men  are  opposed  by  five.  The  struggle  will 
inevitably  be  short  and  almost  inevitably  decisive;  in 
every  case  it  will  give  the  fullest  scope  for  the  exercise  of 
those  fundamental  wiles  and  stratagems  that  form  the 
basis  of  military  science.  Now  let  us  take  the  other  case, 
and  oppose  five  millions  to  five  millions.  Is  it  not  obvious 
that  with  such  masses  engaged  the  result  must  be  long 
delayed,  and  that  under  present  conditions  decisiveness 
could  rarely  be  attained  ?  And  to  quote  a  modern  example, 
it  may  be  recalled  that  most  military  experts  consider  that 
in  the  event  of  a  war  between  France  and  Germany  the 
forces  that  would  be  mobilized  between  Belfort  and  Sedan 
are  so  great  that  it  is  a  question  whether  the  fiercest  fighting 
could  lead  to  any  definite  result,  i 

If  this,  then,  is  the  case,  that  the  larger  the  armies  the 
less  are  the  chances  of  substantial  gain,  is  it  not  better  to 
urge  on  rather  than  to  retard  the  movement  that  is  now 
making  of  Europe  and  the  world  an  armed  camp?  When 
the  runaway  horse  begins  to  flag  is  it  not  better  to  whip 


x  PREFACE 

him  on  to  exhaustion  than  to  attempt  to  rein  him  in  before 
he  has  learned  his  lesson?  Supposing  armaments  could  be 
limited  by  international  agreement,  is  it  not  conceivable  that 
the  result  might  be  just  the  contrary  of  what  so  many  ex 
pect?  With  armies  reduced  to  the  size  of  the  professional 
armies  of  the  eighteenth  century,  the  world  would  always 
have  to  fear  the  advent  of  a  new  Bonaparte  and  the  domina 
tion  of  a  military  caste;  but  with  inflated  armies  it  can  at 
best  only  witness  a  scientific  exposition  of  military  methods 
by  two  contending  groups  of  specialist  staff  officers.  Is 
it  not  really  premature  to  talk  of  disarmament  until  we 
have  established  as  the  guiding  principles  of  statecraft, 
international  toleration,  equity,  good  will,  and  respect  of 
the  weak  by  the  strong  ?  A  nation  that  is  compelled  to  pass 
through  the  ranks  will  be  more  ready  to  deal  justly  by  its 
neighbors  than  one  that  can  get  its  fighting  done  for  it  by  a 
relatively  small  body  of  professional  soldiers.  Let  us  first 
learn  to  act  rightly  in  our  international  dealings  and  the 
question  of  peace  and  disarmament  will  take  care  of  itself. 

And  now  to  come  more  closely  to  the  matter  in  hand,  a 
few  words  of  explanation  appear  to  be  necessary.  The 
series  of  which  this  volume  forms  part  is  intended  to  be 
of  an  elastic  or  continuing  character.  The  reader  is  not 
to  understand  that  the  thirteen  biographies  included  in 
this  volume  represent  the  thirteen  leading  American  soldiers 
in  a  final  and  exclusive  sense.  For  in  the  first  place  to 
draw  up  such  an  exclusive  list,  to  draw  a  line,  say,  between 
Meade  and  Thomas,  or  Horatio  Gates  and  McClellan, 
would  be  an  impossible  task.  All  that  is  claimed  is  that 
these  thirteen  are  leading  American  soldiers,  and  are  those 
it  seemed  best  to  group  together  in  one  volume;  but  this 
does  not  preclude  the  publication  of  further  volumes  in  the 
series  covering  lives  the  inclusion  of  which  should  seem 
properly  warranted. 


PREFACE  xi 

Another  matter  that  requires  explanation  is  this.  The 
classification  of  prominent  men  is  often  difficult.  Thus 
several  of  the  soldiers  included  in  this  volume  were  not  only 
soldiers  but  statesmen.  It  has  therefore  appeared  better 
in  the  case  of  Washington  and  of  Andrew  Jackson,  whose 
political  careers  were  of  such  great  importance,  to  focus 
the  attention  in  this  volume  on  the  military  side  alone, 
reserving  for  another  volume  a  treatment  of  their  lives  as 
statesmen. 

As  this  series  is  intended  to  be  free  from  foot-notes  and 
bibliographies,  the  reader  will  find  an  unsupported  narrative, 
as  to  which  perhaps  the  following  word  of  explanation  is 
due.  No  claim  is  put  forward  that  these  biographies  are 
based  on  new  material.  But  in  those  that  belong  to  the 
Civil  War  period  the  Official  Records  have  been  freely 
used,  and  as  to  many  of  them  it  may  be  said  that  they  offer 
points  of  view  not  to  be  found  in  previous  biographies. 
Hardly  one  of  the  existing  works  on  our  leading  soldiers 
has  been  written  by  a  trained  scholar  with  a  grasp  of  the 
principles  of  military  history.  And  even  in  the  case  of 
George  Washington,  whose  life  has  so  frequently  been 
written,  it  is  possible  that  the  present  biography  may  pre 
sent  a  few  facts  in  a  light  hitherto  unsuspected  by  the  reader. 

Lastly  it  must  be  said  that  in  the  biography  of  Stonewall 
Jackson,  one  authority  has  been  so  closely  followed  that 
special  acknowledgment  is  due.  It  is  only  in  one  or  two 
details  that  it  has  appeared  possible  to  diverge  from  the 
late  Colonel  Henderson's  masterly  work  on  the  subject,  and 
where  his  views  have  not  been  accepted  references  to 
authorities  have  been  given. 


CONTENTS 

PART   I 
THE  REVOLUTION 

PAGE 

GEORGE  WASHINGTON 3 

NATHANIEL  GREENE 66 

PART  II 
FROM   THE   REVOLUTION   TO   THE   CIVIL   WAR 

ANDREW  JACKSON 83 

ZACHARY  TAYLOR 97 

WINFIELD  SCOTT 113 

PART  III 
THE    CIVIL    WAR 

NORTH 

ULYSSES  S.  GRANT 137 

WILLIAM  T.  SHERMAN 193 

PHILIP  H.  SHERIDAN.  ..., 210 

GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN 226 

GEORGE  GORDON  MEADE 244 

SOUTH 

ROBERT  EDWARD  LEE 256 

THOMAS  JONATHAN  JACKSON 311 

JOSEPH  EGGLESTON  JOHNSTON 345 

xiii 


PORTRAITS 


FACING   PAGE 


GEORGE  WASHINGTON,  frontispiece Title 

NATHANIEL  GREENE 66 

ANDREW  JACKSON 83 

ZACHARY  TAYLOR 97 

WINFIELD  SCOTT 113 

ULYSSES  S.  GRANT 137 

WILLIAM  T.  SHERMAN 193 

PHILIP  H.  SHERIDAN 210 

GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN 226 

GEORGE  GORDON  MEADE 244 

ROBERT  EDWARD  LEE 256 

THOMAS  JONATHAN  JACKSON ^n 

JOSEPH  EGGLESTON  JOHNSTON 345 


PART   I 
THE    REVOLUTION 

George  Washington 
Nathaniel  Greene 


GEORGE  WASHINGTON 

WASHINGTON  still  remains  the  great  national  figure  of 
American  history,  and  deservedly;  for  nothing  less  than 
his  heroic  leadership  could  have  brought  the  war  of  inde 
pendence  to  its  triumphant  close,  nothing  less  than  his 
rectitude  and  serenity  could  have  inspired  the  states  to  rise 
above  provincialism  to  union.  Therefore  to  compose  his 
biography  must  be  the  most  gratifying  of  tasks  for  an 
American  writer,  and  yet  that  biography  presents  one  nearly 
insurmountable  difficulty.  So  often  has  the  life  of  Wash 
ington  been  written,  so  diligently  have  the  records  been 
searched,  that  it  would  appear  as  though  at  our  day  nothing 
but  an  ancient  and  familiar  literary  dish  could  be  served 
up.  To  a  certain  extent  this  must,  indeed,  be  the  case; 
and  at  all  events  no  new  facts  concerning  his  life  can  be 
set  out  here.  But  it  may  be  that  the  angle  from  which  the 
old  facts  are  viewed  will  prove  not  altogether  familiar. 
It  was  as  a  soldier  that  Washington  established  the  inde-  | 
pendence  of  his  country,  and  it  is  from  a  strict  military 
standpoint  that  his  life,  his  character,  his  achievements, 
will  now  be  considered. 

There  is  little  known  of  the  boyhood  of  George  Washington. 
He  was  born  on  the  22d  of  February,  1732,  at  Wakefield, 
Westmoreland  County,  Virginia,  at  his  father's  plantation. 
The  Washingtons  had  emigrated  from  England  less  than 
a  century  earlier  and  had  become  prominent  Virginia 
planters.  The  family  was  a  large  one,  however,  and  George 

3 


4  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

had  no  brilliant  prospects  before  him.  His  education  was 
scanty,  and,  except  as  to  mathematics,  left  little  impression 
on  his  mind.  But  for  mathematics  young  Washington  had 
a  natural  bent.  His  intellect  was  precise,  cold,  unyielding. 
There  was  little  elasticity  about  him,  and  with  less  intel 
ligence  and  less  good  breeding,  he  might  have  developed  into 
a  martinet  or  a  prig.  Alongside  of  his  aptitude  for  mathe 
matics  was  another  factor  that  helped  determine  his  early 
vocation.  His  physique  was  splendid.  He  stood  over  six 
feet,  was  broad  in  proportion,  and  excelled  in  the  saddle 
and  in  the  field.  Not  unexpectedly,  therefore,  we  find  him, 
on  leaving  school,  turning  his  attention  to  surveying. 

Many  of  the  wealthy  planters  and  of  the  adventurous 
spirits  of  Virginia  were  at  that  time  interested  in  the  acquisi 
tion  of  land  towards  the  opening  West.  Washington  acted 
as  a  prospector  and  surveyor  for  friends  and  relatives,  thus 
undoubtedly  developing  the  instinct  for  topography  that 
was  later  to  serve  him  so  well  when  at  the  head  of  the  army 
of  the  United  States. 

This  introduction  to  the  western  borders  of  Virginia  led  to 
other  things.  Beyond  lay  the  rich  Ohio  valley,  and  there 
the  French  from  Canada  were  gradually  erecting  a  line  of 
posts  that  must  eventually  close  the  West  to  the  English.  In 
1753  the  British  Government  decided  to  make  a  stand.  In 
structions  were  sent  to  Governor  Dinwiddie  of  Virginia  to 
summon  the  French  to  abandon  their  forts;  and  it  became 
necessary  to  find  a  suitable  person  to  carry  out  the  mission. 
Washington  had  influential  friends;  he  already  had  won 
a  reputation  for  dignity  and  resolution;  his  knowledge  of 
the  woods  was  an  important  advantage;  and  so  he  came  to 
be  chosen  as  Governor  Dinwiddie's  messenger  to  the  French 
on  the  Ohio. 

Washington  carried  out  his  mission  to  the  Ohio  frontier 
successfully.  The  undertaking  proved  arduous  but  fruitful, 
for  he  concentrated  more  experience  into  it  than  many  men 


GEORGE   WASHINGTON  5 

get  in  an  entire  lifetime.  The  hardships  of  winter  travel 
through  the  wilderness  brought  him  several  times  to  the 
verge  of  famine  and  of  exhaustion;  the  Indians  were  mostly 
hostile,  altogether  deceitful;  the  French  were  nearly  as  bad, 
though  in  different  fashion.  To  deal  with  such  conditions 
required  courage,  pertinacity,  resource,  and  even  subtlety. 

All  these  qualities  Washington  displayed,  and  in  respect 
of  the  last  the  point  may  well  be  emphasized.  Great 
generals,  as  a  rule,  have  been  men  who  could  add  to  many 
other  gifts  that  of  deceiving  their  left  hand  as  to  what  their 
right  hand  was  doing,  and  Washington  acquired  that  talent 
rapidly  while  dealing  with  the  French  and  Indians  in  the 
Ohio  valley. 

He  returned  from  his  mission  at  the  beginning  of  January, 
1754.  In  April  he  was  once  more  on  his  way  to  the  Ohio. 
For  some  years  he  had  held  a  commission  in  the  militia,  and, 
partly  owing  to  the  aristocratic  system  then  in  vogue  in 
Virginia,  partly  to  his  real  merit,  he  had  attained  the  rank 
of  major.  On  hearing  that  the  Governor  intended  sending 
a  force  of  militia  to  the  frontier  he  applied  for,  and  obtained, 
promotion  to  the  rank  of  lieutenant-colonel,  in  which  capac 
ity  he  was  sent  at  the  head  of  two  or  three  hundred  Vir 
ginians  to  drive  the  French  from  the  Ohio. 

The  expedition  that  ensued  throws  little  light  on  the 
military  capacity  of  its  leader,  but  it  was  notable  in  that  the 
first  skirmish  between  the  Virginians  and  the  French,  a 
well-planned  ambuscade,  Indian  fashion,  led  by  Washington 
in  person,  was  the  occasion  for  the  firing  of  the  first  shot  in 
the  long  war  that  gave  Silesia  to  Prussia  and  Canada  to 
Great  Britain.  The  skirmishing  and  ambuscades  on  the 
Ohio  were  insignificant  affairs  compared  to  Leuthen  and 
the  Heights  of  Abraham,  yet  they  helped  form  a  soldier  who 
by  his  crowning  triumph  of  Yorktown  won  a  victory  even 
more  fruitful  than  either  of  these. 

It  would  be  fruitless  to  enter  into  the  details  of  the  Ohio 


6  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

adventures  of  Washington.  We  have  no  precise  account, 
as  is  natural,  of  the  way  in  which  he  matched  wits  with  the 
Indian  chiefs  who  might  be  fighting  with  one  party  to-day, 
with  the  other  to-morrow.  Numbers  and  supplies,  two  vital 
factors,  proved  to  be  on  the  enemy's  side,  and  were  decisive. 
After  varying  fortune,  Washington  was  driven  into  a  bad 
position,  at  Fort  Necessity,  and  there,  on  the  3d  of  July, 
1754,  he  had  to  accept  a  capitulation  whereby  he  and  his 
troops  were  to  evacuate  the  fort  and  return  to  Virginia. 

He  was  soon  in  the  field  once  more.  Great  Britain  was 
now  aroused.  The  Government  sent  out  to  America 
General  Braddock  and  two  regiments  of  regulars;  the 
object  of  the  expedition  was  to  drive  the  French  from  Fort 
Duquesne  and  the  forts  of  the  Ohio.  Braddock,  a  much- 
abused  man,  was  clearly  not  a  genius,  yet  he  was  no  such 
fool  as  history  has  generally  represented  him,  if  for  no  other 
reason  than  that  he  singled  out  Washington  and  Benjamin 
Franklin  as  the  two  Americans  with  whom  it  was  a  satisfac 
tion  to  transact  affairs.  It  is  true  that  he  underestimated 
the  fighting  value  of  French,  Indians,  and  Virginians  among 
woods;  yet  he  was  only  partly  wrong  in  insisting  that  his 
British  regulars  should  fight  in  line.  The  British  private, 
as  an  individual,  was  helpless  and  a  poor  soldier;  it  was  only 
under  the  stress  of  accustomed  discipline  that  he  became 
part  of  that  highly  effective  engine  of  destruction,  the 
British  army  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Braddock  erred,  but 
not  wholly.  He  had  great  faith  in  Colonel  Washington, 
whom  he  appointed  to  his  staff  and  consulted  frequently. 
But  when,  on  the  gth  of  July,  1755,  the  little  army  of  regulars 
and  provincials  crossed  the  Monongahela  and  advanced  on 
Fort  Duquesne,  Braddock  unwarily  marched  into  an  ambush 
and  was  annihilated. 

Washington  did  wonders  on  the  day  of  Braddock's  defeat. 
He  was  ill  and  had  rejoined  headquarters  only  the  night 
before.  The  advance-guard  of  the  column  was  suddenly 


GEORGE   WASHINGTON  7 

fired  on  by  the  French  and  Indians  from  a  belt  of  wood  in 
front  and  from  ravines  to  the  right  and  left.  Braddock  rode 
up  and  attempted  to  deploy  his  column  into  line  of  battle. 
The  fire  was  too  hot,  however,  and  too  close.  Braddock 
himself  was  struck  down,  mortally  wounded.  Every  officer 
of  the  staff  was  killed  or  disabled  save  Washington  alone. 
He  had  two  horses  killed  under  him  and  received  four  bullets 
in  his  clothes,  but,  fortunately  for  America,  was  saved  for 
greater  events.  While  the  regulars,  like  the  French  at  Ross- 
bach  or  the  Austrians  at  Marengo,  huddled  into  a  confused 
mass,  failed  to  deploy  and  fired  blindly  in  the  air,  the  Vir 
ginians  sought  cover,  fought  behind  trees,  logs,  and  rocks, 
met  the  enemy  with  equal  tactics.  Washington,  with 
unsparing  courage  and  unfailing  skill,  held  them  together, 
formed  some  sort  of  screen  for  the  army,  saved  its  retreat. 
And  so  it  proved  that  Braddock 's  defeat,  an  event  almost 
insignificant  in  its  military  and  political  consequences, 
made  the  reputation  of  an  individual.  Washington  was 
henceforth  the  most  noted  of  the  provincial  officers,  the 
one  man  who  had  shown  military  capacity  while  British 
regulars  were  meeting  with  their  most  disastrous  rout  on 
the  American  continent. 

It  was  almost  twenty  years  before  this  result  of  Braddock's 
defeat  came  to  a  consequence — years  of  peace,  but  years  of 
unrest.  France  had  been  driven  from  America  by  England, 
and  now  the  time  had  come  when  England  in  turn  should 
be  driven  out  of  the  greater  part  of  her  possessions.  The 
colonies  were  eager  for  independence;  constitutional  and 
economic  questions  had  been  developed  by  short-sighted 
statesmen  into  an  opportunity  for  disruption.  Washington 
took  part  in  the  political  agitation,  but  more  with  sympathy 
and  advice  than  with  words.  He  was  not  so  much  an 
orator  as  a  man  of  the  sword,  and  it  was  not  until  the  quarrel 
had  come  to  a  crisis  that  he  became  prominent.  He  was 


8  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

now,  by  his  marriage  with  Martha  Custis,  one  of  the  wealth 
iest  men  in  Virginia,  and  this,  together  with  his  military 
reputation  and  personal  prestige,  led  to  his  being  chosen 
as  one  of  the  Virginia  delegates  to  the  first  Continental 
Congress. 

Washington  from  the  first  made  his  position  clear.  He 
was  the  most  prominent  of  provincial  officers  and  was 
prepared  to  act  up  to  all  that  this  might  logically  involve. 
His  heart  was  in  the  cause.  He  declared  publicly  that  he 
was  prepared  to  raise  1000  Virginia  riflemen  at  his  own 
expense  and  march  at  their  head  to  the  relief  of  Boston. 
His  appearance  in  Congress  was  significant;  he  attended 
dressed  in  the  uniform  of  a  colonel  of  Virginia  militia. 
There  could  be  but  one  conclusion,  for  Washington's  attitude 
was  not  only  expectant,  but  legitimate.  Clearly  enough  no 
other  man  could  carry  such  weight  at  the  head  of  the 
American  forces  from  his  achievements,  from  his  social 
position  and  from  his  personal  qualities,  as  the  Virginia 
planter.  And  so,  when  the  federation  of  the  colonies 
against  Great  Britain  had  become  an  inevitable  necessity, 
when  the  army  of  New-Englanders  before  Boston  required 
a  commander  whose  prestige  should  silence  petty  provincial 
jealousies,  when  an  amalgamation  of  north  and  south  was 
necessary  to  consolidate  the  new-born  union,  Washing 
ton  was  the  one  man  in  Congress  to  whom  little  objection 
could  be  raised  by  any  section  of  the  country.  John  Adams 
of  Massachusetts,  with  statesmanlike  breadth  of  view  and 
prescience,  moved  the  resolution  himself  that  George 
Washington  of  Virginia  should  be  appointed  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  armies  of  the  united  provinces.  This  was 
at  the  beginning  of  June  of  the  year  1775. 

Washington  arrived  at  Cambridge  on  the  2d  of  July,  and 
assumed  command  of  the  colonial  army  on  the  following 
day.  The  conditions  he  found  were  these:  within  Boston 
was  an  army  of  highly  efficient  British  troops,  nearly  10,000 


GEORGE   WASHINGTON 


men,  under  the  command  of  generals  of  repute — Gage, 
Howe,  Burgoyne,  Percy,  Clinton.  That  army,  capable  by 
its  numbers  and  discipline  of  playing  a  considerable  part 
in  European  warfare,  had,  however,  recently  met  with  two 
somewhat  disconcerting  experiences  at  the  hands  of  the 


LINES 
ROXUURY 


SIEGE   OF   BOSTON 

New-England  farmers  and  militia.  At  Concord  and  Lex 
ington  the  Americans  had  shown  that  men  of  determination 
who  knew  how  to  shoot  straight,  even  though  unorganized, 
could  throw  a  column  of  regulars  into  considerable  confusion 
among  the  winding  roadways  and  stone  fences  of  Massa 
chusetts.  At  Bunker  Hill,  only  a  fortnight  before  Washing- 


10  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

ton's  arrival,  a  small  force  of  militia  had  inflicted  a  loss  of 
over  a  thousand  on  the  flower  of  the  British  army  and  had 
held  a  rough  earthwork  for  over  an  hour  against  superior 
numbers.  From  these  occurrences  two  conclusions  of  a 
general  character  might  be  drawn. 

In  the  first  place,  the  war  that  had  just  broken  out  was  of 
a  character  unlike  those  which  the  armies  of  the  eighteenth 
century  were  especially  fitted  to  cope  with.  The  Americans 
were  a  people  in  arms,  citizen  soldiers  with  opinions  to  fight 
for  and  with  intelligence  and  skill  in  the  essentials,  if  not  in 
the  fine  art,  of  fighting.  Here  was  a  war  not  between  two 
kings,  or  two  ministers,  or  two  favorites,  to  be  resolved  by 
the  formal  manoeuvres  of  trained  tacticians,  by  the  fall  of 
a  frontier  fortress  or  by  the  occupation  of  an  enemy's 
capital,  but  a  war  between  a  king  with  his  small  group  of 
trained  soldiers  and  a  people  in  arms.  France,  Prussia, 
Spain,  might  accept  the  occupation  of  their  capitals  as  de 
cisive  of  their  fate;  the  farmers  of  New  England  were 
rather  exasperated  than  cowed  by  the  British  occupation 
of  Boston.  And  as  against  the  regular  the  farmer  was  by 
no  means  helpless.  The  military  tactics  of  the  eighteenth 
century  were  of  a  highly  artificial  character.  The  conduct 
of  war  had  been  crystallized  by  the  genius  of  Frederick  the 
Great  into  a  somewhat  arbitrary  system.  The  essential 
pivot  of  battle  was  the  infantry.  It  was  armed  with  a 
clumsy  firelock,  loading  slowly,  shooting  inaccurately,  and  not 
able  to  kill  at  more  than  200  yards.  The  efforts  of  tacticians 
were  centred  on  converting  into  an  effective  machine  a  mass 
of  recruits,  the  dregs  of  the  European  capitals  or  the  clods 
of  feudal  servitude.  A  consensus  of  opinion  had  solved  the 
problem  in  the  following  manner.  Musket-fire  to  be  deci 
sive  must  be  delivered  in  volleys  at  a  range  of  from  125 
yards  downwards.  For  this  purpose  soldiers  must  be  aligned 
not  more  than  three  deep,  and  this  extended  order  must  be 
brought  up  in  rigid  ranks  to  murderously  close  distance  of 


GEORGE  WASHINGTON  II 

the  enemy.  There  was  only  one  way  of  obtaining  this  re 
sult,  which  was  to  subject  the  troops  to  an  iron  discipline 
which  instilled  in  them  an  even  greater  fear  of  the  cat-o'- 
nine-tails  than  of  the  enemy's  fire. 

With  this  system  universally  followed,  the  result  of  battle 
depended  largely  on  greater  or  less  rigidity  of  discipline. 
The  British  had  proved  at  Bunker  Hill  the  superb  cour 
age  and  solidity  of  their  infantry.  But  the  New-Englanders 
had  long  held  them  at  bay,  fighting  according  to  an 
entirely  unorthodox  code,  and  the  question  presented  itself, 
would  it  be  possible  for  the  colonials  to  fight  the  mother 
country  by  adopting  a  new  system  of  tactics  ?  Under  what 
we  may  style  the  official  one,  both  contending  generals  should 
be  content  to  seek  out  a  battle-field  where  flat,  open  ground 
would  give  them  opportunity  to  manoeuvre  their  troops; 
but  what  if  the  Americans  should  refuse  to  play  the  game? 
Sixteen  years  later  the  French  Republic,  when  confronted 
by  the  same  problem,  invented  a  new  system  of  tactics  to 
beat  the  old;  in  1776  Washington  accepted  tactics  as  he 
found  them,  but  employed  them  with  some  regard  for  the 
difference  between  the  composition  of  his  battalions  and 
those  of  the  enemy.  It  was  possibly  a  mistake. 

To  besiege  General  Gage  and  his  professional  army  in 
Boston  was  precisely  the  sort  of  task  that  the  well-trained 
soldier,  who  was  that  and  nothing  more,  would  never  have 
attempted.  That  Washington  accepted  it  and  carried  it 
through  to  a  brilliant  conclusion  is  proof  enough  that  he 
had  that  greatest  of  all  qualities  in  a  soldier,  the  quality 
without  which  technical  skill  is  fruitless — moral  intuition 
and  courage.  He  knew  that  "  battles  are  won  in  the 
hearts  of  men";  that  to  abandon  the  positions  occupied 
by  the  New-Englanders,  however  faulty  and  dangerous 
they  might  be,  would  deal  the  cause  a  well-nigh  fatal  blow; 
he  knew  instinctively  that  to  impose  on  the  enemy  is  more 
essential  to  military  success  than  the  best  tactics  and  strategy 


12  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

in  the  world.  He  had  a  cause  behind  him,  he  was  bound 
at  all  risks  to  show  the  world  that  its  leader  was  certain 
of  its  success. 

And  so  Washington,  with  scant  army,  no  gunpowder, 
and  bad  positions,  settled  down  to  besiege  Boston,  f  The 
choice  made  of  him  by  Congress  was  rapidly  justified. 
It  was  one  of  his  characteristics  that  he  impressed  those  he 
met  with  his  greatness  at  first  sight.  Few  men  inspired 
more  complete  and  more  rapid  confidence.  His  common 
sense,  his  dignity,  his  uprightness,  his  devotion,  were  all 
carried  to  the  transcendent  point.  His  physique  was 
magnificent,  his  deportment  indicated  courage,  modesty, 
and  resolution.  To  all  this  Washington  added  a  quality 
indispensable  for  one  who  was  to  control  the  provincial 
levies  of  New  England.  Local  jealousy  and  indiscipline 
were  rife  in  the  camps  of  Cambridge  and  Roxbury,  military 
talents  moderate  and  evenly  matched.  But  the  general-in- 
chief,  designated  by  John  Adams  of  Massachusetts,  was  a 
Virginian;  he  could  arouse  no  local  jealousy;  his  firmness 
and  tact  soon  quelled  any  feeling  of  provincial  rivalry. 

It  was  hard  work  for  Washington  during  the  autumn  of 
1775  and  the  winter  of  1775-76.  Hard  work  establishing 
discipline  and  order  in  the  camps;  hard  work  pleasing  the 
New-England  assemblies  and  resisting  their  often  ill-judged 
demands;  hard  work  supplying  the  troops;  hard  work 
trying  to  get  powder,  money,  cannon,  and  the  thousand 
things  that  feed  war;  hard  work  deceiving  friend  and  foe 
into  the  belief  that  the  army  was  ready  to  beat  back  any 
attempt  the  British  might  make  to  sally  from  Boston. 
And  here,  in  passing,  it  may  be  remarked  that  Washington 
from  the  first  operations  of  the  war  showed  a  wonderful 
skill  in  deceiving  his  opponents.  His  closest  companions 
were  rarely  let  into  his  confidence,  and  his  correspondence 
is  by  no  means  overflowing  with  state  secrets.  In  all  he 
did  and  all  he  wrote  it  is  clear  enough  that  his  inmost 


GEORGE   WASHINGTON  13 

plans  are  kept  to  himself  and  that  he  is  always  thinking  of 
the  state  of  mind  of  his  opponent^ 

It  was  of  course  important  that  Gage  and  his  successor 
Howe  should  not  realize  fully  the  feeble  condition  of  the 
blockading  army.  Although  the  engagement  against  the 
detachment  at  Bunker  Hill  had  severely  tested  the  strength 
of  the  garrison,  yet  it  was  always  possible  that  the  British 
generals  might  attempt  a  further  attack  on  some  part  of  the 
American  lines.  It  was  probably  far  more  with  the  object 
of  keeping  the  enemy  on  the  defensive  than  from  any  real 
intention  that  Washington,  on  at  least  two  occasions,  made 
known  his  opinion,  unanimously  disagreed  from  by  his  gen 
erals,  that  the  American  army  should  attack  Boston.  It  would 
appear  more  reasonable  to  see  in  this  not,  as  generally 
accepted,  the  bold,  almost  rash,  resolve  of  a  mettlesome 
soldier,  but  rather  the  suggestion  of  the  subtle  thinker 
deceiving  his  own  friends  in  order  to  ensnare  the  enemy 
more  completely. 

The  same  profound  calculation  may  be  discerned  in  the 
remarkable  plan  eventually  devised  by  Washington  for 
driving  the  British  out  of  Boston.  For  many  weary  weeks 
and  months  the  blockade  dragged  on,  marked  by  no  incidents 
beyond  an  occasional  fusillade  at  the  outposts.  Washington 
could  not,  Howe  would  not,  attack.  At  last,  in  February, 
1776,  the  situation  changed.  Howe,  very  wisely,  considered 
Boston  a  bad  military  position,  difficult  to  hold,  and  when 
held  not  valuable  as  a  base.  New  York  was  very  differently 
situated.  Its  bay  could  be  controlled  by  the  king's  ships  and 
the  town  formed  a  natural  base  to  the  line  of  the  Hudson; 
that  line  offered  the  best  communication  with  loyal  Canada 
and  also  marked  a  natural  cleavage  between  New  England 
on  the  one  hand,  Pennsylvania,  Virginia,  and  the  South  on 
the  other.  Howe  had  already  decided  to  abandon  Boston; 
Washington  was  already  casting  an  anxious  eye  towards 
New  York.  At  the  close  of  February  Howe  was  leisurely 


14  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

and  quietly  gathering  transports  together,  and  Washington, 
at  last,  had  succeeded  in  collecting  sufficient  gunpowder  with 
which  to  fight. 

It  had  long  been  recognized  by  the  British  that  the  harbor 
could  be  commanded  not  only  by  Bunker  Hill  to  the  north, 
but  also  by  Dorchester  Heights  to  the  south.  The  irrepres 
sible  feeling  of  contempt  of  the  regulars  for  the  provincial 
levies,  however,  even  after  Bunker  Hill,  had  resulted  in 
Howe's  neglecting  to  fortify  this  point.  His  neglect  cost 
him  dear. 

Washington's  plan  was  elaborate  and  carefully  worked 
out  in  every  detail.  On  the  26th  of  February  he  applied 
to  have  all  the  militia  from  the  districts  near  by  sent  into 
camp  for  three  days.  In  the  meanwhile  the  troops  were 
busy.  At  various  points,  and  for  various  purposes,  fascines, 
bales  of  hay,  floating  batteries,  bateaux,  and  bandages  were 
prepared.  On  the  night  of  the  2d  of  March  the  long-silent 
American  batteries  at  last  opened  fire  and  bombarded  the 
town,  though  with  little  more  effect  than  to  terrify  its 
inhabitants.  This  cannonade  lasted  three  nights,  and  was 
intended  to  mask  the  movement  that  was  successfully 
made  on  the  3d.  At  7  P.M.  on  the  6th  of  March  General 
Thomas  with  2000  men  silently  made  his  way  to  Dor 
chester  Heights.  Behind  his  column  followed  a  long  line 
of  carts,  their  wheels  wrapped  in  hay,  full  of  material  for 
building  up  breastworks  on  the  frozen  ground.  The  men 
worked  with  an  ardor  worthy  of  their  cause.  The  route  of 
the  carts  and  the  line  of  the  breastworks  gradually  ex 
tended;  relief -parties  took  the  place  of  the  early  workers; 
while  to  their  left  and  rear  the  batteries  thundered  across 
Roxbury  neck. 

On  the  following  morning  the  surprise  of  the  British  was 
complete.  Howe,  after  so  many  months  of  inaction,  had 
not  anticipated  any  such  decisive  move  as  was  now  disclosed. 
He  had  doubtless  thought  that  the  Americans  would  remain 


GEORGE   WASHINGTON  15 

quiescent  until  the  frost  had  broken  up.  One  thing,  how 
ever,  was  clear,  that  Washington's  check  must  at  once  be 
replied  to;  immediate  orders  were  issued  for  attacking  the 
new  American  position,  and  troops  were  hastened  on  board 
ship  for  the  purpose  of  landing  at  the  foot  of  Dorchester 
Heights.  It  was  to  be  a  repetition  of  the  expulsion  of  the 
provincials  from  Charlestown  eight  months  before. 

But  Washington  did  not  intend  to  repeat  Bunker  Hill. 
His  intrenchments  at  Dorchester  were  carefully  planned; 
they  were  strong  at  dawn,  and  every  hour  that  passed  made 
them  more  formidable.  And  again  they  formed  a  part  only 
of  an  extensive  plan.  For  one  thing,  the  British  were  to 
face,  not  as  before  an  isolated  detachment,  but  the  full  force 
of  the  American  army.  Dorchester  Heights  were  strongly 
held,  with  reserves  close  at  hand,  while  to  the  left  at  Roxbury 
other  corps  were  in  line  ready  for  action;  the  decisive  r61e, 
however,  was  allotted  to  the  part  of  the  army  farthest 
away  from  Dorchester.  Eight  miles  to  the  northwest,  at 
Cambridge,  a  division  of  4000  men  under  Putnam,  Greene, 
and  Sullivan,  was  held  ready  for  a  development  of  the 
situation  Washington  foresaw.  It  was  not  for  an  instant 
to  be  thought  that  Howe  would  accept  passively  the  occu 
pation  of  Dorchester  Heights  and  its  consequences.  He 
would  undoubtedly  collect  every  man  that  could  be  spared 
from  the  defences  and  attempt  to  drive  the  Americans  out. 
But  at  the  instant  that  the  British  power  should  be  concen 
trated  at  Dorchester,  a  slow  and  difficult  operation  involving 
water  transportation,  Washington  was  ready  to  launch  Put 
nam's  division  at  whatever  part  of  the  long  water  front  of 
Boston  appeared  weakest.  Moving  down  the  Charles  River 
on  bateaux,  directed  by  the  general-in-chief's  signals  from 
Roxbury  Heights,  there  was  every  probability  that  the 
Cambridge  troops  could  effect  a  lodgment  at  one  point  or 
another.  Washington  thus  stood  a  double  chance  of  vci- 
tory:  he  was  confident  that  he  could  hold  Dorchester 


16  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

Heights  against  any  troops  Howe  could  mass  there;  he  was 
confident  that  if  Howe  did  mass  his  troops  at  Dorchester, 
Putnam  could  improve  the  opportunity  that  would  then  be 
his.  And  a  success  at  both  points  meant  in  all  human 
probability  a  British  disaster  and  a  forced  surrender.  It 
was  the  plan  of  a  bold  and  subtle  mind,  and  gave  prom 
ise  of  splendid  success,  but  the  elements  intervened  to  dis 
appoint  Washington's  well-grounded  expectations. 

British  troops  embarked  and  were  conveyed  up  the 
harbor  towards  Dorchester.  But  before  their  numbers 
could  be  completed  a  violent  wind  sprang  up  and  a  landing 
was  quickly  out  of  question.  This  proved  decisive.  The 
weather  showed  no  sign  of  moderating  that  night,  while  the 
Americans  could  be  seen  hourly  making  their  position  less 
vulnerable.  Howe  had  intended  to  abandon  Boston,  and 
now  concluded,  wisely,  that  he  had  better  hasten  his  depar 
ture  rather  than  make  the  doubtful  experiment  of  attempting 
to  storm  Dorchester  Heights. 

Soon  Boston  was  full  of  confusion  and  alarm.  Howe's 
transports  were  insufficient  in  number  and  not  ready  for 
sea.  But  the  Americans  were  improving  their  success,  and 
from  Dorchester  were  pushing  forward  to  plant  batteries 
even  closer  to  the  harbor  and  city.  There  could  be  no 
delay,  so,  burning  the  stores  and  spiking  the  guns  that  could 
not  be  carried  away,  the  British  troops  were  hurried  on 
board  ship  and,  on  the  morning  of  the  lyth,  Boston  was 
evacuated  by  the  enemy  and  occupied  by  the  American 
army. 

During  the  two  weeks  that  passed  between  the  first 
movement  to  Dorchester  Heights  and  Howe's  evacuation, 
Washington  had  spent  many  anxious  hours.  Should  he 
attack  the  town  at  any  cost,  now  that  the  British  forbore 
attacking  him?  Were  Howe's  preparations  merely  a  ruse, 
to  be  followed  by  some  unexpected  stroke?  If  Howe  was 
really  evacuating,  would  he  not  transfer  his  army  to  New 


GEORGE  WASHINGTON  17 

York?  These  were  some  of  the  questions  that  perplexed 
Washington,  but  it  was  the  last  one  only  that  proved  of 
practical  importance. 

The  successful  conduct  of  the  siege  of  Boston  was  one  of 
Washington's  most  brilliant  achievements,  one  that  called 
for  the  finest  qualities  both  of  the  statesman  and  the  sol 
dier.  Few  of  his  contemporaries  discerned  how  great  a  part 
in  the  march  of  events  the  genius  of  the  American  leader 
had  played.  Although  real  appreciation  and  discernment 
were  scanty,  however,  the  popular  mind  did  not  fail  in  its 
broad  impressions;  if  the  finer  points  were  missed,  yet  the 
political  instinct  of  the  people  told  them  that  in  Wash 
ington  they  had  found  the  pilot  who  could  steer  them 
through  the  storms  of  civil  warfare  to  a  safe  haven. 

The  faith  of  the  people  in  Washington,  though  never 
shaken,  was  soon  tried.  He  had  guessed,  rightly  enough, 
that  New  York  would  be  Howe's  next  objective,  but  he  had 
not  foreseen  that  the  British  move  would  be  long  delayed. 
As  it  was,  Howe  sailed  to  Halifax  for  the  present,  and  the 
Americans  had  ample  opportunity  to  make  preparation  for 
the  defence  of  the  threatened  point. 

The  first  plan  for  the  protection  of  New  York  was  drawn 
up  by  General  Charles  Lee,  and  was  adopted  and  elaborated 
by  Washington  after  his  arrival.  It  was  based  on  a  perfectly 
sound  principle  stated  in  a  letter  from  Lee  to  Washington, 
as  follows:  "Whoever  commands  the  sea  must  command 
the  town."  The  plan  for  the  defence  of  New  York  was 
accordingly  framed  so  as  to  prevent,  as  far  as  was  possible, 
the  British  fleet  from  approaching  the  city.  This  it  could 
apparently  do  in  one  of  three  ways.  The  first,  and  least  to 
be  feared,  was  the  direct  approach  and  attack,  the  possibility 
of  which  was  met  by  strengthening  the  batteries  at  the  point 
of  New  York  and  the  fortifications  generally.  The  second 
was  by  running  past  the  city  and  up  the  Hudson  River  with 
a  view  to  disembarking  troops  above  it.  The  Hudson  ran 


i8 


LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 


OPERATIONS    ABOUT   NEW    YORK 


GEORGE   WASHINGTON  19 

due  north  150  miles  to  Albany,  which  was  the  objective  of  a 
second  British  army,  operating  from  Canada,  and  might  well 
attract  the  attention  of  General  Howe.  To  ward  off  a  blow 
in  this  direction  numerous  batteries  had  been  placed  from 
Paulus  Hook  on  the  New  Jersey  shore  to  King's  bridge  over 
the  Harlem  River,  near  which  point  two  large  forts  had  been 
erected,  and  some  ships  and  other  obstructions  sunk  in  the 
stream.  The  third  line  of  approach  lay  on  the  other  side 
of  New  York,  by  the  East  River.  This  arm  of  the  sea 
running  from  the  bay  to  Long  Island  Sound  was  commanded, 
so  Lee  thought,  at  the  part  where  it  passed  the  city,  by 
Brooklyn  Heights  on  Long  Island.  He  therefore  planned 
a  line  of  forts  and  intrenchments  about  a  mile  long  enclosing 
the  heights,  forming  a  sort  of  intrenched  camp,  and  declared 
that  this  was  the  key  of  New  York. 

This  defensive  scheme  was  more  specious  than  sound.  It 
set  too  high  a  value  on  land  batteries  as  a  means  of  pre 
venting  ships  of  war  passing  up  such  broad  waterways; 
it  involved  a  wide  dispersal  of  the  defending  troops  in 
works  too  extensive  for  their  numbers;  it  provided  for 
the  defence  of  the  East  River  from  New  York  Bay  only, 
when  it  was  just  as  open  to  a  land  attack,  as  was  subsequently 
demonstrated;  it  hardly  took  account  of  the  size  of  the 
armed  force  which  the  ministers  of  George  III.  were  assem 
bling  for  the  suppression  of  the  American  revolt. 

Between  the  end  of  June  and  the  middle  of  August 
Admiral  Lord  Howe  and  General  Sir  William  Howe,  his 
brother,  brought  seven  hundred  ships  and  thirty  thousand 
troops  inside  Sandy  Hook.  A  blow  was  intended  that  should 
demonstrate  the  might  of  England  and  completely  crush 
the  rebellion  if  necessary.  But  before  resorting  to  force  the 
Howes  tried  to  negotiate.  An  attempt  to  enter  into  com 
munication  with  George  Washington,  Esq.,  failed,  and  some 
pourparlers  with  the  Continental  Congress,  later,  came  to 
nothing.  During  all  the  time  the  British  force  was  assem- 


20  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

bling  in  the  outer  bay  Washington  was  kept  guessing  as  to 
where  the  blow  would  fall.  Every  point  was  guarded,  but 
the  Americans  were  strong  nowhere;  the  army  numbered 
about  27,000  men,  including  a  proportion  of  militia. 

Between  the  22d  and  25th  of  August  Howe  landed  20,000 
men  at  Gravesend  Bay  in  Long  Island.  About  ten  miles 
north  were  the  Brooklyn  lines;  to  the  northeast  stretched 
Long  Island;  between  him  and  Brooklyn  lay  a  small 
American  force,  the  brigades  of  Generals  Parsons  and 
Lord  Stirling.  It  is  easy  to  see  why  Howe,  with  his  over 
powering  numbers,  should  have  aimed  a  blow  at  this  force; 
but  it  is  difficult  to  understand  why  it  was  ever  placed  in 
such  a  position.  It  was  posted  along  a  ridge  of  hills  from 
one  to  three  miles  in  front  of  the  Brooklyn  lines,  its  right 
resting  on  New  York  Bay,  its  front  covering  several  roads 
leading  from  Gravesend  to  Brooklyn,  its  left  in  the  air,  that 
is  resting  on  no  natural  feature  or  fortified  position.  This 
detached  corps  was  large  enough  to  push  a  determined, 
reconnaissance  and  discover  the  strength  of  the  enemy,  but 
it  remained  quiescent  and  Washington  could  get  no  infor 
mation  as  to  Howe's  numbers;  it  was  not  large  enough  to 
leave  in  front  of  Howe's  whole  army  or  even  of  any  con 
siderable  part  of  it;  there  was  not  any  sufficient  object  to  be 
gained  defending  a  line  of  hills  with  a  small  body,  rather 
than  the  elaborately  intrenched  position  behind  with  a 
larger  one. 

Not  only  was  this  dispersion  of  strength  dangerous,  but 
the  handling  of  the  troops  proved  faulty.  Staff  arrange 
ments  were  non-existent  or  primitive.  The  command  of 
the  troops  on  the  Brooklyn  side,  owing  to  the  unfortunate 
illness  of  General  Greene,  changed  hands  twice  just  before 
the  crisis,  and  even  then  there  was  some  question  as  to  who 
should  exercise  command  outside  and  inside  the  lines.  And 
so  it  befell  that  while  Howe,  on  the  night  of  the  26th, 
started  a  column  of  10,000  men  to  march  around  the  unpro- 


GEORGE   WASHINGTON  21 

tected  American  left  flank,  neither  General  Putnam,  com 
manding  at  Brooklyn,  nor  General  Sullivan,  second  in 
command,  nor  Lord  Stirling,  commanding  outside  the 
lines,  nor  General  Washington  himself,  in  New  York, 
saw  that  any  particular  precaution  was  taken  at  the 
vulnerable  point.  One  patrol  was  sent  out,  and  was 
captured;  and  its  failure  to  report  apparently  passed  un 
noticed.  In  extenuation,  however,  it  must  be  said  that 
the  overlooking  of  a  road  outflanking  a  position  is  one  of  the 
commonest  incidents  of  military  history; — was  not  the 
bloody  field  of  Busaco  fought  with  those  two  wary  com 
manders  Wellington  and  Masse*na  equally  blind  to  the 
fact  that  the  position  could  be  easily  turned  ? 

On  the  morning  of  the  2yth  two  British  divisions  demon 
strated  in  front  of  Stirling  and  Parsons  and  held  them  fast 
while  Howe  gained  their  rear.  The  British  movement  was 
well  executed  and  successful.  The  surrounded  and  out 
numbered  Americans  sought  safety  in  flight  or  laid  down 
their  arms.  Stirling  showed  much  courage  and  some  skill, 
but  was  eventually  taken  prisoner,  as  were  also  General 
Sullivan  and  about  1000  rank  and  file. 

Washington,  for  some  days  anxious  about  New  York 
itself  owing  to  the  demonstrations  of  the  British  fleet, 
hurried  over  to  Brooklyn  Heights  in  time  to  witness  the 
rout  of  Stirling  and  Parsons.  He  immediately  ordered 
over  reinforcements  to  make  the  Brooklyn  lines  secure 
from  attack,  but,  probably  before  many  hours  had  passed, 
decided  that  Long  Island  must  be  evacuated.  Earlier  in 
the  summer  Washington  had  been  confident  he  could  de 
fend  New  York.  Yet  he  had  had  misgivings  as  to  the  value 
of  the  river  fortifications,  misgivings  which  the  British 
admiral  confirmed  by  sending  two  of  his  frigates  up  the 
Hudson  as  early  as  the  i2th  of  July.  But  now  there  was  an 
even  worse  danger  to  be  feared,  a  danger  that  came  from 
within  and  not  from  without.  The  army  had  been  in  a  state 


22  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

of  poor  discipline  before  the  battle,  it  now  gave  signs  of 
demoralization.  In  addition  Howe  showed  no  symptoms 
of  trying  to  repeat  the  Bunker  Hill  experiment  on  Brooklyn 
Heights,  but  opened  regular  approaches,  while  the  fleet  pre 
pared  to  clear  communications  between  Long  Island  Sound 
and  New  York  Bay.  Under  these  circumstances  Wash 
ington  prudently  resolved  to  withdraw  the  9000  men  he 
had  in  Brooklyn  to  the  farther  side  of  the  East  River. 

With  characteristic  secrecy,  and  to  the  immense  relief  of 
his  troops,  Washington  effected  his  withdrawal  from  Brooklyn 
on  the  night  of  the  2Qth  of  August.  His  preparations  were 
excellent,  his  movement  swift,  his  energy  unremitting,  the 
elements  favorable,  and  complete  success  resulted.  Wash 
ington,  who  had  not  slept  for  forty-eight  hours,  embarked  in 
the  last  boat  that  left  what  is  now  Fulton  Street  Ferry, 
a  dangerous,  almost  reckless,  proceeding.  In  Howe,  com 
mander  of  a  professional  army,  such  an  act  would  have  been 
folly;  in  Washington  it  was  simply  an  example  of  unflinch 
ing  devotion  which  his  army  absolutely  required  to  nerve  it 
for  the  ordeals  that  were  yet  before  it. 

With  Brooklyn  in  Howe's  possession  New  York  could 
not  be  held.  The  British  extended  up  the  East  River 
beyond  Hell  Gate.  Their  ships  passed  up  and  down  the 
stream  and  controlled  the  waters  of  Long  Island  Sound. 
At  any  moment,  and  at  any  point,  Howe's  formidable  army 
might  be  thrown  over,  and  that  far  enough  behind  the  city 
to  cut  a  great  part  of  Washington's  forces  from  their  line  of 
retreat  to  the  north.  The  American  general  was,  however, 
fully  conscious  that  to  gain  time  would  be  of  inestimable 
value  to  the  new  government  of  the  United  States,  then  only 
two  months  old,  and  that  to  abandon  New  York  without 
some  semblance  of  a  struggle  would  produce  a  bad  effect. 
He  resolved,  therefore,  to  hold  the  city  until  compelled  to 
abandon  it,  and  took  every  precaution  to  minimize  the  risk 
when  the  enemy  should  attack. 


GEORGE   WASHINGTON  23 

Howe,  with  his  usual  deliberation,  did  not  effect  a  crossing 
until  the  i5th  of  September.  His  troops  disembarked  at 
Kip's  Bay,  and  the  American  regiments  occupying  the  de 
fences  at  that  point  straightway  took  to  flight  without  firing 
a  shot.  Washington  galloped  up  to  rally  them,  drew  his 
sword  and  snapped  his  pistols  at  the  men,  all  to  no  pur 
pose.  He  was  abandoned  within  one  hundred  yards  of  the 
advancing  enemy,  and  his  staff  had  to  urge  him  back. 
There  was  truly  enough  ground  for  the  reiterated  com 
plaints  as  to  the  quality  of  his  troops  made  by  Washington 
that  summer. 

The  American  army  was  now  withdrawn  to  Harlem 
Heights  and  King's  bridge  at  the  upper  end  of  New  York 
Island.  Howe,  having  secured  the  city,  and  not  caring  to 
advance  directly  against  the  American  positions,  tried  to 
gain  Washington's  rear,  and,  for  that  purpose,  began  moving 
troops  by  ship  to  various  points  on  Long  Island  Sound.  His 
objective  finally  became  White  Plains,  12  miles  north  of 
Harlem  Heights  and  about  midway  between  the  Sound  and 
the  Hudson  River.  One  road  led  from  White  Plains  north 
to  Albany,  and  another  northeast  into  Connecticut.  It  was 
an  important  point  of  supply  for  Washington,  and  on  Howe 
threatening  it  he  marched  the  whole  army  there  and  in 
trenched.  On  the  28th  of  October  a  slight  engagement 
took  place  on  the  American  right,  Howe  getting  possession 
of  Chatterton  Heights,  not  without  loss,  and  Washington 
in  consequence  drawing  back  his  whole  line  a  short  distance 
to  a  stronger  position  in  his  rear.  The  British  advance  was 
not,  however,  pushed  farther.  Howe  had  failed  to  reach 
Washington's  line  of  communications,  and  he  did  not  care 
to  venture  an  attack  on  his  new  position.  He  turned 
instead  back  towards  Harlem  Heights  and  sent  his  troops 
to  the  attack  of  Fort  Washington.  This,  with  2500  pris 
oners,  he  captured  on  the  i6th  of  November,  Washington, 
from  the  Jersey  side  to  which  he  had  transferred  the  bulk 


24  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

of  the  army,  watching  the  attack,  powerless  to  help  the 
garrison. 

There  has  been  some  debate  as  to  whose  was  the  responsi 
bility  for  leaving  in  Howe's  grasp  the  large  force  which  he 
captured  at  Fort  Washington.  Ought  Washington,  as  he 
did,  to  have  left  the  question  of  whether  the  fort  should 
be  evacuated  to  be  decided  by  Greene,  with  a  mere  general 
recommendation  that  this  should  be  done  ?  Ought  Greene 
to  have  ordered  the  evacuation  when  a  council  of  war  had 
recently  decided  in  favor  of  the  retention  of  the  fort  ?  Such 
questions  cannot  be  answered  in  precise  form  without  losing 
sight  of  the  essential  nature  of  warfare.  No  great  captain 
has  been  faultless.  Mistakes  are  constant  in  war  owing  to 
its  inherent  conditions,  and  the  art  of  the  general  is  to  remedy 
his  own  and  take  advantage  of  those  of  his  opponent. 
Beneath  this  somewhat  academic  question  of  whose  was  the 
responsibility  are  larger  and  more  vital  questions,  two  of 
which  must  receive  short  notice. 

Washington's  whole  treatment  of  the  question  of  fortified 
posts  and  distribution  of  forces  during  the  operations  of  1776 
is  half-hearted  and  shows  his  generalship  not  at  its  best. 
From  the  moment  he  reached  New  York  he  apparently 
doubted  whether  his  earthworks  could  fill  their  purpose  of 
closing  the  rivers  to  the  British  men-of-war.  To  scatter  an 
army  in  detachments  in  widely  separated  fortifications  may 
be  justified  when  those  fortifications  answer  their  purpose, 
but  otherwise  the  result  must  be  what  it  proved  in  1776. 
Both  at  Long  Island  and  at  Fort  Washington  losses  were 
incurred  for  which  the  responsibility  is  to  be  placed  less 
with  any  individual  than  with  an  inherently  faulty  system 
of  defence. 

Alongside  of  this  probable  error  of  principle  was  an 
influence  that  arose  from  a  marked  trait  of  Washington,  his 
deference  for  the  opinion  of  others.  This  came  partly  from 
temperament,  partly  from  political  tact,  partly  from  the 


GEORGE   WASHINGTON  25 

express  injunctions  of  Congress.  That  body  had  enjoined 
on  its  general  never  to  venture  on  steps  of  importance 
without  first  consulting  his  lieutenants.  Now  notoriously 
councils  of  war,  like  most  assemblies,  make  for  half-hearted 
measures.  And  although  Washington's  councils  were  un 
usually  strong  in  their  resolves  and,  after  the  fall  of  Boston, 
were  obviously  dominated  by  the  great  personality  of  their 
president,  yet  they  tended  to  encourage  precisely  such  a 
system  of  defence  as  that  which  had  come  to  such  a  miserable 
end  at  New  York.  It  should  be  added,  however,  that  in 
1778  Congress  authorized  Washington  to  overrule  his  coun 
cils  of  war,  and  that  although  from  beginning  to  end  of 
the  war  he  constantly  called  them,  it  was  never  from  lack  of 
an  opinion  of  his  own,  or  from  fear  of  shouldering  responsi 
bility. 

From  August  to  December,  1776,  were  four  months  of 
constantly  increasing  depression  for  the  American  cause. 
There  was  not  only  defeat  to  face,  but  a  rapid  depletion  of 
the  ranks,  partly  the  result  of  defeat,  partly  of  the  fact  that 
most  of  the  Continental  troops  had  enlisted  for  only  twelve 
months  and  were  reaching  the  term.  When  Howe  had 
moved  back  from  White  Plains  towards  Harlem  Heights, 
Washington  feared  that  the  next  British  movement  might 
be  across  New  Jersey  to  Philadelphia,  where  the  American 
Congress  was  sitting.  By  forced  marches  he  placed  his 
rapidly  dwindling  army  between  Howe  and  his  supposed 
objective,  seized  all  the  boats  he  could  find  on  the  Delaware 
River,  and  called  to  his  assistance  such  reinforcements  and 
such  militia  as  were  available.  For  a  few  days,  early  in 
December,  it  appeared  as  though  the  American  forces  would 
melt  to  nothing,  and  as  though  Howe  might  be  able  to 
march  the  100  miles  that  separated  New  York  from  Phila 
delphia  without  firing  a  shot.  Then,  gradually,  a  change 
came  over  the  situation. 

Howe,  who  had  displayed  some  skill  in  generalship  and 


26  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

great  moderation  in  conduct,  was  above  all  things  methodical. 
He  was  not  ready  as  yet  to  strike  a  blow  for  Philadelphia. 
His  army  had  been  in  the  field  four  months,  had  captured 
New  York,  had  won  considerable  successes  in  the  field. 
Severe  winter  weather  had  set  in.  The  Americans  had  hith 
erto  maintained  a  strictly  defensive  attitude,  and  even  in  that 
had  so  far  given  little  proof  of  military  power.  Their  army 
too,  as  the  British  were  well  aware,  was  rapidly  approaching 
the  point  of  dissolution.  Under  these  circumstances  Howe 
and  his  subordinates  felt  no  apprehensions  for  the  future, 
and  were  decidedly  inclined  for  repose.  The  army  was 
ordered  into  winter  quarters;  the  division  of  Cornwallis  was 
distributed  in  cantonments  so  as  to  utilize  the  resources  of 
New  Jersey,  and  two  brigades  of  Hessians,  under  von  Donop 
and  Rail,  were  pushed  as  far  as  the  Delaware  River. 

Rail's  brigade,  numbering  about  1000  men,  was  quartered 
at  Trenton.  His  nearest  support  was  von  Donop's  brigade, 
five  miles  farther  down-stream,  at  Bordentown.  His  line  of 
communications  ran  north  and  a  little  east  ten  miles  to 
Princeton,  and  thence  through  Brunswick  on  the  Raritan  to 
New  York  Bay.  The  Delaware  covered  his  front,  and  the 
American  army  beyond  it  gave  no  uneasiness.  Washington 
had  only  a  handful  of  men  left,  and  even  these  would  in  part 
leave  him  on  the  ist  of  January.  It  was  this  very  fact  that 
spurred  the  American  leader  to  action.  The  desperate 
situation  of  affairs  urged  that  the  opportunity  should  be 
taken  and  a  blow  attempted  that  might,  if  successful, 
redress  the  drooping  cause.  Washington  decided  on  a  night 
march  and  surprise;  he  fixed  on  Christmas  night  as  likely 
to  further  his  enterprise. 

The  American  army,  about  2500  men,  crossed  the  Dela 
ware  at  dark  under  the  greatest  difficulties.  Floating  ice 
made  the  passage  so  arduous  that  two  bodies  of  militia  under 
orders  to  cross  south  of  Trenton  were  unable  to  get  over. 
The  whole  expedition  was  undertaken  in  conditions  of  such 


GEORGE  WASHINGTON  27 

severity  that  no  less  than  1000  men,  two-fifths  of  the  army, 
dropped  out  of  the  ranks  in  twenty-four  hours  from  ex 
haustion  and  from  frost-bite.  It  was  in  such  circumstances 
that  the  iron  resolve  of  Washington  always  rose  highest. 
Nothing  could  stop  him.  The  passage  of  the  river  appeared 
impossible,  but  he  persisted.  Precious  hours  were  lost  in 
the  struggle  against  the  freezing  Delaware,  and  all  hope  of 
reaching  Trenton  before  dawn  passed;  still  he  persisted. 
After  the  march  was  nearly  accomplished  a  message  reached 


BORMAY  ENQ.  CO..  N. 


TRENTON  AND  PRINCETON 

him  from  General  Sullivan  stating  that  the  ammunition  of 
his  column  was  soaked.  "Tell  General  Sullivan  to  use  the 
bayonet,"  was  the  immediate  answer.  Something  of  their 
leader's  heroic  spirit  was  in  that  small  band  of  devoted 
men,  half  starving,  half  frozen,  half  clothed,  half  armed,  a 
ragged  and  miserable  array  to  any  eye  that  could  not  pierce 
to  the  valorous  hearts  beneath  in  which  was  throbbing  the 
great  destiny  of  their  country. 

The  storm  of  the  night  of  the  25th  to  the  26th  of  December 


28  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

helped  Washington  as  much  as  it  hindered  him.  The  roads 
were  deserted,  and  when  Greene's  column  struck  the  German 
picket  half  a  mile  from  the  town  the  surprise  was  complete. 
Washington  swept  into  Trenton  with  startling  rapidity. 
Before  the  Hessians  could  be  formed  or  posted  for  defence 
six  American  guns  were  in  battery  at  the  head  of  the  chief 
thoroughfare,  and  by  the  time  Rail  had  made  some  sort  of 
disposition  for  facing  Washington  and  Greene,  Sullivan 
appeared  behind  him.  The  Hessians  in  fact  were  asleep; 
forty  or  fifty  of  the  enemy,  including  their  commander,  were 
soon  killed  or  wounded,  and  the  rest  surrendered.  Over 
900  prisoners,  6  guns,  and  several  colors  were  the  trophies  of 
victory. 

Trenton  was  a  well-planned  stroke  carried  out  with  great 
determination ;  but  the  operations  that  immediately  followed 
form  an  example  of  the  highest  generalship  that  extorted  the 
admiration  of  the  great  Frederick  himself — and  the  king  of 
Prussia  was  rarely  given  to  compliment.  After  the  battle 
Washington  had  retraced  his  steps  so  as  to  place  the  Delaware 
once  more  between  himself  and  the  enemy.  His  little  force 
was  too  small  and  too  exhausted  to  be  risked  inside  the 
enemy's  lines.  But  in  the  course  of  the  next  four  days  the 
situation  changed  somewhat.  Pennsylvania  and  New  Jersey 
were  inspirited  by  the  victory.  Over  three  thousand  militia 
from  those  states  were  now  in  the  field  under  Cadwalader 
and  Reed.  Von  Donop  had  retreated  towards  Princeton, 
and  the  British  were  collecting  between  that  point  and  Bruns 
wick  under  the  orders  of  Cornwallis,  who  had  hastened  from 
New  York.  Washington  decided,  on  the  3oth  of  Decem 
ber,  to  recross  the  Delaware,  and  that  day  he  reoccupied 
Trenton. 

Just  as  before  Trenton,  Washington's  preoccupation  while 
making  this  new  move  was  as  much  political  as  military. 
Still  the  American  cause  required  that  a  blow  should  be 
struck  to  inspirit  its  supporters  and  to  raise  recruits  for  a 


GEORGE   WASHINGTON  29 

new  army.  Trenton  had  indeed  done  much.  Most  of  the 
old  soldiers  had  agreed  to  remain  with  the  colors  a  few  days 
longer  to  enable  their  general  to  face  the  enemy.  And  when 
Washington  recrossed  to  Trenton  his  movement  meant 
danger  to  the  British.  It  was  self-evident  that  the  victorious 
British  commanders  would  not  easily  submit  to  have  the  end 
of  their  campaign  marked  by  such  a  check  as  that  which 
Rail's  brigade  had  just  suffered.  Cornwallis  hastened  from 
New  York  and  concentrated  7000  men  at  Princeton  by  the 
ist  of  January.  Washington,  he  knew,  was  at  Trenton,  ten 
miles  away,  with  not  more  than  5000  men,  mostly  militia, 
and  with  the  Delaware  behind  him.  The  river  was  in  such 
a  state  that  no  retreat  seemed  open  to  the  Americans,  and 
Cornwallis,  a  capable  soldier,  did  the  obvious  thing  by 
marching  on  Trenton  without  a  moment's  delay.  Washing 
ton  kept  good  watch  on  the  British  movements,  which  he 
had  more  than  expected. 

The  fact  was  that  Washington  in  taking  post  at  Trenton 
was  merely  attempting  to  decoy  the  enemy  to  that  point. 
Manoeuvres  of  this  sort  are  delicate  and  not  frequently 
recorded  in  military  history,  the  only  other  example  that 
will  be  mentioned  in  this  book  being  that  given  by  Stonewall 
Jackson  at  Manassas  Junction  on  the  2;th  of  August,  1862. 
Whereas  Washington's  generals  wondered,  first  at  the  peril 
ous  situation  of  the  army  between  the  advancing  British  and 
the  impassable  Delaware,  and  later  at  the  ability  with  which 
their  chief  had  extricated  them  from  it,  he  clearly  had  in 
mind  from  the  very  first  that  the  position  taken  up  at  Trenton 
was  not  defensive,  but  offensive.  He  was  there  not  in 
danger  as  to  his  own  line  of  retreat,  but  to  imperil  that  of 
the  enemy.  Yet  so  secretive  was  Washington  that  it  was 
only  when  the  British  army  was  within  musket-shot  that 
he  unfolded  his  purpose  to  his  generals. 

Washington's  plan  was  daring  but  simple.  Trenton  is 
divided  by  the  Assumpink  River  into  two  unequal  halves, 


30  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

north  and  south.  Cornwallis,  starting  from  Princeton 
early  on  the  2d,  was  Delayed  by  detachments  sent  to  harass 
his  advance-guard,  but  reached  that  part  of  the  town  which 
lies  to  the  north  of  the  Assumpink  at  dusk.  Washington  was 
then  drawn  up  on  the  south  side  of  it,  but  at  midnight, 
leaving  his  camp-fires  burning,  he  abandoned  his  positions 
and  marched  for  Princeton  by  a  road  south  of  and  parallel 
to  the  one  over  which  Cornwallis  had  just  arrived.  At  dawn 
next  morning  Washington  with  his  advance-guard  reached 
the  outskirts  of  Princeton  just  as  a  small  column  of  British 
infantry  was  leaving  it  to  join  Cornwallis.  A  short  but 
sharp  skirmish  ensued.  Washington  rode  into  the  thick  of 
the  fighting  to  steady  his  ill-drilled  militiamen,  who  were  at 
first  scattered  by  the  steady  British  volleys.  But  numbers 
told.  The  British  were  soon  dispersed,  and,  leaving  a  party 
behind  to  break  down  a  bridge  on  the  road  Cornwallis 
might  return  by,  Washington  entered  Princeton. 

At  Princeton  another  British  detachment  was  dispersed 
and  captured,  stores  were  taken  or  burned,  several  pieces 
of  artillery  became  prizes;  then  the  army  hurried  on. 
Cornwallis  was  marching  back  from  Trenton  with  tremendous 
rapidity.  His  advance-guard  reached  one  end  of  Princeton 
as  the  American  rear-guard  left  the  other. 

Washington  now  kept  straight  on  towards  the  British  base. 
At  Kingstown  he  crossed  the  Millstone,  and  on  the  northern 
side  of  the  bridge  called  his  generals  to  confer.  The  scene 
is  easy  to  picture.  Fatigue-parties  working  desperately  to 
break  down  the  bridge;  exhausted  soldiers  lying  in  their 
rags  on  the  frozen  ground;  Washington,  the  erect,  calm, 
splendid  figure  we  know,  sitting  his  horse  impassive,  while 
in  a  circle  about  him  his  generals  eagerly  discuss  the 
situation, — Greene,  Sullivan,  Cadwalader,  Mifflin,  Reed, 
Knox.  The  question  was,  should  the  raid  be  pushed 
farther?  Eighteen  miles  north  was  Brunswkk,  Cornwallis' 
base,  where  were  his  treasure,  and  supplies  of  inestimable 


GEORGE  WASHINGTON  31 

value.  On  the  other  hand  the  army  was  well-nigh  spent; 
the  British  were  close  at  hand;  an  inspiriting  success  had 
already  been  won;  was  it  better  to  face  a  great  risk,  or  to  be 
satisfied  with  a  moderate  gain?  The  general-in-chief  and 
his  subordinates  were  apparently  agreed  that  in  the  condition 
of  the  troops  the  prudent  course  was  right,  and  orders  were 
at  once  issued  that  turned  the  march  of  the  army  towards 
the  left  by  Somerset  Court-house  towards  the  Jersey  High 
lands.  Cornwallis  continued  straight  on  Brunswick,  which 
he  reached  with  a  rapidity  that  demonstrated  the  wisdom 
of  Washington's  decision. 

The  surprise  at  Trenton  and  the  raid  on  the  British  line 
of  communications  had  two  great  immediate  results  and 
made  clear  an  important  truth.  They  gave  new  life  to  the 
American  cause.  Even  Washington,  in  the  autumn  of  1776, 
viewed  the  future  as  a  matter  for  something  like  despair. 
With  the  British  uniformly  successful  and  with  the  American 
regular  army  on  the  point  of  coming  to  a  natural  end,  we 
find  Washington  more  than  once  telling  his  correspondents 
that  "the  game  is  nearly  up."  After  Trenton  the  cause 
looked  bright  once  more,  and  Washington  succeeded  in 
recruiting  a  new  army  with  which  to  face  whatever  the  year 
1777  should  bring  forth. 

Another  great  result  was  that  all  but  a  few  points  in  New 
Jersey  were  now  relieved  from  the  presence  of  the  British, 
and  that  their  advance  no  longer  menaced  Philadelphia  from 
the  banks  of  the  Delaware.  Washington  had  taken  the 
offensive  and,  in  face  of  superior  numbers,  had  retained  it. 
From  Morristown,  where  he  now  fixed  his  headquarters,  he 
might  descend  on  any  part  of  the  district  lately  marked  out 
by  Cornwallis  for  his  winter  quarters,  and  the  British  general 
did  not  dare  risk  again  such  losses  as  he  had  just  suffered 
by  reoccupying  his  old  quarters.  So  the  British  troops  were 
withdrawn  to  the  shores  of  New  York  Bay,  and  about  that 
city  spent  the  remainder  of  the  winter  in  comparative  quiet. 


32  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

The  withdrawal  of  the  British  from  New  Jersey  demon 
strated  an  important  truth,  clearer  now,  perhaps,  than  then. 
It  was  this,  that  although  the  British  army  might  well  hope 
to  capture  and  hold  important  points,  especially  on  the 
American  seaboard,  and  although  it  might  anticipate  defeat 
ing  the  American  army  in  pitched  battle,  yet  it  could  not 
hope  to  occupy  permanently  by  detachments  any  large  sec 
tion  of  the  country  so  long  as  Washington  and  his  gallant 
little  army  of  patriots  remained  in  the  field. 

There  was,  perhaps,  only  one  stretch  of  American  country, 
apart  from  the  chief  towns,  that  the  British  might  hope  to 
hold.  And  that  was  the  great  natural  waterway  that  ran 
north  from  New  York  through  Albany,  Saratoga,  Lake 
George,  and  Lake  Champlain  to  Canada.  The  north  had 
remained  faithful  to  England,  the  American  expeditions 
against  it  had  failed,  and  now,  in  1777,  the  British  ministry 
prepared  to  deal  the  revolted  colonies  a  blow  from  that 
quarter.  Burgoyne  operating  from  Canada,  Howe  from 
New  York,  were  to  join  hands  at  Albany  and  get  control  of 
the  long  line  from  New  York  to  Montreal  that  would  cut 
off  New  England  from  the  Middle  and  Southern  States.  On 
the  map  the  plan  looked  well,  in  practice  it  fortunately 
proved  impossible  of  execution. 

One  of  the  numerous  difficulties  inherent  to  this  scheme 
for  the  combined  action  of  the  two  British  armies  was  that 
of  communication.  Instructions  from  London  were  always 
weeks,  and  sometimes  months,  reaching  New  York.  Infor 
mation  from  Canada  was  equally  uncertain.  And  so  Howe 
was  never  quite  clear  when  to  act.  He  had  no  great  faith 
in  the  Hudson  River  plan.  He  was  anxious  to  settle 
accounts  with  Washington,  and  he  thought  the  war  as  likely 
to  be  terminated  by  the  defeat  of  that  general  or  the  capture 
of  Philadelphia  as  by  a  march  on  Albany.  The  game  of 
strategy  that  resulted  between  Howe  and  Washington  was 
extremely  keen. 


GEORGE  WASHINGTON  33 

At  Morristown  the  American  general  was  within  reach 
of  the  Hudson  should  Howe  move  north,  he  was  close 
enough  to  New  York  to  threaten  that  city  should  Howe 
leave  it  unprotected,  and  he  was  on  the  flank  of  the  line 
— Amboy,  Brunswick,  Princeton,  Trenton — that  led  from 
New  York  Bay  across  the  Delaware  to  Philadelphia.  Howe 
felt  the  strength  of  this  position  and  was  anxious  to  lure 
Washington  into  a  battle  that  should  decide  the  issue. 
In  June  he  massed  about  15,000  men  at  Brunswick  and 
moved  as  though  to  cross  the  Delaware.  Washington, 
"the  old  fox,"  as  the  British  officers  called  him,  was  too 
wary  to  be  trapped.  He  read  the  signs  aright,  and  concluded 
that  if  Howe  was  really  intending  to  march  on  Philadelphia 
his  transport  would  be  larger  than  it  actually  was.  Besides 
this  he  did  not  believe  his  opponent  would  attempt  such 
a  move  so  long  as  the  American  army  remained  on  his 
flank  and  rear.  Washington  therefore  made  no  attempt 
to  interpose  and  defend  the  line  of  the  Delaware  as  Howe 
had  hoped,  and  his  judgment  was  quickly  justified,  for 
Howe,  after  manoeuvring  for  a  few  days,  fell  back  to  New 
York  Bay.  During  the  retreat  Washington  pressed  his 
rear-guard  severely  and,  but  for  the  miscarriage  of  an  order, 
might  possibly  have  cut  it  off. 

Soon  after  this  unsuccessful  demonstration  Howe  began 
placing  his  troops  on  board  ship,  and  Washington's  per 
plexity  became  very  great.  Burgoyne  was  making  steady 
progress  in  the  region  of  Lake  Champlain,  and  Washington, 
though  not  in  the  British  secret,  read  clearly  enough  that 
Albany  should  be,  sooner  or  later,  Howe's  objective.  His 
ships  might  carry  the  troops  some  way  up  the  Hudson,  or 
again  they  might  sail  around  from  Sandy  Hook  to  the 
Delaware  and,  with  favorable  winds,  be  near  Philadelphia 
within  comparatively  few  hours.  Which  was  it  to  be? 
Washington  long  supposed  it  must  be  Albany,  and  even  got 
Lord  Stirling's  division  across  the  Hudson  as  an  advance- 


34  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

guard.  But  on  the  23d  of  July  news  came  that  the  British 
fleet  had  put  to  sea.  Instantly  the  American  army  was 
started  for  Philadelphia. 

Washington's  move  proved  correct.  Howe  was  bound  for 
the  city  then  regarded  as  the  American  capital;  but  he  had 
not  worked  out  the  details  of  the  operation  closely  enough 
to  secure  immediate  success.  The  Delaware,  by  which  the 
enemy  sought  to  approach  the  city,  had  been  well  forti 
fied  and  offered  little  depth  of  water.  The  fleet  could  not 
force  a  passage,  and  so  the  army,  after  much  delay,  had  to 
be  carried  around  to  the  Chesapeake,  eventually  disembark 
ing  at  Elk  River  on  the  25th  of  August.  Howe  was  now 
fifty-four  miles  southwest  of  Philadelphia  and  Washington's 
army  was  in  his  front  prepared  to  oppose  his  advance. 
During  the  preceding  month  the  Americans  had  executed 
more  than  one  march  and  countermarch  as  conflicting 
reports  of  the  British  movements  came  in.  But  Washington 
was  always  in  a  position  to  interpose  his  army,  and  was  now 
ready  to  accept  battle  to  defend  Philadelphia. 

The  situation  in  its  broad  outlines  was  as  follows:  the 
direct  road  from  Elk  River  to  Philadelphia  followed  the 
western  bank  of  the  Delaware.  It  was  cut  at  intervals  by 
streams,  the  last  of  which,  the  Schuylkill,  was  of  considerable 
size.  In  August,  however,  with  water  low,  there  were 
many  passable  fords,  and  by  operating  a  little  inland,  that  is 
up-stream  from  the  confluence  of  these  streams  with  the 
Delaware,  there  was  no  very  great  obstacle  to  the  advance 
of  an  army.  Washington's  strategy  was  very  simple.  It 
was  merely  to  defend  the  line  of  these  streams  as  against  a 
direct  advance,  taking  up  the  strongest  position  he  could 
find.  With  this  object  in  view  he  first  disposed  the  army 
along  Red  Clay  Creek  near  Newport. 

Howe  advanced,  made  demonstrations  in  Washington's 
front,  and  began  a  movement  by  the  left  flank  to  turn 
the  American  position  to  the  north.  Washington  was  on 


GEORGE   WASHINGTON 


35 


the  alert,  however,  and,  in  the  night  of  the  8th  to  the  pth 
of  September,  slipped  away  and  fell  back  a  few  miles 
to  the  Brandywine,  where  the  army  went  into  position 
about  Chadd's  Ford,  rather  more  than  20  miles  from 
Philadelphia.  There  were  a  number  of  other  fords  up 
stream,  and  Washington  apparently  gave  personal  in 
structions  for  watching  these,  but  also  left  it  somewhat 
to  General  Sullivan,  commanding  the  right  wing,  to 
take  proper  precautions  in  that  direction.  The  precau- 


OPERATIONS  ABOUT  PHILADELPHIA 

tions  of  both  generals  proved  insufficient,  and  in  their 
breakdown  one  may  see  less  their  individual  failure  than 
the  inherent  weakness  of  an  army  lacking  not  only  a 
properly  trained  and  organized  staff  but  also  light  cavalry 
commanders  accustomed  to  the  duties  of  reconnaissance 
and  flank  protection.  On  the  morning  of  the  loth  of 
September  Howe  had  his  troops  concentrated  a  few  miles 
west  of  the  Brandywine.  He  now  proceeded  to  execute  the 
same  sort  of  movement  that  he  had  attempted  two  days  earlier 


36  LEADING   AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

at  Newport.  With  complete  confidence  in  the  ability  of  his 
troops  to  defeat  the  Americans  in  the  open  field,  he  left 
Knyphausen  with  a  weak  division  to  march  on  Chadd's 
Ford,  while  he  took  Cornwallis  with  the  rest  of  the  army  on 
a  long  flank  march  that  was  intended  to  lead  them  to  Wash 
ington's  right  wing  and  rear.  Howe's  flank  march,  it  should 
be  observed,  was  in  both  cases  to  the  north ;  in  other  words, 
his  object  was  to  drive  the  American  army  down  towards 
the  Delaware  and  Schuylkill,  where  he  might  hope  to  force 
it  into  a  perilous  position. 

On  the  loth  of  September  was  fought  the  battle  of  Brandy- 
wine.  Knyphausen  demonstrated  in  front  of  Chadd's 
Ford.  Washington  first  awaited  the  development  of  the 
attack;  then  conflicting  reports  began  to  come  in  as  to 
British  movements  up-stream.  At  last,  after  an  incredibly 
rapid  march  and  skilful  deployment,  Howe  was  reported 
advancing  behind  Sullivan's  line.  The  British  attack  was 
almost  a  surprise.  The  American  right  wing  was  hurriedly 
thrown  back  to  meet  the  onset,  but  was  almost  immediately 
broken  and  driven  from  its  positions.  Greene  brought  up 
the  reserve  to  cover  the  rout,  and  succeeded  in  checking  the 
British  long  enough  for  Washington  to  withdraw  the  centre 
and  left  from  the  Brandywine.  Brave  efforts  succeeded 
in  extricating  the  army  from  impending  catastrophe,  but  for 
five  miles  or  so  the  retreat  of  the  American  army,  save  for 
a  few  steady  battalions,  was  more  hurried  than  dignified. 

Although  defeated,  Washington  had  saved  his  army. 
Firm  as  ever  in  purpose,  he  was  still  resolved  to  save  Phila 
delphia,  but  his  plans  now  took  somewhat  different  shape. 
The  two  greatest  soldiers  of  the  day,  Frederick  and  Saxe, 
were  agreed  that  the  best  troops  in  the  world  restricting  them 
selves  to  fighting  behind  intrenchments  must  in  the  end  be 
beaten.  Washington's  were  not  the  best  troops  in  the  world, 
but  they  had  more  than  once  been  set  the  passive  task  of 
holding  intrenchments.  Washington's  experience  at  Trenton 


GEORGE  WASHINGTON  37 

and  Princeton  pointed  the  same  lesson  that  the  greatest  mas 
ters  of  the  art  of  war  taught.  It  was  very  questionable 
whether  the  sound  way  to  prevent  Howe's  taking  Philadelphia 
was  to  fortify  positions  in  his  path  and  await  his  onslaught. 
Might  it  not  be  better  to  take  advantage  of  the  patriotic 
ardor  and  good  marksmanship  of  the  American  soldier,  and 
attempt  offensive  instead  of  defensive  operations?  What 
ever  Washington's  train  of  reasoning  may  have  been,  this 
in  fact  was  what  he  decided  to  do. 

From  the  Brandywine  the  American  army  fell  back  to 
the  Schuylkill,  crossed  that  river,  marched  through  Phila 
delphia  and  went  into  camp  at  Germantown,  6  miles  beyond. 
The  troops  were  given  just  enough  rest  to  recover  from  their 
late  misadventure,  and  on  the  i5th  of  September  Washington 
recrossed  the  Schuylkill  at  Swede's  Ford,  nearly  20  miles 
north  of  Philadelphia,  and  assumed  the  offensive.  Washing 
ton's  plan  was  this.  Howe,  with  all  his  ability,  had  a  fault 
common  to  many  eighteenth-century  generals:  he  was  over- 
methodical.  He  was  apt  to  be  slow  both  in  preparing  a 
movement  and  in  improving  a  victory.  Bonaparte  would 
have  pressed  on  immediately  after  Brandywine,  would  have 
occupied  Philadelphia,  and  perhaps  broken  up  the  defeated 
army  within  twenty-four  hours.  Not  so  Howe.  He  must 
restore  his  army  to  machine-like  working  order  before 
advancing  farther.  He  had  wasted  many  hours  in  this  way 
and  was  now  cautiously  feeling  his  way  towards  the  Schuyl 
kill  and  Philadelphia. 

The  British  army  was  in  two  divisions.  The  right  was 
about  Chester,  marching  towards  the  confluence  of  the 
Delaware  and  Schuylkill.  The  left  was  some  miles  north, 
out  of  supporting  distance,  advancing  towards  the  fords 
above  Philadelphia.  Washington  had  left  sufficient  militia 
under  General  Armstrong  to  guard  the  lower  fords  of  the 
Schuylkill  against  the  British  right,  and  he  intended  with  his 
massed  army  to  throw  himself  on  the  British  left.  Nothing 


38  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

could  have  been  sounder  in  theory,  though  with  an  army  so 
loosely  disciplined  as  his  it  is  idle  to  speculate  as  to  what 
were  the  chances  of  success.  To  say  that  they  were  not 
inconsiderable  is  all  that  is  permissible,  for  the  elements 
intervened  and  prevented  Washington's  engaging  the  enemy. 
On  the  first  intimation  of  the  American  movement  Howe 
drew  his  threatened  left  wing  together  with  great  prompt 
ness,  and,  eager  as  always  to  accept  battle,  decided  to 
oppose  Washington  even  with  much  inferior  numbers.  On 
the  1 6th  the  two  armies  came  into  contact  on  the  Lan 
caster  road.  Washington  had  succeeded  in  completing  his 
ammunition  to  forty  rounds  a  man,  and  his  disappointment 
may  be  imagined  when  just  at  this  moment  a  severe  rain 
storm  broke  and  at  a  stroke  disarmed  his  troops.  To 
face  the  British  now  was  impossible;  retreat  only  was  left, 
and  on  the  iyth  the  American  army  once  more  crossed  the 
Schuylkill,  but  so  far  above  the  city  as  to  leave  it  at  Howe's 
mercy.  The  British  general  promptly  seized  his  opportunity. 
His  divisions  now  closed  in  towards  one  another,  crossed  the 
Schuylkill  between  Philadelphia  and  Washington's  camp, 
and  while  some  of  the  British  commands  occupied  the  city, 
others  observed  and  held  in  check  the  American  army. 

Washington,  however,  was  not  yet  disheartened  by  the 
continued  misfortunes  of  the  campaign.  At  the  Brandywine 
he  had  been  surprised;  on  the  Lancaster  road  natural 
forces  had  robbed  him  of  his  opportunity.  But  his  army 
was  still  numerous,  his  subordinates  still  loyal,  and  he  soon 
resolved  on  a  new  effort  to  drive  the  British  from  Phila 
delphia. 

Howe,  like  Washington  before  him,  fixed  his  main  camp 
and  headquarters  at  the  little  village  of  Germantown. 
Washington  decided  to  surprise  him  by  using  a  dangerous 
expedient  to  which  he  was  much  addicted,  a  night  march. 
Now  night  marches  are  delicate  operations  in  the  course 
of  which  errors  and  confusion  generally  arise.  Even  at 


GEORGE   WASHINGTON  39 

Trenton,  where  success  attended  him,  Washington  could 
only  deliver  his  attack  at  8  A.M.  instead  of  three  hours 
earlier,  a  somewhat  different  matter  on  a  December  morn 
ing.  At  Germantown,  on  the  4th  of  October,  his  arrange 
ments  turned  out  even  worse. 

Howe  was  not  altogether  surprised.  His  outposts  were 
well  thrown  out,  and  he  appears  to  have  had  word  that 
a  forward  move  on  the  part  of  the  American  army  was  to 
be  expected.  Added  to  this,  a  fog  arose,  a  circumstance 
more  unfavorable  to  the  assailants  than  to  the  assailed,  and 
in  the  fog  Greene  with  a  division  of  three  brigades  lost  his 
way.  The  attack,  however,  was  delivered  with  great  vigor. 
The  British  outposts  and  their  supports  were  driven  some 
distance  and  only  the  admirable  steadiness  of  Howe's 
infantry  under  very  trying  conditions  finally  checked  the 
American  advance.  Confusion,  the  fatigue  of  a  long  night 
march,  the  well-disciplined  volleys  of  the  Hessians  and 
British,  persuaded  the  patriot  ranks  there  was  nothing 
more  to  be  accomplished,  whereupon  a  sudden  movement 
of  retreat  set  in  not  altogether  creditable  to  the  troops.  Yet 
even  if  complete  success  had  not  been  achieved  enough  had 
been  done  to  show  that  the  British  had  acquired,  in  Philadel 
phia,  less  a  base  for  future  operations  than  a  convenient 
station  to  shelter  their  troops  for  the  winter;  they  held  the 
city  not  as  a  base  for  attacking  Washington,  but  only  until 
Washington  should  be  able  to  drive  them  from  it. 

After  Germantown  Washington  retired  a  few  miles  to  the 
north  and  went  into  winter  quarters  at  Valley  Forge.  This 
was  a  very  well-chosen  strategic  position,  but  one  in  which 
it  appeared  almost  impossible  to  supply  the  army.  The 
camp  could  be  easily  fortified  and  made  impregnable;  it 
was  within  two  marches  of  Philadelphia;  it  commanded 
many  of  the  roads  over  which  the  city  might  draw  pro 
visions. 

It  was  just  at  this  moment  that  was  formed  a  party  among 


40  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

members  of  Congress  and  ambitious  generals  whose  aim  was 
to  effect  a  change  of  commander-in-chief.  It  was  not 
surprising  that  after  Washington's  unsuccessful  campaign, 
after  Congress  had  been  driven  from  Philadelphia,  some  of 
its  members  should  feel  dissatisfied  with  their  general.  And 
this  dissatisfaction  was  all  the  more  accentuated  by  the  fact 
that,  only  a  few  weeks  before,  General  Gates,  in  command 
of  the  northern  army,  had  won  the  first  conspicuous  success 
of  the  war,  receiving  the  surrender  of  Sir  John  Burgoyne 
with  over  5000  men  near  Saratoga  on  the  iyth  of  October. 
Gates  was  really  a  man  of  mediocre  attainments,  his  success 
at  Saratoga  being  far  more  due  to  others — Schuyler,  Stark, 
Arnold — than  to  himself,  but  the  public  had  not  yet  gauged 
his  deficiencies  and  Congress  was  persuaded  to  appoint  him 
president  of  a  Board  of  War  that  was  to  have  supreme 
control  of  operations. 

That  was  unmistakably  a  setback  for  Washington.  But 
Conway's  Cabal,  as  it  was  called  from  General  Conway 
its  prime  mover,  tried  to  move  a  step  farther.  Strong  hopes 
then  existed,  hopes  realized  a  few  months  later,  that  France 
would  recognize  the  independence  of  the  United  States  and 
enter  into  alliance  with  them.  Since  the  beginning  of  the 
war  there  had  been  a  number  of  Frenchmen  in  the  American 
forces, — Conway  himself  had  served  in  the  French  army,— 
though  they  were  mostly  adventurers,  pretentious  and  of  little 
service.  But  in  the  summer  of  1777,  at  a  moment  when 
Frenchmen  were  viewed  with  anything  but  favor,  there 
arrived  a  small  band  of  French  officers,  two  of  whom,  the 
Marquis  de  Lafayette  and  Baron  de  Kalb,  were  destined 
to  earn  very  honorable  distinction  fighting  for  the  American 
cause. 

De  Kalb  was  a  veteran,  a  highly  trained  professional  soldier 
capable  of  rendering,  as  he  did,  eminent  service  in  the  field. 
Lafayette  was  only  a  boy,  but  his  rank  was  conspicuous, 
and  his  departure  from  Paris  to  join  the  American  army  had 


GEORGE   WASHINGTON  41 

caused  something  of  a  sensation.  Lafayette  had,  however, 
more  than  rank  to  recommend  him.  He  was  confessedly 
ambitious  yet  unmistakably  modest;  his  bravery  had  been 
amply  demonstrated  at  his  first  battle,  the  Brandy  wine; 
he  had  shown  spirit,  tact,  loyalty,  military  aptitude,  and, 
from  the  moment  they  met,  he  and  Washington  had  become 
fast  friends.  In  a  few  weeks  from  his  arrival  at  the  American 
headquarters  the  young  French  officer  had  conquered  for 
himself  a  position  of  exceptional  influence,  and  now  that  the 
intervention  of  France  in  the  conflict  was  being  eagerly 
anticipated  he  became,  in  a  sense,  the  unofficial  representa 
tive  of  his  country.  Therefore  to  detach  him  from  Wash 
ington  became  a  pressing  object  with  Conway's  Cabal. 

But  Lafayette  was  true  to  the  leader  whom  he  declared 
on  his  first  acquaintance  and  in  the  hour  of  defeat  to  be  the 
only  man  who  could  steer  the  American  revolt  to  victory. 
That  intense  admiration,  that  veneration,  which  made 
Lafayette  repel  the  insidious  advances  of  Conway,  was  too 
wide-spread  to  allow  a  cabal  of  ambitious  intriguers  to 
jeopardize  the  fortunes  of  America.  Hardly  one  of  Wash 
ington's  generals,  hardly  one  of  his  soldiers,  faltered  in  his 
trust  and  love  for  his  chief.  The  country  at  large  main 
tained  its  belief  in  him  unshaken,  and  before  many  weeks 
had  passed  Conway's  Cabal  weakened  and  died  out. 

Washington  displayed  his  greatness  of  soul  conspicuously 
during  the  winter  of  1777-78.  His  treatment  of  Conway's 
Cabal  was  wise  and  magnanimous.  He  made  not  the  least 
demur  when  Congress,  exercising  its  undoubted  prerogative, 
placed  Gates  and  the  Board  of  War  over  him,  but  when  it 
came  to  questions  affecting  the  conduct  of  the  operations 
of  his  army  he  exercised  his  judgment  freely  and  even 
directly  in  opposition  to  the  wishes  of  Congress.  He  went, 
and  rightly,  into  quarters  at  Valley  Forge,  notwithstanding 
loud  clamors  that  he  should  attack  Philadelphia,  and  there 
his  troops  entered  on  a  period  of  suffering  such  as  no  Ameri- 


42  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

can  army  has  since  known.*  His  attitude  at  this  moment 
is  stated  by  Washington  himself  in  the  admirably  direct 
and  simple  words  of  a  letter  he  addressed  to  one  of  the 
most  trusted  of  his  subordinates,  Nathaniel  Greene.  "Our 
situation  ...  is  distressing,"  he  wrote  on  the  26th  of 
November,  "from  ...  the  impracticability  of  answering 
the  expectations  of  the  world  without  running  hazards 
which  no  military  principles  can  justify,  and  which,  in  case 
of  failure,  might  prove  the  ruin  of  our  cause;  patience  and 
a  steady  perseverance  in  such  measures  as  appear  war 
ranted  by  sound  reason  and  policy  must  support  us  under 
the  censure  of  the  one,  and  dictate  a  proper  line  of  con 
duct  for  the  attainment  of  the  other;  that  is  the  great 
object  in  view." 

Washington  took  up  his  position  at  Valley  Forge  and 
retained  it  from  the  middle  of  December  to  early  summer, 
notwithstanding  the  outcry  of  most  of  his  officers  and  men 
that  to  keep  the  army  in  a  country  swept  bare  of  supplies 
instead  of  dispersing  it  into  convenient  cantonments  meant 
destruction.  If  Washington  clung  firmly  to  his  purpose  of 
wintering  at  Valley  Forge,  it  was  because  of  his  determination 
at  all  costs  to  retain  the  superior  moral  position  implied  by 
the  offensive.  From  Valley  Forge  he  threatened  Philadel 
phia,  he  could  cut  off  its  supplies,  he  placed  Howe  on  the 
defensive.  So  long  as  the  American  army  maintained  its 
position  there  British  success  remained  in  question.  And 
yet  Washington's  iron-hearted  and  right  resolve  to  keep 
the  offensive  at  all  hazards  came  near  destroying  the  patriot 
army. 

In  the  earliest  part  of  that  terrible  winter,  two  days  before 
Christmas,  nearly  one-half  of  Washington's  8000  men  were 
barefooted,  many  were  shirtless,  over  one-half  had  tasted  no 

*  Probably  the  hardships  endured  by  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
during  the  winter  of  1863-64  and  of  1864-65  most  nearly  approximate 
to  those  of  Washington's  army  at  Valley  Forge. 


GEORGE  WASHINGTON  43 

meat  for  seven  days,  and  the  commissariat  had  no  food 
save  25  barrels  of  flour.  Starving  men  make  revolutions, 
and  Washington's  soldiers,  small  wonder,  were  now  at 
mutiny-point.  The  utmost  exertions  of  their  officers  brought 
the  troops  through  the  ordeal  successfully,  but  Washington's 
correspondence  shows  that  even  his  extraordinarily  calm  and 
generous  spirit  had  been  ruffled  by  the  strain.  Yet  it  must 
not  be  thought  that  the  winter  at  Valley  Forge,  as  too  often 
represented,  was  the  darkest  hour  of  the  American  cause. 
Far  from  it.  There  was  merely  a  question  of  food-supply; 
an  awful  question,  but  not  one  of  moral  or  military  power. 
And  the  Continental  army  gained  from  Valley  Forge  not 
only  strategically,  but  in  tactical  efficiency. 

There  is  no  evidence  that  Washington  was  a  tactician,  in 
the  sense  of  an  innovator  in  minor  tactics.*  Such  immense 
labor  was  thrown  on  his  shoulders  by  the  lack  of  organization 
of  the  army  and  government  that  it  is  not  to  be  wondered 
that  he  found  no  time  to  devote  to  the  tactical  state  of  his 
quickly  fleeting  battalions.  Valley  Forge  he  viewed  as  an 
opportunity  for  army  organization,  and  fortune  favored 
by  sending  a  foreign  volunteer  to  him  at  this  moment, 
specially  fitted  to  impart  tactical  efficiency  and  unity  to  the 
army. 

Baron  Steuben,  who  joined  Washington  at  Valley  Forge, 
was  a  lieutenant-general  and  aide-de-camp  of  Frederick 
the  Great.  A  stronger  certificate  of  military  attainment  no 
man  could  hold,  as  he  very  quickly  proved.  As  Inspector- 
General  of  the  army  he  introduced  uniform  infantry  tactics, 
taught  colonels  to  manoeuvre  a  battalion,  and  generals  a 
brigade.  Steuben  was  as  indefatigable  as  he  was  skilful; 
he  showed  elasticity  and  a  comprehension  of  the  special 
needs  of  a  patriot  and  republican  army;  he  was  appreciated 

*  A  subject  of  some  interest,  however,  would  be  a  study  of  Washing 
ton's  employment  of  militia  alongside  of  regular  troops,  their  special  value 
as  skirmishers,  split  up  into  very  small  commands,  etc. 


44  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

by  his  fellow  generals;  his  services  were  highly  commended 
by  Washington.  What  he  accomplished  as  drillmaster  was 
matched  by  what  Greene  accomplished  as  quartermaster, 
and  it  was  with  increased  numbers  and  much-increased 
efficiency  that  the  American  army  prepared  to  open  the 
campaign  of  1778. 

If  Great  Britain  was  unsuccessful  in  the  war  of  the  Ameri 
can  revolution,  the  blame  is  not  to  be  imputed  to  her  soldiers. 
The  rank  and  file  were  admirably  led,  and  fought  superbly. 
The  generals,  Howe,  Clinton,  Cornwallis,  Burgoyne,  were 
all  men  of  courage  and  capacity  who,  though  not  the  equals 
of  Washington,  knew  their  business  thoroughly.  But  so 
universal  is  the  ignorance  of  military  affairs  among  civilians 
that  even  the  best  general  in  the  world  must  expect  to  find 
public  support  measured  by  the  only  test  of  the  uneducated, 
the  uncritical,  and  the  vulgar  —  success.  By  that  test 
Howe  had  not  accomplished  as  much  as  was  hoped,  and 
as  a  result  the  chief  command  of  the  British  army  in  America 
was  transferred  to  Sir  Henry  Clinton  on  the  gih  of  April, 


There  was  a  greater  change  in  the  relative  position  of  the 
antagonists,  however,  than  that  represented  by  Clinton 
superseding  Howe.  Four  weeks  later  a  grand  review  was 
held  at  Valley  Forge,  managed  by  Steuben  to  the  general 
satisfaction,  to  celebrate  the  conclusion  of  an  armed  alliance 
between  His  Most  Christian  Majesty  Louis  XVI.  and  the 
independent  and  united  States  of  North  America.  In 
camp  there  was  parade,  running  fire  of  musketry,  and  rejoic 
ing;  in  the  mind  of  the  commander-in-chief  there  was 
anxious  scrutiny  to  perceive  the  military  bearing  of  this  new 
development. 

One  thing  was  plain  enough.  Clinton's  army  of  10,000 
men  was  not  secure  in  Philadelphia.  Supplies  were  difficult 
to  obtain.  Detachments  could  not  safely  be  ventured  far. 
The  prospect  of  reinforcements  was  dim,  because  the  war 


GEORGE  WASHINGTON  45 

with  France  meant  the  presence  of  hostile  fleets  at  sea, 
fleets  that  might  intercept  troop-ships,  or  that  might  even 
blockade  the  Delaware,  Clinton's  only  easy  line  of 
communications.  Under  these  circumstances  he  was  bound, 
as  Washington  readily  guessed,  to  move  from  Philadelphia, 
and  when,  on  the  i8th  of  June,  news  reached  Valley  Forge 
that  the  British  had  evacuated  the  city  in  the  early  morning, 
he  was  ready  to  act.  Five  American  brigades  were  out  of 
camp  and  on  the  march  within  four  hours. 

There  was  little  choice  of  route  for  Clinton.  New  York 
was  the  only  point  he  could  make  for,  and  there  were  only 
two  ways  of  getting  there,  by  sea  and  by  land.  The  sea 
route  was  safe  in  1777,  dangerous  in  1778.  It  was  known 
that  a  powerful  French  fleet  was  in  the  Atlantic,  and  Clinton 
decided  to  attempt  the  march  across  New  Jersey  which 
Howe  would  not  risk  the  year  before.  He  might,  however, 
have  sent  his  heavy  baggage  by  sea;  he  chose  rather  to  take 
it  with  the  army,  and  so  saddled  himself  with  a  train  12 
miles  long.  This  decision  came  near  costing  the  British 
army  dear. 

On  hearing  that  Clinton  had  left  Philadelphia,  Washington 
ordered  his  army  forward  in  the  direction  of  New  York. 
His  position  now  was  the  converse  of  what  it  had  been  twelve 
months  earlier.  Then,  from  the  vicinity  of  Morristown,  he 
was  on  the  flank  of  the  line  through  the  Jerseys  which  Howe 
must  follow  to  get  from  New  York  Bay  to  Philadelphia, 
Howe  had  marched  towards  the  Delaware,  light  of  baggage, 
and  had  manoeuvred  to  draw  Washington  into  a  pitched  bat 
tle.  He  failed  in  this,  but  declined  the  long  flank  march  with 
the  American  army  so  near.  Now,  Clinton,  with  his  12 
miles  of  baggage,  was  merely  anxious  to  get  across  to  New 
York  Bay  without  fighting,  and  Washington  intended  operat 
ing  exactly  as  he  would  have  in  1777  had  Howe  attempted 
the  march  to  Philadelphia. 

From  Valley  Forge  the  American  army  advanced  with 


46  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

as  great  celerity  as  the  exceptionally  hot  and  rainy  weather 
would  permit,  so  as  to  gain  Clinton's  flank.  In  his  front 
General  Dickinson,  with  the  New  Jersey  militia  and  a  few 
Continental  troops,  was  burning  bridges,  damming  streams, 
blocking  roads,  and  in  every  possible  way  delaying  the  British 
advance.  The  Americans  to  the  north  and  on  parallel  roads 
rapidly  outmarched  the  British.  On  the  2ist,  just  before 
crossing  the  Delaware  above  Trenton,  Washington  called 
a  council  of  war. 

The  council  of  war  assembled  by  Washington  on  the 
2ist  of  June,  1778,  has  especial  interest,  for  two  reasons. 
In  the  first  place  it  illustrates  admirably  Washington's  some 
what  curious  attitude  towards  his  councils,  and  how  little 
it  was  for  the  sake  of  shifting  responsibility  that  he  called 
them.  Here  he  was,  at  the  evening  of  the  third  day  of  a 
forced  march,  still  pressing  on  towards  the  flank  of  the 
enemy,  carrying  out  a  long-matured  strategic  design  of  which 
Howe  had  twelve  months  earlier  certified  the  excellence ;  and 
now,  on  calling  his  officers  together,  they  agreed,  Lafayette 
and  one  or  two  others  dissenting,  that  to  attack  the  enemy 
would  be  imprudent.  Though  we  have  no  positive  evidence 
one  way  or  the  other,  it  will  be  safe  to  dismiss  the  idea  that 
Washington  was  influenced  in  the  very  least  by  this  timid 
decision,  and  at  all  events  the  rapid  movement  of  the  army 
towards  Clinton's  line  of  march  was  not  for  an  instant 
relaxed. 

The  vote  of  the  council  had  been  carried  by  General 
Charles  Lee.  This  officer,  taken  prisoner  in  December, 
1776,  and  exchanged  just  before  the  operations  of  1778 
opened,  had  proved  a  capable  and  dashing  regimental  com 
mander  in  the  British  army  some  years  before.  His  ambi 
tious  and  treacherous  character,  his  headstrong  temper, 
made  him  unsuited  to  larger  commands.  Inspired  by 
doubtful  motives,  he  urged  so  cleverly  and  so  strongly 
that  Clinton  should  not  be  attacked  that  the  council  was  won 


GEORGE  WASHINGTON  47 

to  this  opinion.  And  so  it  happened  that  whereas  Greene, 
Stirling,  de  Kalb,  Lafayette,  responded  loyally  to  the  order 
of  the  general-in-chief  though  his  object  was  precisely 
contrary  to  the  opinion  of  the  council,  Lee  clung  obstinately 
to  his  view,  disobeyed  orders,  and  finally  threw  away  delib 
erately  the  opportunity  which  Washington  had  so  long,  so 
patiently,  and  so  ably  worked  for. 

At  Monmouth  Court-house,  early  on  the  2gth  of  June, 
the  American  van  caught  up  Clinton's  column.  On  the 
night  before  the  advance-guard,  a  division  of  5000  picked 
men  under  Lee,  camped  within  3  miles  of  the  British,  and 
the  main  part  of  the  army  under  Washington  was  only  a 
few  miles  in  the  rear.  Orders  of  the  most  explicit  character 
were  issued  to  attack  the  enemy  as  soon  as  they  should  get 
on  the  march.  The  commander-in-chief's  intentions  were 
as  plain  as  noonday.  Clinton's  long  column  would  in  due 
course  set  out  on  its  journey  the  following  morning.  If 
attacked  vigorously  by  Lee's  command  just  as  the  day's 
march  was  beginning  it  was  more  than  probable  that  some 
part  of  the  rear  of  the  column  would  be  cut  off.  If  Clinton 
succeeded  in  drawing  back  and  deploying  a  considerable 
part  of  his  8000  men,  Lee  should,  at  the  worst,  be  able 
to  hold  them  long  enough  for  Washington  to  get  up  to 
his  support.  In  furtherance  of  this  general  idea  Washing 
ton  got  his  part  of  the  army  out  of  camp  early;  the  men 
marched  in  light  order,  leaving  all  baggage  behind;  Greene's 
division  was  detached  to  the  right  for  a  flanking  move  that 
might,  had  Lee  done  his  duty,  have  had  far-reaching  con 
sequences. 

But  Lee  did  not  do  his  duty.  His  troops  were  full  of 
ardor,  and  his  subordinates,  notably  Wayne  and  Lafayette, 
strove  hard  to  carry  out  Washington's  intentions.  Detach 
ments  were  marched  here  and  there.  Lee  refused  to  give 
orders,  or  gave  such  as  withdrew  the  troops  from  the  enemy, 
and  finally,  having  given  Clinton  time  to  get  his  train  well  on 


48  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

its  way  and  to  turn  back  his  best  battalions  and  form  a  line  of 
battle,  orders  were  given  for  a  general  retreat.  In  sullen  dis 
gust  regiments  that  had  done  no  fighting  fell  back  in  obedience 
to  orders.  Clinton  pressed  forward  his  lines  of  grenadiers 
and  light  infantry,  and  the  retreating  troops,  blocking  the 
roads,  were  soon  in  some  confusion.  It  was  at  this  moment 
that  Washington,  riding  in  advance  of  Stirling's  division, 
reached  the  scene  of  action.  He  met  Lee,  with  whom  he 
exchanged  a  few  words,  indignant,  yet,  as  ever,  dignified 
and  restrained.  Lee  rode  to  the  rear,  never  again  to  exer 
cise  command,  while  Washington  set  to  work  to  retrieve  a 
threatening  disaster. 

The  situation  was  serious.  Close  behind  the  van,  now 
streaming  backwards,  were  the  enemy's  battalions  ad 
vancing  unchecked.  The  road  beyond  was  filled  with  the 
main  American  column  marching  forward.  There  was 
the  most  instant  danger  of  a  general  confusion  and  rout 
of  the  whole  army  should  the  two  currents  meet  while 
under  the  enemy's  fire.  Washington  was  never  more 
prompt,  more  resourceful,  a  greater  soldier,  than  on  this 
occasion.  The  retreating  troops  had  not  been  defeated, 
only  mishandled.  The  general  rode  among  them,  rapidly 
inspired  them  with  courage,  succeeded  at  once  in  throw 
ing  two  regiments  in  line  right  and  left  of  the  road. 
Stirling's  troops  filed  off  at  the  double  to  the  left,  their 
artillery  finding  an  admirable  position.  Soon  a  line  of 
battle  was  improvised  and  the  roar  of  musketry  and  can 
nonade  arose.  Greene  heard  the  sound,  and,  promptly 
changing  his  line  of  march,  came  up  on  the  right. 

There  appears  to  be  a  general  agreement  among  eye 
witnesses  that  Washington  never  appeared  to  better  advan 
tage  than  at  this  difficult  moment.  Not  only  was  the  battle 
restored,  but  the  army  so  placed  as  to  check  the  British 
advance  completely.  Clinton  was  much  outnumbered; 
he  had  covered  the  march  of  his  train  so  that  he  could  now 


GEORGE   WASHINGTON  49 

count  on  its  reaching  Sandy  Hook  safely;  he  maintained  his 
ground  till  evening,  and  at  midnight  he  silently  and  swiftly 
moved  away.  He  had  fought  a  successful  rear-guard 
action;  and  yet  the  impression  produced  had  been  highly 
favorable  to  the  American  cause.  Washington  had  clearly 
been  within  measurable  distance  of  a  considerable  success; 
the  Continental  troops  had  shown  discipline  and  steadiness 
far  greater  than  ever  before;  and,  most  important  of  all, 
the  offensive  now  was  unmistakably  with  Washington  and 
the  British  army  was  little  more  than  the  garrison  of  New 
York,  capable  at  most  of  an  occasional  incursion  into  the 
neighboring  country. 

The  direct  consequences  of  the  affair  at  Monmouth  were 
not  otherwise  momentous.  Lee  was  tried  by  a  court  martial, 
over  which  the  Earl  of  Stirling  presided,  for  disobedience,  mis 
conduct,  and  insolence  to  the  commander-in-chief.  He  was 
found  guilty  on  all  counts,  and  was  suspended  from  command. 
He  had  clearly  shown  his  incapacity  for  handling  large  bodies 
of  troops,  and,  for  that  reason  alone,  the  army  was  well  rid  of 
him.  Clinton  was  not  followed.  He  had  not  many  miles 
to  march  from  Monmouth  to  get  in  touch  with  the  fleet,  and 
the  country  he  had  to  pass  through  was  highly  favorable 
for  defence.  Under  these  circumstances  Washington  made 
no  attempt  at  pursuit,  but  directed  the  march  of  his  army 
to  the  Hudson. 

The  Americans  were  now  back  in  much  the  same  situa 
tion  as  a  year  earlier,  when  Howe  had  left  New  York 
for  Philadelphia.  But  prospects  were  brighter.  The 
tide  of  war  had  turned  and  British  success  was  now  fast 
ebbing.  The  army  had  shown  to  advantage  in  the  field; 
Clinton  was  reduced  to  garrisoning  New  York,  and  French 
assistance  was  known  to  be  on  the  way.  A  combined  French 
and  American  attack  on  New  York  was  a  clear  possibility, 
and  such  an  enterprise  successfully  concluded  would  prob 
ably  terminate  the  war.  It  proved,  however,  that  Great 


50  LEADING   AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

Britain  was  to  continue  the  struggle  for  three  more  years, 
but  during  those  years  Washington's  army  remained  un 
questionably  the  decisive  factor  in  the  situation  and  was 
not  once  seriously  threatened. 

This  second  stage  of  the  war,  now  opening,  had  the  follow 
ing  main  features.  Great  Britain,  engaged  in  a  European 
conflict,  could  not  increase  her  army  in  America  to  such  a 
total  as  would,  in  the  opinion  of  men  like  Howe,  Carleton, 
and  Amherst,  give  her  a  prospect  of  subduing  the  revolt. 
The  force  she  maintained  there  was  sufficient  to  garrison 
New  York  and  to  operate  near  the  seaboard  at  one  or  two 
other  points.  Furthermore  the  British  army  depended 
for  its  supplies  and  communications  on  the  sea.  But  the 
sea  was  now  in  dispute,  and  here  lay  Washington's 
opportunity.  If  the  French  fleet  could  hold  the  sea  at  any 
point  where  the  British  army  was  operating,  at  New  York  or 
elsewhere,  he  would  at  once  concentrate  the  chief  effort  of 
the  American  arms  at  that  point.  The  general  principle 
was  plain,  but  three  years  were  to  pass  before  it  could  be 
successfully  applied. 

Just  before  Washington  fixed  his  headquarters  once  more 
at  White  Plains,  on  the  8th  of  July,  Admiral  Count  d'Estaing 
with  twelve  sail  of  the  line  and  four  frigates  made  the  Capes 
of  the  Delaware.  Operations  were  soon  concerted  between 
him  and  Washington.  A  small  British  force  held  Newport, 
the  capital  of  Rhode  Island.  D'Estaing  agreed  to  blockade 
the  town  by  sea  and  Washington  detached  troops  from  his 
army  so  that  it  could  be  effectively  besieged  by  land.  The 
operations  at  Newport  were  not  destined  to  prove  successful, 
however,  and  only  one  incident  connected  with  them  requires 
mention  here.  The  French  and  American  officers,  as  fre 
quently  happens  with  allies,  especially  in  misfortune,  grew 
quarrelsome.  Recriminations  arose,  and  the  Americans  pro 
claimed  loudly  that  d'Estaing  had  failed  to  play  his  part  and 
had  robbed  them  of  success.  Washington  rose  higher  than 


GEORGE   WASHINGTON  51 

these  petty  disputes.  His  attitude  towards  France  remained 
immovably  correct,  courteous,  grateful,  yet  independent.  He 
realized  the  full  value  of  foreign  aid,  and  by  his  admirable 
stanchness  and  elevation  of  character  soon  won  for  himself 
a  position  in  European  opinion  that  led  to  important  con 
sequences.  For  the  moment,  however,  French  aid  had 
proved  unavailing,  and  no  event  of  note  marked  Washing 
ton's  observation  of  New  York.  He  still  watched  the  city 
and  the  main  British  army  from  the  Highlands  of  the 
Hudson,  and  there  in  fact  more  or  less  remained  from  the 
time  of  the  battle  of  Monmouth  until,  three  years  later,  he 
marched  to  Yorktown  and  the  final  victory. 

During  this  long  period  the  struggle  was  a  deadlock, 
Clinton  unable  to  drive  his  adversary  from  the  Hudson, 
Washington  unable  to  raise  sufficient  forces,  or  to  secure 
French  cooperation,  for  an  attack  on  New  York.  It  ap 
peared  demonstrated  that  Great  Britain  could  not  reconquer 
her  colonies,  and  equally  demonstrated  that  she  could  not  be 
driven  from  the  American  continent.  But  to  Great  Britain 
the  struggle  in  America  was  essentially  an  incident;  her 
resources,  her  credit,  her  supply  of  money  remained  practi 
cally  unimpaired.  It  was  far  otherwise  with  the  United 
States.  More  than  once  the  army  dwindled  nearly  to 
vanishing-point.  No  food,  no  money,  no  uniforms,  no 
shoes,  were  the  constant  cries  of  the  American  soldiers.  To 
be  a  major-general  in  the  Continental  line  was  to  take  up  a 
life  of  denial  and  pain  and  not  one  of  emoluments  and 
reward.  Under  this  strain  and  in  the  stagnation  of  military 
operations,  the  new-made  patriotism  of  the  Americans  often 
faltered.  Recruits  were  hard  to  find,  and  many  in  all  cl  sses 
of  the  community  remembered  too  easily  that  up  to  a  few 
months  before  they  had  been  the  loyal  subjects  of  George 
III.  Among  these  persons  the  most  conspicuous  was 
Major-General  Arnold. 

Benedict  Arnold  was  a  brilliant  soldier.     Washington  had, 


52  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

from  the  time  of  the  siege  of  Boston,  repeatedly  shown  the 
highest  appreciation  of  his  services.  He  was  more  than 
once  specially  selected  by  the  commander-in-chief  for 
important  duty.  He  had  greatly  distinguished  himself  under 
Gates  fighting  Burgoyne.  But,  unlike  his  great  leader,  his 
personal  character  was  not  of  a  piece  with  his  military  attain 
ments.  Arnold  was  placed  by  Washington  in  command  of 
the  strategic  pivot  of  his  operations  on  the  Hudson  under  the 
following  circumstances.  As  we  have  seen,  Washington  was 
observing  New  York  from  the  Highlands.  In  other  words, 
he  had  taken  up  a  position  just  north  of  the  city  that  secured 
the  communications  of  New  England  with  Philadelphia. 
This  position  was  one  of  great  natural  strength.  The 
Highlands  of  the  river  Hudson  are  too  familiar  to  American 
readers  to  require  description.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  Wash 
ington  chose  West  Point  as  his  central  post  and  began 
fortifying  it  even  before  he  left  Valley  Forge. 

A  few  miles  below  West  Point  the  Hudson  narrows  to  a 
small  strait  between  Verplanck's  Point  on  the  east  and  Stony 
Point  on  the  west.  These  were  outposts  of  the  American 
army,  slightly  fortified,  and  Clinton,  in  the  summer  of  1779, 
decided  to  attack  them.  The  expedition,  supported  by  a 
powerful  fleet,  was  successful,  and  the  British  proceeded  to 
erect  two  considerable  forts  there  as  a  standing  menace  to 
West  Point  above.  Washington  replied  to  Clinton's  move. 
A  few  weeks  later  General  Wayne  with  a  picked  body  of 
light  infantry  surprised  Stony  Point,  stormed  and  captured 
it  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet.  Prisoners,  artillery,  munitions 
of  war,  colors,  rewarded  the  victors,  but  Washington  decided 
not  to  hold  the  position.  He  staked  the  security  of  the 
army  and  of  the  country  on  West  Point.  In  the  summer 
of  1780,  feeling  some  uneasiness  as  to  the  capacity  of 
the  general  officer  then  in  command,  he  had  him  trans 
ferred  to  a  less  important  post  and  replaced  him  by  Bene 
dict  Arnold. 


GEORGE  WASHINGTON  53 

Washington  had  no  reason  to  suspect  Arnold,  and  yet  it 
must  be  said  that  he  shared  with  Robert  Lee  what  is  in  a 
gentleman  a  virtue,  in  a  soldier  sometimes  a  failing.  He  was 
wont  to  assume  that  his  officers  would  act  up  to  the  same 
standard  as  his  own,  and  often  showed  forbearance  with 
them  when  a  sterner  measure  was  necessary.  Washington 
and  Charles  Lee  before  Monmouth,  suggest  Robert  Lee 
and  Longstreet  at  Gettysburg;  it  is  more  than  probable 
that  neither  Stonewall  Jackson  nor  Philip  Sheridan  in  the 
same  position  as  Washington  or  Lee  would  have  treated 
his  subordinate  with  as  much  confidence  and  forbearance. 
Be  this  as  it  may,  Washington  was  profoundly  mistaken  in 
his  man;  Arnold  was  a  traitor.  He  had  been  bought  for 
money  by  Clinton.  He  prepared  to  deliver  West  Point  to  the 
British.  Fortunately  the  plot  exploded  prematurely. 

On  the  23d  of  September  one  of  the  principal  officers  of 
the  British  army,  Major  Andre,  Clinton's  adjutant-general, 
was  captured  within  the  American  lines  in  civilian  dress.  He 
had  seen  Arnold  the  night  before,  and  in  his  boots  were  found 
papers  proving  Arnold's  guilt  beyond  question.  By  the 
folly  of  a  subordinate  officer  the  first  news  of  Andre's  capture 
reached  Arnold  and,  without  a  moment's  delay,  he  took  boat 
and  escaped  down  the  river  to  the  British.  Washington  had 
been  absent  from  the  army  a  few  days,  but  happened  to 
return  just  at  the  moment  of  Arnold's  escape.  He  made  an 
attempt  to  intercept  the  traitor's  flight,  but  failing  in  this, 
decided  that  Andre  must  pay  the  penalty  exacted  by  the  laws 
of  war.  Clinton  made  every  appeal,  every  effort,  to  save  his 
unfortunate  officer;  in  vain.  All  he  succeeded  in  obtaining 
was  an  intimation  that  Andre*  could  be  exchanged  for  Arnold. 
This  Clinton  could,  of  course,  not  consent  to,  and  at  that 
point  negotiations  stopped. 

From  the  first  Washington  was  determined  to  hang  Andre. 
A  stroke  of  severity  was  most  necessary  at  the  moment;  ill- 
timed  weakness  might  have  fatal  consequences;  and  so  the 


54  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

British  chief  of  staff  was  sent  before  a  board  of  general 
officers.  The  facts  were  patent;  Andre  admitted  them;  he 
was  sentenced  to  be  hanged  as  a  spy.  In  vain  he  begged  to 
be  spared  the  ignominy  of  the  rope  and  to  die  a  soldier's  death 
facing  levelled  muskets.  But  Washington  was  inexorable. 
He  was  merely  the  instrument  of  the  law;  he  joined  the 
universal  regret  at  Andre's  fate;  but  his  duty  to  the  United 
States  forbade  clemency.  He  confirmed  the  sentence,  and  on 
the  2d  of  October  Andre  was  hanged. 

Washington  was  absent  from  the  army  just  before  Andre's 
arrest.  Such  a  thing  was  nearly  unprecedented,  and  it  was 
only  a  reason  of  the  utmost  urgency  that  could  draw  him 
away  from  his  command.  His  absence  on  this  occasion  was 
for  the  most  important  object  of  conferring  with  General 
Rochambeau,  commander  of  a  corps  of  French  troops  recently 
landed  at  Newport.  American  diplomacy  had  secured 
French  help,  but  it  is  worthy  of  special  remark,  in  a  military 
biography,  that  the  armed  assistance  rendered  by  France  to 
the  United  States  was  marked  by  unusual  features.  Joint 
action  by  allied  armies  is  apt  to  result  in  discord  and  jealousy. 
The  French,  however, — Louis  XVI.,  his  ministers,  his 
generals,  and  his  admirals, — all  vied  with  one  another  in  their 
efforts  to  be  of  real  assistance  to  the  Americans.  In  this 
respect  Rochambeau  deserves  the  most  favorable  mention; 
he  was  not  only  a  good  soldier,  but  a  gentleman,  loyal, 
tactful,  and  determined  to  work  for  the  success  of  the  cause 
rather  than  for  his  own.  Another  point  that  needs  emphasis 
is  the  fact  that  the  instructions  handed  to  Rochambeau  placed 
him  under  the  orders  of  Washington.  This  was  an  extraor 
dinary  tribute  to  the  genius  and  character  of  the  American 
leader,  and  although  he  used  the  power  thus  conferred  on  him 
with  the  utmost  restraint,  yet  it  speaks  well  for  the  French 
officers  with  their  well-appointed  regiments  that  they  should 
have  unquestioningly  accepted  the  position.  There  are  few 
more  pleasing  features  of  the  War  of  Independence  than  the 


GEORGE  WASHINGTON  55 

history  of  the  loyal  cooperation  of  Rochambeau  and  Wash 
ington. 

The  little  French  corps,  about  4000  effective  men,  had 
reached  America  in  July,  1780,  preceded  a  few  weeks  earlier 
by  Lafayette.  This  young  nobleman  had  crossed  to  France 
the  year  before,  had  been  very  active  in  promoting  the 
American  cause  there,  and  was  greeted  with  much  enthusi 
asm  on  his  return.  Washington,  with  French  cooperation 
once  more  possible,  turned  at  once  to  his  favorite  plan  for 
an  attack  on  New  York.  But  once  more  circumstances  were 
against  it.  Rochambeau  was  bound  to  afford  protection  to 
the  French  fleet  on  which  he  had  crossed  the  Atlantic,  and 
that  was  soon  blockaded  in  Newport.  The  British  admirals, 
following  their  favorite  strategy,  were  holding  the  French 
fleets  beleaguered  in  port,  and  unfortunately,  so  Washington 
wrote  to  Franklin,  naval  superiority  was  the  pivot  on  which 
everything  turned.  Let  the  French  control  the  sea  for  a 
few  days  only,  and  British  power  in  America  might  be  dealt 
a  fatal  blow. 

For  the  moment  Rochambeau  must  protect  his  fleet  at 
Newport,  and  Clinton  held  New  York  too  strongly.  Mean 
while  the  British,  while  still  holding  New  York  in  sufficient 
force,  had  been  making  great  progress  with  a  detached  corps 
in  the  South,  where  Cornwallis,  after  defeating  Gates  at 
Camden  in  August,  1780,  was  virtually  in  control  of  Georgia 
and  South  Carolina.  Gates  was  suspended,  and  Greene,  on 
Washington's  selection,  was  sent  to  command  in  the  South. 
Lafayette  also  left  headquarters  on  detached  duty  to  oppose  a 
small  British  corps  operating  in  Virginia  under  Arnold,  and 
Washington's  main  army  was  so  reduced  in  numbers  that  he 
declared  that  he  had  little  more  with  him  than  a  garrison  for 
West  Point. 

The  year  1781  opened  inauspiciously.  On  the  ist  of 
January  the  Pennsylvania  line  mutinied.  The  corps  was  non- 
American,  being  made  up  largely  of  Germans  and  deserters, 


56  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

and  its  officers  were  poor  disciplinarians.  But  the  funda 
mental  reasons  for  the  mutiny  applied  to  the  army  at  large. 
They  may  best  be  stated  in  Washington's  own  words  taken 
from  a  circular  he  wrote  on  this  occasion  to  the  governors  of 
the  New  England  States. 

"HEADQUARTERS    NEW  WINDSOR,  5  January,  1781. 

"SiR,  It  is  with  extreme  anxiety  and  pain  of  mind  I  find 
myself  constrained  to  inform  you  that  the  event  I  have  long 
apprehended  would  be  the  consequence  of  the  complicated 
distresses  of  the  Army,  has  at  length  taken  place. — On  the 
night  of  the  ist  instant,  a  mutiny  was  excited  by  the  non 
commissioned  officers  and  privates  of  the  Pennsylvania  line 
which  soon  became  so  universal  as  to  defy  all  opposition.  .  .  . 
At  what  point  this  defection  will  stop,  or  how  extensive  it 
may  prove,  God  only  knows;  at  present  the  troops  at  the 
important  posts  in  this  vicinity  remain  quiet,  not  being 
acquainted  with  this  unhappy  and  alarming  affair.  How 
long  they  will  continue  so  cannot  be  ascertained.  .  .  . 

"The  aggravated  calamities  and  distresses  that  have  re 
sulted  from  the  total  want  of  pay  for  nearly  twelve  months, 
the  want  of  clothing  at  a  severe  season,  and  not  unfrequently 
the  want  of  provisions,  are  beyond  description.  ...  I 
give  it  decidedly  as  my  opinion  that  it  is  vain  to  think  an 
army  can  be  kept  together  much  longer  under  such  a  variety 
of  sufferings  as  ours  has  experienced,  and  that  unless  some 
immediate  and  spirited  measures  are  adopted  ...  the  worst 
that  can  befall  us  may  be  expected.  ..." 

And  Lafayette  wrote  to  his  wife:  "Human  patience  has 
its  limits.  No  European  army  would  suffer  the  tenth  part 
of  what  the  Americans  suffer.  It  takes  citizens  to  support 
hunger,  nakedness,  toil,  and  the  total  want  of  pay,  which 
constitute  the  condition  of  our  soldiers,  the  hardiest  and 
most  patient  that  are  to  be  found  in  the  world." 

The  mutineers  were  soon  out  of  Washington's  reach,  for 
he  dared  not  leave  the  rest  of  the  army.  They  marched  on 
Philadelphia,  closely  followed  by  the  fearless  Wayne,  their 


GEORGE   WASHINGTON  57 

divisional  commander.  A  committee  of  Congress  met  them 
near  the  Delaware,  negotiated  with  them,  and  compacted 
an  arrangement  of  which  the  practical  effect  was  that  nearly 
the  whole  of  the  Pennsylvania  line  secured  a  discharge  from 
service.  Washington  was  much  distressed  at  this  occur 
rence.  He  feared  that  the  weakness  of  Congress  would  en 
courage  more  mutiny,  and  when,  a  few  weeks  later,  Wayne 
put  down  a  rising  in  the  New  Jersey  line  by  having  every 
leader  shot  down  or  bayoneted  on  the  spot  he  earned  the 
warmest  praise  Washington  could  give. 

The  spring  of  1781  brought  important  developments. 
The  French  Court,  yielding  to  the  pressing  solicitations  of 
the  American  envoys  and  of  Lafayette,  sent  over  a  large  sum 
of  money  to  be  employed  at  the  discretion  of  Washington. 
This  was  indeed  the  most  decisive  step  that  could  be  taken. 
There  was  patriotism,  there  was  heroism  enough  in  the 
American  ranks  to  earn  success,  but  when,  as  in  the  South 
ern  army,  men  appeared  in  the  ranks  with  only  a  strip  of 
blanket  for  a  loin-cloth,  when  there  was  neither  food  nor 
pay,  how  could  human  nature  stand  the  strain?  French 
gold  removed  the  worst  of  Washington's  embarrassment; 
their  commanders  soon  brought  him  further  aid.  The 
French  fleet  at  Newport  was,  on  Washington's  advice,  moved 
to  Boston,  a  port  in  which  it  was  secure  from  British  attack. 
Rochambeau  now  felt  at  liberty  to  undertake  active  opera 
tions,  and,  after  a  conference  with  Washington,  agreed  to 
march  to  the  Hudson,  there  to  unite  with  the  American  army 
in  an  attack  on  New  York,  Washington's  constant  objec 
tive. 

At  the  back  of  the  Franco-American  concentration  against 
New  York  lay  the  really  decisive  factor  in  the  whole  situa 
tion.  A  powerful  fleet  of  nearly  thirty  line-of-battle  ships 
under  the  Count  de  Grasse  was  in  the  Atlantic  making  its 
way  to  the  West  Indies.  But  Washington,  Rochambeau, 
Lafayette,  and  a  few  other  persons  knew  that  the  French 


58  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

attack  on  the  West  Indies  was  little  more  than  a  diversion, 
and  that  the  real  objective  of  this  powerful  armament  was 
the  British  army  in  America.  At  some  time  during  the  sum 
mer  it  would  appear,  with  a  reinforcement  of  3000  or  4000 
infantry,  off  the  coast  of  the  United  States,  and  then,  as  all 
the  generals  equally  realized,  the  opportunity  for  a  great 
stroke  would  have  arrived.  Washington  hoped  that  the 
blow  might  be  struck  at  New  York,  the  most  decisive  point. 
In  the  meanwhile  Rochambeau  directed  Grasse  that  the 
best  landfall  for  him  to  make,  with  a  view  to  quick  com 
munication  with  Philadelphia  and  headquarters,  was  the 
Chesapeake. 

While  Rochambeau  marched  to  the  Hudson  to  join  Wash 
ington,  while  Grasse  operated  in  the  West  Indies  and  thence 
sailed  northward,  an  important  change  was  taking  place  in 
the  Southern  States.  Greene,  who  had  succeeded  Gates, 
although  his  means  were  scanty,  had  made  some  headway. 
Cornwallis  decided  to  shift  the  theatre  of  war  farther  north, 
and  invaded  Virginia.  On  this  new  ground  he  was  opposed 
by  a  small  corps  under  Lafayette,  and  after  much  manoeu 
vring,  in  the  course  of  which  he  failed  to  bring  the  Americans 
to  a  general  engagement,  he  decided  to  abandon  all  efforts 
at  holding  the  central  parts  of  the  State.  The  British  gen 
eral  now  had  several  courses  open  to  him.  He  could,  brush 
ing  Lafayette  aside,  march  north  through  Maryland  and 
effect  a  junction  with  Clinton;  but  Washington  would  prob 
ably  attack  him  on  the  Delaware  or  in  New  Jersey,  and 
the  risk  was  obviously  great.  Again,  he  might  retrace  his 
steps  and  return  to  reinforce  Lord  Rawdon  in  the  South. 
Or  again  he  might  make  his  way  to  a  port  and  there  embark 
for  New  York.  The  course  he  chose  was  to  march  down 
the  long  promontory  between  the  York  and  James  rivers, 
and  there,  on  orders  from  Clinton,  he  intrenched  himself  at 
Yorktown.  He  had  with  him  a  little  more  than  7000  men. 

Yorktown,  on  the  York   River,   is  in  Chesapeake  Bay. 


GEORGE  WASHINGTON  59 

Cornwallis  took  up  his  position  there  on  the  ist  of  August, 
and  on  the  3oth  of  that  month  the  French  fleet  under 
Grasse  arrived  at  the  same  point.  The  arrival  of  the 
French  fleet  had  been  preceded  by  dispatches  which  made 
it  appear  very  doubtful  whether  Grasse  could  be  persuaded 
to  attempt  to  force  his  way  into  New  York  Bay,  and  more 
over,  just  at  the  precise  moment  when  news  of  his  arrival 
at  the  Chesapeake  with  the  largest  fleet  ever  assembled  in 
American  waters  was  momentarily  expected,  came  the  intelli 
gence  that  Cornwallis  had  established  himself  at  Yorktown. 
The  same  thought,  an  obvious  one,  occurred  to  Washington, 
to  Rochambeau,  to  Lafayette,  that  the  best  move  was  to 
concentrate  every  effort  by  sea  and  by  land  on  Cornwallis. 
The  British  generals  had  so  long  assumed  that  the  sea  was 
at  their  command  that  they  had  for  a  moment  overlooked 
the  possibility  of  the  enemy's  controlling  it. 

On  the  day  that  Grasse  reached  the  Chesapeake  Wash 
ington,  with  the  allied  army  not  many  miles  behind,  reached 
Philadelphia.  The  march  from  New  York  had  been  marked 
by  the  utmost  secrecy  and  celerity.  The  most  elaborate  de 
ceptions  were  practised  on  Clinton  to  persuade  him  into  the 
belief  that  New  York  was  the  objective  of  the  allied  army. 
And  Washington,  deeply  versed  in  the  ways  of  spies,  took 
care  to  deceive  even  his  own  generals  and  troops  as  long  as 
possible.  When  at  last  the  movement  could  no  longer  be 
concealed  it  was  accomplished  with  great  rapidity. 

On  the  1 4th  of  September  Washington  and  his  staff 
reached  Williamsburg  only  a  few  miles  from  Yorktown. 
There  he  found  Lafayette  with  his  corps,  who  had  been 
joined  a  week  earlier  by  the  Marquis  de  St.  Simon  with 
about  3000  men  disembarked  from  the  fleet  of  Count  de 
Grasse.  Ten  days  later  Washington's  whole  force  was 
assembled:  with  the  2000  Continentals  from  the  Hudson, 
the  7000  French  troops,  Lafayette's  corps,  and  some  3500 
Virginia  militia,  it  totalled  about  16,000  men,  and,  what 


60  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

was  equally  important,  it  included  strong  detachments  of 
artillery  with  many  heavy  guns.  On  the  2yth  Washington 
issued  orders  for  a  general  advance. 

Cornwallis,  a  very  capable,  clever  soldier,  made  a  some 
what  moderate  defence  at  Yorktown.  Conditions  were  cer 
tainly  against  him.  He  had  never  reckoned  on  the  French 
controlling  the  sea.  Yorktown  was  not  altogether  a  good 
position  for  so  small  a  force  as  his,  owing  to  its  topograph 
ical  peculiarities.  He  was  not  well  supplied  with  ammuni 
tion,  was  short  of  heavy  guns,  and  had  few  engineer  officers. 
Yet,  all  allowance  made,  the  British  defence  was  not  up  to 
the  reputation  of  the  general  or  the  excellence  of  his  troops. 

It  appears  probable  that  Cornwallis  was  disheartened 
even  before  the  siege  began.  Grasse  had  been  less  than  a 
week  in  the  Chesapeake  when  the  British  admirals,  on  whom 
Cornwallis  relied,  had  attempted  his  rescue,  but  failed. 
Graves  and  Hood  were  met  by  Grasse  on  the  5th  of  Sep 
tember  off  the  Chesapeake,  and  a  naval  action  on  stereo 
typed  eighteenth-century  lines  was  fought.  The  French 
carried  their  usual  tactics  to  a  successful  issue;  they 
crippled  several  of  the  British  ships,  kept  the  enemy  at 
arm's  length,  and  retained  possession  of  the  Chesapeake 
until  Graves  should  have  refitted  at  New  York.  Had 
Cornwallis  realized,  however,  for  how  few  days  the  French 
control  of  the  sea  was  to  last,  he  might  have  taken  heart 
and  made  a  stouter  defence. 

Washington  knew  what  Cornwallis  did  not  know,  that 
de  Grasse  was  bound  by  his  orders  to  return  to  France 
within  a  very  short  period,  and  his  anxiety  during  the  ten 
weeks  that  followed  the  ist  of  August  was  intense.  There 
is  a  note  in  his  correspondence  for  this  period  clearly  dif 
ferent  from  what  is  to  be  found  at  any  other  time:  he  is 
perceptibly  keyed  up  to  a  higher  pitch.  The  dignity  is  still 
there,  but  it  is  not  quite  calm.  He  knows  better  than  any 
man  what  a  climax  has  come,  how  many  small  factors  may 


GEORGE  WASHINGTON  61 

produce  or  may  shatter  a  great  result,  and  his  resolution 
is  raised  to  the  highest  stress  of  daring  and  doing.  There 
is  no  wavering.  His  judgment  has  decided  his  course,  his 
courage  holds  him  on  it,  but  there  is  an  unwonted  glow  in 
his  words  when  at  last,  on  the  5th  of  September,  after  march 
ing  to  Philadelphia  and  beyond  without  any  news  of  Grasse, 
he  is  able  to  write  that  word  has  just  reached  him  that  the 
French  admiral  has  made  the  Chesapeake.  But  that  was 
not  the  last  trial,  not  the  last  hour  of  suspense.  Now  that 
Grasse  had  reached  the  decisive  point,  would  he  consent 
to  stay  there  ?  Grasse,  as  it  proved,  was  somewhat  inclined 
for  operating  at  sea,  and  had  to  be  persuaded  not  to;  he 
had  instructions  to  leave  the  American  coast  by  the  i5th  of 
October,  but  consented  to  stay  two  weeks  longer  if  required. 

It  was  morally  certain  that  in  either  event,  if  Grasse 
went  to  sea,  or  if  he  left  the  American  coast  by  the  i5th 
of  October  as  his  instructions  required,  Cornwallis  could 
not  be  captured;  and  it  is  pathetic  to  read  Washington's 
entreaties  and  arguments  to  persuade  him  to  support  the  siege. 
Yet  with  all  the  need  for  haste  Washington  would  not  move 
from  Williamsburg  against  the  British  position  until  he 
had  collected  a  force  that  would  make  the  attack  decisive. 
His  army  was  of  excellent  quality;  it  was  well  commanded; 
there  was  an  admiration  for  Washington  in  the  French  ranks 
that  facilitated  his  supreme  direction  of  the  operations; 
French  and  Americans  vied  with  one  another  with  splendid 
zeal. 

The  siege  turned  against  Cornwallis  from  the  very  first 
moment.  On  the  3oth  of  September,  when  the  allies  pre 
pared  to  advance,  the  British  abandoned  the  exterior  lines 
of  defence,  which  they  had  not  sufficient  numbers  to  hold; 
the  inner  lines  were  not  nearly  so  well  situated.  On  the 
night  of  the  5th  to  the  6th  of  October  the  first  trench  was  dug. 
Three  days  later  the  batteries  opened,  and  immediately  mas 
tered  those  of  the  defenders.  A  storm  of  shot  and  shell  was 


62  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

poured  into  the  town  and  its  defences.  On  the  i2th  the 
second  parallel  was  opened.  On  the  i4th  two  British  re 
doubts  were  stormed  and  captured  at  the  point  of  the  bay 
onet,  one  by  the  French,  the  other  by  the  American  light 
infantry.  On  the  i6th  the  garrison  made  an  ineffective  sortie, 
the  only  one  attempted  during  the  siege.  On  the  iyth,  the 
bombardment  having  greatly  increased  in  intensity,  Corn- 
wallis  sent  out  a  flag  and  proposed  capitulation. 

Washington's  sudden  shifting  of  the  centre  of  war  400 
miles  from  the  Hudson  to  the  York  was,  in  the  manner  of 
its  doing,  a  very  brilliant  military  operation;  the  actual  siege 
of  Yorktown  was  merely  a  well-conducted,  spirited  attack 
by  a  well-appointed  army  on  one  not  properly  equipped  for 
supporting  a  siege.  But  the  surrender  itself  was  one  of 
those  events  that  rightly  strike  the  imagination  of  contem 
poraries  and  of  posterity.  The  details  of  this  ceremony 
over  which  the  parties  contended  appear  indeed  less  im 
portant  to  us  than  to  eighteenth-century  military  formalists. 
It  surprises  us  to  note  that  the  British  resented  the  con 
dition  that  their  standards  should  be  cased  and  not  un 
furled.  We  wonder  why  it  was  with  reluctance  that  they 
consented  to  lay  down  their  arms  to  one  of  their  own  mili 
tary  marches  instead  of  to  the  tune  of  Yankee  Doodle* 
But  what  is  as  clear  to  us  to-day  as  it  was  to  men  in  those 
times  is  that  the  picture  of  Washington,  the  man  who  had 
moved  through  so  many  years,  so  many  sufferings,  so  many 
defeats,  always  serene,  strong  in  the  right  of  his  cause  and 
in  the  hope  of  the  future, — the  picture  of  Washington  at  the 
head  of  his  ragged  but  at  last  victorious  battalions  receiving 
the  submission  of  the  brilliant  army  of  King  George  was  a 


*  The  freaks  of  patriotism  are  curious,  and  the  case  of  that  ancient  tune, 
Yankee  Doodle,  a  sad  one.  We  prefer  nowadays  more  dignified  national 
airs, — borrowed  without  permission, — and  turn  up  our  noses  at  the  mem 
orable  fife-and-drum  march  to  the  sprightly  step  of  which  our  fathers 
made  America. 


GEORGE   WASHINGTON  63 

striking  symbol  of  the  triumph  of  right  over  wrong.  The 
whole  world,  except  one  individual,  accepted  Yorktown  as 
conclusive.  The  English  Prime  Minister,  Lord  North,  on 
hearing  the  news  immediately  exclaimed,  "Oh  God,  it's  all 
over ! "  But  George  III.  declared  that  the  surrender  of  Corn- 
wallis  could  make  no  difference  to  his  views  and  intentions. 

Happily  the  King  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  was  sin 
gular  in  his  opinion.  Although  peace  did  not  come  for 
many  months  after  Yorktown,  active  operations  practically 
ceased,  and  Washington's  career  as  a  soldier  closes  with  this 
hard-earned  triumph.  Though  his  victories  were  few,  his 
battalions  scanty,  there  can  be  no  question  but  that  he 
belongs  in  the  ranks  of  the  great  captains.  He  had  those 
supreme  qualities  of  mind  and  of  character  that  make  a 
man  something  more  than  merely  a  good  general.  His 
patriotism  was  balanced  with  the  most  far-sighted  judg 
ment,  his  careful  investigation  of  minute  details  went  with 
lightning  conception  and  execution,  his  unconquerable 
prudence  was  matched  by  his  lofty  courage;  his  tact,  his 
courtesy,  his  justice,  his  loyalty,  were  all  unimpeachable, 
and  yet  were  all  deliberately  employed  for  the  proper  exe 
cution  of  his  duty;  he  was  a  master  of  craft,  of  spying,  of 
stratagem,  and  yet  a  more  honorable  gentleman  never  led 
men  into  the  field. 

Yorktown  proved  the  culmination  of  the  War  of  the 
Revolution  and  of  Washington's  military  career.  During 
the  two  years  that  were  still  to  elapse  before  the  treaty  was 
signed  whereby  Great  Britain  acknowledged  the  indepen 
dence  of  the  United  States,  the  war  was  practically  at  a 
standstill,  and  no  sooner  was  peace  signed  than  preparations 
were  made  for  disbanding  the  army.  This  proved  a  delicate 
operation  owing  to  the  deep-rooted  and  justified  discontent 
of  the  soldiers.  Their  past  sufferings  and  continued  want 
made  their  spirit  dangerous,  but  Washington's  influence, 
firmness,  and  good  sense  led  to  a  reasonable  and  patriotic 


64  LEADING   AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

conclusion.  In  December,  1783,  he  bade  farewell  to  his 
officers, — a  touching  and  memorable  scene, — and  proceeded 
to  his  plantation  at  Mt.  Vernon. 

Mt.  Vernon,  his  home,  his  family,  were  the  focus  within 
which  were  concentrated  the  affections  of  Washington.  He 
had  accomplished  his  arduous  duty  and  now  longed  for  repose 
and  retirement.  "I  have  not  only  retired  from  all  public 
employments,"  he  wrote  to  Lafayette,  "but  I  have  retired 
within  myself,  and  shall  be  able  to  view  the  solitary  walk, 
and  tread  the  paths  of  private  life,  with  heartfelt  satisfac 
tion.  Envious  of  none,  I  am  determined  to  be  pleased 
with  all;  and  this,  my  dear  friend,  being  the  order  for  my 
march,  I  will  move  gently  down  the  stream  of  life,  until 
I  sleep  with  my  fathers."  This  pious  wish,  however,  could 
not  be  fulfilled. 

In  1789  Washington  was  elected  first  President  of  the 
United  States;  the  choice  was  inevitable.  Reluctantly,  bow 
ing  only  to  the  obvious  call  of  duty,  he  accepted  a  thank 
less  office  in  which  he  expended  his  remaining  strength. 
As  statesman  he  completed  the  work  he  had  begun  as 
soldier.  Though  many  have  attacked  his  abilities,  have 
drawn  shallow  parallels  contrasting  his  powers  unfavor 
ably  with  those  of  the  statesmen  who  surrounded  him,  it 
is  safe  to  say  that  Washington  in  the  President's  chair  as 
at  army  headquarters  remained  a  giant  among  pygmies. 
Jefferson  even,  so  a  contemporary  reported,  never  felt  quite 
at  his  ease  in  the  greater  man's  presence;  to  elaborate  the 
uncertain  rhetoric  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence  was 
one  thing,  to  enforce  that  independence  at  the  point  of 
the  sword  was  another;  when  it  comes  to  the  things  that 
count,  reason  remains  inferior  to  wisdom  and  action.  As 
I  President,  Washington  showed  to  the  full  that  supreme 
j  quality  of  the  intellect  and  of  the  heart  known  as  greatness. 
His  secretaries  might  elaborate  details  better  than  he,  but 
he  knew  how  to  utilize,  how  to  judge,  how  to  accord  their 


GEORGE   WASHINGTON  65 

talents,  and  always  for  the  furtherance  of  his  duty  to  the 
country. 

The  narrative  of  Washington's  political  life  must  be 
sought  elsewhere;  here  his  career  as  a  soldier  is  all  that 
concerns  us.  And  it  was  chiefly  as  a  soldier  that  he  hoped! 
his  memory  would  be  perpetuated.  "Any  memoirs  of  myjj 
life  distinct  and  unconnected  with  the  general  history  of 
the  war,"  he  once  wrote,  "would  rather  hurt  my  feelings 
than  tickle  my  pride  whilst  I  lived."  He  served  two  terms 
as  President,  and  then  retired  to  Mount  Vernon  for  a  few 
months  of  quiet  ere  the  end  came.  His  constitution  had 
been  much  impaired  by  hardship,  and  a  chill  caught  in  a 
snow-storm  while  riding  about  his  farms  proved  quickly 
fatal.  On  the  i4th  of  December,  1799,  at  the  age  of  67, 
he  passed  away  at  Mount  Vernon.  His  death  removed 
from  the  scene  one  of  the  greatest  characters  of  history,  a 
general  fit  to  encounter  his  contemporaries  Frederick  and 
Napoleon,  a  patriot,  statesman,  and  hero  with  whom 
William  of  Orange  alone  offers  a  near  parallel.  He  was 
an  aristocrat  though  serving  the  cause  of  democracy,  and 
that  is  perhaps  why  of  late  years,  not  unnaturally,  a  tend 
ency  has  arisen  to  make  of  Lincoln,  a  son  of  the  people, 
our  national  hero.  History  cannot  support  this  view,  and 
the  verdict  of  the  future  as  that  of  the  past  must  be  that 
to  George  Washington  is  wholly  due  that  most  noble,  most 
splendid  of  epithets,  the  Father  oj  his  country. 


NATHANIEL  GREENE 

NATHANIEL  GREENE,  next  to  Washington  the  most  emi 
nent  soldier  produced  by  the  Revolution,  was  the  fit  counter 
part  of  his  great  commander.  Washington  stood  for  the 
aristocracy  of  the  South,  Greene  for  the  democracy  of  the 
North;  they  came  to  mutual  appreciation  by  their  similar 
qualities  of  common  sense,  rectitude,  courage,  and  untiring 
application  to  details. 

Greene  came  of  a  Quaker  family  of  Rhode  Island,  and 
was  born  on  the  6th  of  June,  1742,  at  Potowomut.  He 
was  brought  up  to  work  in  a  mill  and  forge  belonging  to 
the  family.  The  forge  was  a  considerable  one  for  those 
days,  making  a  specialty  of  ships'  anchors.  Young  Nathan 
iel  soon  showed  his  remarkable  powers.  He  had  an  insa 
tiable  thirst  for  books  and  learning,  attaining  great  pro 
ficiency  in  mathematics,  and,  later  in  life,  reading  many 
military  books.  His  business  capacity  was  quickly  recog 
nized;  his  affairs  prospered;  he  was  looked  up  to  by  his 
neighbors  as  a  man  of  good  counsel.  Thus  it  came  about 
that  when  the  Revolution  broke  out  Greene  quickly  came 
to  the  front  as  one  of  the  leaders  of  Rhode  Island. 

In  the  year  1775,  being  then  33  years  old,  Greene  joined, 
as  a  private,  a  military  company  organized  because  of  the 
trouble  between  the  colonies  and  the  mother  country. 
Although  he  only  shouldered  a  musket,  yet  he  was  one  of 
the  most  prominent  citizens  thus  enrolled,  and  one  of  the 
most  useful,  for  he  had  journeyed  as  far  as  Boston  to  pur 
chase  his  musket,  and  there  had  fallen  in  with  a  British 

66 


NATHANIEL   GREENE  67 

sergeant,  whom  he  had  brought  back  with  him  to  act  as 
drillmaster  for  the  Rhode-Islanders.  Characteristically, 
now  that  hostilities  had  broken  out  and  that  he  had  decided 
to  take  part  in  them,  Greene  set  to  work  to  learn  all  he 
could  about  war.  Drill  and  discipline,  he  realized,  were  of 
the  essence  of  the  matter,  and  also  certain  larger  questions 
which  he  set  to  work  to  study  with  all  his  might  in  the 
military  books  he  was  able  to  procure.  In  other  words, 
he  proceeded  to  undertake  the  business  of  making  war  just 
as  he  had  that  of  making  anchors,  by  close  application  to 
details. 

Rhode  Island  was  a  small  place.  Neighbor  knew  neigh 
bor,  and  Greene  had  long  been  a  marked  man.  There  was 
no  voice  listened  to  with  more  attention  and  respect  in  the 
Assembly.  He  was  now  constantly  consulted,  not  without 
profit,  on  military  affairs,  and  when,  after  the  fighting  at 
Lexington  and  Concord,  Rhode  Island  decided  to  form  an 
army  of  observation,  Nathaniel  Greene  was  relieved  of  his 
musket,  passed  over  the  head  of  his  comrades,  and  ap 
pointed  general-in-command.  It  was  a  wise  and  fortunate 
choice,  the  choice  of  a  small  community  in  which  each  man 
was  well  known,  and  the  fittest  for  the  business  in  hand 
chosen. 

At  the  head  of  a  brigade  of  Rhode  Island  troops  Greene 
joined  the  New-England  army  that  was  blockading  Boston. 
After  Washington's  arrival  as  commander-in-chief,  Greene's 
brigade  and  Sullivan's  were  assigned  to  the  division  of 
General  Lee,  which  held  the  left  of  the  lines  of  investment. 
During  the  siege  Greene  figured  in  no  conspicuous  event, 
but  silently  and  steadily  he  built  up  a  reputation  at  head 
quarters,  just  as  he  had  formerly  in  the  Rhode  Island  Assem 
bly.  The  regiments  of  his  brigade  were  soon  known  as 
the  best  drilled  and  best  disciplined  of  the  army.  He  paid 
unremitting  attention  to  his  intrenchments,  to  the  welfare 
and  to  the  good  conduct  of  his  troops,  to  matters  of  organi- 


68  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

zation  and  commissariat.  Washington  was  not  slow  to 
perceive  the  value  of  such  an  officer,  and  after  compelling 
Howe  to  evacuate  Boston,  he  appointed  Greene  military 
governor  to  tide  over  the  period  of  confusion  following  the 
British  departure. 

From  Boston,  happily  released,  the  tide  of  war  rolled  to 
New  York.  Again,  in  the  operations  that  culminated  in 
the  battle  of  Long  Island,  Greene  was  destined  to  play  no 
conspicuous  part.  Washington  did,  indeed,  intrust  to  him 
the  construction  and  defence  of  the  Brooklyn  lines,  the 
point  of  danger.  But  a  few  days  before  Howe  delivered  his 
victorious  attack,  Greene,  ill,  had  to  give  up  the  command 
and  retire  to  New  York  for  medical  treatment.  He  was 
fortunate,  therefore,  in  escaping  the  rout  that  overtook 
Sullivan  and  Stirling  a  few  days  later,  for  it  would  be  idle 
to  suppose  that  his  presence  alone  would  have  saved  the 
army.  The  surprise  might  have  been  averted,  but  defeat 
was  apparently  inevitable. 

It  is  at  the  period  of  the  operations  about  New  York 
that  Greene  begins  to  emerge  as  an  officer  specially  trusted 
by  Washington.  The  thoroughness  of  his  intellect  never 
showed  more  clearly  than  in  the  long  letter  on  the  situa 
tion  after  the  evacuation  of  Long  Island  which  he  wrote  to 
his  commander  from  his  sick-bed.  To  attempt  to  hold 
New  York  now,  he  declared,  would  be  folly,  and  if  the  city 
must  be  abandoned,  then,  rather  than  let  Howe  make  a  base 
of  it,  he  would  burn  and  destroy  it.  From  a  strict  military 
point  of  view  this  was  counsel  of  perfection,  but  Washing 
ton,  and  especially  Congress,  had  to  consider  the  operations 
of  the  army  as  part  of  the  larger  game  of  politics,  and 
Greene's  drastic  advice  as  to  the  destruction  of  New  York 
passed  unheeded.  It  was,  however,  largely  through  his 
influence  that  the  council  of  war  decided  that  New  York 
must  be  evacuated. 

When  Washington  retreated  from  New  York  northwards 


NATHANIEL   GREENE  69 

to  observe  the  city  from  the  east  side  of  the  Hudson,  he 
could  communicate  directly  on  his  left  with  Connecticut  and 
the  New-England  States.  But  to  reach  Philadelphia  it  was 
necessary  to  cross  the  Hudson,  and  British  frigates  were 
not  unfrequently  passing  up  and  down  the  river.  He 
decided,  therefore,  partly  to  keep  this  line  of  communica 
tion  open,  partly  to  ward  off  any  sudden  British  stroke 
against  New  Jersey,  to  place  one  division  of  his  army  on 
the  Jersey  side  opposite  the  city,  and  he  selected  Greene  for 
this  important  command. 

At  a  point  not  far  from  where  now  stands  Columbia 
University  stood  Fort  Washington,  a  very  extensive  for 
tified  position  covering  Harlem  Heights.  Opposite  Fort 
Washington  on  the  Jersey  side  were  other  works,  and  the 
crossing  between  them,  though  occasionally  forced  by 
British  vessels,  was  the  direct  line  of  communication  be 
tween  Washington  to  the  east  and  Greene  to  the  west  of 
the  Hudson.  Fort  Washington  had,  however,  two  glaring 
faults,  not  clearly  enough  perceived  either  by  Washington 
or  Greene.  It  was  a  good  position  to  stop  an  enemy  advanc 
ing  straight  up  the  island  of  New  York  from  south  to  north , 
and  had  been  planned  for  that  purpose,  but  weak  if  attacked 
from  the  east  or  north;  again,  it  was  too  small  a  position, 
and  with  too  difficult  an  outlet,  for  the  whole  army  to 
occupy,  but  it  was  far  too  large  to  hold  with  the  small  gar 
rison  that  a  mere  fortified  post  should  call  for.  And  un 
fortunately  when  Howe  came  to  attack  it,  he  was,  as  no  one 
had  foreseen,  marching  south  instead  of  north. 

Howe  tried  to  gain  Washington's  flank,  took  his  troops  up 
Long  Island  Sound,  then  struck  west.  Washington  met 
the  movement,  fell  back,  until  at  White  Plains  the  two 
armies  met  and  there  came  to  a  stalemate,  neither  of  them 
able  to  advance.  This  again  was  unforeseen.  Greene, 
anxiously  following  events  from  the  Jersey  side,  knew  that 
the  two  armies  were  coming  together,  and  expected,  as 


70  LEADING   AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

most  men  did,  soon  to  hear  tidings  of  victory  or  defeat.  If 
victory,  there  could  be  no  question  of  evacuating  Fort  Wash 
ington;  if  defeat,  it  might  be  prudent,  and  there  would 
surely  be  time,  to  withdraw  its  garrison  to  the  other  side  of 
the  river.  But  there  was  neither  defeat  nor  victory.  Howe 
could  not  push  matters  farther  against  the  main  army,  so  he 
turned  back  swiftly  and  marched  towards  Harlem  Heights. 
Washington  sent  Greene  discretionary  orders  to  evacuate 
the  fort.  Greene  hesitated  somewhat  as  to  the  best  course. 
Washington  reached  the  scene  too  late.  And  Howe,  swift 
as  ever  in  execution,  stormed  the  lines  of  Fort  Washington 
and  forced  a  capitulation  under  the  very  eyes  of  the  Ameri 
can  generals. 

With  men  of  less  lofty  intelligence  and  patriotism  than 
Washington  and  Greene,  this  misfortune  might  well  have 
led  to  recrimination  and  loss  of  confidence.  It  speaks  for  both 
to  see  them  associated  perhaps  even  more  closely  than  before 
in  the  stirring  events  that  shortly  followed.  At  Trenton,  on 
the  26th  of  December,  we  find  Greene  and  Washington 
riding  side  by  side  at  the  head  of  the  left  column,  and 
together  visiting  the  bedside  of  Rail,  the  Hessian  commander, 
mortally  wounded  in  the  fighting.  At  Princeton,  a  few  days 
later,  Greene  is  again  at  the  head  of  his  division. 

It  is  not  so  much  at  Trenton  and  Princeton,  however,  as 
a  little  later  that  one  can  discern  what  an  important  figure 
in  the  army  General  Greene  had  become.  From  the  begin 
ning  of  the  war  Washington  had  had  constant  difficulties 
with  Congress:  he  striving  to  obtain  an  effective  military 
machine;  they,  jealous  of  the  army,  omitting  to  supply  him 
with  men,  money,  and  munitions,  and  taking  many  steps  of 
a  political  character  subversive  of  all  discipline  and  effi 
ciency.  Washington,  in  despair  of  persuading  Congress  to 
support  him,  and  unable  to  leave  his  troops,  commissioned 
Greene  to  proceed  to  Philadelphia  and  there  to  lay  the 
state  of  the  army  before  Congress.  Nothing  could  show 


NATHANIEL   GREENE  71 

more  clearly  how  entirely  they  were  in  accord  or  how 
much  the  commander-in-chief  relied  on  his  subordinate's 
judgment. 

Greene's  experience  with  Congress  did  not  prove  very 
satisfactory.  He  appears  to  have  displayed  much  tact, 
patience,  and  restraint  in  his  dealings  with  the  legislators; 
but  like  most  political  assemblies,  especially  those  contain 
ing  a  strong  legal  element,  Congress  proved  utterly  incapa 
ble  of  dealing  with  military  questions.  Greene  had  much 
trouble  and  accomplished  little.  But  there  was  worse  to 
follow.  Not  many  weeks  after  his  return  to  camp,  Con 
gress  appointed  a  French  officer,  Du  Condray  by  name,  to 
be  a  major-general  with  rank,  by  seniority  of  appointment, 
in  front  of  Greene,  Knox,  and  Sullivan.  These  three 
officers  immediately  tendered  their  resignation.  There  had 
been  repeated  protests  against  granting  commissions  to 
foreign  officers;  the  thing  had  been  overdone;  and  these 
three  generals,  among  the  very  best  in  the  service,  thought  it 
due  to  themselves  and  to  the  army  to  protest  as  they  did. 
Who  shall  say  they  were  wrong?  Congress,  indignant  at 
first,  finally  shelved  Du  Condray,  and  the  services  of  Greene 
and  Knox  were  fortunately  saved  for  their  country. 

In  the  summer  of  1777  Howe  decided  to  attack  Phila 
delphia,  transferring  his  army  by  sea  to  the  Chesapeake. 
Washington  made  a  corresponding  movement,  and  the  two 
armies  were  soon  face  to  face,  manoeuvring  between  the 
Schuylkill  and  the  Elk.  There  are  indications  that  Greene 
perceived  more  clearly  than  his  commander-in-chief  the 
strategic  mistake  that  placed  the  American  army  directly 
in  the  path  of  the  British  and  that  led  eventually  to  the  rout 
at  the  Brandywine.  Greene  declared  his  belief  that  Howe 
would  never  march  on  Philadelphia  leaving  an  undefeated 
American  army  behind  him,  and  that  strongly  expressed 
judgment  of  a  soldier  may  serve  to  confirm  the  opinion  that 
to  defend  Philadelphia  the  American  army  should  have  taken 


72  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

position  to  the  north  of  the  British  line  of  advance  and  not 
across  it. 

At  the  battle  of  the  Brandywine  Greene  commanded  the 
reserve  or  centre  division,  two  good  brigades  under  Weedon 
and  Muhlenberg.  When  the  sudden  and  impetuous  on 
slaught  of  Cornwallis  shattered  the  American  right  wing, 
Greene  was  ordered  by  Washington  to  support  it  or  cover 
its  retreat.  Greene  did  all  that  was  possible.  He  suc 
ceeded  in  throwing  his  brigades  across  Cornwallis'  path. 
For  a  while  he  stemmed  the  current,  while  behind  his  line 
the  left  wing  and  the  artillery  were  got  away.  He  handled 
his  troops  skilfully,  covering  the  fugitives,  alternately  with 
drawing  one  brigade  while  the  other  held  the  enemy.  But 
before  night  the  retreat  was  general  and  rapid.  The  army 
had  been  saved,  but  it  had  unmistakably  been  routed. 

A  few  weeks  later  Washington  once  more  met  Howe  in 
the  field,  attempted  to  surprise  him  at  Germantown  just 
north  of  Philadelphia.  Greene  commanded  one  of  the  four 
divisions  engaged,  but  succeeded  in  effecting  little.  A 
morning  fog  and  an  untrustworthy  guide  threw  his  division 
out.  He  arrived  on  the  field  an  hour  late.  Confusion 
already  prevailed,  and  Wayne's  brigade  was  mistaken  for 
the  enemy.  As  usual  Greene  showed  coolness  and  resource, 
but  he  could  not  prevent  the  general  advance  of  the  British 
line,  and,  with  the  rest  of  the  army,  was  soon  forced  to 
retreat. 

We  must  follow  Greene  as  a  subordinate  officer  in  one 
more  engagement  before  we  come  to  the  important  part  of 
his  career.  At  Monmouth  Court-house  in  the  following 
year,  1778,  again  we  find  him  in  command  of  a  division, 
this  time  with  better  success.  His  troops  formed  the  right 
wing  of  the  army  and  were  ordered  to  march  by  roads  some 
distance  on  the  flank  of  the  main  column.  But  on  hearing 
the  cannonade  that  marked  the  defeat  of  General  Lee  in 
the  morning,  Greene  at  once  moved  on  the  sound  of  the 


NATHANIEL   GREENE  73 

guns  and,  as  Washington  reported,  "  marched  up  and  took 
a  very  advantageous  position  on  the  right."  This  position 
he  held  through  the  day,  thus  materially  contributing  to 
Washington's  eventual  success. 

The  division  commanded  by  Greene  at  Monmouth  was 
not  his  own,  but  General  Lee's.  For  he  had  a  few  weeks 
earlier  entered,  with  some  reluctance,  on  duties  even  more 
important  than  the  charge  of  a  division,  those  of  quarter 
master-general.  The  past  winter,  the  winter  of  Valley  Forge, 
had  been  one  of  army  reform  and  organization,  and  one  of 
the  most  valuable  of  the  reforms  had  been  the  placing  of 
an  officer  of  high  rank  at  the  side  of  the  commander-in- 
chief  as  quartermaster-general.  Greene  was  without  ques 
tion  the  best  man  in  the  army  for  the  post.  Washington 
pressed  it  on  him  as  a  patriotic  duty,  and  Greene,  on  the 
understanding  that  when  opportunity  offered  he  should  be 
given  a  chance  of  service  in  the  field,  accepted  the  appoint 
ment.  It  was  just  such  an  opportunity  that  arose  at  Mon 
mouth  when,  Lee  being  detached  on  special  duty,  Greene 
temporarily  took  over  his  division. 

After  Monmouth  Greene  returned  to  his  arduous  duties 
as  quartermaster  for  a  while.  At  the  end  of  July,  however, 
he  proceeded  once  more  on  special  service  to  Newport,  which 
Sullivan,  with  the  help  of  a  French  fleet,  was  attempting  to 
reduce.  The  enterprise  was  unsuccessful,  and  Greene  had 
little  opportunity  for  distinction,  but  as  usual  worked  hard 
for  success,  loyally  supported  his  commanding  officer,  and 
gave  sound  advice.  One  also  perceives  from  his  corre 
spondence  at  this  time  that  he  is  really  the  confidential  cor 
respondent  of  Washington  and  the  tactful  intervener  between 
the  hot-headed  Sullivan  and  the  French  commanders. 
After  the  failure  of  the  siege  he  proceeded  to  Boston  to 
make  arrangements  for  the  refitting  of  d'Estaing's  fleet. 

For  nearly  two  years  after  the  siege  of  Newport,  until 
the  summer  of  1780,  we  must  imagine  Greene  involved 


74  LEADING   AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

in  a  continuous  wrestle  with  questions  of  supply,  of  arma 
ments,  of  transport,  of  finance,  and  the  million  other 
details  falling  within  the  province  of  the  quartermaster- 
general.  He  was  ill  requited  for  his  labors.  All  the 
principal  officers  of  the  army  were  agreed  that  his  services 
had  been  invaluable  in  the  past  and  that  his  retirement 
might  be  disastrous,  yet  Congress  singled  out  his  depart 
ment  for  censure,  and  for  reforms  that  made  it  in  his  opinion 
necessary  for  him  to  resign  the  thankless  post.  This  he 
did  in  a  straightforward  but  somewhat  uncompromising 
letter  on  the  26th  of  July,  1780.  A  storm  followed.  Con 
gress  threatened  to  cashier  Greene  by  a  vote.  Washing 
ton  wrote  pointing  out  that  even  in  despotic  governments 
such  a  step  would  be  unparalleled.  Greene,  weary  of  the 
folly  of  Congress  and  of  his  dreary  semi-civilian  duties, 
declined  to  recede  from  his  position,  and  finally  had  his 
way.  Colonel  Pickering,  a  good  officer,  became  quarter 
master,  and  Greene  was  left  free  for  active  duty.  His 
release  proved  well  timed. 

The  last  phase  of  the  war  was  marked,  on  the  part  of 
the  British,  by  immobility  at  New  York  and  the  north,  and 
active  enterprise  in  the  Southern  States.  There  were  many 
loyalists  in  Georgia  and  the  Carolinas,  and  though  it  was 
obvious  enough  that  no  decisive  results  could  be  reached 
so  far  from  the  great  centres  of  population,  yet  the  British 
government  decided  to  operate  actively  there.  On  the  i2th 
of  May,  1780,  Clinton  with  7500  men  captured  Charles 
ton.  On  the  i3th  of  June  Congress,  without  consulting 
Washington,  appointed  Gates  to  command  the  southern 
army.  On  the  i6th  of  August  Gates  was  routed  at  Camden, 
showing  so  much  incompetence  that  he  was  relieved  from 
command  until  a  board  of  inquiry  should  have  considered 
his  conduct.  Cornwallis,  now  in  command  of  the  British 
forces,  had  the  South  apparently  at  his  mercy. 

It  was  necessary  to  appoint  a  successor  to  Gates,  and 


NATHANIEL  GREENE  75 

Congress  this  time  placed  the  selection  in  Washington's 
hands.  There  was  a  wide-spread  feeling  that  Greene  was 
the  best  possible  choice,  and  with  that  feeling  Washing 
ton  entirely  concurred.  The  appointment  was  offered  and 
accepted,  and  Washington  when  he  notified  it  to  Congress 
added,  "I  think  I  am  sending  you  a  general."  He  was 
not  mistaken. 

Greene  assumed  command  of  the  Southern  Department 
at  Charlotte,  North  Carolina,  on  the  3d  of  December,  1780. 
The  situation  he  found  was  this:  South  of  him,  less  than 
a  hundred  miles,  was  Cornwallis  at  Winsboro,  covering 
Granby  and  the  well-settled  districts  of  South  Carolina 
that  stretched  out  westwards  to  Ninety-Six.  The  British 
were  trying  to  do  in  the  South  what  they  had  failed  to  do 
in  the  North:  having  established  their  superiority  in  the  field, 
they  were  attempting  from  a  seaport  as  base  to  hold  the 
country  inland  with  their  army  and  detachments.  It  was 
Greene's  business  to  dislodge  the  British  and,  even  if  he 
could  not  beat  them  in  the  field,  to  drive  them  back  into 
Charleston.  From  the  first  the  American  general  realized 
clearly  the  nature  of  the  problem  he  had  to  deal  with,  and 
adapted  his  means  closely  to  that  end.  He  determined  to 
fight  no  pitched  battles  except  on  the  most  favorable  terms, 
to  outmarch  and  outmanceuvre  his  opponents  by  securing 
mobility,  to  make  large  use  of  flying  columns  under  two 
Continental  colonels  who  had  already  shown  their  effective 
ness — Marion  and  Sumter. 

The  campaign  opened  well.  Greene  had  detached  to 
his  right  a  mixed  force  of  about  1000  men  under  General 
Morgan  to  threaten  the  British  posts  towards  the  west. 
Cornwallis,  on  receiving  a  reinforcement  under  General 
Leslie,  determined  to  strike  a  blow  at  Greene;  he  marched 
swiftly  northwards,  bearing  to  his  left  and  preceded  by  a 
flying  column  under  Colonel  Tarleton,  who  was  to  overtake 
Morgan  and  bring  him  to  bay.  Tarleton  was  swift,  resolute, 


76  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

daring,  but  a  little  uncertain  of  judgment.  He  overtook 
Morgan  at  the  Cowpens  on  the  iyth  of  January,  and,  with 
equal  numbers,  attacked  him.  Morgan  made  judicious 
dispositions  and  completely  defeated  Tarleton,  capturing 
600  prisoners  and  two  guns. 

The  blow  proved  a  severe  one  to  Cornwallis,  for  it  deprived 
him  of  nearly  all  his  light  troops.  He  still  outnumbered 
Greene,  however,  and  continued  his  march  northwards 
with  the  intention  of  distancing  the  Americans  and,  keep 
ing  well  to  the  west,  of  reaching  the  Dan  on  the  border  of 
North  Carolina  and  Virginia  before  or  as  soon  as  they. 
He  hoped  by  striking  at  so  distant  a  point  to  find  Greene 
unprepared  with  means  to  cross  the  river,  and  by'gaining 
its  upper  reaches  he  expected  to  control  the  fords  and  to 
push  his  enemy  down  the  south  bank  of  the  Dan  towards 
the  sea.  The  plan  was  bold,  and  the  little  army  of  Corn 
wallis  marched  brilliantly,  but  the  British  general  had  for 
opponent  a  strategist  able  to  meet  him  on  equal  terms. 

Greene  had  no  choice  of  courses.  He  mustered  barely 
two  thousand  men,  many  of  them  nearly  naked.  He 
could  only  retreat,  and  hope  that  the  enemy  would  event 
ually  become  overconfident  and  give  him  an  opening. 
In  two  days  he  rode  125  miles  to  join  Morgan.  He  got  the 
prisoners  away  into  Virginia.  He  appealed  for  help  to 
the  States  behind  him,  concentrated  the  various  parts  of 
his  command  at  Guilford  Court-house,  and  then,  with 
Cornwallis  25  miles  west  of  him  and  bearing  north, 
marched  in  the  same  direction  for  the  Dan.  Cornwallis 
was  now  certain  of  success,  but  when  his  advance-guard 
reached  the  Dan  after  covering  40  miles  in  their  last  day's 
march,  they  found  that  the  last  American  soldier  had  just 
crossed  the  river.  Greene  had  foreseen  the  move  and, 
long  before  he  needed  them,  had  collected  every  boat  on  the 
river  for  use  in  just  such  an  emergency. 

Cornwallis,   baffled   and  fatigued,   now  turned   back  to 


NATHANIEL   GREENE  77 

pacify  and  control  the  State  of  North  Carolina,  which  he 
had  so  rapidly  traversed.  He  fell  back  to  Hillsboro,  and 
Greene  immediately,  on  the  22d  of  February,  crossed  to  the 
south  side  of  the  Dan  again,  and  threw  out  detachments  in 
the  direction  of  Guilford  Court-house.  Cornwallis  made  a 
corresponding  movement  towards  the  same  place.  Greene, 
having  now  received  reinforcements  and — with  Cornwallis 
east  of  him — having  control  of  the  upper  fords  of  the  Dan 
with  a  good  line  of  retreat,  decided  to  meet  the  British  in 
the  field. 

On  the  1 5th  of  March,  1781,  was  fought  the  battle  of 
Guilford  Court-house.  Greene  had  over  4000  men,  double 
the  British  numbers,  but  of  these  more  than  one-half  were 
raw  levies  and  militia,  and  the  uncertain  composition  of  his 
troops  dictated  a  curious  plan  of  battle.  His  Continental 
infantry  and  guns,  about  1500  men,  were  placed  along  a 
ridge  with  open  ground  in  front  of  it,  covering  the  cross 
roads  at  the  Court-house.  The  Virginia  militia  made  an 
advanced  line  in  the  woods  across  the  road  the  British  must 
follow;  the  North  Carolina  militia  formed  a  still  more 
advanced  line.  Riflemen  were  on  the  flanks,  and  Greene 
probably  hoped  that  with  his  irregulars  thus  placed  there 
was  hope  that  at  the  first  or  second  line  the  British  would 
receive  some  sort  of  a  check. 

Cornwallis  advanced  in  line  across  the  road.  The  North 
Carolina  militia  fired  one  volley  and  fled.  The  Virginians 
did  a  little  better.  The  riflemen  threatened  and  galled 
the  British  wings.  Cornwallis  threw  troops  out  right  and 
left  to  clear  himself,  and  pushed  the  Virginians  back  through 
the  woods.  At  last,  but  no  longer  in  line,  the  British  reached 
the  open  in  front  of  Guilford  Court-house.  Their  force 
was  now  somewhat  scattered.  If  Greene  could  hold  the 
ridge,  if  the  riflemen  could  continue  the  fight  in  the 
woods,  if  the  militia  would  rally  and  help,  there  was  good 
hope  yet. 


7$  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

The  ridge  was  nearly  held.  Two  attacks  were  met  by 
counterstrokes  in  which  the  Maryland  Continentals  broke  the 
British  light  infantry  and  the  Grenadier  Guards  at  the  point 
of  the  bayonet.  But  the  British  soon  formed  again.  The 
riflemen  relaxed  their  hold  on  the  flanks.  The  militia  were 
clearly  disposed  of  for  the  day.  The  whole  British  force 
was  gathering  to  attack  the  ridge.  Greene  now  rightly 
judged  retreat  prudent.  In  perfect  order  he  got  his  troops 
away,  falling  back  12  miles  to  a  strong  position  he  had 
previously  reconnoitred  on  Troublesome  Creek.  There  he 
prepared  to  withstand  a  further  attack.  But  Cornwallis, 
although  able  to  claim  the  victory,  had  really  suffered  a 
check.  He  had  lost  one  quarter  of  his  little  army,  and  had 
been  within  measurable  distance  of  defeat.  He  felt  no 
inclination  to  attack  Greene  again.  After  remaining  near 
Guilford  a  few  days,  he  started  for  Wilmington  near  Cape 
Fear  to  refit  his  troops,  and  Greene  was  left  in  possession 
of  the  interior  of  North  Carolina. 

Greene  was  not  the  man  to  leave  a  favorable  slant  of 
affairs  unimproved.  He  gauged  the  move  of  Cornwallis 
rightly  as  one  of  necessity.  He  realized  that  for  a  few  weeks 
he  could  count  on  the  British  force  as  out  of  the  game,  so 
he  decided  to  move  at  once  into  South  Carolina,  and  operate 
against  the  detachment  Cornwallis  had  left  there  under  the 
orders  of  Lord  Rawdon.  Sending  Marion,  Sumter,  and 
Harry  Lee  to  operate  against  the  British  posts  and  lines  of 
communication,  Greene  approached  Camden,  where  Rawdon 
was  stationed,  and  pitched  camp  on  Hobkirk's  Hill.  There, 
on  the  25th  of  April,  an  engagement  was  fought  by  about 
TOCO  men  on  each  side,  as  a  result  of  which  Greene  was 
driven  from  his  position  and  compelled  to  fall  back  a  few 
miles. 

After  this  the  war  in  South  Carolina  becomes  for  a  time 
merely  a  long  record  of  marches  and  countermarches, 
until,  in  August,  Greene's  army  received  reinforcements 


NATHANIEL   GREENE  79 

of  regulars  that  brought  his  numbers  up  to  about  2500. 
The  British  force  in  South  Carolina,  now  under  Colonel 
Stewart,  was  no  greater,  and  Greene  determined  to  attack 
it.  At  Eutaw  Springs,  forty  miles  from  Charleston,  was 
fought  Greene's  last  battle,  on  the  8th  of  September,  1781. 
His  little  army  was  well  constituted,  well  officered,  and 
confident  in  its  general;  the  British  were  not  so  well  led  as 
usual.  The  two  armies  met  in  conflicting  lines,  and  after 
some  heavy  fighting  the  Americans  carried  the  day  at  every 
point,  forced  the  enemy  back  to  their  camp,  and  captured  it. 
Here,  however,  success  came  to  an  end.  To  place  the 
starving,  naked  American  soldier  in  the  midst  of  a  British 
camp  and  ask  him  not  to  plunder,  was  clearly  to  ask  more 
than  human  nature  could  endure.  The  victors  broke 
order  to  loot  the  tents;  the  British  reformed,  and  main 
tained  a  new  line.  It  was  not  till  the  evening  of  the  next 
day  that  Stewart  gave  up  his  positions  and  retreated  towards 
Charleston. 

After  Eutaw  Springs,  followed  so  closely  by  the  capitu 
lation  of  Cornwallis  at  Yorktown,  the  British  made  little 
effort  to  control  any  points  in  the  South  not  on  the  sea 
board.  There  were  a  few  minor  operations,  but  the  two 
armies  did  not  meet  again,  nor  did  Greene  have  the  material 
means  for  attempting  the  siege  of  Charleston.  He  had, 
with  the  splendid  support  of  Marion,  Sumter,  Morgan, 
and  Harry  Lee,  accomplished  wonders,  and  although  the 
British  were  never  dislodged  from  Charleston,  yet  the  close 
of  the  war  deservedly  left  him  with  a  reputation  second 
only  to  that  of  Washington. 

The  Southern  States  made  handsome  recognition  of 
Greene's  services.  Several  valuable  plantations  were  con 
veyed  to  him,  and  on  one  of  these,  Mulberry  Grove,  Georgia, 
he  and  his  family  took  up  their  residence  after  the  war. 
He  was  not,  however,  destined  to  enjoy  a  long  repose.  In 
September,  1786,  he  suffered  an  attack  of  sunstroke,  and 


8o  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

died  on  the  lyth  of  that  month.  He  was  only  44  years  of 
age,  and  such  were  his  attainments  and  character  that  it 
was  certainly  unfortunate  for  his  country  that  he  did  not 
live  to  succeed  his  great  commander  in  the  Presidency  of 
the  United  States. 


PART   II 

FROM   THE   REVOLUTION    TO    THE 
CIVIL   WAR 

Andrew  Jackson 
Zachary  Taylor 
Winfield  Scott 


ANDREW  JACKSON 

ANDREW  JACKSON  is  the  extreme  representative  of  the  gen 
eration  that  immediately  followed  the  War  of  the  Revolution. 
He  belongs  to  the  War  of  Independence,  yet  because  of  his 
youth  took  no  real  part  in  it;  his  hatred  of  England  was 
then  aroused,  but  not  assuaged;  he  witnessed  the  struggle 
in  its  worst  form,  that  of  a  civil  war  waged  by  contending 
factions  with  all  the  excesses  of  irregular  warfare.  This 
beginning  of  his  life  colored  its  every  development.  He 
was  always  the  bitter  enemy  of  England,  and  the  equally 
bitter  opponent  of  his  political  rivals.  He  could  only  see 
them  through  the  distorting  haze  which  had  surrounded  the 
struggle  of  his  neighbors  and  friends  against  Tarleton  and 
the  Tories,  of  the  struggle  which  had  dramatically  swept 
from  his  sight  his  brother  and  his  mother.  As  a  soldier  his 
achievements  were  few,  as  a  politician  they  were  not  always 
commendable,  but  as  a  representative  of  the  fervid  Ameri 
canism  born  of  the  Revolution  Andrew  Jackson  occupies 
the  most  conspicuous  place  in  our  annals. 

He  was  born  on  the  i5th  of  March,  1767,  the  third  son 
of  an  Ulsterman  and  his  wife  who  had  just  settled  on  the 
border  of  North  and  South  Carolina.  His  early  years 
were  full  of  difficulty  and  bereavement.  Just  before  his 
birth,  his  father  died.  Neighbors  and  relatives  lent  will 
ing  help  to  the  widow,  but  when  Andrew  was  only  eight 
years  old  another  misfortune,  as  it  proved,  overtook  the 
family:  the  War  of  Independence  broke  out. 

The  early  period  of  the  war  was  one  in  which  the  South 

83 


84  LEADING   AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

was  not  directly  concerned,  but  in  1780  the  British  opera 
tions  were  extended  to  the  Carolinas,  and  in  May  of  that 
year  Tarleton  with  a  flying  column  surprised  and  cut  to 
pieces  a  detachment  of  American  militia  at  Waxhaws,  the 
very  settlement  where  Mrs.  Jackson  and  her  sons  resided. 
A  year  before  this  the  eldest,  Hugh,  had  enlisted,  and  in  a 
few  weeks  had  been  struck  down  by  fever, — he  was  only 
sixteen.  The  two  younger  boys  joined  in  the  fighting  after 
the  affair  at  Waxhaws,  with  what  result  is  shown  by  the 
following  inherently  credible  account,  ascribed  to  Andrew 
Jackson  himself: 

"I  witnessed  two  battles,  Hanging  Rock  and  Hobkirk's 
Hill,  but  did  not  participate  in  either.  I  was  in  one  skir 
mish,  that  of  Sand's  House,  and  there  they  caught  me,  along 
with  my  brother  Robert  and  my  cousin,  Tom  Crawford. 
A  lieutenant  of  Tarleton' s  Light  Dragoons  tried  to  make  me 
clean  his  boots,  and  cut  my  arm  with  his  sabre  when  I 
refused.  After  that  they  kept  me  in  jail  at  Camden  about 
two  months,  starved  me  nearly  to  death,  and  gave  me  the 
smallpox.  Finally  my  mother  persuaded  them  to  release 
Robert  and  me  on  account  of  our  extreme  youth  and  ill 
ness.  Then  Robert  died  of  the  smallpox  and  I  barely 
escaped  death.  When  it  left  me  I  was  a  skeleton — not 
quite  six  feet  long  and  a  little  over  six  inches  thick!  .  .  . 
Whenever  I  took  the  field  it  was  with  Colonel  Davie,  who 
never  put  me  in  the  ranks,  but  used  me  as  a  mounted 
orderly  or  messenger.  .  .  .  Take  it  altogether  I  saw  and 
heard  a  good  deal  of  war  in  those  days,  but  did  nothing 
toward  it  myself  worth  mention."  * 

Andrew  was  the  only  member  of  the  family  who  survived 
the  war.  Just  before  its  close  his  mother  contracted  yellow 
fever  on  a  visit  to  Charleston,  and  died.  So  that  when  the 
war  was  over  Andrew,  then  a  boy  of  sixteen,  was  left  to 
shift  for  himself  in  the  world.  This  he  did  with  much 

*  Report  of  a  conversation  of  Jackson,  by  F.  P.  Blair  to  A.  C.  Buell;  vide 
the  latter's"  Andrew  Jackson,"  I,  51. 


ANDREW  JACKSON  85 

success.  His  personality  was  conspicuous,  his  energy 
superabundant,  his  qualities  those  of  a  born  leader  of  men. 
In  a  restless,  active  community,  as  a  pioneer  of  advancing 
civilization,  he  was  bound  to  make  a  mark. 

First  came  several  years  of  indeterminate  struggle  to 
make  money  and  live.  There  were  occasional  spells  of 
teaching  school  and  of  studying  law,  until  at  last,  in  1787, 
he  was  admitted  to  the  bar  and  a  few  months  later  received 
a  commission  from  the  State  of  North  Carolina  to  proceed 
as  " Public  Solicitor"  to  the  frontier  settlement  of  Nashville 
beyond  the  mountains.  This  step  proved  decisive  of 
Jackson's  future. 

Nashville  was  then  a  mere  village  on  the  fringe  of  civil 
ization  and  surrounded  by  Indian  tribes  counting  many 
thousands  of  braves,  Choctaws,  Chickasaws,  Creeks,  Chero- 
kees.  Whites  were  constantly  killed  even  within  sight 
of  the  town.  Conditions  were  unsettled  in  the  extreme; 
comforts  few,  money  scarce — but  litigation  constant.  The 
tide  of  immigration  poured  steadily  on.  Jackson  soon 
made  a  reputation  in  this  pioneer  community.  He  was 
a  typical  frontiersman,  fond  of  card-playing,  cock-fighting, 
wagering,  hunting,  and  ever  prone  to  the  settlement  of 
personal  differences  according  to  the  code  of  honor.  But 
alongside  of  all  this  he  was  astute  as  a  lawyer,  he  was 
sane  and  reliable  in  counsel,  he  was  swift  and  daring  in 
emergencies,  and  the  community  soon  looked  to  him  as 
one  of  its  leading  men.  In  1791  occurred  an  incident  which 
in  any  but  a  frontier  community  would  have  ruined  Jackson's 
career.  Shortly  after  his  arrival  at  Nashville  he  had  taken 
up  his  abode  at  the  house  of  a  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Robards.  The 
husband  became  jealous  of  the  guest,  and  eventually  left 
his  wife  in  Nashville  to  go  to  Kentucky.  In  1790  Mr. 
Robards  introduced  a  bill  for  a  divorce  in  the  Virginia 
legislature  authorizing  him  to  take  legal  proceedings  and 
have  a  case  tried  before  a  jury.  The  notice  of  the  Act  was 


86  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

published  by  the  Kentucky  Gazette  in  the  summer  of  1791; 
it  was  seen  by  Jackson  and  Mrs.  Robards,  and  they  there 
upon,  within  a  few  weeks,  went  through  a  ceremony  of 
marriage  at  Natchez.  In  1793  the  Kentucky  court  gave 
Robards  a  verdict  on  evidence  of  adultery  that  had  taken 
place  after  the  Virginia  Act  had  been  passed;  and  it  is 
clear  that  Mrs.  Robards  was  equally  open  to  the  imputation 
of  bigamy.  A  second  ceremony  was  gone  through,  and, 
however  irregular  its  inception,  the  marriage  proved  to  be 
a  long  and  happy  one. 

Returning  to  Nashville  with  Mrs.  Robards,  Jackson 
proceeded  to  live  down  this  matrimonial  irregularity. 
This  he  did  with  his  usual  concentration  of  energy  and 
directness  of  method.  The  pistol  and  the  code  of  honor 
cost  one  imprudent  man  his  life,  and  secured  for  the  couple 
a  certain  immunity  from  criticism  which  was  increased 
by  Jackson's  real  popularity  in  the  community.  He  now 
settled  down  to  improving  his  fortunes,  and  he  prospered, 
as  did  Tennessee.  In  1795,  when  a  convention  was  held  for 
erecting  the  territory  into  a  State,  he  was  one  of  the  prom 
inent  delegates.  Shortly  afterwards  the  newly  constituted 
legislature  of  the  State  appointed  Jackson  its  first  repre 
sentative  in  Congress.  On  the  8th  of  December,  1796,  he 
took  his  seat  for  the  first  time  and  was  therefore  present  on 
the  occasion  of  Washington's  last  address.  Eighteen  months 
later  he  retired  in  favor  of  Daniel  Smith,  and  returned  to 
Nashville,  where  all  his  interests  centred. 

Jackson  now  threw  himself  into  farming  and  trading  with 
great  vigor,  in  addition  to  which  he  became  a  judge  of 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Tennessee  in  January,  1799.  Judge 
of  the  Supreme  Court  is  a  dignified  and  imposing  designa 
tion,  but  in  those  early  days  and  in  Tennessee,  and  espe 
cially  as  filled  by  Andrew  Jackson,  the  functions  were  of  the 
liveliest,  sometimes  even  melodramatic,  character.  The 
judge  occasionally  strengthened  the  authority  of  the  law 


ANDREW  JACKSON  87 

by  the  display  of  his  pistols,  and  to  this  period  belongs 
a  famous  shooting  affray  between  Jackson  and  the  Governor 
of  the  State  which  fortunately  resulted  in  no  loss  of  life. 
In  1804  he  resigned  from  the  bench  and  thenceforward 
had  little  more  to  do  with  the  law. 

A  year  later  Aaron  Burr  arrived  in  Nashville  and  became 
the  guest  of  Jackson.  Burr  was  just  at  the  fatal  crisis  of 
his  career.  A  year  before  this  he  had  shot  Alexander 
Hamilton,  and  a  few  weeks  before  he  had  laid  down  the 
office  of  Vice-President  of  the  United  States.  He  was 
now  embarking  on  the  political  scheme  that  was  to  mark 
his  final  downfall.  What  that  scheme  was  Jackson 
did  not  exactly  realize.  He  thought  Burr  wanted  to  lead 
a  few  thousand  western  riflemen  to  the  conquest  of  Mexico, 
or  to  war  against  Spain,  in  a  general  way  to  the  new  south 
west  territory  of  Louisiana  just  acquired  from  France. 
One  thing  was  both  clear  and  satisfactory:  that  Burr  re 
quired  large  quantities  of  supplies  and  transportation  for 
which  Jackson  was  ready  to  contract.  Later,  however, 
suspicion  arose.  Jackson,  in  doubt  as  to  Burr's  intentions, 
asserted  his  allegiance  to  the  Government  and  declined 
further  contracts.  And  a  few  months  afterwards  he  was  sum 
moned  to  Richmond  as  a  witness  when  Burr  was  tried  for 
treason,  though  he  was  not  actually  called  on  to  testify. 

It  was  just  at  this  time  that  Jackson  began  to  prepare 
for  the  war  with  England  which  he  judged  to  be  inevitable. 
Unlike  most  of  the  political  leaders  of  the  day,  who 
hoped  by  a  temporizing  policy  and  mild  attitude  to  avert 
a  conflict,  Jackson  flamed  out  against  England  with  a  vigor 
that  came  from  his  life-long  hatred,  but  that  in  this  instance 
coincided  with  true  patriotism  and  wisdom.  At  Richmond, 
while  attending  Burr's  trial,  he  delivered  on  the  steps  of 
the  state-house,  on  the  occasion  of  the  Leopard  Chesapeake 
incident,  a  tremendous  diatribe  against  President  Jefferson 
and  the  peace  party.  This  speech  was  long  remembered 


88  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

and  placed  Jackson  prominently  before  the  eastern  public. 
On  returning  to  Nashville  he  set  to  work  steadily  and 
methodically  to  perfect  the  military  organization  of  Ten 
nessee.  He  was  already  major-general  of  the  State  militia, 
and  he  now  strained  every  nerve  to  make  its  2500  men 
effective  in  discipline  and  armament.  If  the  ability  to 
see  two  or  three  years  into  the  future  is  one  of  the  sure 
signs  of  the  statesman,  Jackson  certainly  earned  the  dis 
tinction  at  this  period. 

In  1812  the  long-gathering  storm  burst,  and  Congress 
declared  war  against  England.  In  January,  1813,  Jackson 
with  the  Tennessee  militia  was  ordered  to  Natchez  for  the 
protection  of  Louisiana,  but  remained  there  only  till  the  end 
of  March,  when  the  troops  returned  home  on  the  alarm 
passing  over.  Jackson  was  disappointed  at  losing,  as  it 
seemed,  an  opportunity  for  military  service;  he  got  into 
conflict  with  Government  as  to  the  manner  of  disbanding 
his  men;  he  became  personally  involved  for  military  pay 
ments:  these  were  circumstances  that  proved  highly  irri 
tating  and  that  perhaps  explain  or  palliate  a  disgraceful 
shooting  affray  in  which  he  became  involved  soon  after 
his  return  to  Nashville.  The  code  of  honor  was  as  usual 
at  the  bottom  of  the  trouble,  and  in  a  resultant  brawl 
Colonel  Thomas  H.  Benton  of  the  Tennessee  militia  shot 
and  severely  wounded  his  major-general.  So  foolish  and 
disgraceful  was  the  whole  affair  that  even  the  irrepres 
sible  Jackson  was  ashamed  of  it,  and  had  not  the  great 
opportunity  of  his  life  come  just  at  this  moment,  nothing 
is  more  likely  than  that  his  influence  in  the  politics  of  his 
State  would  have  been  seriously  compromised.  As  it 
was,  such  feeling  as  was  already  working  against  Jackson 
was  very  quickly  set  at  rest. 

In  August,  1813,  the  Creeks  took  to  the  war-path.  On 
the  30th  of  that  month  they  surprised  Fort  Mims,  not  far 
from  Mobile,  and  massacred  three  or  four  hundred  people 


ANDREW  JACKSON  89 

there.  Jackson  immediately  made  preparations  to  place 
the  Tennessee  militia  in  the  field.  September  was  spent  in 
organizing,  October  in  marching.  On  the  2d  of  November 
fighting  began.  The  Creeks  had  to  face  superior  numbers, 
excellent  riflemen,  and  good  leadership;,  they  were  beaten 
in  every  encounter.  At  Tallahatchee,  at  Talladega,  at 
Emuckfaw,  at  Tohopeka,  the  Indians  were  broken,  and  by 
the  end  of  April,  1814,  all  the  chiefs  save  a  few  who  had 
fled  to  Florida  made  their  submission. 

The  Creek  war  had  proved  a  severe  ordeal,  and  Jackson's 
determined  leadership  had  been  perhaps  the  chief  factor 
of  success.  His  services  were  handsomely  acknowledged 
by  appointment  to  the  rank  of  brigadier,  and  later  of 
major-general  in  the  regular  army.  In  September  he  was 
sent  to  take  command  of  the  seventh  military  district  with 
headquarters  at  Mobile,  and  arrived  there  the  day  after 
a  small  British  fleet  had  made  an  unsuccessful  attempt  to 
capture  the  forts  guarding  the  bay.  Jackson  determined 
to  return  the  British  compliment,  and  prepared  to  attack 
Pensacola,  nominally  Spanish,  but  in  reality  the  British 
base  of  supplies. 

Entirely  on  his  own  responsibility  General  Jackson  marched 
out  from  Mobile  on  the  26th  of  October,  at  the  head  of  3000 
men,  on  his  invasion  of  Spanish  Florida.  The  governor 
of  Pensacola  attempted  to  defend  the  town,  but  the  small 
British  force  at  Fort  Barrancas  abandoned  the  post  and 
went  on  board  ship.  Jackson  occupied  the  town  for  a  few 
days,  destroyed  the  fortifications,  and  then  returned  to 
Mobile,  which  he  reached  on  the  i6th  of  November.  Only 
twelve  days  later  a  privateer  brought  a  British  transport 
into  the  bay  as  a  prize  and,  with  her,  information  of  the 
utmost  moment.  A  great  British  armament  was  collecting 
at  Jamaica  for  the  purpose  of  dealing  a  blow  at  New 
Orleans. 

Four  days  later  Jackson  was  at  New  Orleans,  and  every 


90  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

available  man  in  the  Southwest  was  being  rushed  to  the 
threatened  point.  It  was  a  curious  episode  of  our  history, 
this  sudden  convergence  on  the  Creole  and  far-distant 
city  of  the  backwoodsmen  of  Tennessee  and  Kentucky. 
And  it  proved  fortunate  for  New  Orleans  that  they  ar 
rived  in  time  to  defend  her.  That  they  did  so  arrive 
was  the  result  of  a  combination  of  circumstances  that  must 
now  be  related. 

The  British,  long  held  back  by  head-winds,  arrived  off 
the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi  a  few  hours  after  Jackson 
reached  New  Orleans,  but  they  spent  much  precious  time 
reconnoitring  before  placing  any  of  their  troops  on  shore. 
To  attack  New  Orleans  was  in  fact  a  very  difficult  under 
taking.  The  British  engineers  soon  found  that  on  the 
western  side  of  the  river  a  continuous  line  of  swamp  fringed 
the  coast,  making  disembarkation  well-nigh  impossible. 
On  the  eastern  side  there  were  two  or  three  possible  lines  of 
advance  amid  the  lagoons  and  swamps,  and  finally  it  was 
decided  to  march  up  the  narrow  strip  on  that  side  which 
extended  with  varying  width  from  the  levee  of  the  Missis 
sippi  to  the  swamps  just  to  the  east.  Difficulties  of  trans 
port  further  retarded  the  British  advance.  The  command- 
er-in-chief,  General  Pakenham,  with  some  of  the  troops, 
had  not  yet  arrived.  No  horses  or  mules  could  be  found 
to  haul  guns  and  supplies.  So  it  was  not  until  the  end  of 
December  that  the  two  armies  actually  came  into  contact. 

Jackson,  meanwhile,  had  been  busy.  His  exuberant 
courage,  resource,  and  enthusiasm  inspired  even  sleepy 
New  Orleans  with  martial  ardor.  He  was  joined  by  Cof 
fee's  Tennessee  riflemen.  He  disposed  his  2200  available 
men  across  the  neck  up  which  the  British  were  advancing. 
He  impressed  negroes  to  build  an  intrenchment  across  it 
at  a  point  little  more  than  a  mile  wide  where  a  ditch  ran 
from  the  Mississippi  to  the  swamp.  He  collected  all  the 
cannon  that  was  to  be  found,  and  mounted  it.  He  manned 


ANDREW  JACKSON  91 

his  artillery  with  crews  of  smugglers  and  privateersmen, 
mostly  Frenchmen, — a  piratical  assortment  were  they,  but 
they  laid  their  guns  with  deadly  accuracy.  He  was  still 
in  the  midst  of  these  preparations,  still  hoping  for  the 
arrival  of  reinforcements  from  up  the  river,  when  the  British 
advance  under  General  Keane  reached  the  front  of  the 
American  position  near  the  ViHere*  house.  It  was  the  23d 
of  December. 

Jackson  decided  to  attack  the  British  that  night.  We 
have  no  record  of  his  reasons  for  this  bold  step;  but  a  good 
soldier  acts  by  instinct  quite  as  much  as  by  reason,  and  the 
decision  was  entirely  sound  from  a  military  point  of  view. 
There  was  the  chance, — there  always  is  when  a  small  force 
is  attacked  by  night, — that  the  enemy  might  be  stampeded 
and  routed;  there  was  the  probability  that  even  if  the 
attack  failed  it  would  deter  the  British  from  continuing 
their  advance  at  once,  and  that  it  would  therefore  gain 
time;  there  was  the  certainty  that  it  would  accustom  his 
troops  to  face  regulars  in  the  open,  and  it  was  better  to 
effect  this  before  the  real  crisis  came.  And  in  addition 
to  these  very  valid  reasons,  one  cannot  doubt  that  all 
Jackson's  long-pent-up  Anglophobia  had  now  reached  ex 
plosion-point  and  that  the  sight  of  the  British  uniforms 
had  the  same  effect  on  him  that  a  red  rag  has  on  the  pro 
verbial  bull.  At  all  events  that  night  the  Americans,  in  two 
divisions,  crept  out  of  their  lines,  edged  around  the  right 
and  left  wing  of  General  Keane's  command,  3500  bayonets, 
and,  at  a  preconcerted  signal,  opened  fire. 

The  night  battle  of  the  23d  of  December  was  claimed 
as  a  success  by  both  sides.  The  British  troops  were  vet 
erans  of  the  Peninsular  War  and  displayed  great  steadiness 
under  very  trying  conditions.  They  refused  to  be  stam 
peded,  and  although  driven  back  at  first,  came  on  again 
when  reinforced,  and  recaptured  their  original  ground. 
Jackson  had  only  2200  men  against  first  3500  and  later 


92  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

5000;  and  when  the  British  took  up  the  attack,  he  pru 
dently  and  properly  withdrew  to  his  intrenchments.  The 
losses  were  about  250  killed  and  wounded  on  each  side. 

The  engagement  had  one  result  indisputably  clear. 
General  Keane's  advance  was  for  the  moment  checked,  and 
while  the  British  force  in  his  front  slowly  accumulated, 
Jackson  was  given  time  to  complete  his  defences.  What 
he  prepared  for  his  enemy  was  a  more  elaborate  and  more 
complete  Bunker  Hill,  one  of  the  most  murderous  death 
traps  a  brave  army  was  ever  led  into.  A  breastwork  was 
completed  right  across  the  British  front,  eight  feet  high 
counting  the  ditch,  four  feet  thick,  made  of  heavy  black 
earth  packed  tight  within  a  casing  of  planks.  For  the 
embrasures  of  his  artillery  Jackson  tried  cotton  bales  to 
take  the  place  of  gabions,  but  found  them  useless  or  worse, 
and,  contrary  to  legend,  cotton  played  no  useful  part  in 
the  defence  of  New  Orleans. 

On  the  ist  of  January  the  British  tried  an  artillery  duel. 
Their  field-pieces  and  improvised  shelter  were,  however, 
completely  outmatched  by  the  heavier  American  guns 
and  intrenchments.  Finding  artillery  useless,  the  British 
generals  thought  of  opening  siege-trenches,  but  the  watery 
nature  of  the  soil  caused  them  to  abandon  that  idea.  There 
remained  but  two  courses:  either  to  rely  on  numbers  and 
discipline  and  to  attempt  to  carry  the  American  lines  by 
a  direct  attack,  or  to  abandon  the  present  line  of  operations 
and  try  elsewhere.  It  was  this  latter  course  Jackson  most 
feared,  and  he  was  scouting  with  the  utmost  vigilance  east 
and  west.  But  Pakenham,  as  it  proved,  decided  on  the 
frontal  attack;  his  troops  were  as  splendid  a  body  of  in 
fantry  as  the  world  could  show,  and  he  decided  to  throw 
them  at  the  American  position. 

At  eight  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  8th  of  January 
Jackson  was  standing  on  the  breastwork  gazing  through 
the  morning  mist  at  the  long  lines  of  British  infantry  advanc- 


ANDREW  JACKSON  93 

ing  in  successive  waves  towards  him.  The  attack  bore 
towards  his  left,  and  there,  lying  against  the  breastwork, 
were  the  rough  riflemen  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  with 
the  Louisiana  militia  and  the  regulars  on  their  right,  and 
with  Coffee,  Carroll,  and  Adair  to  see  that  the  orders  of 
their  commander  were  carried  out.  The  British  were 
advancing  in  line,  three  battalions,  twelve  ranks,  nearly 
3000  men.  What  Pakenham  was  attempting  might  have 
been  possible  against  French  or  German  troops  armed 
with  muskets;  it  was  quite  impossible  against  backwoods 
men  armed  with  rifles.  With  the  former  the  first  volley 
would  have  been  fired  probably  at  about  120  yards  with 
the  troops  just  breaking  from  a  quickstep  to  a  charge,  and 
even  then  would  probably  have  done  comparatively  little 
damage;  with  the  backwoodsmen  a  single  rifle  cracked  out 
with  the  British  still  at  a  route-step  300  yards  away  and 
the  officer  riding  in  the  front  of  the  line  toppled  from  his 
horse,  shot  through  the  forehead  with  mathematical  accuracy. 
Then  followed  a  horrible  scene :  the  44th  Foot  were  literally 
mowed  down  by  a  storm  of  bullets;  other  regiments  took 
their  place  and  shared  their  fate.  In  fifteen  minutes  the 
first  attack  had  been  swept  away.  But  Pakenham  was 
brave,  and  so  were  his  soldiers.  The  British  general 
formed  a  new  column  of  attack,  and  with  his  staff  behind 
him,  his  hat  raised  in  the  air,  rode  at  the  head  of  the  Suther 
land  Highlanders  back  into  that  fearful  zone  of  fire.  Only 
one  thing  could  happen.  Once  more  the  rifles  blazed. 
Pakenham  went  down,  killed  outright,  and  every  one  of  the 
British  staff  went  to  earth  at  the  same  moment.  The 
Highlanders  were  decimated,  but  heroically  struggled  on, 
a  few  getting  within  a  hundred  yards  of  the  intrenchment 
—but  no  farther.  Placed  on  four  ranks,  constantly  firing  and 
stepping  back  to  reload  in  rotation,  Coffee's  buck-hunters 
had  too  easy  a  target,  and  when  General  Gibbs,  succeeding 
Pakenham  in  command,  brought  up  the  Scots  Fusiliers 


94  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

and  the  43d  Light  Infantry,  dealt  out  the  same  fate  to  him 
as  to  his  predecessor.  General  Lambert  followed,  and  he, 
too,  with  magnificent  but  senseless  British  courage,  attempted 
to  continue  the  attack;  but  it  was  no  longer  possible;  even 
Wellington's  veterans  could  not  face  such  an  ordeal,  and 
there  was  nothing  left  but  retreat. 

The  British  had  9000  men  in  the  field,  of  which  about 
7000  actually  took  part  in  the  attacks.  The  loss  was  about 
3300  killed  and  wounded,  and  500  prisoners;  the  color 
company  of  the  Sutherland  Highlanders  went  into  action 
103  strong,  and  lost  100.  The  Americans  out  of  4500 
present  lost  8  killed  and  13  wounded.  The  battle  of  New 
Orleans  was  certainly  one  of  the  most  remarkable  engage 
ments  of  the  nineteenth  century.*  Above  all  things  it  illus 
trated  what  an  artificial  adjustment  a  system  of  tactics  is,  and 
that  the  soldier  of  first-rate  ability  must  look  beyond  them 
to  the  essential  factors  on  which  they  repose.  On  this 
occasion  the  British  system,  invincible  in  Europe,  was 
founded  on  data  obtained  from  Brown  Bess;  it  was  found 
useless  in  the  presence  of  the  long  Tennessee  rifle. 

The  battle  of  New  Orleans  was  fought  after  the  signing 
of  peace  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
at  Ghent  (Dec.  24,  1814),  so  it  was  fortunate  for  Jackson's 
reputation  that  news  travelled  slowly  in  those  days.  The 
victor  was  suddenly  magnified  by  his  well-earned  triumph 
into  one  of  the  most  conspicuous  men  in  the  country,  and  he 
now  inevitably  became  the  representative  of  a  new  force  in 
American  politics.  The  tendency  of  the  pioneer  States  of 
the  West  was  towards  a  democratic  equality  that  the  old 
settled  States  of  the  seaboard,  inheritors  of  an  older  tradition, 
had  not  as  yet  accepted.  There  the  educated  and  wealthy 
classes  still  controlled  political  power,  but  a  change  was 

*  In  these  figures  allowance  is  made  for  the  small  force  detached  by  each 
army  to  the  western  bank  of  the  Mississippi. 


95 

fast  coming,  coming  from  the  West,  coming  under  the 
leadership  of  Jackson. 

It  was  not  all  at  once,  however,  that  Jackson  led  his 
countrymen  into  the  Promised  Land  of  the  ballot-box  and 
the  party  machine.  He  was  a  solider  and  still  had  soldier's 
duty  to  perform.  In  the  year  1818  he  was  actively  engaged 
against  the  Seminoles  and  other  Indians,  and  in  the  course 
of  his  operations  once  more  crossed  the  Spanish  border. 
The  Indians  had  used  Florida  as  a  refuge  and  were  con 
stantly  supplied  with  guns  and  ammunition  by  English 
traders,  which  was  hardly  sufficient  warrant  for  Jackson's  un 
authorized  invasion  of  the  soil  of  a  friendly  power  and 
for  his  causing  to  be  executed,  while  on  Spanish  territory, 
two  British  subjects  who  fell  into  his  hands.  However, 
diplomacy  succeeded  in  smoothing  out  this  last  matter, 
and  as  to  Florida,  its  purchase  from  Spain  in  1821  put 
an  end  to  the  constant  irritation  which  reigned  on  the 
border.  In  this  same  year  Jackson  resigned  his  commis 
sion. 

Jackson  henceforth  devoted  himself  exclusively  to  poli 
tics.  His  bent  was  all  for  organization,  his  temper  made 
of  him  the  most  extreme  of  party  men,  his  breadth  of 
view  and  right  instinct  made  him  delicately  responsive  to 
the  currents  of  opinion  of  the  electorate.  His  career  as 
a  statesman  proved  far  from  edifying,  it  was  marred  by 
violence  of  temper  and  the  obtrusion  of  personal  motives, 
and  yet  beneath  it  all  was  a  wonderful  sagacity  that 
generally  pierced  beyond  the  detail  of  etiquette  and  the  ar 
gumentation  of  the  day.  Above  all,  here  was  a  man  born 
a  leader,  all  of  one  piece,  honest,  a  pioneer  of  democracy. 
That  was  enough,  in  a  day  when  political  questions  and 
parties  were  ill  defined,  to  give  Jackson  the  Presidency. 

From  1829  to  1837  Andrew  Jackson  was  President  of 
the  United  States;  the  period  was  marked  by  three  special 
features.  As  a  private  citizen,  as  a  politician,  as  a  general, 


96  LEADING   AMERICAN    SOLDIERS 

Jackson  had  always  been  a  man  of  friends  and  enemies. 
His  enemies  he  struck  at  with  all  the  vigor  that  was  in  him, 
his  friends  he  could  not  do  too  much  for.  His  advent  at 
Washington  changed  matters  at  the  Federal  capital.  Jack 
son  supporters  were  rewarded  with  government  offices, 
and  the  former  occupants  were  turned  out.  This  was  the 
famous  system  the  active  principle  of  which  is  expressed  in 
the  formula,  To  the  victor  belong  the  spoils,  a  system  that 
subsists  to  this  day. 

To  the  period  of  Jackson's  administration  belong  the 
first  marked  symptoms  of  the  great  struggle  between  North 
and  South  that  eventually  broke  out  in  1861.  In  1832 
South  Carolina  put  forth  the  celebrated  Nullification  Ordi 
nance  which  implied  that  a  State  had  the  right  to  override 
the  Federal  laws  and  constitution.  Jackson  was  firm  in 
his  intention  of  asserting  the  supremacy  of  the  central 
government,  and  a  judicious  mixture  of  resolution  and 
forbearance  fortunately  tided  over  a  very  threatening 
crisis. 

A  great  question  among  the  politicians  of  that  day  was 
that  of  the  renewal  of  the  charter  of  the  United  States 
Bank.  Jackson,  whose  financial  theories  were  of  an 
elementary  character,  had  long  marked  the  bank  as  a  victim. 
His  persistent  attacks,  backed  by  popular  support,  finally 
won  the  day  and  brought  the  institution  to  an  end. 

Jackson  retired  from  the  presidency  in  1837,  Dut  con" 
tinued  to  act  as  leader  of  the  Democratic  party.  So  great 
was  his  zeal  that  he  afforded  the  country  the  spectacle  of 
an  ex-President  well-nigh  an  octogenarian  still  taking  the 
stump.  His  activities  continued  up  to  a  few  weeks  of  his 
death,  which  occurred  in  1845;  ne  was  tnen  7&  years  of  age. 


ZACHARY  TAYLOR 

ZACHARY  TAYLOR,  like  so  many  other  prominent  soldiers 
of  America,  came  from  Virginia.  He  was  born  at  Orange 
Court-house  on  the  24th  of  November,  1784,  the  third 
child  of  Richard  Taylor,  who  had  served  as  colonel  of  a 
Continental  regiment  under  the  orders  of  Washington. 
But  Virginia  could  not  claim  Zachary  Taylor  long.  His 
father  moved  west  soon  after  the  close  of  the  Revolution, 
and  Zachary  grew  up  in  a  frontier  settlement  on  the  site 
of  what  is  now  Louisville.  He  received,  however,  a  better 
education  than  what  was  then  usual  so  far  west,  though 
the  little  schoolhouse  which  he  attended  was  in  the  midst 
of  woods  in  which  Indians  were  frequently  seen  lurking 
and  were  occasionally  shot. 

As  he  left  boyhood  behind,  Zachary  Taylor  showed  a 
restless,  adventurous  disposition.  In  1806  an  opportunity 
came  for  gratifying  this  taste.  That  was  the  year  of  Aaron 
Burr's  conspiracy.  All  along  the  Mississippi  valley 
volunteers  were  raised  to  meet  the  emergency  of  the  hour, 
and  among  those  of  Kentucky  was  enrolled  young  Taylor. 
His  disappointment  was  great  when  the  conspiracy  ended 
in  smoke  and  the  volunteers  were  disbanded.  Two  years 
later,  however,  a  better  opportunity  offered.  His  elder 
brother  had  obtained  a  commission  in  the  army,  but  died 
prematurely.  Colonel  Taylor  therefore  applied  to  his 
friend  President  Jefferson  to  grant  a  commission  to  his 
younger  boy.  This  was  done,  and  in  1808  he  thus  became 
a  lieutenant  in  the  yth  Regiment  of  Infantry. 

97 


98  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

From  this  time  on,  for  forty  years,  the  life  of  Zachary 
Taylor  was  devoted  to  the  steady  and,  until  nearly  the  end, 
inconspicuous  pursuit  of  his  profession.  He  long  remained 
unknown  to  the  public;  but  his  persevering  attachment  to 
duty,  his  unvarying  success  in  all  missions  entrusted  to  his 
charge,  finally  brought  to  him  the  opportunity  that  served 
to  crown  the  close  of  his  life  with  national  renown. 

All  of  Taylor's  early  experience  was  gained  fighting 
Indians.  Under  General  Harrison  he  took  part  in  the 
campaign  against  Tecumseh,  though  he  was  apparently 
not  present  at  the  famous  battle  of  Tippecanoe.  A  little 
later,  as  commandant  of  Fort  Wabash,  he  conducted  a 
spirited  defence  against  a  very  large  force  of  Indians.  This 
incident  apparently  gained  him  some  little  reputation  in 
the  army,  and  earned  for  him  the  brevet  rank  of  major. 

After  the  close  of  the  War  of  1812,  during  which  Taylor 
was  engaged  entirely  in  Indian  fighting,  the  army  was 
much  cut  down  and  many  officers  were  retained  on  the 
establishment  only  on  condition  of  accepting  a  reduction 
of  rank.  Major  Taylor  was  offered  a  company;  he  de 
clined,  and  sent  in  his  resignation.  He  had  made  influen 
tial  friends,  however;  General  Harrison  and  others  worked 
for  him  in  Washington,  and  before  long  he  was  commis 
sioned  as  major  of  the  3d  Infantry  by  President  Madison, 
a  family  connection. 

In  the  course  of  the  next  twenty  years  Zachary  Taylor 
served  in  many  regiments  and  saw  duty  along  the  whole 
length  of  the  frontier  from  Fort  Winnebago  in  Wisconsin 
to  Baton  Rouge  in  Louisiana.  In  1832  he  was  promoted 
colonel.  In  1837  he  received  orders  to  proceed  to  Florida, 
where  he  was  to  assume  command  of  one  of  the  columns 
then  operating  against  the  Seminoles  and  Creeks. 

The  Florida  Indians  had  long  caused  trouble  to  the 
Government,  and  had  damaged  the  reputation  of  nearly 
every  prominent  officer  in  the  service,  even  that  of  Winfield 


ZACHARY  TAYLOR  99 

Scott  himself.  They  were  brave,  crafty,  stubborn;  and  the 
everglades  in  which  they  lurked  were  nearly  impassable. 
None  but  a  commander  deeply  versed  in  Indian  warfare 
and  of  high  determination  could  hope  to  do  much  with 
them;  and  this  was  undoubtedly  why  the  unknown  and 
uninfluential  Colonel  Taylor  had  been  selected  for  this 
service. 

Taylor  met  with  decidedly  more  success  than  his  pre 
decessors  in  this  Florida  fighting.  On  the  23d  of  December, 
1837,  he  heavily  defeated  the  Seminoles  at  Okeechobee 
(Kissimmee)  after  a  stiff  fight  in  which  his  volunteer  regi 
ments  were  routed  and  his  regulars  suffered  severely  in 
restoring  the  battle.  For  this  distinguished  service  he  was 
rewarded  with  the  brevet  rank  of  brigadier-general,  and 
was,  on  the  retirement  of  General  Jesup,  appointed  to 
chief  command  in  Florida.  For  two  years  more  he  strug 
gled  to  pacify  the  country  with  some  measure  of  success. 
In  1840,  however,  worn  out  by  the  constant  strain,  he 
asked  to  be  relieved.  This  application  was  reluctantly 
acceded  to,  and  he  was  appointed  to  the  military  district 
which  included  the  States  of  the  Southwest.  In  other 
words,  he  was  sent  to  the  frontier  of  Texas  where  a  war- 
cloud  was  hanging  on  the  horizon,  a  war-cloud  that  was 
destined  to  burst  in  1846. 

Louisiana,  when  Taylor  took  command,  was  a  border 
State.  Beyond  lay  Texas,  Mexican  territory  into  which 
the  tide  of  American  emigration  had  long  been  setting. 
And  the  questions  had  now  arisen:  were  the  American 
settlers  to  shake  off  their  Mexican  allegiance  and  transfer 
it  to  the  United  States?  And  further,  would  the  United 
States  assist  them  to  carry  out  such  an  enterprise?  Taylor 
had  his  personal  views  on  these  questions,  and  they  were 
not  always  in  accord  with  those  held  in  high  places  at 
Washington,  but  whatever  they  might  be,  he  sank  them 
entirely  when  called  on  to  act  professionally.  His  duty 


loo  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

as  a  soldier  was  to  attend  to  the  military  affairs  of  the  govern 
ment  and  to  carry  out  such  instructions  as  he  might  receive, 
keeping  his  political  opinions  to  himself. 

In  1845  tne  crisis  came.  President  Polk  and  his  Cabinet 
decided  to  support  the  Texans  and  to  bring  them  into  the 
Union.  Taylor  received  instructions  to  enter  Texas  and 
defend  its  inhabitants  from  Mexican  aggression.  This  he 
did,  in  July,  1845,  disposing  the  small  force  he  had  with  him 
in  positions  about  the  mouth  of  the  river  Nueces.  This 
was  the  extreme  line  of  Texan  settlement,  and  the  Mexican 
government  claimed  that  it  constituted  the  boundary  of 
the  State  of  Texas.  Unfortunately  neither  the  Texan 
leaders  nor  their  supporters  in  Washington  would  accept 
the  Nueces  as  a  boundary;  they  must  have  the  Rio  Grande 
del  Norte  130  miles  farther  south.  Taylor,  accordingly, 
received  instructions  to  occupy  the  disputed  territory,  and 
to  take  position  on  the  Rio  Grande;  once  there  he  was  to 
assume  a  strictly  defensive  attitude,  engaging  no  hostilities 
unless  the  Mexicans  should  cross  the  river  and  attack  him. 
Thus  did  the  quibbling  statesmen  of  Washington  seek  to 
demonstrate  that  Mexico,  not  the  United  States,  was  respon 
sible  for  war. 

There  are  two  points  near  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande 
that  played  an  important  part  in  what  followed.  About 
ten  miles  to  the  north  of  the  mouth  is  Point  Isabel,  a 
convenient  station  for  ships  and  for  the  disembarkation 
of  troops;  this  Taylor  chose  for  his  base.  On  the  river 
itself,  but  to  the  south  or  Mexican  side,  is  Matamoros, 
some  twenty  miles  from  the  mouth;  this  was  the  point  of 
assembly  of  the  Mexican  forces.  From  Matamoros  to 
Point  Isabel,  the  longest  side  of  the  triangle,  is  28  miles. 

The  army  placed  under  Taylor's  orders  for  the  conquest 
of  Texas  could  hardly  be  described  as  a  vast  host;  it  num 
bered,  when  hostilities  began,  little  more  than  3000  men. 
Even  then  many  deductions  had  to  be  made  for  ineffectives 


ZACHARY  TAYLOR  101 

and  detachments.  One  of  Taylor's  first  steps  after  reaching 
the  Rio  Grande  was  to  erect  a  small  fort  exactly  opposite 
Matamoros,  and  this  at  once  swallowed  up  no  less  than 
six  hundred  men.  Leaving  these  under  command  of 
Major  Brown,  Taylor  then  turned  back  to  Point  Isabel. 

Taylor's  action  in  erecting  this  fort  and  then  withdrawing 
to  Point  Isabel  is  susceptible  of  two  interpretations.  He 
could  probably  have  concentrated  the  greater  part  of  his 
army  on  the  river  in  time  to  contest  the  passage  of  the 
Mexicans;  but  would  the  enemy  attempt  to  cross  if  the 
passage  was  to  be  disputed?  By  going  back  to  Point 
Isabel  and  concentrating  the  main  strength  of  the  army 
there,  he  could  collect  more  men;  but  he  would  also  leave 
the  Rio  Grande  for  a  while  unprotected.  Again,  the  detach 
ing  of  600  men  to  hold  a  post  opposite  Matamoros,  was 
a  great  loss  of  strength  with  little  compensating  advantage, 
unless,  indeed,  the  object  was  to  tempt  the  Mexicans  across 
the  Rio  Grande.  And  perhaps  this  was  Taylor's  chief 
object,  for  it  was  only  in  this  event  that  his  instructions 
permitted  him  to  engage  the  enemy. 

Whatever  the  real  interpretation  of  Taylor's  retirement 
to  Point  Isabel,  it  immediately  resulted  in  drawing  the 
enemy  north  of  the  river.  The  Mexican  commander, 
General  Arista,  was  in  force;  he  viewed  Taylor's  with 
drawal  as  a  symptom  of  weakness;  he  immediately  crossed 
the  Rio  Grande,  and,  leaving  a  part  of  his  army  to  reduce 
Fort  Brown,  advanced  cautiously  with  the  remainder 
towards  Point  Isabel.  Midway  he  took  up  a  position  at 
Palo  Alto,  and  Taylor  there  found  him  on  the  8th  of  May, 
1846. 

Palo  Alto  is  usually  dignified  by  the  name  of  battle;  it 
was  really  not  much  more  than  a  skirmish.  Taylor,  advanc 
ing  from  Point  Isabel,  found  the  Mexicans  drawn  up  in  line. 
The  enemy  outnumbered  him  by  over  two  to  one,  and  had 
a  large  force  of  cavalry.  Taylor,  confident  in  the  steadiness 


102  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

of  his .  regulars,  deployed  in  line  of  battle,  and  advanced 
towards  the  enemy.  Arista  then  moved  his  cavalry  so  as 
to  threaten  the  American  right.  A  regiment  was  thrown 
into  square  to  check  this  move.  On  both  sides  the  artillery 
was  busy,  and  the  fight  was  really  more  of  a  long-range 
cannonade  than  anything  else.  Taylor  was  weaker  than  the 
enemy  in  the  number  of  his  guns,  but  he  had  brought  with 
him,  dragged  by  long  lines  of  oxen,  two  i8-pounders,  and 
these  heavy  pieces  rendered  the  greatest  service.  At  the 
close  of  the  day  the  Mexican  cavalry  was  beaten  off,  and  the 
Mexican  infantry  had  fallen  back  a  little  from  their  original 
position.  That  night  General  Arista  decided  to  retreat  five 
miles  to  the  stronger  position  of  Resaca  de  la  Palma,  there 
to  await  the  American  advance.  Taylor's  victory  had  cost 
him  only  9  killed  and  less  than  50  wounded. 

At  Resaca  de  la  Palma  on  the  following  day  the  fighting 
was  of  a  far  more  serious  character.  The  road  was  cut  by 
a  ravine  and  was  swept  by  the  Mexican  guns.  Taylor 
ordered  his  line  forward  to  carry  the  position  by  frontal 
attack.  The  Mexican  guns  were  taken  by  a  charge  of 
dragoons,  then  lost  again,  and  again  captured,  by  the 
infantry  this  time,  and  held.  The  troops  fought  well  and 
obstinately  until  at  last  the  Mexicans  lost  heart  and  gave 
way  in  a  general  panic  that  spread  to  their  whole  army. 
They  were  pursued  to  the  Rio  Grande,  where  many  were 
drowned  and  many  taken  prisoners.  The  Mexicans  had 
lost  all  their  artillery  and  about  1000  killed,  wounded, 
and  prisoners,  in  the  two  engagements. 

After  Resaca  de  la  Palma,  General  Arista  gave  up  all 
hopes  of  holding  the  district  at  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande, 
and  a  few  days  later  he  abandoned  Matamoros  to  the 
Americans.  General  Taylor  promptly  occupied  the  city, 
but  was  then  at  once  confronted  by  a  difficulty.  Mata 
moros  with  the  surrounding  country  was  virtually  an  oasis. 
The  nearest  fertile  and  inhabited  part  of  Mexico  was 


ZACHARY   TAYLOR  103 

Monterey,  200  miles  to  the  west,  and  to  reach  it  a  tract  of 
what  was  virtually  desert  would  have  to  be  crossed.  This 
meant  a  formidable  problem  in  transportation.  Then  there 
was  another  question.  Even  if  Monterey  could  be  reached 
and  captured,  was  the  enterprise  worth  undertaking? 
This  was  a  very  debatable  point.  The  war  had  now 
obviously  entered  a  new  stage,  for  Taylor's  victories  had 
settled  the  question  of  the  possession  of  Texas.  There 
remained,  however,  the  quarrel  with  Mexico,  and  it  was 
now  necessary  to  bring  it  to  a  successful  issue.  Would  the 
capture  of  Monterey  lead  to  such  a  result?  It  seemed 
hardly  probable;  for  the  city  was  too  small  and  too  distant 
from  the  Mexican  capital  for  its  loss  to  be  greatly  felt. 
The  commander-in-chief,  Winfield  Scott,  constantly  urged 
that  the  best  means  of  bringing  the  war  to  an  end  was  to 
land  an  army  as  close  as  possible  to  the  city  of  Mexico  and 
march  on  it.  This  was  sound  advice,  as  even  Taylor  was 
bound  to  admit. 

The  administration  dealt  with  this  military  problem 
after  the  manner  of  the  untutored  politician;  they  ignored 
strategy  and  concentrated  their  attention  on  politics.  The 
President  and  Cabinet  were  Democrats;  their  two  chief 
generals  were  Whigs.  Scott  had  long  been  a  possible  Whig 
candidate  for  the  Presidency;  Taylor,  since  Resaca  de  la 
Palma,  had  suddenly  become  a  probable  one.  To  increase 
the  reputation  of  either  general  was  clearly  bad  politics.  Un 
der  these  circumstances  operations  came  to  a  painful  halt 
after  Taylor's  occupation  of  Matamoros  while  President 
Polk  and  his  advisers  were  casting  about  for  a  profitable 
solution  of  the  Mexican  problem.  Finally  public  im 
patience  came  into  play.  A  result  was  loudly  demanded, 
and  Washington  was  forced  to  decide  that  Scott  should  at 
tempt  the  march  on  Mexico.  But  instead  of  giving  him  the 
very  moderate  numbers  he  asked  for,  24,000  men,  he  was 
cut  down  to  half  that  amount,  while  Taylor  was  allowed  to 


104  LEADING   AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

continue  his  campaign  towards  Monterey.  That  campaign, 
whether  brilliantly  successful  or  not,  could  have  no  possible 
effect  on  the  result  of  the  war,  while  the  resulting  dispersal 
of  force  criminally  exposed  Scott  to  disaster.  It  was  fortu 
nate  for  the  United  States  that  the  expedition  to  Mexico 
happened  to  be  conducted  by  one  of  the  most  brilliant 
soldiers  produced  by  the  American  army. 

It  was  no  business  of  Taylor's  whether  folly  or  wisdom 
prevailed  in  the  councils  of  the  White  House;  his  part  was 
merely  to  do  all  he  could  in  the  place  to  which  he  was  sent 
and  with  the  means  placed  at  his  disposal.  This  he  did  fully. 
To  reach  Monterey  he  decided  first  to  shift  his  base  to 
Camargo,  180  miles  up  the  Rio  Grande;  thence  the  march 
would  be  another  150  miles.  It  took  time  and  trouble  to 
accomplish  this  change  of  base,  and  it  was  not  till  the  end 
of  August,  1846,  that  Taylor  started  from  Camargo  on  his 
march  south;  he  was  now  at  the  head  of  nearly  7000  men. 

The  American  army  reached  the  outskirts  of  Monterey  on 
the  i  Qth  of  September.  The  town  was  garrisoned  by  a 
Mexican  force  under  General  Ampudia,  the  numbers  of 
which  may  be  found  variously  stated;  it  was  in  all  proba 
bility  about  equal  to  that  of  Taylor.  The  city  was,  however, 
carefully  fortified.  There  was  a  considerable  fort  or  citadel 
on  the  northern  side  from  which  the  Americans  must  of 
necessity  approach.  On  the  east  were  a  bend  of  the  San 
Juan  River  and  various  fortifications;  on  the  west  was  a 
high  elevation,  the  Obispado,  on  which  several  public 
buildings  of  massive  character  had  been  elaborated  into  a 
strong  position.  Taylor,  after  careful  consideration,  de 
cided  to  force  Monterey  by  the  west  side,  for  if  he  could 
get  possession  of  the  Obispado  hill  he  would  not  only 
command  the  city,  but  also  the  road  running  thence  west 
wards  towards  Saltillo.  This  was  the  chief  line  of  com 
munications  of  the  Mexican  army  and  therefore  the  decisive 
point. 


ZACHARY   TAYLOR  105 

On  the  2ist  of  September  the  fighting  began,  and  con 
tinued  for  three  days.  General  Worth  was  entrusted  with 
the  main  task,  that  of  carrying  the  Obispado  hill.  This 
he  did  after  two  days  of  continuous  fighting;  on  the  23d 
he  effected  a  lodgment  in  the  city,  and  by  nightfall  had 
reached  a  point  near  the  Cathedral  Square.  In  the  mean 
while  the  left  wing  after  some  alternation  of  success  and 
failure,  for  the  Mexicans  made  a  good  fight,  carried  the 
outworks  of  the  town  to  the  east  and  penetrated  the  streets. 
At  9  P.M.  of  the  23d  Ampudia,  who  had  done  his  duty, 
wrote  to  Taylor  proposing  that  the  Mexican  troops  evacuate 
Monterey. 

The  evacuation  of  Monterey  by  Ampudia's  army  proved 
a  very  difficult  matter  to  adjust;  and  the  terms  that  were 
finally  settled  provoked  much  unfavorable  comment.  Taylor 
agreed  that  the  Mexican  troops  should  retire  with  their  arms 
and  six  of  their  guns  to  a  line  drawn  some  miles  south  of 
Monterey,  and  that  this  line  should  not  be  crossed  by  either 
belligerent  until  after  the  expiration  of  eight  weeks.  These 
terms  were  assailed  as  too  lenient  by  Taylor's  enemies  and 
political  opponents,  yet  on  the  whole  the  defence  which  he 
made  of  his  action  appears  perfectly  valid.  Ampudia  had 
made  a  courageous  and  capable  defence.  That  being  the 
case,  it  was  reasonably  certain  that  if  a  surrender  of  his  army 
had  been  insisted  on  he  would  have  declined,  and  got  out 
of  Monterey  by  the  roads  leading  south — roads  that  Taylor 
did  not  control — in  as  good  order  as  he  could,  leaving  the 
citadel  to  hold  out  for  as  long  as  possible.  Then,  if  Taylor 
chose  to  enter  into  an  armistice  of  eight  weeks,  the  arrange 
ment,  as  he  saw  it,  was  quite  as  advantageous  to  him  as  to 
the  Mexicans.  Meeting  the  enemy  in  battle,  he  wrote  to 
a  friend,  was  the  simplest  of  the  problems  he  had  to  deal 
with.  The  campaign  turned  chiefly  on  questions  of  trans 
portation  and  supply.  Taylor  knew  that  he  could  not 
operate  effectively  beyond  Monterey  for  at  least  eight  weeks; 


lo6  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

he  hoped  that  by  tying  the  enemy  to  an  armistice  he  might 
so  utilize  the  respite  that  at  its  close  he  would  be  in  a  posi 
tion  to  push  matters  vigorously. 

Yet  Taylor  was  never  under  illusions  as  to  the  significance 
of  his  strategic  situation,  or  as  to  what  could  be  accomplished 
on  his  present  line  of  advance.  The  distances  in  front  of 
him  were  too  great;  the  country  was  too  poor;  his  troops 
were  too  few.  To  Saltillo,  the  next  town  of  any  importance, 
was  seventy  miles;  thence  to  S.  Luis  Potosi,  over  200 
more;  and  thence  to  Mexico  a  further  journey  unnecessary 
to  state  in  terms  of  miles.  And  Taylor  was  already  clear 
that  Saltillo  must  of  necessity  mark  the  utmost  limit  of  his 
advance. 

After  the  expiration  of  the  armistice  there  were  op 
erations  by  various  columns  resulting  in  the  unopposed 
occupation  of  Saltillo  and  other  towns  of  the  northeast  of 
Mexico.  The  Mexicans  had  for  the  moment  given  up 
hopes  of  defending  this  part  of  their  country,  but  only  for 
the  moment.  A  change  of  government  had  brought  the 
capable  and  energetic  Santa  Anna  to  power,  and  he  was 
now  fast  concentrating  at  S.  Luis  Potosi  an  army  with  which 
he  expected  to  deal  a  crushing  blow  at  the  feeble  American 
forces.  It  was  just  at  this  moment  that  the  paltry  wire 
pullers  who  were  posturing  as  statesmen  at  Washington 
decided  to  send  Scott  to  Vera  Cruz,  but  as  this  was  pre 
liminary  to  reviving  the  grade  of  lieutenant-general  and  to 
appointing  a  party  man  to  fill  it  over  the  heads  of  Scott 
and  Taylor,  they  were  not  altogether  anxious  that  the  Whig 
generals  should  cover  themselves  with  glory.  So  their 
nimble  wits  devised  this:  Instead  of  giving  Scott  24,000  men, 
which  he  stated  were  necessary,  he  was  allowed  to  make  up 
12,000  men  by  taking  every  regiment  of  Taylor's  regular 
infantry  from  his  army.  It  was  a  great  blow  to  Taylor, 
but  it  was  in  part  softened  by  the  considerate  and  courteous 
manner  in  which  Scott  broke  the  news  to  him,  and  by  the 


ZACHARY   TAYLOR  107 

military  obviousness  of  the  move  by  Vera  Cruz.  In  fact 
Taylor  so  fully  concurred  in  the  necessity  for  it  that  he  offered 
to  serve  with  the  Vera  Cruz  force  under  Scott's  orders. 

Just  as  when  Harold  turned  from  the  south  coast  of 
England  to  deal  a  blow  at  the  Danes  ere  the  Normans 
should  land,  so  Santa  Anna  resolved  to  march  swiftly  north 
to  crush  Taylor  and  then  to  move  back  to  Mexico  and  Vera 
Cruz  before  Scott  should  arrive.  He  anticipated  an  easy 
victory  over  his  first  antagonist,  for  his  well-appointed  army 
numbered  20,000  men,  while  Taylor,  as  he  knew,  was  re 
duced  to  less  than  5000.  Scott  had  advised  Taylor  to  retire 
as  far  as  Monterey,  and  there  was  a  general  feeling  that  a 
retirement  had  become  necessary,  but  Taylor  had  a  con 
stitutional  aversion  to  retrograde  movements,  and  he  de 
cided  to  hold  on  where  he  was  and  play  the  game  out. 

Santa  Anna  marched  rapidly  from  Potosi  and  reached 
Encarnacion,  about  25  miles  south  of  Saltillo,  on  the  2ist 
of  February,  1847.  From  this  place  two  roads  ran  to 
Saltillo,  one  the  direct  road,  the  other  perhaps  twenty  miles 
longer,  leading  through  the  mountains  to  the  east.  Now 
it  so  happened  that  Taylor  had  decided  to  make  a  stand 
about  7  miles  south  of  Saltillo  in  a  very  strong  natural  posi 
tion  near  the  hacienda  of  Buena  Vista.  Had  Santa  Anna 
realized  what  this  position  held  by  a  resolute  fighter  like 
Taylor  meant,  he  would  probably  have  detached  a  division 
to  march  around  by  the  eastern  road.  But  he  was  very 
confident  in  his  numbers,  and  in  a  great  hurry  to  dispose 
of  Taylor  so  as  to  get  back  to  Scott,  now  operating  near 
Vera  Cruz.  So  he  continued  his  headlong  march  on  the 
direct  road  to  Saltillo,  merely  detaching  a  small  force  of 
cavalry  to  operate  by  the  eastern  road. 

On  the  morning  of  the  22d  Santa  Anna  reached  Encantada, 
only  6  miles  from  Buena  Vista.  The  head  of  his  column 
had  already  come  into  contact  with  the  Americans,  and  a 
line  of  battle  was  being  deployed.  So  certain  was  Santa 


io8  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

Anna  of  the  result  that  he  now  wrote  a  curt  letter  to  Taylor 
in  which,  after  alluding  to  his  own  overwhelming  numbers, 
he  summoned  him  to  surrender  his  army  as  prisoners  of 
war.  This  letter  was  not  fated,  as  Santa  Anna  perhaps 
believed,  to  exercise  any  marked  influence  on  the  result  of 
the  campaign;  Taylor  replied  to  it  in  the  fewest  words 
that  would  serve  to  convey  the  most  point-blank  of  refusals. 

Taylor's  position  at  Buena  Vista  was  across  the  road 
leading  to  Saltillo,  at  a  point  where  it  traversed  a  nar 
row  pass.  To  the  right  the  ground  sank  lower  than  the 
road  and  was  so  cut  by  precipitous  gullies  as  to  be  virtually 
impassable.  No  movements  of  any  importance  were 
attempted  by  either  army  in  this  direction.  To  the  left 
were  a  series  of  spurs  running  down  from  the  mountains 
with  deep  ravines  between  them.  These  spurs  formed 
difficult  but  by  no  means  impassable  ground,  and  the  Ameri 
cans  would  have  the  great  advantage  of  defending  them. 
The  Mexicans  might  counterbalance  this  by  their  numbers, 
as  the  ravines  and  spurs  between  the  foad  and  the  moun 
tains  made  a  possible  front  of  operations  varying  from  a 
mile  to  a  mile  and  a  half.  The  position  on  the  road,  nar 
row  and  well  covered  by  Captain  Washington's  battery,  was 
the  pivot  of  the  American  line  and  was  held  firmly  on  both 
days  of  the  battle;  the  question  was,  would  Taylor's  small 
numbers  suffice  to  hold  the  excellent  but  somewhat  long 
line  between  this  pivot  and  the  mountains  ? 

On  the  22d  there  was  little  serious  fighting,  Santa  Anna 
being  anxious  to  get  all  his  men  up  before  engaging.  Such 
movements  as  took  place  were  favorable  to  the  Mexicans, 
Ampudia's  division  gaining  one  of  the  spurs  far  to  the 
American  left.  On  the  23d  the  main  attack  was  delivered. 
Santa  Anna  made  demonstrations  on  his  left,  among  the 
gullies  below  the  road;  he  threatened  the  pass  itself;  he 
sent  Ampudia  forward  on  his  extreme  right  below  the 
mountains,  and  then,  when  the  Americans  were  hotly 


ZACHARY  TAYLOR  109 

engaged  on  a  wide  front,  holding  such  hills  and  denies  as 
gave  best  opportunity  for  defence,  the  Mexican  commander 
launched  a  serried  mass  of  two  divisions,  greater  than  the 
whole  American  army,  straight  at  Taylor's  centre.  This 
was  good  generalship,  and  nearly  succeeded.  A  few 
companies  of  volunteers  were  not  sufficient  to  hold  back 
this  tide;  they  were  swept  away,  many  of  the  fugitives 
not  stopping  short  of  Saltillo.  A  few  regular  guns,  served 
with  splendid  skill  and  the  most  reckless  courage,  checked 
the  advancing  Mexicans  a  few  minutes,  just  long  enough  for 
Taylor  to  reach  the  spot,  Taylor  cool  and  resolute  as  ever, 
Taylor  with  a  regiment  of  Mississippi  riflemen  behind  him. 
The  riflemen  fought  well,  and  were  well  handled  by  their 
colonel,  Jefferson  Davis.  By  desperate  efforts  the  line  of 
battle  was  slowly  reestablished.  Pressed  by  several  of  his 
officers  to  fall  back  and  take  up  a  new  position,  Taylor 
curtly  declined;  with  regulars  this  might  have  been  the 
more  prudent  course,  with  volunteers  it  would  probably 
have  been  fatal. 

This  was  not,  however,  Santa  Anna's  last  attempt.  Before 
the  close  of  the  day,  after  Taylor  had  reestablished  his  line, 
when  both  armies  were  nearing  exhaustion,  he  aimed  one 
more  blow  at  the  same  spot,  and  again  he  nearly  succeeded. 
All  the  Mexican  reserves  were  thrown  in,  and  once  more  a 
powerful  column  began  steadily  pressing  into  the  American 
centre.  Resistance  was  nearly  over  when  Braxton  Bragg, 
who  sixteen  years  later  saw  a  greater  but  less  glorious 
victory  at  Chickamauga,  galloped  up  with  three  guns. 
For  some  minutes  those  guns  were  all  that  was  left  of  the 
American  centre,  and  Bragg  fought  them  heroically.  He 
poured  in  his  last  discharge  of  grape  and  canister  with  the 
enemy  only  fifty  yards  away,  and  Taylor,  who  stood  by 
the  guns,  afterwards  reported  that  this  last  round  saved 
the  day.  The  efforts  of  Santa  Anna's  men  were  well-nigh 
spent,  and  his  last  attack  presently  rolled  back  defeated. 


no  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

At  sundown  the  two  armies  camped  on  the  ground  they 
had  occupied  in  the  morning.  At  night  Santa  Anna  began 
his  retreat,  thus  acknowledging  defeat.  He  had  lost 
nearly  2000  men  in  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners,  while 
Taylor  had  proportionately  suffered  even  more  heavily, 
losing  about  750  killed  and  wounded. 

One  incident  of  Buena  Vista,  not  of  a  military  character, 
is  too  curious  to  be  passed  over.  The  colonel  of  the  Missis 
sippi  riflemen  who  was  later  to  be  President  of  the  Confed 
erate  States  had  some  years  previously  eloped  with  one 
of  Zachary  Taylor's  daughters.  The  general  had  constantly 
refused  to  forgive  him.  But  after  the  splendid  stand  made 
by  Jefferson  Davis'  men  when  the  American  centre  had 
first  been  pierced,  Taylor  could  hold  out  no  longer;  he 
made  his  peace  with  his  subordinate  after  the  battle,  and 
gave  him  a  handsome  mention  in  dispatches. 

Buena  Vista  marks  the  close  of  Taylor's  military  career. 
Active  operations  after  this  were  practically  confined  to 
those  of  Scott  and  Santa  Anna  in  the  south,  and  during 
the  remainder  of  the  war  Taylor  was  little  more  than  a 
spectator.  But  there  were  soon  other  matters  of  national 
importance  to  engage  his  attention.  Taylor's  personality 
had  many  of  the  characteristics  that  make  for  wide  popu 
larity.  His  soldiers  called  him  Old  Rough-and-ready,  an 
expression  clearly  implying  endearment.  To  his  men 
indeed  he  was  always  the  personification  of  justice  and 
kindliness.  Then,  again,  he  was  a  very  plain  and  direct 
man,  and  Americans  have  always  loved  directness  and 
plainness  save  in  their  oratory  and  literature.  He  was  not 
fond  of  fuss  and  feathers.  He  went  into  action  wearing  a 
broad -brimmed  straw  hat  and  a  linen  duster;  and  to  rest 
himself  he  would  often  pass  his  leg  over  the  pommel  of  his 
saddle  in  the  most  unmilitary  and  unpicturesque  manner. 
All  these  were  matters,  crystallized  by  anecdotes,  for  making 
popularity,  and,  added  to  his  victories,  they  had  made  of 


ZACIIARY  TAYLOR  ill 

Zachary  Taylor  a  national  hero.  And  so  the  party  leaders 
seized  on  him  as  a  man  likely  to  win  a  presidential  election. 

There  were  also  reasons  of  a  more  narrowly  political 
character  why  Taylor  should  carry  the  presidential  election 
set  to  take  place  in  1848.  The  war  with  Mexico  had 
indirectly  brought  to  a  head  the  great  question  of  slavery 
then  dividing  North  and  South.  From  Texas  to  California 
a  vast  stretch  of  territory  had  been  won  and  might  be  con 
verted  into  slave  States  or  free  States.  The  quarrel  which 
till  then  had  been  led  on  both  sides  by  comparatively  small 
groups  of  extremists  threatened  to  become  a  popular  one, 
to  resolve  itself  into  civil  war.  The  wisest  still  hoped, 
however,  to  avert  disaster  by  moderate  courses,  and  the 
Whig  party,  declining  to  follow  the  Abolitionist  lead,  chose 
Taylor  for  its  candidate,  and  chose  him  because,  although 
a  moderate  or  Henry  Clay  Whig,  he  was  a  citizen  of  the  State 
of  Louisiana,  a  planter,  and  the  owner  of  300  slaves.  Here 
was  the  man  of  all  others  to  conciliate  the  South,  to  allay 
the  fears  of  its  citizens.  And  so  it  proved. 

Taylor  did  nothing  to  secure  the  nomination;  it  is  indeed 
probable  that  the  choice  of  Henry  Clay  as  candidate  would 
have  gratified  him.  But  being  elected  he  proceeded  to 
carry  out  his  duty  as  he  had  always  been  accustomed  to. 
During  the  few  months  of  his  presidency  he  gave  one  or 
two  indications  of  his  character.  Political  feeling  at  Wash 
ington  was  running  very  high.  Members  of  Congress  put 
pistols  in  their  pockets  before  going  to  the  Capitol.  Prom 
inent  Southerners  were  already  advocating  secession.  But 
the  President,  whatever  his  sentiment  as  to  slavery,  was 
firm  in  his  allegiance  to  the  flag  he  had  so  long  served,  the 
flag  of  Monterey  and  Buena  Vista.  He  declared  roundly 
to  a  deputation  of  Southern  hotheads  that  if  there  was  an 
insurrection  he  would  put  it  down  himself  at  the  head  of 
an  army  of  Southern  volunteers.  This  was  more  than 
bravely  said,  it  was  statesmanlike.  This,  however,  was 


112  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

not  always  the  case  with  the  old  soldier's  utterances.  For 
getting  the  delicate  balance  between  free  and  slave  States, 
forgetting  how  slight  a  spark  would  fire  the  political  maga 
zine,  he  bluntly  advised  and  helped  new-born  California 
to  advance  towards  the  statehood  that  was  due  to  her 
population,  statehood  under  a  free  constitution. 

All  in  all,  however,  President  Taylor's  was,  in  a  personal 
sense,  an  uneventful  presidency.  It  came  to  a  sudden 
close  in  the  summer  of  1850.  On  the  4th  of  July  of  that 
year  the  President  graced  the  ceremonies  attendant  on 
the  laying  of  the  foundation-stone  of  the  Washington  monu 
ment.  He  was  slightly  overcome  by  the  heat,  and  that 
evening  aggravated  his  condition  by  partaking  too  freely 
of  fruit  and  iced  milk.  His  state  rapidly  became  alarming, 
and  on  the  gth  of  July  he  died.  His  death  was  felt  as  a 
great  loss  even  by  men  like  Daniel  Webster  who  had  been 
accustomed  to  look  down  on  his  lack  of  political  training. 
But  the  loss  was  a  real  one,  for  "Qld  Rough-and-ready" 
was  far  above  common  men  in  his  resolute  valor  and  sense, 
and  his  memory  has  therefore  long  been  honored  in  the 
annals  of  his  country. 


O    r ; 


WINFIELD    SCOTT 

AMONG  American  soldiers  few  have  received  less  recogni 
tion  than  Winfield  Scott.  This  is  doubtless  due  in  part  to 
the  fact  that  the  end  of  his  career  came  just  at  the  moment 
when  our  greatest  war  broke  out,  and  when  the  veteran 
had  to  make  way  for  young  men  who  soon  filled  the  public 
eye  to  his  exclusion.  But  there  is  another  reason,  which 
is  that  no  historian  has  yet  set  forth  with  due  emphasis  the 
magnitude  of  his  military  achievements  and  shown  the 
public  that  Scott,  though  he  was  never  put  to  the  test  of 
handling  large  armies,  conducted  one  campaign,  that  of 
Mexico,  after  a  fashion  that  Frederick  or  Napoleon  might 
not  have  surpassed.  His  field  was  small,  but  within  it  he 
played  his  part  like  a  great  captain. 

He  was  born  on  the  i3th  of  June,  1786,  near  Petersburg, 
Virginia,  and  his  grandfather  was  a  Scotch  Jacobite  who 
had  fled  to  this  country  after  Culloden  in  1746.  The 
second  American  Scott,  Winfield's  father,  served  in  Wash 
ington's  army  and  died  in  1792;  fortunately  the  family  was 
well-to-do,  and  Winfield  was  therefore  able  to  secure  a  good 
education.  His  school  days  were  mostly  spent  under  a 
Quaker  schoolmaster,  whose  pacific  precepts  were  fated 
to  be  somewhat  wasted  on  his  pupil;  Scott  recorded  later 
that  on  his  return  home  from  the  war  in  1815  he  met  his 
old  pedagogue,  who  greeted  him  thus:  "Friend  Winfield, 
I  always  told  thee  not  to  fight;  but  as  thou  wouldst  fight, 
I  am  glad  that  thou  weren't  beaten." 

In  1805  young  Scott  entered  William  and  Mary  College, 


H4  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

but  remained  there  only  a  short  time,  leaving  it  in  his 
nineteenth  year  to  enter  a  law  office  in  Petersburg.  Two 
years  later,  in  1807,  came  the  Chesapeake  and  Leopard 
incident;  President  Jefferson  closed  our  ports  to  British 
men-of-war  and  called  for  volunteers;  Scott  was  among 
those  who  responded  to  the  call.  The  President's  procla 
mation  reached  Richmond  late  one  evening;  but  on  the 
very  same  night  Scott  travelled  twenty-five  miles,  pur 
chased  a  horse  and  borrowed  a  uniform.  The  next  morn 
ing  he  was  back  in  Richmond  fully  equipped  as  a  private 
in  the  Petersburg  troop  of  cavalry.  His  manner  of  joining 
the  army  augured  well  for  his  military  aptitude. 

Scott's  experience  of  volunteer  soldiering  in  1807  lasted 
only  a  few  weeks,  but  it  awoke  in  him  a  strong  taste  for 
the  career  of  arms.  For  a  few  months  after  the  first  war 
alarm  had  blown  over  he  returned  to  the  law,  but,  using 
such  influence  as  he  could  control  at  Washington,  he 
succeeded  in  obtaining  a  commission  as  captain  of  light 
artillery.  This  was  in  May,  1808.  He  recruited  his 
company  about  Petersburg  and  Richmond,  and  was  soon 
afterwards  ordered  to  proceed  to  New  Orleans. 

The  first  four  years  of  Scott's  army  life  offer  no  incidents 
of  sufficient  importance  to  find  space  here;  but  on  the 
breaking  out  of  war  with  England,  in  1812,  he  profited 
from  the  dearth  of  officers  and  the  increase  of  the  army, 
being  promoted  lieutenant-colonel  immediately  on  the 
declaration  of  hostilities.  After  some  time  spent  in  recruit 
ing  duties  at  Philadelphia,  he  succeeded  in  getting  orders 
to  proceed  to  the  frontier  at  Niagara,  reporting  to  General 
Alexander  Smyth.  In  the  ill-conducted  engagement  at 
Queenstown  Scott  was  at  one  time  in  command  of  the 
troops  rashly  sent  to  the  farther  side  of  the  Niagara  River, 
and,  after  their  defeat,  he  entered  into  a  capitulation.  He 
was  courteously  treated  by  his  captors,  paroled,  and,  in 
January,  1813,  exchanged.  The  war  was  still  proceeding, 


WINF1ELD   SCOTT  115 

and  so  Scott  had  a  farther  opportunity,  of  which  he  was 
destined  to  make  better  use. 

In  May,  1813,  Colonel  Scott  joined  the  staff  of  General 
Dearborn  as  adjutant-general,  and  on  the  2yth  he  led  the 
advance  against  Fort  George,  a  work  on  the  British  side  of 
the  Niagara  River.  The  troops  were  met  by  the  enemy  as 
they  were  disembarking,  and  it  was  not  till  the  second 
attempt  and  after  heavy  loss  that  a  foothold  was  gained 
and  the  British  driven  back.  Scott  instantly  pursued, 
gained  the  rear  of  Fort  George,  and,  from  prisoners,  learned 
that  it  was  being  abandoned  and  that  its  magazines  were 
about  to  be  exploded.  Followed  by  captains  Hyndman 
and  Stockton,  he  instantly  galloped  towards  the  fort,  but 
was  struck  down  from  his  horse  by  the  explosion  of  one  of 
the  magazines,  and  had  his  collar-bone  broken.  For  most 
men  this  would  have  been  enough,  but  Scott  was  undeterred. 
He  struggled  to  his  feet,  ran  on,  was  the  first  to  reach  the 
fort  and  hauled  down  the  enemy's  flag  with  his  own  hands, 
while  Hyndman  and  Stockton  were  stamping  out  the  fuses 
that  would  in  another  minute  have  exploded  the  two  remain 
ing  magazines. 

By  his  conspicuous  action  at  the  taking  of  Fort  George, 
and  in  other  ways  as  well,  Colonel  Scott  won  considerable 
repute  in  the  army,  a  repute  that  penetrated  even  as  far  as 
Washington,  so  that  at  the  close  of  1813,  a  year  marked 
by  numerous  reverses  and  by  the  glaring  incapacity  of  our 
generals,  he  was  noted  in  many  quarters  as  an  officer 
likely  to  be  soon  tried  in  independent  commands.  Promo 
tion  came  in  March,  1814,  six  years  after  joining  the  army, 
and  made  him  at  the  very  early  age  of  twenty-seven  a 
brigadier-general.  Up  to  this  point  he  had  moved  upwards 
even  faster  than  his  illustrious  contemporary,  Napoleon. 

Appointed  to  the  army  of  Major-General  Brown,  Scott  first 
devoted  his  attention  to  a  considerable  camp  of  instruction 
formed  at  Buffalo.  There,  armed  with  a  single  copy  of 


Il6  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

the  French  Manuel  d'Injanterie,  he  set  himself  to  teach 
his  raw  army  scientific  war.  He  took  in  hand  personally 
large  squads  of  officers  which  he  put  through  the  soldiers' 
exercises,  and  after  several  weeks  of  unremitting  toil  he 
was  rewarded  by  finding  his  companies,  regiments,  and 
brigades  capable  of  effective  deployment  into  a  well- 
aligned  battle  array  and  full  of  confidence  in  their  chief. 

At  the  end  of  June  General  Brown  arrived  at  Buffalo, 
and  promptly  decided  on  an  effort  to  capture  Fort  Erie, 
on  the  Canadian  bank  of  the  Niagara  River.  Scott,  as  had 
now  become  usual,  was  placed  in  command  of  the  van;  he 
was  nearly  drowned  while  effecting  a  landing,  but  was 
rescued  and  was  able  to  carry  through  the  expedition  to 
a  successful  end,  the  fort  surrendering  to  the  greatly  superior 
numbers  brought  against  it.  At  dawn  of  the  next  morning, 
the  4th  of  July,  1814,  an  English  force  under  Lord  Tweed- 
dale  was  discovered  advancing  towards  Fort  Erie;  Scott 
promptly  attacked  it,  and,  on  the  enemy  retreating,  pursued 
sixteen  miles  to  the  Chippewa  River  with  the  utmost  vigor. 
At  this  point  he  discovered  the  main  British  army  under 
General  Riall. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  5th  Brown  joined  his  lieu 
tenant  and  decided  to  take  the  offensive.  To  do  this  it 
appeared  necessary  to  cross  the  Chippewa,  which  was 
strongly  held  at  its  mouth  by  the  enemy.  It  was  therefore 
decided  to  bridge  it  some  way  up-stream,  and  until  this 
should  be  accomplished,  never  suspecting  that  General 
Riall  might  also  decide  to  take  the  offensive,  Scott  indulged 
his  men  with  their  deferred  4th-of-July  dinner.  Late  in 
the  afternoon,  dinner  being  disposed  of,  he  led  them  down 
to  some  meadows  towards  his  left,  about  one  mile  from  the 
Chippewa  River,  where  he  intended  employing  such  leisure 
as  yet  remained  in  putting  them  through  some  field  exer 
cises.  Just  as  Scott  reached  a  bridge  crossing  a  creek 
near  these  meadows  he  was  joined  by  Brown  galloping 


WINFIELD    SCOTT  117 

up  with  the  information  that  the  whole  British  army  was 
on  them. 

Scott  barely  had  time  to  get  his  guns  in  position  and  to 
start  his  column  over  the  bridge  when  the  British  artillery 
opened.  It  was  at  this  moment  that  the  long  hours  of  drill 
in  the  camp  of  instruction  at  Buffalo  came  to  their  proof. 
With  a  steadiness  that  astonished  the  British  general,  Scott's 
infantry  continued  its  march  across  the  bridge,  deploying 
into  line  of  battle  on  the  farther  side  face  to  face  with 
the  British.  Scott  was  outnumbered,  and  the  rest  of  the 
army  was  not  within  supporting  distance  of  his  brigade, 
but  he  disposed  his  troops  with  such  skill  as  to  secure  an 
enfilading  fire,  and  his  men  behaved  with  great  determina 
tion.  The  two  lines  closed  nearer  and  nearer  firing  succes 
sive  volleys  until  they  were  locked  together,  in  some  places 
at  push  of  bayonet;  the  breaking-point  was  soon  reached, 
and  it  was  the  British  who  broke.  Scott  pursued  as  far  as 
the  Chippewa  River,  making  many  prisoners.  The  victory 
of  Chippewa  came  at  a  moment  when  a  gleam  of  success 
was  badly  wanted  to  lighten  up  the  gloom  caused  by  many 
months  of  failure.  The  country  rejoiced,  and  Scott  in 
stantly  became  a  national  hero. 

A  second  engagement,  that  of  Lundy's  Lane,  was  soon 
fought  by  the  two  armies  within  a  few  miles  of  the  Chippewa 
River.  Riall,  reinforced  by  Sir  Gordon  Drummond,  re 
sumed  the  offensive,  and  the  American  army,  unaware 
of  the  enemy's  vicinity,  was  unexpectedly  attacked  on  the 
1 5th  of  July.  Scott's  brigade  was  first  in  action,  and,  well 
handled,  won  some  success,  including  the  capture  of  General 
Riall.  Then  followed  a  confused  night  engagement  in 
which,  after  the  Americans  had  gained  some  advantage, 
the  British  delivered  several  successive  attacks  that  were 
all  for  the  moment  driven  back.  Scott,  however,  had 
two  horses  killed  under  him  and  was  twice  wounded,  the 
last  time  so  severely  that  he  had  to  leave  the  field.  Brown 


Ii8  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

having  also  been  wounded,  the  command  devolved  on 
General  Ripley.  That  officer  decided  on  retreat,  so  that 
on  the  following  day  the  British  occupied  the  American 
positions  and  claimed  a  victory. 

Scott,  who  was  shortly  after  promoted  major-general, 
was  seriously  wounded,  and  took  no  farther  part  in  the 
war.  He  was  met  with  great  ovations  on  his  journey  to 
Washington,  and  his  own  description  of  one  of  the  scenes 
that  took  place  on  this  occasion  is  so  characteristic  that  it  is 
here  reproduced  just  as  he  wrote  it  in  his  memoirs:  "From 
Albany  another  long  journey,  on  a  mattress,  was  to  be 
undertaken.  At  Princeton  College  (Nassau  Hall)  a  very 
interesting  scene  occurred.  The  invalid  chanced  to  arrive 
at  that  seat  of  learning  on  Commencement  Day,  in  the 
midst  of  its  exercises,  and  made  a  short  halt  for  rest.  He 
was  scarcely  placed  on  a  bed  when  a  deputation  from  the 
Trustees  and  Faculty  did  him  the  honor  to  bear  him,  almost 
by  main  strength,  to  the  platform  of  their  body.  This  was 
in  the  venerable  church  where  thousands  of  literary  and 
scientific  degrees  had  been  conferred  on  pupils  from  all 
parts  of  the  Union.  The  floor  and  galleries  were  filled 
to  overflowing  with  much  of  the  intelligence,  beauty,  and 
fashion  of  a  wide  circle  of  the  country. 

"All  united  in  clamorous  greeting  to  the  young  wounded 
soldier  (bachelor),  the  only  representative  they  had  seen 
of  a  successful,  noble  army. 

"The  emotion  was  overpowering.  Seated  on  the  platform 
with  the  authorities,  he  had  scarcely  recovered  from  that 
burst  of  enthusiasm,  when  he  was  again  assailed  with  all 
the  powers  of  oratory.  .  .  .  Finally  the  honorary  degree 
of  Master  of  Arts,  conferred  on  the  soldier,  rounded  off 
his  triumphs  of  the  day." 

All  this  is  very  like  Scott.  Alongside  of  his  great  military 
qualities  he  had  marked  foibles.  He  was  a  conspicuously 
tall  and  handsome  man,  inclined  to  vanity  on  the  score  of 


WINFIELD   SCOTT  119 

his  looks  and  his  achievements,  to  which  he  added  an 
exaggerated  dignity  of  manner  and  a  fondness  for  the 
trappings  of  rank.  "Old  fuss  and  feathers"  was  his  name 
in  the  army,  and  it  fitted  him  like  a  glove.  His  courage 
was  exuberant,  and  on  at  least  one  occasion,  shortly  after 
the  war,  led  him  into  very  foolish  behavior.  He  had 
made  some  comments  on  certain  proceedings  of  Andrew 
Jackson,  which  led  that  general  to  correspond  with  and 
complain  of  Scott.  His  reply  was  part  provocative,  part 
pompous,  and  wholly  inconclusive.  Soon  afterwards 
Scott  found  himself  in  Washington,  where  Jackson  had 
just  arrived  to  take  his  seat  in  the  Senate.  For  six  con 
secutive  days  Scott  attended  the  meetings  of  that  body 
as  a  spectator,  placing  himself  so  that  Jackson  could  not 
fail  to  see  him,  and  on  one  occasion  deliberately  walked 
out  just  in  front  of  him.  It  was  a  regular  "won't  you  step 
on  the  tail  of  my  coat?"  proceeding,  but  Jackson  declined 
to  notice  his  fire-eating  brother  officer.  Finally  Scott  wrote 
as  follows: 

"SiR, — One  portion  of  the  American  community  has 
long  attributed  to  you  the  most  distinguished  magnanimity, 
and  the  other  the  greatest  desperation,  in  your  resentments. 
Am  I  to  conclude  that  both  are  in  error?  I  allude  to  cir 
cumstances  which  have  transpired  between  us,  and  which 
need  not  here  be  recapitulated,  and  that  I  have  now  been 
six  days  in  your  immediate  vicinity  without  having  attracted 
your  notice.  As  this  is  the  first  time  in  my  life  that  I  have 
been  within  a  hundred  miles  of  you,  and  as  it  is  barely 
possible  that  you  may  be  ignorant  of  my  presence,  I  beg 
leave  to  state  that  I  shall  not  leave  the  District  before  the 
morning  of  the  i4th  inst." 

To  this  swashbuckling  provocation  Jackson  had  the 
good  sense  to  answer  with  mild  courtesy,  and  there  the 
matter  fortunately  dropped. 

After  the  close  of  the  war  we  find  Scott  travelling  to 


120  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

Paris,  which  was  then  in  the  occupation  of  Wellington  and 
Bliicher.  There  he  seems  once  more  to  have  done  all  that 
was  reasonably  possible  to  bring  on  a  private  conflict  with 
pistols,  by  organizing  a  banquet  at  a  hotel  immediately 
opposite  the  headquarters  of  a  British  regiment  to  celebrate 
Jackson's  defeat  of  Pakenham  and  the  veterans  of  the 
Peninsula.  On  his  return  to  Washington  he  married  a 
Miss  Mayo,  and  then  relapsed  into  the  humdrum  duties 
of  a  general  in  times  of  peace. 

For  seventeen  years  Scott's  life  was  uneventful,  until 
1832,  when  South  Carolina  became  greatly  excited  over 
the  Nullification  proclamation  and  threatened  to  secede 
from  the  Union.  He  was  now  specially  selected  by 
President  Jackson  to  take  charge  of  affairs  at  Charleston. 
In  this  delicate  task  he  showed  much  discretion  and  tact, 
and  his  forbearance  was  largely  instrumental  in  averting 
violent  action  on  the  part  of  the  South  Carolinians,  action 
that  might  have  brought  on  a  civil  war.  Shortly  after 
this  he  saw  active  service  once  more. 

At  the  close  of  1835  tne  l°nS  war  against  the  Seminoles 
and  Creeks  of  Florida  and  Georgia  began.  Scott  was  sent 
down  to  take  command  in  1836,  but  accomplished  nothing, 
either  on  the  Withlacoochee  against  the  Seminoles  or  on 
the  Chattahoochee  against  the  Creeks.  The  great  diffi 
culty  was  one  of  transportation  and  Scott  had  been,  with 
slender  means,  unable  to  solve  it.  He  was  summoned  to 
Washington  by  order  of  Jackson  to  appear  before  a  military 
court,  his  command  being  transferred  to  other"  officers, 
who  proved  no  more  successful.  The  Court  of  Inquiry 
honorably  acquitted  Scott,  and  unanimously  recorded  its 
approval  of  the  steps  taken  by  him  for  prosecuting  the  war 
against  the  Indians.  It  may,  however,  not  be  useless  to 
reproduce  the  opening  sentence  of  the  accused  and  indignant 
general's  address  to  his  judges:  "Mr.  President  and  Gentle- 


WINFIELD   SCOTT  12 1 

men  of  the  Court:  When  a  Doge  of  Genoa,  for  some  im 
aginary  offence  imputed  by  Louis  XIV.,  was  torn  from  his 
government  and  compelled  to  visit  France  in  order  to 
debase  himself  before  that  inflated  monarch  .  .  .  ."  It 
is  clear,  unfortunately  clear,  that  the  ''inflated  monarch" 
Scott  had  in  mind  was  none  other  than  Andrew  Jackson, 
President  of  the  United  States! 

In  1839  Scott,  whose  real  abilities  and  conspicuous  traits 
had  both  served  him  with  the  political  world,  came  out  as 
a  presidential  candidate.  It  was  "without  wish  or  agency 
on  his  part,"  as  he  carefully  informs  the  reader  of  his 
memoirs,  that  his  name  was  put  forward;  it  was  neverthe 
less  an  obvious  disappointment  to  him  when  the  nomination 
went  to  Harrison.  A  compensation  came  soon  after, 
however,  in  the  form  of  the  appointment  to  be  commander  - 
in-chief  of  the  army  of  the  United  States.  This  was  in 
1841,  and  only  five  years  later  the  new  commander-in- 
chief's  powers  were  put  to  the  most  severe  test. 

The  war  with  Mexico  broke  out  in  the  early  part  of  the 
year  1846.  It  was  one  of  those  incidents  in  the  spread 
of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  over  the  world,  of  which  Elizabeth's 
seamen  gave  the  first  examples  and  of  which  the  present 
day  has  given  us  the  continuing  tradition  in  the  Transvaal 
and  at  Panama.  Seen  close  to,  such  episodes  in  our  history 
savor  too  strongly  of  politics  and  sordid  motives  to  attract 
the  reader  possessed  of  the  slightest  elevation  of  mind; 
viewed  in  a  wider  perspective,  however,  they  possess  that 
attraction  which  often  bedecks  the  less  lofty  actions  when 
set  in  the  scenery  of  war  and  of  a  great  racial  evolution. 
The  war  with  Mexico  was  a  land-grabbing  affair;  party 
wire-pullers  were  constantly  tampering  with  the  machinery 
of  our  army;  Scott  himself  had  been  a  presidential  candi 
date  and  might  again  figure  in  that  capacity;  yet  the  pure 
military  achievement  was  great  and  is,  fortunately,  the 


122  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

only  direct  issue  here.  For  Scott  was  first  and  foremost 
a  soldier,  and,  however  much  or  little  politics  influenced 
him,  his  campaign  of  Mexico  is  a  well-nigh  flawless  example 
of  the  performance  of  military  duty. 

There  were  two  possible  ways  of  conducting  war  against 
Mexico.  The  first  arose  naturally  from  the  cause  of  the 
dispute.  The  question  was,  should  the  United  States  or 
should  Mexico  control  Texas;  hostilities  took  place  on  the 
border;  both  parties  sent  reinforcements  to  that  point; 
presently  the  Mexican  army  under  Arista  and  the  Amer 
ican  army  under  Taylor  were  in  presence  on  the  Rio 
Grande.  But  a  victory  could  have  little  effect  at  a  point 
so  remote  from  the  populous  parts  of  both  countries,  and  a 
march  from  the  Rio  Grande  to  the  city  of  Mexico  would 
involve  a  line  of  communications  through  a  hostile  country 
and  of  such  length  that  only  a  very  numerous  army  could 
venture  to  hold  it.  Scott  at  the  very  outbreak  of  the  war 
proposed  another  plan  of  campaign  based  on  perfectly 
sound  strategical  reasons;  and  it  was  eventually  adopted. 
By  this  plan  an  army  was  to  be  transported  by  sea  to  the 
port  of  Vera  Cruz,  and,  after  capturing  that  city  and  es 
tablishing  a  base,  was  thence  to  march  on  the  Mexican 
capital,  260  miles  inland.  There,  it  was  supposed,  a  peace 
could  be  dictated. 

The  events  of  the  spring  and  summer  of  1846  demon 
strated  the  futility  of  operations  on  the  Rio  Grande. 
Taylor  won  several  successes  and  pushed  as  far  south  as 
Saltillo,  but  there  came  to  a  stop  and  was  clearly  not 
able  to  carry  offensive  operations  on  that  line  to  any  decisive 
conclusion.  Finally,  President  Polk  and  his  advisers 
concluded  that  they  must  let  Scott  take  charge  and  carry 
out  his  plan,  and  with  that  object  he  left  Washington  just 
before  the  close  of  1846.  First  proceeding  to  Taylor's 
camp  he  conferred  with  that  general  and  made  arrange 
ments  for  drawing  some  of  his  troops  for  the  projected 


WINFIELD   SCOTT  123 

move  on  Vera  Cruz.  Taylor  was  left,  much  to  his  disgust, 
with  the  bare  minimum  that  would  enable  him  to  maintain 
the  defensive,  and  Scott  assembled  a  force  of  12,000  men 
for  his  expedition.  On  the  yth  of  March  the  army 
reached  the  coast  near  Vera  Cruz,  and  on  the  Qth  a  landing 
was  effected  unopposed  by  the  enemy. 

There  was  a  garrison,  however,  sufficient  to  man  the 
not  inconsiderable  fortifications  of  Vera  Cruz,  and  Scott 
decided  that  regular  siege  operations  must  be  opened. 
For  this  purpose  heavy  artillery  had  been  placed  on  board 
ship  and  was  now  brought  to  land,  where  approaches  and 
batteries  had  already  been  begun.  On  the  22d  the  city 
was  summoned  to  surrender,  and,  on  the  governor's  refusal, 
the  American  batteries  opened  fire. 

Vera  Cruz  was  not  very  stubbornly  defended,  but 
surrendered  long  before  any  signs  of  a  breach  had 
appeared,  on  the  2yth  of  March.  Five  thousand  pris 
oners  were  taken  and  a  strong  base  secured  at  a  cost 
of  less  than  one  hundred  officers  and  men  killed  and 
wounded. 

Scott  was  now  confronted  by  a  task  that  called  for  reso 
lution  and  courage  nearly  equal  to  that  of  Cortez  himself. 
He  had  but  12,000  men,  though  he  had  long  before  informed 
the  Government  that  24,000  would  be  necessary  to  carry 
the  enterprise  through  to  a  successful  termination.  The 
city  of  Mexico  was  nearly  300  miles  distant,  and  was  7000 
feet  higher  than  Vera  Cruz,  with  several  mountain  passes 
intervening.  Santa  Anna,  the  Mexican  president,  had  a 
deserved  military  reputation  and  large  resources,  while  it 
was  known  that  he  was  determined  to  defend  the  capital 
to  the  last  extremity.  Under  these  circumstances  it  might 
have  been  thought  that  Scott's  little  force  was  no  larger 
than  might  actually  be  required  to  protect  his  line  of 
communications  between  the  two  cities,  leave  alone  meeting 
20,000  or  30,000  Mexicans  in  battle.  Yet  Scott  faced  the 


124  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

problem,  a  problem  that  only  courage  and  firmness  of  well- 
nigh  heroic  quality  could  possibly  solve. 

In  a  little  more  than  two  weeks  after  the  capture  of  Vera 
Cruz  Scott  had  collected  sufficient  transportation  to  begin 
his  advance.  Twiggs'  division  marched  first,  followed  at 
a  few  days'  interval  by  Patterson's,  and  later  by  Worth's. 
At  Plan  del  Rio,  fifty  miles  from  the  coast,  this  first  stage 
of  the  advance  culminated;  just  beyond  this  point  the  road 
began  climbing  and  zigzagging  up  the  steep  pass  of  Cerro 
Gordo,  which  the  enemy  had  fortified  and  occupied  with 
13,000  men  and  40  guns.  Their  right  was  covered  by  a 
precipitous  ravine,  their  left  by  the  mountain  of  Cerro 
Gordo;  numerous  batteries  made  these  naturally  strong 
positions  apparently  impregnable. 

To  attack  Santa  Anna  Scott  disposed  of  less  than  9000 
men,  yet  he  never  doubted  of  complete  success.  Finding 
the  position  virtually  unassailable  on  its  front,  he  cast  about 
for  some  means  of  turning  it,  and  Captain  Robert  Lee, 
a  brilliant  young  engineer  officer  of  Scott's  staff,  succeeded 
in  discovering  a  line  whereby  troops  could  be  marched 
by  the  spurs  of  Cerro  Gordo  around  the  enemy's  left  flank 
to  his  rear  on  the  main  road  to  the  city  of  Mexico.  Pio 
neers  swiftly  and  secretly  improved  the  passage,  and  on  the 
evening  of  the  iyth  of  April  orders  were  issued  for  an  attack 
on  the  following  morning.  Twiggs'  division  was  to  turn 
the  enemy's  left  and  attack  his  rear,  while  the  rest  of  the 
army  pressed  him  in  front,  and  so  certain  was  Scott  of 
victory  that  the  greater  part  of  the  order  was  taken  up  with 
directions  for  carrying  on  the  pursuit  of  the  Mexicans  after 
their  anticipated  defeat.  On  the  following  morning  Scott's  or 
ders  were  carried  out  with  great  vigor  and  effect.  Santa  Anna 
had  grossly  failed  in  neglecting  to  cover  his  wings,  and 
paid  the  penalty.  His  army  was  surprised;  his  positions 
were  turned;  his  troops  were  routed.  Scott's  dragoons 
pursued  relentlessly,  and  a  military  oversight  in  the  face 


WINFIELD  SCOTT  125 

of  a  bold  opponent  cost  the  Mexican  army  1200  killed 
and  wounded,  3000  prisoners,  and  all  their  artillery. 
The  American  losses  were  less  than  500  killed  and 
wounded. 

Scott  followed  up  his  brilliant  success  by  a  rapid  advance; 
he  believed  in  improving  victories.  For  four  weeks  the 
army  marched  on,  meeting  little  opposition  and  securing 
several  fortified  posts,  until  on  the  i5th  of  May  the  city 
of  Puebla  was  reached,  180  miles  from  Vera  Cruz  and 
only  80  from  Mexico.  Here  Scott  had  perforce  to  come 
to  a  halt.  For  of  his  little  army  nearly  one-half  was  made 
up  of  volunteer  regiments,  and  these  now  claimed  a  discharge 
under  the  terms  on  which  they  had  enlisted.  There  was 
no  help  for  it;  Scott  let  the  troops  return  to  the  coast  and 
with  a  mere  handful  of  men,  5000  all  told,  settled  down  at 
Puebla  until  he  should  get  reinforcements  and  be  able 
to  resume  his  march  on  the  Mexican  capital. 

It  was  weary  waiting,  and  infinitely  dangerous,  while 
the  politicians  at  Washington  and  the  hostile  administration 
were  wrangling  and  wire-pulling  over  the  fate  of  the  gal 
lant  little  army.  At  last  reinforcements  slowly  came  up, 
and  in  August  Scott,  now  at  the  head  of  11,000  effective 
men,  was  able  to  resume  offensive  operations.  Dividing 
his  army  into  four  divisions  under  Worth,  Twiggs,  Pillow, 
and  Quitman,  he  marched  out  from  Puebla  on  the  yth  of 
August. 

Meanwhile,  Santa  Anna  had  collected  a  considerable 
force,  about  25,000  men,  for  the  defence  of  the  capital,  but, 
not  realizing  fully  the  perils  to  which  Scott's  little  army 
was  exposed  owing  to  its  comparative  isolation  from  its 
base,  he  adopted  a  defective  plan  of  campaign.  Instead 
of  leaving  Mexico  to  take  care  of  itself  and  carrying  on 
offensive  operations  against  the  Americans,  attacking 
especially  their  line  of  communications,  he  resolved  to 
await  Scott's  advance  under  the  walls  of  the  city  and  there 


126  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

to  stake  everything  on  the  results  of  a  pitched  battle.  This 
course  proved  a  fatal  one. 

On  the  1 2th  contact  with  the  enemy  was  established  at  a 
point  only  8  miles  from  the  city  of  Mexico,  and  it  soon  be 
came  clear  that  any  further  advance  would  be  in  the  face  of 
great  obstacles.  Reconnaissances  disclosed  the  fact  that  the 
whole  Mexican  army  was  drawn  up  on  a  narrow,  hilly,  and 
heavily  fortified  front,  while  its  flanks  were  covered  by 
Lake  Tezcoco  to  the  north  and  Lake  Xochimilco  to  the 
south.  Clearly  the  approach  to  the  city  from  the  east  was 
too  risky,  and,  as  at  Cerro  Gordo,  Scott  cast  about  for  means 
to  get  around  his  enemy's  wings. 

As  at  Cerro  Gordo  the  American  army  once  more  suc 
ceeded  in  getting  at  Santa  Anna  by  moving  over  ground 
which  the  Mexican  President  had  considered  impracticable. 
By  a  rapid  circuitous  march  to  the  southwest,  between  the 
lakes  and  the  spurs  of  Popocatepetl,  Scott  succeeded  in 
placing  his  army  on  another  road  leading  to  the  city  of 
Mexico  from  the  south.  Santa  Anna,  however,  moving 
on  interior  lines,  quickly  faced  the  Americans  again,  and 
took  position  behind  some  heavy  intrenchments  about  the 
hacienda  of  San  Antonio  directly  in  the  line  of  advance. 

The  situation  of  the  American  army  was  now  apparently 
even  worse  than  before.  In  front  was  the  enemy  numeri 
cally  much  superior  and  in  carefully  prepared  positions; 
to  the  right  were  the  lakes;  in  the  rear  were  lofty  mountains; 
to  the  left  was  a  rugged  district  known  as  the  Pedregal, 
a  maze  of  broken  ridges  and  ancient  lava-beds  reputed 
impassable.  Once  more,  however,  Scott  punished  Santa 
Anna  for  his  inert  defensive,  and  overcame  the  natural 
obstacle.  Lee  found  a  way  through  the  Pedregal;  the 
army  once  more  shifted  to  its  left;  and  on  the  igth  of 
August  Worth  and  Pillow  debouched  from  the  wilderness 
of  lava  on  to  the  road  that  runs  into  Mexico  from  the  south 
west  through  Contreras. 


WINFIELD   SCOTT  127 

•  At  Contreras  itself  a  desperate  action  was  fought  that 
very  day.  One  half  of  Scott's  force  was  faced  by  6000 
Mexicans,  who,  before  the  end  of  the  day,  were  supported 
by  the  bulk  of  Santa  Anna's  army.  Little  headway  was 
made  by  the  Americans,  for  the  Mexicans  were  as  usual 
heavily  and  not  unskilfully  intrenched.  At  the  close  of 
the  day's  fighting  the  troops  had  gained  little  and  were 
faced  by  four  times  their  numbers.  Under  these  circum 
stances  an  anxious  conference  was  held  by  the  generals, 
to  which  Lee  was  summoned.  The  heroic  ardor  and 
courage  of  the  absent  general-in-chief  was  reflected  by  his 
staff-officer.  The  generals  decided  not  to  relax  from  the 
offensive,  but  to  continue  their  efforts  and  to  attempt, 
by  a  night  movement,  the  surprise  of  the  enemy's  lines  at 
early  dawn.  Lee,  after  seven  other  staff-officers  had  failed, 
rode  back  through  the  Pedregal  in  a  terrific  storm  to 
carry  this  information  to  Scott,  and  the  general  sent 
him  back  once  more  to  convey  his  approval  of  their 
decision.  Lee  was  further  charged  to  announce  a  simul 
taneous  movement  by  the  wing  that  had  not  crossed  over 
the  Pedregal. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  2oth  an  attack  was  delivered, 
for  which  the  Mexicans  were  quite  unprepared.  In  little 
more  than  fifteen  minutes  all  their  positions  near  Contreras 
were  won,  and  a  disordered  retreat  began.  From  this 
early  discomfiture  they  were  not  allowed  to  recover.  Far 
to  the  right  Worth  drove  the  enemy  out  of  San  Antonio, 
and  then  the  two  American  columns  pressed  on  in  pursuit, 
converging  on  Churubusco.  There  the  Mexicans  held 
their  ground  for  two  hours,  but  the  irresistible  vigor  of  the 
American  troops  finally  prevailed  and  the  defeated  army 
sought  refuge  within  the  walls  of  the  capital.  Kearney 
with  two  squadrons  of  dragoons  sabred  the  fugitives  up  to 
the  very  gates.  In  this  severe  fighting  Scott  had  lost  just 
over  icoo  killed  and  wounded;  the  enemy  suffered  three 


128  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

times  as  much,  besides  losing  3000  prisoners,  37  guns, 
and  a  quantity  of  supplies. 

Scott  could  probably  have  carried  the  city  of  Mexico  by 
force  of  arms  that  night  or  the  following  morning;  he 
chose  rather  to  hold  his  hand.  The  reason  he  gives  is  that 
he  feared  lest  a  further  disaster  would  shatter  Santa  Anna's 
government,  and  thereby  postpone  the  peace  that  now 
appeared  inevitable.  He  may  also  have  hesitated  at  plac 
ing  his  little  army  in  the  midst  of  such  a  large  population, 
under  circumstances  that  might  have  resulted  in  street 
fighting.  As  it  was,  he  sent  in  a  flag  and  proposed  an 
armistice  with  a  view  to  negotiating  a  peace.  Santa  Anna  ac 
cepted  the  proposal,  but  only  to  gain  time  for  reorganizing 
his  forces. 

For  two  weeks  the  American  troops  camped  in  sight  of 
the  city,  and  then,  on  the  yth  of  September,  Santa  Anna 
being  now  ready  to  renew  the  struggle,  hostilities  broke 
out  again.  As  a  first  step  Scott  decided  to  capture  an 
arsenal  just  outside  the  city  gates  known  as  Molinos  del 
Rey,  and  also  the  formidable  height  and  fort  of  Chapultepec 
that  commanded  it.  On  the  8th  Molinos  del  Rey  was 
gallantly  attacked  and  captured  by  Worth's  division,  but 
at  a  cost  of  no  less  than  800  killed  and  wounded.  On 
the  1 2th  batteries  of  siege-guns  opened  fire  on  Chapul 
tepec.  Twenty-four  hours  later  Scott  sent  two  columns 
to  the  attack,  and  after  a  brief  struggle  the  hill  and  fort 
were  carried.  On  all  sides  the  troops  pressed  on  after  the 
retreating  enemy,  and  General  Quitman  succeeded  in 
taking  the  San  Cosme  gate  before  dark.  At  four  o'clock 
on  the  following  morning  a  deputation  from  the  municipality 
reached  the  commander-in-chief  to  treat  for  the  capitula 
tion  of  the  city. 

Although  in  all  these  operations  Santa  Anna  had  grossly 
violated  strategical  principles  in  confining  himself  to  a 
passive  defence,  this  does  not  detract  from  the  extraor- 


WINFIELD   SCOTT  129 

dinary  brilliance  of  Scott's  achievement.  What  stands 
out  most  conspicuously  is  his  boldness,  his  greatness  of 
heart.  And  his  army  was  like  him.  Not  even  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  in  its  greatest  days  equalled  the 
splendidly  officered,  splendidly  disciplined,  splendidly  effec 
tive  and  responsive  army  that  carried  the  stars  and  stripes 
in  triumph  from  Contreras  to  Chapultepec.  The  achieve 
ment  was  on  a  small  scale,  yet  it  has  rarely  been  surpassed 
in  military  annals.  Wellington  had  pronounced  an  advance 
to  Mexico  impossible.  Grant,  who  fought  through  the 
campaign  as  a  subaltern,  declared  afterwards  that  Scott's 
strategy  and  tactics  "were  faultless."  Lee  always  spoke 
of  his  chief  with  the  utmost  reverence,  and  once  said  of 
him  that  he  did  not  "hide  his  head  under  a  bushel,  but 
appears  the  bold,  sagacious,  truthful  man  that  he  is." 

In  truth  Scott,  like  nearly  all  great  generals,  was  something 
of  a  statesman  as  well.  His  fondness  for  full-dress  uni 
forms  and  parades  was  but  a  trifling  weakness  and  was 
much  weighed  down  in  the  balance  by  the  broad  humanity 
and  benevolence  he  showed  to  the  conquered.  By  the 
strict  discipline  he  enforced  and  by  his  consideration  for 
their  interests  he  won  the  good  will  of  the  Mexicans,  and 
during  the  long  weeks  that  followed  Chapultepec  the 
American  army  established  excellent  relations  with  the 
inhabitants  of  the  capital.  At  last  the  long-protracted 
negotiations  culminated  in  peace,  and  in  February,  1848, 
Scott  was  able  to  turn  over  the  command  to  General  Butler 
and  start  for  home  and  well-earned  repose. 

For  his  services  in  Mexico  Scott  was  rewarded  by  a 
joint  resolution  of  thanks  passed  by  the  Senate  and  the 
House  of  Representatives  on  the  Qth  of  March,  1848. 
Four  years  later  he  received  the  brevet  rank  of  lieutenant- 
general,  being  the  first  officer  to  reach  that  grade  since 
George  Washington.  His  great  prominence  in  the  national 
life  now  once  more  led  him  into  the  political  arena.  Not 


130  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

without  some  heartburning  and  unseemly  exhibitions  of 
petty  vanity  he  secured  the  Whig  nomination  for  the  presi 
dency  in  June,  1852,  but  in  the  ensuing  election,  largely 
owing  to  his  own  blunders,  he  was  overwhelmingly  defeated 
by  Franklin  Pierce.  His  own  comment  on  the  result  can 
by  no  means  be  passed  over:  "For  his  political  defeats," 
he  writes,  "the  autobiographer  cannot  too  often  return 
thanks  to  God.  As  he  has  said  before,  they  proved  benefits 
to  him.  Have  they  been  such  to  his  country?  This  is  a 
point  that  may,  perhaps,  hereafter  be  doubted  by  calm 
inquirers." 

With  the  exception  of  this  excursion  into  political  affairs, 
there  is  nothing  of  moment  in  Scott's  life  to  mark  the  period 
that  elapsed  between  the  Mexican  and  the  Civil  War.  The 
Secession  movement  found  him  still  general-in-chief,  but 
old  and  infirm.  It  was  evident  to  all,  and  to  Scott  himself, 
that  he  was  past  commanding  an  army  in  the  field.  But 
from  this  the  politicians  jumped  to  the  conclusion  that  he 
was  not  competent  even  to  offer  counsel.  It  was  perhaps 
the  greatest  in  Lincoln's  long  series  of  military  blunders 
that  he  was  unable  to  gauge  the  value  of  Scott's  technical 
attainments  and  advice.  If  Buchanan  would  not  listen 
to  the  veteran's  reiterated  plea  that  the  coast  fortresses 
should  be  secured  by  adequate  garrisons  and  the  South 
thus  shut  off  from  outside  communication,  the  reason  is 
plainly  that  Buchanan's  heart  was  with  the  Secession 
movement.  Lincoln  had  no  such  excuse  to  offer.  He 
apparently  did  not  consider  for  a  moment  Scott's  perfectly 
reasonable  opinion  that  300,000  men  under  an  able  general 
might  carry  the  business  through  in  two  or  three  years.  This 
was  far  from  immoderate;  it  proved,  in  fact,  an  underesti 
mate;  but  the  Government  decided  that  75,000  men  enlisted 
for  three  months  would  suffice,  which  resulted  in  McDowell's 
premature  advance  on  Manassas  Junction  and  the  disaster 


WINFIELD   SCOTT  131 

of  Bull  Run.  Worse  was  to  follow,  for  the  deplorable  in 
cident  that  closed  Scott's  military  career  certainly  constitutes 
one  of  the  gravest  faults  in  the  administration  of  that  fine 
diplomat,  clever  politician,  admirable  patriot,  but  far  from 
impeccable  statesman,  Abraham  Lincoln. 

In  his  memoirs  Scott  displays  a  restraint  unusual  with 
him  when  dealing  with  the  circumstances  of  his  retirement 
from  command  of  the  army.  He  adopts  the  official  version 
presented  by  the  Administration  to  the  country,  and  this, 
doubtless,  for  the  patriotic  motive  of  avoiding  any  con 
troversy  likely  to  diminish  the  prestige  of  those  in  office. 
But  his  biographer,  forty  years  after  the  events,  may  well 
reestablish  the  facts  in  their  true  light. 

McDowell  had  been  defeated  by  Johnston  and  Beaure- 
gard  at  Bull  Run.  The  half-drilled  volunteers  had  lost 
their  cohesion  under  the  strain  of  retreat.  Washington 
was  full  of  stampeded  soldiers.  The  wildest  alarm  pre 
vailed.  The  Administration,  closely  responsive  to  public 
sentiment,  cast  about  for  a  new  general  to  supersede 
McDowell,  and  their  choice  fell  on  McClellan.  This 
officer's  great  capacity  was  widely  known,  he  had  been 
successful  in  some  engagements  in  western  Virginia,  and, 
on  the  whole,  the  choice  was  reasonable  and  justified. 
But  what  followed  McClellan's  arrival  at  Washington  was 
neither  reasonable  nor  justified.  The  Administration, 
while  retaining  Scott  as  commander-in-chief,  gave  all  their 
confidence  to  the  younger  man  and  freely  adopted  his 
views.  It  was  subversive  to  the  discipline  of  the  army 
to  deal  direct  with  a  subordinate  over  the  head  of  the 
commander-in-chief.  It  was  folly  to  hearken  to  McClellan's 
timid  views  and  to  turn  deaf  ears  to  Scott's  stout-hearted 
and  perfectly  sound  opinions.  But  the  Administration  was 
panic-stricken  and  cared  neither  for  decency,  nor  discipline, 
nor  reason.  Scott  maintained  silence,  however,  until,  on 
the  8th  of  August,  his  subordinate  wrote  him  a  letter  which 


132  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

broke  down  his  restraint.  In  this  letter  McClellan  urged 
the  immediate  necessity  of  taking  steps  to  secure  Wash 
ington  from  an  attack  on  the  part  of  Beauregard  at  the 
head  of  100,000  men,  and  generally  wrote  in  such  a  tone 
as  completely  to  reveal  both  his  state  of  panic  and  his  lack 
of  subordination.  Scott  promptly  wrote  to  the  Secretary 
of  War.  In  this  letter  he  scouted  McClellan' s  opinion  that 
Washington  was  in  "imminent  danger,"  and  declared 
roundly  that  he  had  "not  the  slightest  apprehension  for 
the  safety  of  the  Government  here."  He  concluded  by 
requesting  that  his  resignation  as  commander-in-chief  be 
accepted. 

This  communication  was  shown  to  McClellan  by  the 
President,  who  asked  the  younger  general  to  withdraw  his 
letter.  McClellan  consented.  Lincoln  then  went  in  person 
to  see  Scott,  and  asked  him  if,  under  the  circumstances, 
he  would  agree  to  withdraw  his  own  letter.  Scott  took 
two  days  to  consider  his  reply,  and  then,  on  the  i2th  of 
August,  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  declining  to  with 
draw  his  letter,  and  specifying  very  clearly  that  his  ground 
for  this  refusal  was  the  obvious  fact  that  the  Administration 
was  transacting  the  business  of  the  army  over  his  head 
with  his  subordinate.  To  this  there  was,  there  could  be, 
no  answer;  and  so  the  only  capable  and  clear-sighted 
general  officer  at  Washington  was  thus  virtually  forced 
out  of  the  army.  On  the  ist  of  November,  1861,  the 
President  announced  in  a  general  order  the  retirement  from 
active  command  of  the  honored  veteran  "upon  his  own 
application."  This  was  an  extremely  official  way  of  stating 
the  facts. 

• 

Thus  closed  Scott's  career,  unfortunately  for  the  country 
he  was  yet  capable  of  serving.  He  did  not  survive  long, 
but  died  on  the  2Qth  of  May,  1866,  at  West  Point.  Once 
the  favored  hero  of  the  American  public,  which  has  forever 
perpetuated  his  memory  in  one  of  its  favorite  exclamations 


WINF1ELD   SCOTT  133 

of  surprise,  it  was  his  misfortune  to  end  his  career  at  a 
moment  when  public  attention  was  riveted  on  events  of 
gigantic  magnitude  that  dwarfed  and  dimmed  the  memory 
of  his  exploits.  But  history  must  rescue  his  name  from 
oblivion  and  place  it  with  those  of  the  two  or  three  greatest 
captains  that  the  American  people  have  produced. 


PART   III 
THE   CIVIL   WAR 


North 

U.  S.  Grant 
VV.  T.  Sherman 
P.  Sheridan 
G.  McClellan 
George  Meade 


South 


R.  E.  Lee 
T.  J.  Jackson 
J.  E.  Johnston 


J. 


/113'' 


*!•••• 


ULYSSES  S.   GRANT 

No  man  since  Washington  has  rendered  greater  service 
to  the  United  States  than  Ulysses  Grant,  and  yet  his  figure 
as  it  appears  in  history  still  keeps  a  certain  haziness  of 
outline,  lacks  the  clear-cut  precision  with  which  we  evoke 
Franklin,  Andrew  Jackson,  Lee,  Jefferson,  Lincoln.  We 
realize  that  Grant  accomplished  the  greatest  deeds,  but  we 
fail  to  detect  in  him  anything  of  the  heroic,  anything  of  the 
supreme.  He  was  plain,  not  over-educated,  unprepossess 
ing  in  manners  and  appearance,  entirely  devoid  of  subtlety, 
far  removed  from  the  brilliant  intuitions  of  genius;  and 
so,  as  we  run  over  these  traits,  we  wonder  at  his  fame.  The 
fact  is  that  he  was  an  ordinary  American  citizen,  endowed 
with  exceptional  firmness  of  character  and  strong  practical 
sense,  whom  circumstances  placed  face  to  face  with  a 
problem  that  might  be  solved  by  the  relentless  and  single- 
minded  application  of  these  qualities  alone.  "The  whole 
man,"  says  Badeau,  "was  a  marvel  of  simplicity,  a  powerful 
nature  veiled  in  the  plainest  possible  exterior,  imposing 
on  all  but  the  acutest  judges  of  character,  or  the  constant 
companions  of  his  unguarded  hours."  His  success  was 
the  success  of  sheer  common  sense, — which  is  almost  the 
same  thing  as  generalship, — and  of  American  democracy. 

Hiram  Ulysses  Grant  was  born  at  Point  Pleasant,  Cler- 
mont  County,  Ohio,  on  the  27th  of  April,  1822;  his 
ancestors  were  Scotch  by  origin,  and  New-Englanders  by 

137 


138  LEADING   AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

eight  generations.  His  father,  Jesse  Grant,  moved  in  the 
year  1823  to  Georgetown,  in  the  adjoining  county,  and  there 
carried  on  in  successful  fashion  the  trade  of  tanning.  Jesse 
Grant  was  a  typical  New-Englander  and  found  the  com 
munity  into  which  he  had  come  not  altogether  of  his  way 
of  thinking.  Even  at  the  time  that  his  son  Ulysses  was 
born  the  question  of  slaveholding  was  an  agitating  one, 
and  on  this  question  Jesse  Grant  was  outspoken  and  radical. 
He  was,  in  fact,  connected  with  the  extreme  abolitionist 
party,  having  learnt  tanning  from  John  Brown's  father. 

As  a  boy  Ulysses  had  to  suffer  for  the  family  opinions. 
Georgetown  was  a  violently  anti-abolition  community; 
"There  was  probably  no  time  during  the  rebellion,"  Grant 
wrote  in  his  memoirs,  "when  ...  it  would  not  have  voted 
for  Jefferson  Davis  for  President  of  the  United  States." 
Most  of  the  village  boys  translated  their  father's  politics 
into  social  action  of  an  unpleasant  character,  so  that  at 
his  earliest  and  most  impressionable  age  the  mind  of  Grant 
became  thoroughly  saturated  with  sentiments  the  strength 
of  which  had  much  to  do  with  the  unquenchable  force 
he  displayed  in  putting  down  the  great  rebellion. 

The  first  forty  years  of  Grant's  life  were  inconspicuous 
and  the  biographer  who  by  the  ingenious  use  of  doubtful 
anecdotes  would  attempt  to  show  that  his  childhood  and 
youth  were  marked  by  the  traits  of  genius  would  be 
performing  a  misleading  task.  Superficially  he  was  dull 
and  plodding,  difficult  to  interest  in  anything  but  farming 
and  horses;  below  the  surface  ran  an  undercurrent  of  hard 
sense  and  determination  that  was  in  late  life  to  rise  to  the 
surface  and  sweep  through  great  events. 

In  1838  Jesse  Grant  secured  a  nomination  to  West  Point 
for  his  son,  and  it  was  on  registering  at  the  Academy  that 
his  baptismal  name  of  Hiram  Ulysses  was  altered  by  a  clerical 
error  into  Ulysses  Simpson.  The  change  was  adopted  for 
convenience;  it  gave  Grant  his  mother's  family  name,  and 


ULYSSES  S.   GRANT  139 

initials  that  were  converted  by  his  classmates  into  United 
States,  Uncle  Sam,  and  for  short  Sam  Grant,  which  remained 
his  name  among  his  comrades  of  the  army.  The  young  cadet 
appears  to  have  viewed  West  Point  with  mixed  feelings. 
His  disposition  was  not  military, — he  was  in  fact  the  most 
unpugnacious  of  boys, — and  he  did  not  look  forward  to  an 
army  career.  The  work  was  hard  and,  with  the  exception 
of  mathematics,  uncongenial.  The  discipline  was  severe, 
the  uniform  uncomfortable,  the  hazing  wearisome.  In 
1839  Congress  was  debating  the  abolition  of  West  Point, 
and  young  Grant  expressed  his  hopes  that  this  result  might 
be  reached.  Yet  at  other  times  he  saw  clearly  enough 
what  a  privilege  he  was  enjoying,  and  although  he  took 
little  interest  in  his  studies,  he  was  strong  enough  in  mathe 
matics  to  make  him  aspire  to  teaching  them  as  his  future 
career. 

Grant's  four  years  at  West  Point  were  passed  with  fair 
credit,  and  in  due  course  he  was  appointed  to  the  4th 
Infantry.  He  was  still  a  sub-lieutenant  in  that  regiment 
when,  in  1846,  the  Mexican  War  broke  out.  The  war  was 
one  that  Grant  entirely  disapproved  of;  he  believed  it 
unjust  and  the  work  of  party  politicians;  and  so,  when  he 
went  into  action  for  the  first  time,  he  felt  none  of  the  enthu 
siasm  that  often  helps  the  young  soldier  through  that  trying 
ordeal.  In  his  matter-of-fact,  ungarnished  way  he  has 
left  it  on  record  that  when  he  first  heard  the  sound  of  the 
enemy's  guns  he  felt  sorry  that  he  had  enlisted;  the  con 
fession  does  honor  to  his  common  sense  and  no  discredit  to 
his  courage,  for  did  not  even  the  great  Frederick  run  away 
from  his  first  battle-field  ? 

The  4th  Infantry  was  attached  to  General  Taylor's  army 
and  fought  at  Palo  Alto  and  Resaca  de  la  Palma.  These 
were  mere  skirmishes,  and  Grant  gained  no  distinction. 
The  attack  and  capture  of  Monterey  followed,  and  there 
Grant  proved  beyond  question  his  personal  courage.  After 


140  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

Monterey,  Taylor's  advance  was  suspended.  A  new  army 
was  formed  under  Winfield  Scott  for  operations  against 
the  city  of  Mexico,  and  the  4th  Infantry  was  transferred 
from  Monterey  to  Vera  Cruz.  The  regiment  took  part  in 
the  siege  of  that  city  and  followed  Scott's  brilliant  march 
thence  to  the  Mexican  capital.  During  these  operations 
Grant  rendered  good  service  as  regimental  quartermaster, 
the  duties  of  which  post  he  was  specially  suited  to  by  his 
youthful  experience  of  teaming  and  of  horses.  In  action 
he  also  showed  ability,  courage,  and  determination.  At 
the  battle  of  Molino  del  Rey,  being  ordered  to  dislodge 
some  Mexican  soldiers  from  the  roof  of  a  house,  he  had  a 
cart  pushed  up  and,  improvising  a  ladder  from  the  shafts, 
was  the  first  to  scramble  up.  A  little  later  in  the  day,  on 
his  own  initiative,  he  ordered  a  howitzer  to  be  dragged  up 
to  the  top  of  a  church  tower,  whence  it  did  such  execution 
that  General  Worth  sent  an  aide-de-camp  to  congratulate 
the  officer  in  charge.  That  aide-de-camp's  name  was 
Pemberton,  and  he  was  to  meet  Grant  again  seventeen 
years  later  at  Vicksburg  on  the  Mississippi  River.  For  his 
distinguished  conduct  at  Molino  del  Rey  Grant  was  men 
tioned  by  his  regimental,  brigade,  and  divisional  command 
ers,  and  by  two  successive  steps  he  reached  the  brevet 
rank  of  captain,  though  his  substantive  rank  when  the 
army  entered  the  city  of  Mexico  was  no  higher  than  when 
he  had  first  seen  the  enemy  at  Palo  Alto. 

Just  before  the  4th  Infantry  had  left  for  the  war  Grant 
had  become  engaged  to  Miss  Julia  Dent  of  St.  Louis,  and 
shortly  after  the  regiment's  return  from  Mexico,  on  the 
22d  of  August,  1848,  the  marriage  was  solemnized  in  that 
city.  It  proved  a  happy  one,  and  Mrs.  Grant  eventually 
bore  her  husband  a  large  family. 

A  wife  and  family  were  an  expensive  luxury  for  a 
lieutenant  of  infantry,  and  it  was  only  by  strict  economy  that 
the  Grants  managed  to  live.  For  four  years  they  passed  a 


ULYSSES   S.    GRANT  141 

quiet  garrison  life  at  Sackett's  Harbor  and  Detroit,  but 
when,  in  the  spring  of  1852,  the  4th  Infantry  was  ordered 
to  California,  Grant  decided  that  his  wife  and  family  must 
for  the  present  stay  behind.  He  reached  the  Pacific  coast 
with  his  regiment  that  summer,  and  remained  there  until 
the  spring  of  1854,  when  he  resigned  his  commission  and 
returned  to  the  East.  This  momentous  change  in  Grant's 
career  was  due  to  a  circumstance  that  must  be  briefly  dwelt 
on. 

Grant  had  two  bad  habits,  one  venial,  the  other  serious. 
The  first   was  his   passion  for  smoking.     He  was  rarely 
without  a  cigar  in  his  mouth,  and  a  cigar  of  the  strongest 
possible  kind.     He  always  reeked  of  tobacco,  and  doubtless 
accelerated  or  brought  on  the  disease  that  killed  him  through 
its  use.     His  other  failing  was  drink.     He  was  one  of  those 
men  so  constituted  that  a  very  slight  amount  of  stimulant 
affected  the  head.     He  is  said  to  have  contracted  the  habit 
of  over-indulgence  in  whisky  while  campaigning  in  Mexico. 
Perhaps  his  lonely  and   isolated   life   in   California  drove 
him  farther  down  the  path;   suffice  it  to  say  that  it  was  for 
being  found  unfit  for  duty  by  his  colonel  that,  instead  of 
being  sent  before  a  court-martial,  he  was  told  to  hand  in 
his  resignation.     In  his  memoirs  Grant  gives  as  his  reason 
for  resigning  his  commission  the  fact  that  he  could  not 
hope  to  maintain  his  wife  and  family  on  the  Pacific  coast, 
and  was  anxious  to  rejoin  them.     There  is  no  reason  to 
doubt  that  he  felt  this  quite  sincerely,  and  there  is  no  reason 
to  be  surprised  that  he  does  not  state  the  other,  more  urgent 
but  less  creditable,  reason.     To  dispose  of  the  topic  once 
and  for  all,  this  much  must  be  added:   that  Grant  battled 
with  this  failing  all  his  life,  that  the  habit  never  entirely 
conquered  him,  as  is  well  enough  attested  by  his  record  of 
achievement,   and   that   probably   his   worst   years   in   this 
respect  were  between  1852  and  1860. 

Grant,  during  the  gloomy  period  of  his  life  that  followed 


142  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

his  retirement  from  the  army,  offers  the  picture  of  a  man 
hovering  with  uncertain  steps  along  the  line  beyond  which 
is  perdition.  Returning  to  the  Mississippi  valley,  he  drew 
his  wife  and  family  to  him  and  set  to  work  farming,  cutting 
lumber,  teaming,  doing  what  he  could.  An  old  army  friend 
who  met  him  in  the  streets  of  St.  Louis  in  1860  barely 
recognized  him:  he  appeared  so  shabby,  so  unshorn,  and  so 
discouraged.  This  was  the  lowest  ebb  of  his  career,  and 
from  this  point  his  fortune  began  to  rise.  His  father  now 
offered  to  take  him  into  a  leather  store  which  he  had  placed 
in  charge  of  his  two  other  sons  at  Galena,  Illinois.  Grant 
accepted,  and  it  was  at  Galena  that  the  outbreak  of  the 
Civil  War  found  him. 

During  the  few  months  that  Grant  lived  at  Galena  he 
worked  steadily  at  his  father's  business,  but  acquired  few 
friends.  It  was  as  a  comparative  stranger  that  he  made 
his  appearance  at  a  meeting  called  for  the  purpose  of 
organizing  volunteer  troops  to  put  down  the  rebellion. 
He  was  called  on  to  take  the  chair  as  the  only  professional 
soldier  of  the  town  and  a  veteran  of  the  Mexican  War,  and, 
instead  of  indulging  in  spread-eagle  eloquence,  he  spoke 
to  the  young  men  who  were  anxious  to  volunteer  of  the 
dangers  and  duties  of  a  military  life  with  an  earnest  and 
serious  patriotism  that  produced  a  considerable  impression 
on  them.  Grant  himself  was  deeply  moved,  and  had 
instantly  made  up  his  mind  to  rejoin  the  army  if  possible. 
His  life  seemed  gathered  up  to  a  focus.  From  his  earliest 
days,  when  the  village  boys  jeered  at  him  as  an  abolitionist, 
to  days  only  just  past  when  his  wife's  slaveholding  relatives 
pointed  the  finger  of  scorn  at  him  as  a  failure  in  life,  the 
question  of  slavery  had  been  ever  present,  ever  burning. 
His  conviction  on  the  matter  was  whole-souled;  it  had  long 
smouldered,  waiting  for  the  spark  that  should  set  it  ablaze. 
And  now  the  chance  had  come  for  relieving  his  mind  of 
this  long  and  silently  accumulated  burden  of  opinion,  and 


ULYSSES   S.    GRANT  143 

at  the  same  time  for  recovering  the  honorable  position  he 
had  lost,  for  stepping  back  into  the  army  with  a  chance  of 
doing  useful,  patriotic  work.  Grant  undoubtedly  felt  that 
he  could  do  such  work,  for  at  the  very  outset  his  conduct 
was  that  of  a  man  conscious  of  his  value.  He  declined  the 
command  of  the  company  raised  by  Galena  and  drilled  by 
his  efforts,  and  quietly  packing  a  carpet-bag  betook  himself 
to  Springfield,  the  State  capital,  in  search  of  military  employ 
ment.  A  captain  of  regulars,  he  thought,  must  surely  be 
equal  to  the  command  of  a  regiment  of  volunteers. 

Several  weeks  of  sore  trial  were  spent  by  Grant  before 
he  obtained  the  command  he  aspired  to.  He  was  penni 
less;  he  had  few  political  friends;  his  name  was  bad  in 
regular  army  circles.  At  last  he  succeeded  in  obtaining 
employment  as  a  mustering  officer,  and  in  that  capacity 
impressed  those  with  whom  he  came  into  contact  with  his 
ability  and  decision.  A  few  weeks  later  mustering  was 
over,  and  Grant  was  out  of  place  once  more.  He  wrote 
to  the  War  Department;  he  wandered  from  Cincinnati  to 
St.  Louis,  begging  to  be  allowed  to  help  in  the  great  struggle. 
He  has  left  no  record  of  the  mental  torture  he  must  have 
felt,  incompetence  flourishing  on  all  hands,  his  own  glowing 
patriotism  and  trained  ability  despised  and  rejected.  Finally 
the  opportunity  came.  The  officers  of  the  2ist  Illinois,  a 
regiment  which  Captain  Grant  had  mustered  in,  unani 
mously  petitioned  the  governor  of  the  State  to  remove  their 
colonel,  whose  incompetence  they  could  no  longer  tolerate. 
Many  of  them  asked  for  Grant  to  replace  him,  and  after 
some  hesitation  the  appointment  was  made. 

There  is  but  one  incident  in  Grant's  career  as  a  regimental 
commander  that  need  be  recorded  here.  In  some  of  the 
preliminary  movements  that  preceded  the  greater  operations 
of  the  war  the  2ist  Illinois  found  itself  in  the  vicinity  of 
a  Confederate  command  of  equal  strength.  Grant  deter 
mined  to  advance  against  it,  and  on  the  march  felt  to  the 


144  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

full  those  misgivings  bred  of  the  imagination  that  so  fre 
quently  assail  the  man  who  has  to  bear  large  responsibilities. 
On  arriving  at  the  position  occupied  by  the  Confederates 
Grant  found  it  deserted,  and  instantly  realized  the  great 
truth  that  his  enemy  was  as  likely  to  be  afraid  of  him  as 
he  of  his  enemy.  He  made  up  his  mind  then  and  there 
never  again  to  be  afraid  of  attacking,  and  his  career  from 
Fort  Donelson  to  the  Wilderness  demonstrates  how  over 
and  over  again  he  compelled  success  by  a  firm  and  logical 
determination  not  to  fear  the  enemy.  The  lesson  that 
Colonel  Grant  so  firmly  grasped  that  day  is  one  that  many 
quite  distinguished  soldiers  have  failed  to  learn. 

Grant  was  slowly  but  surely  making  friends;  E.  B. 
Washburne,  representative  of  his  district  in  Congress,  was 
among  the  strongest  of  them,  and  used  his  influence  to 
have  him  promoted.  He  had  not  been  in  command  of 
the  2ist  Illinois  long  before  President  Lincoln  nominated 
several  brigadiers  to  command  the  State  troops,  and  his 
name  appeared  in  the  list  of  appointments.  Before  the 
close  of  1861  he  was  commanding  an  important  district 
with  headquarters  at  Cairo  at  the  junction  of  the  Ohio  and 
Mississippi  and  with  nearly  20,000  men  under  his  orders. 
It  was  Grant's  good  fortune  that  Cairo  was  the  most 
important  strategic  point  within  the  Federal  lines  on  the 
western  side  of  the  Alleghanies.  To  understand  its  im 
portance,  and  in  fact  all  Grant's  western  campaigns,  a 
general  survey  of  the  strategical  situation  will  be  necessary. 

The  Civil  War  presents  several  distinctive  features  that 
will  bear  restatement.  In  the  first  place,  the  contestants 
were  playing  different  parts.  The  South  was  generally 
on  the  defensive,  owing  to  the  political  starting-point  taken 
by  her  leaders,  whose  constant  claim  it  was  that  they  were 
merely  defending  their  rights  and  their  soil;  few  if  any  of 
her  generals  had  the  ruthless  logic  of  Stonewall  Jackson, 
whose  aim  was  consistently  that  taught  by  all  military 


ULYSSES   S.    GRANT  145 

history  as  the  only  sound  one — the  annihilation  of  the 
enemy's  forces  in  the  field;  even  Lee  was  deeply  influenced 
by  the  idea  of  gaining  time.  The  Northern  point  of  view 
was  totally  different;  it  was  offensive  and  not  in  the  least 
defensive.  The  South  was  in  a  state  of  armed  rebellion, 
and  the  duty  of  the  Federal  Government  was  to  put  down 
that  rebellion,  or,  in  other  words,  to  occupy  with  its  military 
forces  the  territory  in  which  the  rebellion  had  occurred. 
Incidental  to  this  object  it  was  necessary  to  defeat  such 
armies  as  the  South  might  bring  into  the  field.  From  this 
it  followed  that  the  problem  confronting  the  Federal  generals 
was :  along  what  lines  should  the  Southern  States  be  invaded 
and  how  should  the  invading  armies  be  kept  supplied? 
This  problem  was  fairly  simple  in  the  East,  owing  to  the 
proximity  of  the  Confederate  capital  to  Washington,  but 
in  the  West  it  was  somewhat  more  complicated. 

In  the  first  place,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  modern 
war  is  largely  a  matter  of  transportation,  for  an  army  is 
a  voracious  devourer  of  supplies,  and  a  shortage  of  bread, 
of  powder,  of  boots,  of  cannon-balls,  or  even  of  horseshoes, 
might  entail  the  failure  of  the  greatest  captain  and  the 
bravest  army.  Transportation  to  the  west  of  the  Alle- 
ghanies  in  1861  was  so  difficult  a  matter  that  it  dictated 
peremptorily  the  lines  along  which  the  war  was  bound  to 
be  conducted.  Stated  in  the  shortest  terms,  one  might 
say  that  the  Southern  armies,  fighting  on  the  defensive, 
depended  on  several  lines  of  railroad  running  diagonally 
from  northeast  to  southwest,  from  Richmond  to  New 
Orleans,  while  the  Northern  armies,  acting  on  the  offensive, 
relied  on  the  waterways  and  aimed  at  cutting  through  the 
Southern  lines  of  communication.  Looking  due  south 
from  Cairo  was  the  long  line  of  the  Mississippi,  leading  to 
New  Orleans  and  the  sea;  looking  about  east  was  the  Ohio, 
already  covered  at  various  points  by  Federal  troops;  looking 
southeast  were  Nashville,  then  Chattanooga,  then  Atlanta, 


146 


LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 


the  three  great  railroad  junctions  of  the  South.  With 
these  in  the  hands  of  the  Federal  troops  the  heart  of  the 
Confederacy  would  be  pierced,  and  communication  between 
the  northeast  and  southwest  would  be  cut.  General  Grant 
was  eventually  to  solve  the  problem  by  viewing  the  theatre 


RAILROAD    SYSTEM   OF   THE   CONFEDERATE   STATES 

of  war  as  it  has  just  been  described,  but  in  1861,  as  a 
brigadier-general  commanding  a  small  body  of  troops  at 
Cairo,  his  eye  did  not  range  beyond  the  first  movements 
along  the  two  great  lines  of  attack  that  opened  out  from 
his  headquarters,  the  one  south,  the  other  southeast. 

Nashville,  capital  of  Tennessee,  is  only  about  150  miles 
southeast  of  Cairo  as  the  crow  flics.     It  lies  on  the  Cumber- 


ULYSSES   S.   GRANT  147 

land  River,  a  navigable  affluent  of  the  Ohio.  Both  the 
Cumberland  and  the  Tennessee  run  into  the  Ohio  within 
a  few  miles  of  one  another  and  not  far  from  its  junction 
with  the  Mississippi;  they  offered  the  best  line  along  which 
to  move  an  army  from  Cairo  towards  Nashville.  To  block 
this  possible  line  of  invasion  the  Confederates  had  erected 
a  large  fort  on  each  river  at  a  point  near  their  junction 
with  the  Ohio  where  they  flowed  close  together;  these 
were  named  Fort  Henry  and  Fort  Donelson,  and  were 
intended  to  make  the  waterway  impassable  to  steamers. 
Grant,  quickly  recognizing  the  strategical  importance  of 
these  forts  and  eager  to  get  into  action,  urged  his  superiors 
to  be  allowed  to  operate  against  them  by  river  from  Cairo, 
but  for  some  time  he  was  held  back  and  restricted  to  opera 
tions  of  a  subordinate  character. 

The  first  engagement  in  which  Grant  met  the  Confederates 
is  known  as  the  battle  of  Belmont;  it  was  fought  under 
the  following  circumstances:  Fremont,  who  was  in  supreme 
command  of  operations  on  the  Mississippi,  was  anxious 
to  strike  a  blow  at  the  enemy  near  Indian  Ford  on  the  St. 
Francis  River  in  southeastern  Missouri.  To  assist  him 
in  this  object  it  was  necessary  to  prevent  reinforcements 
being  despatched  by  the  Confederates  from  Columbus,  a 
point  on  the  Kentucky  side  of  the  Mississippi  about  20 
miles  below  Cairo.  Grant  was  therefore  ordered  to  make 
a  demonstration  against  this  point. 

On  the  evening  of  the  6th  of  November  3000  men  left 
Cairo  in  steamboats.  On  the  yth  they  landed  a  few  miles 
above  Columbus,  but  on  the  Missouri  bank.  Grant  was 
anxious  to  turn  his  demonstration  into  an  opportunity  for 
giving  his  men  some  experience  of  fighting,  and  had  infor 
mation  that  led  him  to  believe  he  might  capture  a  camp 
established  by  the  Confederates  at  Belmont  on  the  opposite 
bank  to  Columbus.  His  anticipation  proved  correct. 
After  four  hours  of  heavy  skirmishing  the  Federal  troops 


148  LEADING   AMERICAN    SOLDIERS 

drove  the  enemy  from  their  camp  to  the  river-bank  and 
then,  getting  out  of  hand,  started  plundering  and  celebrating 
their  victory.  But  the  Confederates  were  not  yet  done  with. 
Reinforcements  were  crossing  over  from  Columbus.  Soon 
the  enemy  was  threatening  the  Federal  flank  and  line  of 
retreat.  At  this  critical  moment  the  coolness  of  Grant 
probably  saved  his  command.  He  ordered  the  Confederate 
camp  to  be  fired,  the  result  of  which  was  to  drive  his  men 
from  their  plundering.  By  dint  of  great  efforts,  and  not 
without  much  disorder,  the  troops  were  eventually  with 
drawn  to  their  steamboats.  Grant  had  lost  about  500, 
half  prisoners,  inflicting  much  heavier  loss  on  the  enemy. 
The  battle  was  claimed  as  a  victory  by  the  Confederates, 
but  Grant  could  truly  say  that  he  had  accomplished  the 
strategic  object  of  his  expedition,  which  was  to  prevent 
the  despatch  of  reinforcements  from  Columbus  to  the  St. 
Francis  River. 

Belmont  was  hardly  more  than  a  skirmish;  operations 
of  greater  moment  were  soon  to  follow.  Grant  had  long 
recognized  the  importance  of  operating  on  Nashville. 
Within  a  few  days  of  assuming  command  at  Cairo  he  had 
seized  Paducah,  a  few  miles  up  the  Ohio  River,  where  the 
Tennessee  flows  into  it.  On  the  appointment  of  Halleck 
as  Fremont's  successor  soon  after  Belmont,  Grant  urged 
a  movement  beyond  Paducah  on  Fort  Henry,  and  eventually 
succeeded  in  obtaining  his  superior's  consent. 

On  the  2d  of  February  the  expedition  left  Cairo — 17,000 
men  on  river  steamboats.  They  slowly  made  their  way 
up  the  Ohio,  past  Paducah,  into  the  Tennessee,  and  reached 
a  point  a  few  miles  below  Fort  Henry  on  the  5th.  On  the 
6th  the  troops,  supported  by  some  armored  gunboats, 
advanced  to  the  attack.  The  fort  was  poorly  planned 
and  of  moderate  strength;  it  withstood  the  fire  of  the 
Federal  gunboats  for  about  an  hour,  after  which  its  com 
mander,  General  Tilghman,  surrendered.  It  was  found 


ULYSSES  S.  GRANT  149 

that  nearly  all  the  garrison  had  escaped  before  the  crisis, 
and  less  than  100  prisoners  were  made. 

The  capture  of  Fort  Henry  requires  little  notice  here, 
as  it  was  entirely  the  work  of  the  navy;  it  proved  the  superi 
ority  of  the  armored  gunboat  over  open  earthworks  placed 
on  a  low  river-bank,  for  Commodore  Foote,  opening  fire 
at  about  1200  yards,  had  closed  to  about  half  that  distance 
in  an  hour,  disabling  seven  of  Tilghman's  eleven  guns. 
The  Confederate  commander-in-chief  in  the  west,  Albert 
Sidney  Johnston,  read  the  lesson  instantly.  He  wrote,  on 
the  day  after  Fort  Henry  fell,  that  Fort  Donelson  would 
fall  in  the  same  way,  and  perceiving  the  strategic  con 
sequences  of  Grant's  movement,  he  immediately  took 
steps  to  have  all  the  Confederate  forces  fall  back,  from 
right  and  left,  from  Bowling  Green  and  Columbus  to 
Nashville. 

Grant,  who  had  witnessed  the  effective  action  of  the 
gunboats  on  the  yth  of  February,  immediately  announced 
the  capture  of  Fort  Henry  to  Halleck,  and  added:  "I 
shall  take  and  destroy  Fort  Donelson  on  the  8th."  This 
promise  could  not  be  kept  literally,  owing  to  heavy  rain 
storms  that  prevented  the  movement  of  the  troops,  but 
there  was  only  postponement,  not  failure. 

Grant  knew  that  reinforcements  were  being  hurried  by 
the  Confederates  towards  the  point  he  now  proposed  attack 
ing,  and  that  he  might  at  any  time  be  confronted  by  large 
numbers.  He  was  anxious  to  profit  by  his  initial  advantage 
and  to  attack  before  the  enemy  had  time  to  prepare.  He 
was  further  encouraged  to  attack  Fort  Donelson  because 
he  remembered  its  commander,  Pillow,  from  the  days 
of  the  Mexican  War.  He  prophesied  to  his  staff  officers 
that  the  Confederates  would  have  no  outposts  and  that 
he  would  be  able  to  reconnoitre  right  up  to  the  walls  of 
Fort  Donelson,  and  this  he  actually  did  on  the  yth.  It  was 
not  till  the  nth,  however,  that  the  troops  could  be  started 


150  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

on  their  march  across  the  twelve  miles  that  separated  the 
Tennessee  from  the  Cumberland. 

On  the  Confederate  side  there  was  thorough  compre 
hension  of  the  importance  of  Fort  Donelson.  Johnston 
stated  later  that  he  sent  to  the  threatened  point  every  avail 
able  man,  for  he  realized  that  the  struggle  there  was  really  a 
struggle  for  Nashville.  Reinforcements  were  hurried  down 
the  Cumberland  River,  and  on  the  i3th  of  February,  the 
day  after  Grant  appeared  in  strength  before  Fort  Donel 
son,  there  were  not  far  short  of  15,000  men  assembled  to 
defend  it. 

On  the  1 2th  and  i3th  Grant,  who  was  awaiting  Foote's 
gunboats,  did  little  but  get  his  troops  into  position  so  as 
to  encircle  the  Confederate  position  on  the  land  side.  Pillow 
and  Floyd — the  latter  had  only  just  arrived — made  the 
mistake  of  allowing  the  Federals  to  do  this  unopposed,  not 
recognizing  the  fact  that  their  command  should  be  dealt 
with  rather  as  a  field  army  than  as  a  garrison,  and  that 
it  was  essential  that  a  line  of  communications  should  be 
kept  open.  Once  surrounded  in  Fort  Donelson,  their  only 
line  of  retreat  was  the  Cumberland,  and  not  only  were 
their  steamers  few  in  number,  but  Grant  had  got  a  foot 
hold  on  the  river  to  the  south  of  them,  near  Dover. 

On  the  night  of  the  I3th  Foote  arrived  with  four  armored 
gunboats.  About  3  P.M.  on  the  following  day  he  advanced 
to  the  attack.  With  the  utmost  gallantry  he  pushed  close 
in  to  the  batteries;  but  his  losses  were  heavy,  and  after  two 
of  his  ships  had  been  disabled  he  gave  up  the  attempt. 
The  fact  was  that  at  Fort  Donelson  the  batteries  were  on 
higher  ground  than  at  Fort  Henry,  they  were  better  planned , 
more  heavily  armed,  and  more  largely  garrisoned. 

The  defeat  of  the  gunboats  was  discouraging.  Foote, 
who  was  wounded,  sent  for  Grant,  and  declared  that  he 
could  not  engage  again  until  after  repairs  that  would  take 
ten  days  to  effect,  and  Grant  had  to  concur.  This  was 


ULYSSES   S.    GRANT  151 

early  on  the  i5th.  The  Federal  commander  was  depressed 
by  Foote's  communication  and  was  turning  his  mind 
towards  a  regular  siege,  when  word  was  brought  to  him 
that  severe  fighting  had  broken  out  to  the  south  of  Fort 
Donelson.  He  hurried  on  shore  and  riding  along  the  rear 
of  his  left  and  centre, — Smith  and  Lew  Wallace, — reached 
McClernand's  division  on  his  right,  which  he  found  driven 
from  its  ground  and  in  a  state  of  the  utmost  confusion.  It 
was  just  at  this  moment  that  occurred  an  incident  which 
shows  Grant's  coolness,  common  sense,  and  courage.  He 
ordered  the  knapsack  of  a  Confederate  soldier  to  be  brought 
to  him  and  on  examination  found  that  it  contained  rations 
for  three  days.  From  this  he  instantly  and  correctly 
deduced  that  the  Confederates  had  decided  to  force  their 
way  out  of  Fort  Donelson  towards  Nashville,  but  finding 
that,  although  they  had  driven  McClernand's  division, 
from  its  ground  and  put  it  into  confusion,  they  were  not 
pressing  on,  he  further  inferred  that  the  enemy  was  also 
partly  disorganized.  Under  these  circumstances  he  acted 
with  unhesitating  logic  and  courage.  McClernand's  division 
supported  by  some  fresh  troops,  was  fast  getting  into 
position  again,  and  Grant  immediately  sent  orders  to  Wallace 
and  Smith  to  attack  all  along  the  line.  If  the  Confederates 
were  trying  to  force  their  way  out  on  Grant's  right,  there 
would  probably  be  a  weak  point  somewhere  opposite  his 
centre  and  left.  The  move  proved  correct.  The  Con 
federates  were  poorly  led;  their  dispositions  were  faulty. 
Before  night  Smith's  troops  had  won  ground  that  com 
manded  Fort  Donelson,  and  there  was  only  one  issue 
possible. 

Floyd  and  Pillow,  having  shown  no  capacity  for  handling 
an  army,  now  shirked  the  duty  of  surrendering  it,  and 
passed  it  over  to  their  junior  Buckner.  A  few  troops  were 
ferried  across  the  Cumberland  and  escaped  with  Floyd. 
The  rest,  about  13,000  men,  became  prisoners  of  war.  On 


152  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

the  morning  of  the  i6th  Buckner  wrote  asking  for  con 
ditions,  and  Grant  promptly  replied  in  words  that  soon 
acquired  celebrity:  "No  terms  except  an  unconditional 
and  immediate  surrender  can  be  accepted.  I  propose  to 
move  immediately  upon  your  works."  Buckner,  knowing 
as  well  as  Grant  did  that  those  works  could  not  be  defended, 
bowed  to  the  inevitable.  Grant's  victory,  the  first  great 
success  of  the  war,  caused  intense  excitement  through 
the  Northern  States,  and  notwithstanding  Halleck's  jealous 
efforts  to  keep  his  subordinate's  name  in  the  shade,  many 
realized  that  the  North  had  found  a  leader.  From  that 
moment  Stanton,  Secretary  of  War,  believed  in  the  new 
general;  he  probably  contrasted  the  sureness  and  self- 
confidence  with  which  Grant  read  his  opponents'  weakness 
with  the  apocalyptic  imagination  of  McClellan  that  was 
always  raising  imaginary  armies  with  which  to  fill  his 
endless  reports  to  his  masters  at  Washington. 

Fort  Donelson  was  followed  by  the  occupation  of  Nash 
ville  by  Buell's  army;  Johnston,  with  numbers  too  few  to 
risk  an  engagement,  made  a  dangerous  but  skilful  retreat 
southwest  from  Nashville  and  across  the  Tennessee  towards 
Memphis  on  the  Mississippi,  leaving  the  road  to  Chatta 
nooga  open.  On  his  line  of  march  between  the  Tennessee 
and  Mississippi  was  Corinth,  of  which  the  Federal  com 
manders  did  not  at  once  perceive  the  importance;  for  by 
moving  Grant's  army  straight  up  the  Tennessee  it  would 
have  been  possible  to  intercept  Johnston  near  that  point. 
Grant  indeed  urged  a  forward  movement  on  Nashville, 
but  on  finding  that  Buell  had  occupied  the  city,  he  pro 
ceeded  there  in  person  to  see  him  with  a  view  to  concerting 
combined  operations.  This  aroused  Halleck's  animosity. 
He  had  all  along  shown  the  utmost  jealousy  of  his  subor 
dinate's  success,  and  had  a  real  grievance  in  that,  owing 
as  it  proved  to  the  fault  of  a  telegraph-operator,  he  couki 
not  get  replies  to  official  inquiries  he  had  sent  to  Grant 


ULYSSES   S.   GRANT  153 

at  the  request  of  the  War  Department.  He  took  this 
opportunity,  with  the  concurrence  of  McClellan,  then 
commander-in-chief,  to  disgrace  Grant.  McClellan  gave 
Halleck  permission  to  place  him  under  arrest,  and  this 
gave  Halleck  the  chance  of  removing  Grant  from  command. 
The  army  was  to  be  moved  up  the  Tennessee,  but  it  was 
ordered  that  General  Grant  should  remain  at  Fort  Henry 
to  forward  supplies,  while  the  field  army  passed  under  the 
orders  of  General  C.  F.  Smith.  This  petty  incident  need 
not  be  dwelt  on.  "Give  a  dog  a  bad  name  and  hang  him" 
was  a  true  proverb  for  Grant  during  many  months.  But 
the  fiery  furnace  of  war  is  a  searching  test  of  merit;  and 
it  soon  consumed  the  reputations  of  those  who  would  have 
held  down  Ulysses  Grant.  Fortunately  the  feeling  against 
him  was  confined  to  a  small  section  of  regular  army 
officers.  The  President  and  the  Secretary  of  War  were 
strongly  inclined  to  believe  in  him.  Lincoln  caused  him 
to  be  promoted  major-general  for  his  victory,  and  soon 
after,  on  the  telegraph  incident  being'satisf actorily  explained, 
sent  him  back  to  the  command  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee. 

The  Tennessee  and  the  Mississippi  rivers  form  two  sides  of 
a  rough  triangle  of  which  the  apex  is  Cairo,  and  the  base  a 
line  of  about  100  miles  from  luka  on  the  former  to  Memphis 
on  the  latter;  from  Memphis  to  Cairo  is  about  150  miles 
as  the  crow  flies.  On  the  base-line  between  Memphis  and 
luka  was  Corinth,  and  at  this  point  two  great  lines  of 
communication  intersected,  one  running  east  through 
Chattanooga  to  Richmond,  the  other  running  south  through 
Jackson  and  Vicksburg  to  New  Orleans.  Johnston  had 
brought  his  small  force  into  Corinth,  and  to  that  point  the 
Confederate  Government  had  hastened  all  available  re 
inforcements. 

When  Grant  resumed  command  of  his  army  he  found  it 
encamped  on  the  Tennessee  and  nearly  as  far  south  as  the 
line  Memphis-Iuka.  Twenty  miles  to  the  west  was  Corinth, 


154  LEADING   AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

and  about  100  miles  to  the  northeast  was  a  Federal  army 
of  40,000  men  under  Buell  marching  from  Nashville  to 
cooperate  with  him.  Under  these  circumstances  what  was 
Grant  to  do?  His  inclination  was  to  march  at  once  on 
the  enemy  at  Corinth,  but  this  Halleck  would  not  permit. 
In  view  of  the  numbers  and  proximity  of  the  reinforcements 
then  on  their  march  to  join  Grant,  and  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
Johnston  was  more  or  less  bound  to  stand  an  engagement 
before  giving  up  Corinth,  it  appears  probable  that  Halleck 
was  right.  On  the  assumption,  then,  that  no  advance 
would  be  made  until  BuelPs  arrival,  what  was  Grant's 
proper  course?  He  could  encamp  on  the  eastern  bank 
of  the  Tennessee  and,  with  that  stream  to  protect  him,  await 
Buell's  approach  with  perfect  safety;  or  he  could  place 
his  army  on  the  western  bank  at  some  point  whence  a  road 
led  in  the  direction  of  Corinth  so  as  to  save  the  delay  of 
crossing  the  Tennessee  after  Buell  arrived.  He  chose 
the  latter  course  and  its  consequent  detriment,  which  he 
had  seen  so  well  exemplified  at  Fort  Donelson,  of  placing 
an  army  with  its  back  to  a  river  so  that  if  attacked  it  would 
be  at  a  great  disadvantage.  Grant  admits  in  his  memoirs 
that  he  was  firmly  convinced  that  the  Confederates  would 
only  fight  on  the  defensive  and  that  they  would  never  attack 
him,  but  that  is  merely  an  explanation,  not  an  excuse.  Hav 
ing  placed  his  army  in  this  unfavorable  position,  he  should 
clearly  have  taken  every  precaution  that  prudence  could 
dictate;  breastworks  and  intrenchments  should  have  been 
thrown  up,  artillery  positions  should  have  been  prepared,  and 
when,  in  the  first  few  days  of  April,  there  were  constant  signs  of 
Confederate  activity  along  the  front,  careful  reconnaissances 
should  have  been  pushed  out  to  feel  the  enemy.  These 
things  were  all  virtually  left  undone,  and  when,  on  the 
6th  of  April,  Johnston  attacked  in  full  force,  the  Federal 
army  was  surprised,  pushed  back,  and  nearly  driven  to 
disaster. 


ULYSSES   S.    GRANT  155 

Albert  Sidney  Johnston  had  as  brilliant  a  reputation  as 
any  general  then  in  the  field,  North  or  South,  and  nothing 
in  the  conduct  of  the  Confederate  army  intrusted  to  his 
charge  belied  it.  He  remembered  what  had  not  apparently 
occurred  to  Grant,  that  the  surest  defence  is  to  take  the 
offensive.  His  army  at  Corinth  had  rapidly  been  increased 
to  about  40,000  men,  and  with  this  force  he  determined  to 
strike  Grant  in  his  ill-chosen  position  before  he  could  be 
reinforced  by  Buell.  Had  Johnston  moved  48  hours  earlier 
he  would  have  met  Grant  alone;  as  it  was,  BuelPs  troops 
reached  the  battle-field  at  the  very  close  of  the  day. 

On  the  4th  and  5th  of  April  Sherman,  whose  division 
was  nearest  the  enemy,  made  some  attempts  at  discovering 
their  intentions,  but  so  slight  were  his  reconnaissances  that 
he  reported  to  Grant  there  was  no  probability  of  a  serious 
movement.  On  the  right,  however,  Lew  Wallace  succeeded 
in  locating  a  large  body  of  Confederates  in  his  front,  and 
reported  to  headquarters  accordingly.  Yet  Grant  was 
undoubtedly  surprised  when,  on  the  morning  of  the  6th,  his 
breakfast  was  interrupted  by  the  sound  of  heavy  firing  in 
the  distance.  Headquarters  were  at  Savannah,  five  miles 
lower  down  the  Tennessee  than  Pittsburg  Landing  and 
on  the  opposite  bank.  Grant  had  remained  at  that  point 
for  several  good  reasons:  to  superintend  many  urgent 
details  of  organization  and  transport,  to  concert  the  junction 
of  BuelPs  army,  of  which  the  leading  division  under  Nelson 
was  just  arriving.  The  fact  that  the  commanding  general 
was  not  with  his  troops  when  they  were  attacked  produced 
a  bad  impression  at  the  time,  but  was  not  Wellington 
dancing  in  Bruxelles  when  Napoleon's  advance  had  already 
attacked  his  outposts  near  Quatre  Bras?  If  Grant  was 
at  Savannah  instead  of  with  his  advance-guard,  it  was 
because  he  thought  there  was  more  for  him  to  do  there. 
The  real  fault  Grant  committed  was  more  that  he  failed 
to  perceive  that  Johnston  might  perhaps  attack  him,  and 


156  LEADING   AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

that  he  neglected  to  dispose  his  troops  to  meet  such  an 
obvious  eventuality,  than  that  he  chose  for  his  headquarters 
the  point  where  he  thought  he  could  effect  most. 

The  sound  of  the  cannonade  indicated  beyond  doubt  that 
a  battle  was  raging  along  the  whole  line,  and  Grant,  after 
sending  word  to  Buell  to  get  as  many  of  his  troops  as  pos 
sible  over  the  river,  hurried  to  join  his  army.  The  battle 
of  Shiloh  and  Grant's  personal  share  in  it  may  both  be 
related  in  very  few  words.  Johnston  advanced  in  three 
big  echelons,  right  wing  forward,  intending  to  get  a  foot 
hold  on  the  Tennessee  and  to  bear  back  the  Federal 
army  to  the  river.  He  nearly  succeeded.  Grant's  divisions 
were  not  properly  disposed  for  battle,  and  in  that  sense 
the  Confederate  onset  was  a  surprise.  On  both  sides  a 
large  part  of  the  troops  fought  well,  but  on  the  Federal  side 
the  leadership,  with  the  exception  of  Sherman's  was  not 
effective.  Divisions,  brigades,  regiments,  fought  where 
they  happened  to  be,  some  well,  some  badly.  Many  of  the 
troops  were  quite  raw  and  quickly  broke  up  before  the 
combined  Confederate  onset.  Stragglers  melted  away  from 
the  fighting-line,  and  by  the  afternoon  nearly  10,000  men, 
about  a  quarter  of  Grant's  army,  were  cowering  under 
the  banks  of  the  Tennessee,  a  panic-struck  mob  that  no 
effort  could  get  back  to  face  the  enemy's  fire.  Steadily 
the  Confederates  drove  back  the  Federals,  and  through  all 
the  turmoil  and  confusion  of  the  fight,  hoping  and  at  times 
despairing  that  reinforcements  would  come,  Grant  rode 
here  and  there.  He  did  his  best  coolly,  effectively,  and  with 
grim  determination,  but,  in  fact,  there  was  little  he  could 
do  save  to  send  messages  calling  Buell,  Nelson,  Lew  Wallace 
to  his  aid.  His  soldiers  saved  him.  With  that  stubborn 
bravery  that  will  not  own  defeat,  the  stubborn  bravery 
that  saved  the  Union,  many  raw  recruits  from  the  farms 
and  cities  of  the  West  gave  their  lives,  but  saved  the  fight 
that  day.  As  the  sun  was  sinking  the  Confederate  shells 


ULYSSES   S.    GRANT  157 

were  bursting  on  Pittsburg  Landing,  but  at  the  same  moment 
Nelson's  division  was  hurrying  from  the  steamboats  to  the 
rescue  and  Buell  was  urging  on  30,000  more  men  at  their 
heels.  Both  armies  were  spent;  the  Confederates  had 
just  failed  to  gain  enough  to  make  their  success  decisive 
and  they  had  lost  their  able  general,  killed  in  the  early  part 
of  the  afternoon;  the  Federals  had  just  managed  to  hold 
their  ground  and  were  being  reinforced  by  a  large  army  of 
fresh  troops. 

Grant  did  not  hesitate  as  to  his  course  of  action.  Generals 
are  of  one  cast  of  mind  or  of  another :  either  they  are  always 
turning  events  towards  the  possibility  of  attacking  the 
enemy,  or  they  are  always  devising  how  they  can  use  events 
for  repelling  the  attacks  they  imagine  the  enemy  might 
make.  Grant  belonged  to  the  first-mentioned  class,  and, 
with  the  possible  exception  of  Fabius  Cunctator,  it  is 
difficult  to  name  a  great  general  who  belongs  to  the  other. 
He  issued  orders  that  night  for  placing  BuelFs  divisions 
in  line  and  for  an  advance  on  the  enemy  at  the  earliest 
dawn. 

On  the  yth  the  battle  was  renewed,  the  Federals  advanc 
ing  to  the  attack.  The  Confederates  were  outnumbered, 
and  although  they  offered  a  fierce  resistance  it  was  soon 
apparent  that  they  must  fall  back.  Position  after  position 
was  slowly  recaptured,  and  Beauregard,  who  had  succeeded 
Johnston  in  the  command,  decided  on  retreat.  The  second 
day's  battle  was  less  sanguinary  than  the  first,  but  Grant, 
who  had  in  all  about  60,000  men  engaged,  lost  in  the  two 
days  some  12,000  killed  and  wounded,  a  figure  that  pro 
duced  a  feeling  akin  to  consternation  in  the  North.  On 
the  evening  of  the  7th  he  made  dispositions  to  pursue  the 
enemy  towards  Corinth,  but  his  troops  were  so  jaded  and 
so  ill  organized,  the  roads  were  so  mud-bound,  that  the 
attempt  was  eventually  given  up  as  hopeless. 

Grant  undoubtedly  was  not  seen  at  his  best  at  Shiloh; 


158  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

he  committed  obvious  errors  of  judgment;  and  yet  on  the 
field  he  showed  the  dauntless  resolution  that  never  forsook 
him  in  any  of  his  military  operations,  and  that,  though  not 
always  a  showy  quality,  is  the  one  that  often  carries  farthest. 
There  was  much  dissatisfaction  over  Shiloh,  there  were 
many  gross  exaggerations  in  the  newspapers,  and  Grant 
was  made  a  scapegoat.  His  bad  name  still  clung  to  him, 
and  it  was  freely  reported  that  he  had  been  actually  seen 
drunk  on  the  field;  for  such  a  statement  there  was  appar 
ently  not  the  slightest  foundation. 

After  Shiloh,  as  after  Fort  Donelson,  Grant  had  to  endure 
a  period  of  disgrace.  Halleck,  commander-in-chief  of 
the  Department  of  the  West,  had  left  his  headquarters  at 
St.  Louis  and  arrived  at  Pittsburg  Landing  a  few  days  after 
the  battle.  He  assumed  command,  and  drawing  in  all  the 
forces  available  concentrated  a  grand  army  of  over  100,000 
men.  Grant  was  retained  as  commander  of  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee,  but,  with  his  superior  constantly  at  his 
elbow,  was  reduced  to  the  position  of  a  mere  channel  for 
the  conveyance  of  orders. 

Halleck' s  operations  need  not  be  related:  he  was  a 
general  more  in  theory  than  in  practice,  and  his  timidity 
in  the  field  resulted  in  his  great  army's  accomplishing  very 
little.  In  two  months  he  succeeded  in  capturing  Corinth, 
which  the  Confederates  made  no  attempt  to  defend  against 
overpowering  numbers.  The  lack  of  vigor  of  the  Federal 
commander  was  taken  advantage  of  by  Bragg,  Beauregard's 
successor,  to  transfer  the  greater  part  of  his  army  to  Chatta 
nooga,  whence  he  advanced  northwards  to  Nashville  and 
Louisville.  This  move  transferred  the  initiative  to  the 
other  side  and,  coupled  with  Halleck's  appointment  to 
act  as  commander-in-chief  at  Washington,  resulted  in  the 
splitting  up  of  the  army.  Heavy  reinforcements  were  dis 
patched  to  McClellan  in  the  Peninsula;  Buell  was  sent  east 
towards  Chattanooga;  Grant  remained  with  the  army  of 


ULYSSES   S.   GRANT  159 

the  Tennessee  on  a  line  between  Pittsburg  Landing  and 
Memphis. 

Grant's  duties  were  now  of  a  strictly  defensive  character; 
the  main  operations  of  the  war  were  being  conducted  else 
where.  Two  small  Confederate  corps  were  in  his  immediate 
vicinity  under  Price  and  Van  Dorn.  At  luka,  on  the  iQth 
of  September,  Grant  dealt  a  heavy  blow  to  the  former,  and 
at  Corinth,  on  the  3d  and  4th  of  October,  Rosecrans,  one 
of  Grant's  divisional  commanders,  beat  off  the  combined 
force  of  the  two  Confederate  generals.  It  was  just  at  this 
moment  that  the  stress  of  war  in  the  east  was  relieved ;  Lee's 
brilliant  series  of  victories  over  McClellan  and  Pope  had 
at  last  been  checked  at  the  Antietam.  The  North  breathed 
once  more;  300,000  new  troops  were  levied;  Grant's  army 
began  to  receive  fresh  accessions.  It  became  evident  that 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  would  soon  be  in  a  position  to 
exchange  its  defensive  for  an  offensive  attitude.  The 
question  was,  what  should  be  its  objective? 

Southwards  from  Grant's  army,  from  Corinth  and  from 
Grand  Junction,  ran  two  parallel  lines  of  rail  to  Mobile 
and  to  New  Orleans.  These  two  lines  were  traversed,  at 
Meridian  and  at  Jackson,  by  another  line  that  ran  east  and 
west,  from  Atlanta  to  Vicksburg.  Vicksburg  was  the  last 
foothold  of  the  Confederacy  on  the  Mississippi.  New 
Orleans  had  fallen  to  Farragut,  and  the  occupation  of 
Corinth  by  the  Federals  had  made  Memphis  and  everything 
on  the  Mississippi  above  that  point  untenable.*  Grant's 
objective  in  the  Mississippi  valley  might  therefore  well  be 
Vicksburg,  but  there  were  several  ways  in  which  that  strong 
hold  might  be  approached.  One  of  these  was  from  New 
Orleans  by  river,  but  Farragut  had  made  the  attempt  and 
found  that  the  high-placed  batteries  of  the  Confederates 

*  Halleck's  operations  against  Island  Number  Ten  were  pure  waste; 
the  troops  sent  there  should  obviously  have  been  sent  up  the  Tennessee, 
for  Island  Number  Ten  could  be  taken  at  Corinth. 


160  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

were  too  strong  for  his  ships.  Another  plan  was  to  move 
an  army  down  the  Mississippi  and  to  attack  Vicksburg 
directly  from  the  river.  Another  was  to  operate  along  the 
line  of  rail  towards  Jackson,  thus  getting  into  the  rear  of 
Vicksburg  and  cutting  it  off  from  the  rest  of  the  Confed 
eracy.  Grant  apparently  was  in  favor  of  this  plan;  it 
would  place  the  Confederates  under  the  necessity  of  fighting 
for  the  possession  of  Jackson,  and  a  victory  at  that  point 
would  probably  entail  the  fall  of  Vicksburg. 

Circumstances  arose,  however,  that  led  eventually  to 
Grant's  moving  down  the  Mississippi.  During  the  close 
of  1862  he  operated  along  the  rail  towards  Jackson,  but 
found  it  difficult  to  keep  his  army  supplied  so  far  from  its 
base,  especially  as  the  Confederate  cavalry  was  actively 
raiding  his  lines  of  communication.  Then,  again,  Grant 
had  not  a  free  hand;  he  was  a  subordinate,  he  was  not 
yet  trusted  in  high  places,  and  he  was  at  the  mercy  of  the 
suggestions,  often  far  removed  from  valuable,  of  Halleck  and 
the  Executive.  Under  these  circumstances  he  cautiously 
framed  a  plan  for  detaching  his  most  trusted  divisional 
commander,  Sherman,  to  attack  Vicksburg  by  the  Missis 
sippi  while  he  held  Pemberton  with  the  Confederate  army 
on  the  Yallabusha.  Finally,  towards  the  end  of  December, 
he  determined  to  give  up  the  advance  towards  Jackson 
and  to  shift  the  bulk  of  his  forces  to  the  river. 

Through  all  these  apparent  hesitations  and  half-hearted 
plans  ran  a  thread  of  political  intrigue.  Not  only  had 
Grant  to  show  deference  to  the  strategic  suggestions  that 
were  constantly  being  flashed  to  him  from  Washington, 
but  he  had  also  to  fear  the  influence  of  one  of  his  least- 
competent  divisional  commanders.  General  McClernand 
was  an  Illinois  politician,  an  orator,  opinionated,  full  of 
self-esteem,  and  a  friend  of  President  Lincoln.  From  his 
headquarters  he  constantly  sent  reflections  to  Washington 
on  the  conduct  of  operations  in  defiance  of  all  military 


ULYSSES  S.   GRANT  161 

etiquette.  He  finally  obtained  a  month's  leave,  proceeded 
to  the  capital,  and  there  persuaded  the  President  of  the 
vital  importance  of  immediately  clearing  the  Mississippi. 
This,  as  a  military  plan,  was  unobjectionable,  but  the  corol 
lary  was  fraught  with  danger, — it  was  that  McClernand 
should  raise  fresh  levies  in  Illinois  and,  adding  these  to 
other  troops  from  Grant's  department,  take  command  of 
the  expedition.  McClernand  nearly  succeeded  in  securing 
the  President's  complete  support,  and  it  was  knowledge 
of  this  intrigue  that  largely  affected  Grant's  decisions. 
Fortunately  Halleck  stood  firm  for  the  maintenance  of 
proper  military  order,  and  was  able  to  inform  Grant  that 
he  would  in  every  event  retain  supreme  control  of  all  offi 
cers  and  troops  in  his  department. 

Sherman  failed  in  his  attempt  on  Vicksburg.  McCler 
nand,  his  senior  in  rank,  joined  him,  and  Grant,  who  would 
gladly  have  left  the  command  to  Sherman,  went  down  the 
Mississippi  to  take  the  direction  of  affairs.  On  the  iyth 
of  January,  1863,  he  found  the  troops,  numbering  about 
30,000  men,  at  Napoleon,  midway  between  Memphis  and 
Vicksburg.  Two  weeks  later,  notwithstanding  McCler 
nand 's  protest  that  he  was  to  have  charge  of  the  enterprise, 
Grant  assumed  the  command  of  all  the  troops  on  the  Mis 
sissippi. 

Grant's  earlier  plan,  to  attack  Vicksburg  by  marching 
parallel  to  the  Mississippi  and  striking  at  Jackson,  was  the 
better  one,  as  he  quickly  realized  as  soon  as  he  arrived 
on  the  ground.  From  the  Mississippi  Vicksburg  was 
practically  unassailable.  The  line  of  bluffs  on  which  the 
town  stood  was  covered  with  batteries,  and  where  the  Missis 
sippi  did  not  serve  as  a  ditch  to  this  natural  glacis,  swamps 
took  its  place.  The  lowlands  were  mostly  under  water, 
and  the  only  hope  of  getting  into  the  place  seemed  to  be 
by  landing  on  the  east  bank  either  far  above  or  far  below 
the  city  and  executing  a  very  wide  turning  movement. 


162 


LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 


The  outlook  was  most  unpromising,  but  the  political  posi 
tion  was  so  difficult  that  Grant  decided  that  it  was  absolutely 
necessary  to  carry  the  undertaking  out,  now  that  it  was 
begun,  and  so  set  to  work  with  his  usual  determination. 

During  February  and  March  a  continuous  struggle  was 
waged  against  the  flooded  Mississippi.  Attempts  were 
made  to  clear  a  passage  for  boats  into  the  Yazoo,  whence 
Vicksburg  could  be  turned  by  the  right,  and  at  the  same 


VICKSBURG 

time  waterways  were  dug  and  prospected  that  might  serve 
to  carry  the  army  below  the  Confederate  position,  out  of 
reach  of  its  guns.  Enormous  difficulties  were  surmounted, 
but  all  in  vain.  In  the  first  week  of  April  Grant  decided 
to  abandon  all  further  attempts  on  the  north,  and  to  trans 
port  his  army  by  land  to  some  point  below  Vicksburg. 
Miles  of  corduroy  roads  and  trestles  were  built,  gunboats 
and  transports  ran  the  batteries  by  night,  and  finally,  on 
the  3oth  of  May,  a  landing  was  effected  at  Bruinsburg, 


ULYSSES   S.    GRANT  163 

below  Grand  Gulf,  about  40  miles  south  of  Vicksburg. 
From  this  point  Grant  marched  northeast  for  Jackson, 
then,  just  as  in  November,  the  strategic  centre  of  the  whole 
Vicksburg  district.  This  jtown  lay  about  50  miles  clue 
east  of  Vicksburg. 

Grant's  march  towards  the  rear  of  Vicksburg  was  stren 
uously  resisted  by  the  Confederates.  General  Pemberton, 
in  command  of  the  Department,  had  about  50,000  men, 
and  although  a  large  proportion  of  this  force  was  dispersed 
to  man  the  numerous  fortifications  erected  to  protect  the 
Mississippi  and  its  tributaries,  yet  enough  remained  to 
meet  the  Federals  in  the  field.  Grant's  landing  at  Bruins- 
burg  had  been  so  skilfully  and  rapidly  effected  that  Pem 
berton  was  not  in  force  to  oppose  him.  But  on  the  follow 
ing  day  (May  i)  General  Bowen  with  about  7000  men 
barred  the  Federal  advance  near  Port  Gibson.  McCler- 
nand's  and  McPherson's  corps,  over  20,000  bayonets,  were 
sent  to  the  attack,  and  after  a  hot  fight,  in  which  the  Con 
federates  lost  5  guns  and  1000  prisoners,  they  were  driven 
from  the  field.  It  was  more  than  twelve  months  since 
Shiloh  had  been  fought,  and  Grant's  success  was  all  the 
more  welcome  as  in  the  east  Lee  had  recently  defeated 
Burnside  at  Fredericksburg,  while  on  the  same  day  that  the 
battle  of  Port  Gibson  was  fought  the  Confederate  com- 
mander-in-chief  met  Burnside's  successor,  General  Hooker, 
on  the  disastrous  field  of  Chancellorsville. 

The  operations  that  followed  the  battle  of  Port  Gibson 
were  the  most  brilliant  in  Grant's  military  career,  and  the 
most  carping  strategist  could  find  little  in  them  to  criticize. 
North  of  him  lay  Vicksburg  with  a  large  garrison,  north 
east  Jackson,  where  reinforcements  for  Vicksburg  could 
be  collected.  He  therefore  determined  to  strike  rapidly, 
that  is,  before  the  enemy  could  concentrate  a  large  force 
at  either  point,  and  to  march  in  such  a  direction  as  to  cut 
the  Vicksburg- TScksori  line.  To  carry  out  this  plan  he 


164  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

concentrated  an  army  of  about  40,000  men  with  great 
rapidity  and  decided  to  rely  on  the  country  for  supplies. 

Grant  marched  northeast  from  Port  Gibson.  On  the 
1 2th  of  May  an  engagement  was  fought  by  his  right  wing 
at  Raymond,  and  on  the  following  day  his  left  wing  got 
across  the  Jackson- Vicksburg  line  at  Clinton,  10  miles  west 
of  Jackson.  The  Federal  army  was  now  between  two 
Confederate  ones:  to  the  west  was  Pemberton  with  the 
Vicksburg  garrison,  following  Grant's  movements  at  a 
cautious  distance;  to  the  east  was  Joseph  Johnston,  who 
had  that  day  arrived  at  Jackson,  with  a  small  command  of 
two  brigades.  Grant  had  cut  the  line  only  just  in  time  to 
prevent  the  junction  of  the  two  Confederate  armies,  and 
he  was  still  in  danger  of  a  combined  attack  on  his  right 
wing,  front  and  rear.  The  brilliant  decisiveness  of  his 
movements,  however,  gave  his  opponents  no  chance  of 
assuming  the  offensive. 

On  the  1 4th  the  Federal  columns  converged  on  Jackson; 
the  Confederates,  hopelessly  outnumbered,  made  only  a 
short  stand  and  abandoned  the  town  with  16  guns  and 
large  stores.  Giving  his  men  and  his  opponents  no  rest, 
Grant  issued  orders,  as  soon  as  he  knew  that  Johnston 
was  in  retreat,  for  turning  the  army  sharp  back  to  the  west 
to  strike  at  Pemberton.  On  the  i6th  his  leading  divisions 
were  nearly  half-way  to  Vicksburg  when,  at  Champion's 
Hill,  the  enemy  was  found  ready  to  give  battle.  Pemberton 
was  outnumbered,  and  after  a  sharp  fight  he  was  defeated 
with  a  loss  of  1500  killed  and  wounded,  2500  prisoners,  and 
25  guns.  So  complete  was  the  victory  that  Grant  for  the 
moment  thought  Vicksburg  was  his.  The  army  was  urged 
forward  to  one  last  march  that  should  crown  its  efforts. 

On  the  following  day  Pemberton  made  an  ill-considered 
stand  on  the  Big  Black  River.  The  Federal  advance  was 
so  rapid  that  no  proper  dispositions  for  defence  had  been 
made,  with  the  result  that  the  Confederates,  after  a  very 


ULYSSES   S.    GRANT  165 

short  engagement,  lost  nearly  1000  men  with  18  guns. 
Pemberton  thereupon  ordered  all  his  remaining  troops, 
including  those  at  Haines'  Bluff,  into  Vicksburg  and  disposed 
them  for  the  defence  of  the  city;  he  numbered  about  21,000 
men  actually  in  the  ranks.  On  the  night  of  the  i8th  a 
great  part  of  the  Federal  army  lay  stretched  out  in  front  of 
Vicksburg,  and  at  2  P.M.  on  the  ipth  Grant  sent  it  forward 
to  storm  the  Confederate  works. 

For  three  days  the  Federal  army  attempted  to  carry 
Vicksburg  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet,  but  after  the  repulse 
of  a  combined  and  determined  attack,  on  the  morning  of 
the  22d,  Grant  decided  that  a  regular  siege  must  be  under 
taken.  He  was,  however,  undoubtedly  right  in  ordering 
the  attempt  that  had  been  made.  His  army  was  inspirited 
by  the  brilliant  and  successful  operations  of  the  preceding 
two  weeks,  and  Pemberton's  troops  were  in  part  demoralized. 
To  seize  such  a  moment  for  immediate  attack  was  sound 
generalship,  for  there  are  occasions  in  war  when  anything 
is  possible  to  the  side  with  which  fortune  is  marching.  And 
the  reward  of  victory  would  have  been  great,  for  delay  in 
front  of  Vicksburg  meant  that  Johnston  would  be  given 
time  to  organize  a  force  for  its  relief. 

The  siege  of  Vicksburg  lasted  from  the  i8th  of  May  to 
the  4th  of  July,  1863.  It  was  not  marked  by  any  striking 
incidents.  The  besiegers  worked  continuously  at  trenches, 
batteries,  and  mines  that  gradually  crept  nearer  and  nearer 
to  points  chosen  for  a  final  assault.  But  when  Grant  had 
already  fixed  the  6th  of  July  as  the  day  on  which  he  could 
breach  the  works  and  carry  them,  Pemberton  decided 
to  surrender.  He  had  given  up  hope  of  Johnston's  being 
able  to  relieve  him;  he  was  short  of  food  and  ammunition; 
he  did  not  believe  his  troops  would  be  able  to  resist  the 
assault  which  he  expected  Grant  to  deliver  on  the  4th  of 
July;  and  so  on  the  3d,  the  very  day  on  which  Lee  retreated 
from  Gettysburg,  he  hoisted  the  white  flag.  Grant 


166  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

received  a  letter  from  the  Confederate  general  asking  on 
what  terms  the  garrison  could  surrender,  and  in  his  reply 
wrote:  "The  useless  effusion  of  blood  you  propose  stopping 
.  .  .  can  be  ended  at  any  time  you  may  choose  by  the 
unconditional  surrender  of  the  city  and  garrison.  Men 
who  have  shown  so  much  endurance  and  courage  as  those 
now  in  Vicksburg  will  always  challenge  the  respect  of 
an  adversary,  and  I  can  assure  you  will  be  treated  with  all 
the  respect  due  to  prisoners  of  war.  ..."  An  interview 
between  the  two  commanders  followed  under  an  oak  between 
the  two  lines,  and  after  a  good  deal  of  discussion  Grant, 
though  entering  into  no  formal  capitulation,  agreed  to 
several  conditions  pressed  on  him  by  the  Confederates.  On 
the  4th  of  July  the  garrison  marched  out,  with  colors  flying, 
stacked  arms,  and  then  returned  to  the  city,  where  officers 
and  men  were  called  on  to  sign  a  parole  and  take  their 
departure.  Over  30,000  paroles  were  signed,  though  the 
effective  strength  of  the  garrison  was  much  less. 

The  campaign  against  Vicksburg  marked  a  great  turn 
ing-point  both  in  the  Civil  War  and  in  the  career  of  Grant. 
It  was  in  solving  the  many  and  difficult  problems  of 
this  campaign  that  Grant  apparently  found  himself,  and 
stood  revealed  as  a  general  of  conspicuous  ability.  He 
had  always  been,  and  always  remained,  a  modest  and 
sensible  man.  When,  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  he  wrote 
his  opinion  that  under  the  existing  circumstances  he  was 
fit  to  command  a  regiment,  he  meant  plainly  what  he  said, 
and  what  he  said  was  plain  truth,  neither  more  nor  less. 
He  would  have  said,  with  equal  directness,  that  he  was  not 
fit  to  command  a  brigade.  A  little  later,  just  before  Fort 
Donelson,  he  remarked  to  one  of  his  staff  officers  that  he 
thought  himself  capable  of  commanding  a  brigade  effectively; 
this  time  he  was  perhaps  a  little  under  the  mark.  Grant 
never  overrated  himself,  but  the  Vicksburg  campaign 
taught  him  not  to  underrate  himself.  The  whole  aspect  of 


ULYSSES   S.    GRANT  167 

his  correspondence  with  Washington  changes  most  markedly 
at  this  period.  Up  till  then  the  tone  of  his  dispatches  to 
Halleck  is  often  disappointing.  He  is  very  deferential  at 
times,  anxious  to  carry  out  the  least  whim  of  the  com- 
mander-in-chief,  trying  to  carry  out  the  plans  made  at 
headquarters  rather  than  his  own, — just  doing  his  best 
as  a  military  subordinate.  But  as  the  course  of  events 
about  Vicksburg  unrolls  itself,  as  his  moral  courage  and 
military  insight  carry  him  triumphant  over  every  obstacle, 
he  feels  less  and  less  the  superiority  of  Halleck,  he  feels 
more  and  more  the  undeniable  truth  that  he,  Ulysses  Grant, 
is  a  general  whose  services  are  absolutely  indispensable  to 
the  Union  cause.  Sherman,  as  he  rode  by  his  chief's  side 
on  the  day  the  army  came  in  sight  of  the  fortifications  of 
Vicksburg,  told  him  with  enthusiasm  that  the  campaign 
just  finished  was  the  work  of  a  great  captain;  and  so  sure 
did  Grant  now  feel  of  his  position  that  midway  through 
the  siege  he  took  occasion  of  an  irregular  and  ill-judged 
proceeding  on  the  part  of  McClernand  to  remove  on  his  own 
responsibility  that  officer  from  the  command  of  his  corps. 

Halleck  supported  Grant  most  effectively  through  all 
the  operations  against  Vicksburg.  No  sooner  was  Pem- 
berton  hemmed  in  than  the  necessity  arose  for  warding  off 
any  attempt  Johnston  might  make  to  relieve  the  city. 
Grant  called  for  reinforcements,  but  Halleck  had  foreseen 
the  emergency  and  troops  were  already  on  their  way;  by 
the  ist  of  July  the  Federal  army  numbered  over  70,000 
effective  men.  This  was  far  more  than  necessary  to  contain 
Pemberton,  so  that  Grant  was  able  to  dispose  of  quite  a 
large  force  to  ward  off  any  offensive  movement  from  the 
east.  About  30,000  men  under  Sherman  were  solidly 
established  along  the  Big  Black  River  facing  towards 
Jackson,  and  successfully  held  Johnston  in  check.  The 
instant  Vicksburg  surrendered  Grant  started  reinforce 
ments  for  his  lieutenant,  and  on  the  afternoon  of  the  4th  of 


168  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

July  Sherman  was  rapidly  marching  towards  Jackson  at 
the  head  of  50,000  men. 

For  some  weeks  following  the  fall  of  Vicksburg  Grant 
was  occupied  with  matters  of  minor  importance,  especially 
details  concerning  the  clearing  up  of  the  Mississippi,  which 
took  him  to  New  Orleans  and  other  points.  But  his  services 
were  soon  required  to  deal  with  another  great  crisis  of  the 
war.  On  the  igth  and  20th  of  September  Rosecrans  was 
defeated  at  Chickamauga,  and  two  weeks  later  Halleck 
telegraphed  to  Grant  to  proceed  with  his  staff  to  Cairo. 

Rosecrans'  defeat  had  been  very  severe.  His  partly 
routed  army,  after  losing  nearly  20,000  in  killed,  wounded, 
and  prisoners,  had  been  driven  into  Chattanooga  by  Bragg, 
who  there  held  it  close.  The  problem  was  how  to  extricate 
it.  The  Government's  measures  to  this  end  were  wise. 
On  the  advice  of  Grant,  Rosecrans  was  superseded  by 
Thomas,  whose  stubborn  and  skilful  fighting  had  saved 
the  army  from  complete  disaster  at  Chickamauga.  Grant 
was  given  supreme  control  of  the  departments  of  the  Ohio, 
the  Tennessee,  and  the  Cumberland;  this  gave  him*  the 
army  under  Thomas  and  in  fact  all  the  armies  west  of 
the  Alleghanies  save  that  of  Banks  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Mississippi.  Grant  telegraphed  to  Chattanooga  an  order 
assuming  command,  and  to  Thomas  instructions  to  hold  his 
position  at  all  hazards,  thus  reversing  Rosecrans'  decision 
to  abandon  Chattanooga  and  retreat.  Grant's  resolve  was 
prompt,  bold,  and  soldier-like.  Chattanooga  was  a  point 
of  the  highest  strategic  value,  worth  heavy  sacrifices;  and 
he  judged  that  were  Thomas  to  attempt  a  retreat,  his  army 
was  so  lacking  in  transport  and  supplies,  so  badly  placed 
for  reaching  a  line  of  communications,  so  shaken  from  its 
defeat,  that  Bragg  might  possibly  destroy  it  before  it  could 
reach  safety. 

Having  made  these  dispositions,  and  having  ordered  up 
the  nth  and  i2th  army  corps  under  Hooker,  and  the  army 


ULYSSES   S.    GRANT  169 

of  the  Tennessee  under  Sherman,  Grant  repaired  to  Chat 
tanooga  to  take  direct  charge  of  operations.  The  town 
lay  on  the  Tennessee  River  at  the  opening  of  a  lateral  valley 
which  was  bounded  by  two  lines  of  hills,  Lookout  Mountain 
and  Missionary  Ridge.  These  two  lines  ended  abruptly  on 
the  river  and  perpendicular  to  it,  a  mile  above  and  a  mile 
below  the  town,  and  Bragg  had  intrenchments  running 
along  them  and  across  the  valley  between  them  at  the  back 
of  the  town.  Grant's  plan  was  of  the  simplest  character. 
Taking  advantage  of  a  great  preponderance  of  numbers,— 
he  had  about  60,000  men  against  35,000, — he  decided  to 
attack  Bragg's  positions  at  every  point  and  to  force  him 
out  of  them.  This  was  carried  into  effect  on  the  23d,  24th, 
and  25th  of  November  in  a  series  of  engagements  at  Orchard 
Knob,  Lookout  Mountain,  and  Missionary  Ridge,  jointly 
known  as  the  battle  of  Chattanooga.  Hooker,  on  the  right, 
won  the  first  great  success,  his  men  scaling  Lookout  Moun 
tain.  Sherman,  on  the  left,  was  to  have  moved  from  the 
Tennessee  up  the  spur  of  Missionary  Ridge,  but  found  the 
Confederates  too  strongly  posted  and  was  checked.  Thomas, 
in  the  centre,  made  good  headway  up  the  valley  and  turned 
against  the  line  of  Missionary  Ridge,  his  men  finally  charg 
ing  up  the  last  precipitous  ridge  without  orders  and  captur 
ing  many  guns  and  prisoners.  The  victory  was  complete. 
Bragg's  army  was  badly  demoralized  and  in  part  dispersed; 
6000  prisoners  and  50  guns  were  captured. 

As  soon  as  Bragg  was  disposed  of,  Grant  turned  to  the 
relief  of  Burnside  at  Knoxville.  The  Confederates  had 
committed  the  strategic  error  of  disseminating  their  forces 
just  before  the  battle  of  Chattanooga.  Bragg,  trusting  to 
the  natural  strength  of  his  positions  and  to  the  ill-supplied 
condition  of  the  Federal  forces,  thought  he  was  safe  from 
attack  and  detached  Longstreet's  corps  in  hopes  of  over 
whelming  a  small  force  under  Burnside  at  Knoxville.  The 
anxiety  of  the  Government  as  to  the  fate  of  Burnside  was 


170  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

intense,  but  Lincoln  had  by  now  nearly  learned  the  lesson 
that  it  was  safer  to  allow  his  generals  to  judge  of  the  ex 
pediency  or  inexpediency  of  military  measures,  so  he  re 
stricted  himself  to  sending  constant  telegrams  to  Grant, 
reminding  him  of  the  danger  in  eastern  Tennessee.  Grant, 
free  to  make  his  own  decision,  adhered  firmly  to  the  sound 
military  principle  of  concentrating  every  available  man  on 
the  decisive  point.  The  instant  Sherman's  army  had 
joined  him  his  attack  on  Bragg  had  been  delivered,  and  the 
instant  Bragg  had  been  defeated  columns  were  rapidly 
started  on  the  road  to  Knoxville.  But  Chattanooga  settled 
the  fate  of  the  absent  corps  of  Longstreet  as  well  as  the 
present  corps  of  Bragg.  Burnside  had  defended  himself 
skilfully,  and  Longstreet,  on  the  news  of  Bragg's  defeat, 
realized  that  he  was  at  Grant's  mercy  and  promptly  aban 
doned  all  further  efforts  against  Knoxville. 

One  more  point  may  be  mentioned  in  connection  with 
the  Chattanooga  campaign,  which  is  that  it  called  for  a 
display  of  all  Grant's  natural  aptitude  for  questions  of 
transportation.  In  boyhood  his  bent  had  been  for  teaming; 
in  early  army  days  he  had  been  regimental  quartermaster; 
as  a  general  he  was  always  resourceful  and  skilful  in  sup 
plying  his  troops.  He  got  food  for  Thomas'  starving  army 
in  Chattanooga  by  prompt,  decisive  military  steps  backed 
up  by  hard  driving  of  the  transport  service,  and  only  these 
measures  made  possible  the  great  success  that  followed. 

Vicksburg  and  Chattanooga  made  Grant  the  inevitable 
leader  that  the  North  had  constantly  looked  for  during 
two  weary  years  marked  by  many  disasters.  McDowell, 
McClellan,  Pope,  Halleck,  Burnside,  Hooker,  Rosecrans, 
had  all  proved  disappointments,  and  Meade,  who  had  won 
Gettysburg  and  had  since  then  commanded  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  was  viewed  by  few  soldiers  or  civilians  as 
anything  more  than  a  capable  and  judicious  corps  com 
mander.  Public  opinion  pointed  to  Grant  as  the  necessary 


ULYSSES   S.    GRANT  171 

man.  Swords  of  honor  were  presented  to  him.  Congress 
voted  him  thanks  and  a  gold  medal  for  Vicksburg  and 
Chattanooga.  Lincoln  had  long  believed  in  him  as  a  man 
who  would  do  things,  not  merely  plan  them.  Among 
congressmen  he  had  enthusiastic  supporters,  under  his  old 
friend  E.  B.  Washburne.  And  so  it  came  about  naturally 
enough,  after  a  ripening  of  public  opinion  through  the 
winter  of  1863-64,  that  towards  the  end  of  February  Con 
gress  passed  a  law  restoring  the  grade  of  lieutenant-general 
in  the  army  of  the  United  States.  Washington  was  the  only 
other  man  who  had  held  this  rank,  though  Winfield  Scott 
had  taken  it  by  brevet.  There  could  be  no  question  as  to 
the  person  whom  Lincoln  would  nominate  to  fill  it. 

On  the  3d  of  March,  1864,  Grant  was  summoned  to 
Washington  to  take  up  the  duties  of  lieutenant-general  and 
commander-in-chief  of  all  the  armies  of  the  United  States. 
The  letter  which  he  wrote  to  Sherman  on  the  following  day 
is  so  characteristic,  so  creditable  to  both  men,  that  it  must 
find  space  here. 

"DEAR  SHERMAN:  The  bill  reviving  the  grade  of  lieu 
tenant-general  in  the  army  has  become  a  law,  and  my  name 
has  been  sent  to  the  Senate  for  the  place.  I  now  receive 
orders  to  report  to  Washington  in  person,  which  indicates 
either  a  confirmation  or  a  likelihood  of  confirmation.  I 
start  in  the  morning  to  comply  with  the  order;  but  I  shall 
say  very  distinctly,  on  my  arrival  there,  that  I  accept  no 
appointment  which  will  require  me  to  make  that  city  my 
headquarters.  This,  however,  is  not  what  I  started  to 
write  about. 

"Whilst  I  have  been  eminently  successful  in  this  war  in 
at  least  gaining  the  confidence  of  the  public,  no  one  feels 
more  than  I  how  much  of  this  success  is  due  to  the  skill 
and  energy,  and  the  harmonious  putting  forth  of  that  energy 
and  skill,  of  those  whom  it  has  been  my  good  fortune  to 
have  occupying  a  subordinate  position  under  me. 

"There  are  many  officers  to  whom    these  remarks  are 


172  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

applicable  to  a  greater  or  less  degree,  proportionate  to  their 
ability  as  soldiers;  but  what  I  want  is  to  express  my  thanks 
to  you  and  McPherson  as  the  men  to  whom,  above  all 
others,  I  feel  indebted  for  whatever  I  have  had  of  success. 
How  far  your  advice  and  suggestions  have  been  of  service, 
you  know.  How  far  your  execution  of  whatever  has  been 
given  you  to  do  entitles  you  to  the  reward  I  am  receiving, 
you  cannot  tell  as  well  as  I.  I  feel  all  the  gratitude  this 
letter  can  express,  giving  it  the  most  flattering  construction. 
"The  word  'you'  I  use  in  the  plural,  intending  it  for 
McPherson  also.  I  should  write  him,  and  will  some  day; 
but,  starting  in  the  morning,  I  do  not  know  that  I  will  find 
time  now." 

Grant  was  not  many  days  in  Washington.  His  mind 
was  too  simple,  too  concentrated  on  the  task  before  him, 
to  face  for  long  the  hero-worship  of  hotel  and  White  House 
mobs.  He  was  anxious  to  get  into  the  field,  and  after  a 
few  meetings  with  President  Lincoln,  Secretary  of  War 
Stanton,  and  others,  he  left  the  capital  to  visit  the  head 
quarters  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  It  was  inevitable 
that  this  should  be  the  first  point  to  attract  the  attention 
of  the  new  commander-in-chief.  The  theatre  of  war  in 
the  west  was  familiar  to  him  from  New  Orleans  to  Chat 
tanooga,  and  now  that  he  held  supreme  control  he  knew 
exactly  what  measures  should  be  taken  in  that  part  of  the 
field  and  where  to  find  men  to  carry  them  into  effect.  But 
in  the  east  ground  and  men  were  equally  unfamiliar,  in  the 
east  was  the  more  important  scene  of  operations,  in  the 
east  the  Federal  arms  had  been  constantly  checked  and 
the  Federal  capital  itself  more  than  once  threatened  by 
the  Confederacy's  finest  army.  Grant's  unmistakable  duty 
was  to  face  in  person  the  great  general  who  commanded 
that  army,  Robert  Lee. 

Grant  received  his  commission  on  the  gth  of  March. 
On  the  following  day  he  was  near  the  Rapidan  River  at 
Brandy  Station,  headquarters  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 


ULYSSES   S.   GRANT  173 

Meade  was  in  command,  and  Grant,  who  had  a  good  opinion 
of  Meade's  capacity  and  a  due  appreciation  of  the  great 
services  he  had  rendered  the  Union  at  Gettysburg,  decided 
to  retain  him  in  this  position.  He  proposed,  however,  to 
place  his  own  headquarters  in  close  proximity  to  those  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  thus  virtually  directing  the 
movements  of  that  army.  The  arrangement  was  a  clumsy 
and  unsatisfactory  one  and  it  speaks  much  for  the  loyalty 
and  right  spirit  of  both  Grant  and  Meade  that  they  were 
able  to  carry  it  out  to  the  end. 

Grant  was  back  at  Washington  on  the  nth  of  March, 
then  off  west,  where  he  met  Sherman  at  Nashville.  To 
this  trusted  officer  and  warm  friend  he  had  decided  to  give 
control  of  the  West,  and  he  wanted  to  confer  with  him  on 
the  operations  that  were  shortly  to  be  entered  on.  The 
plan  was  on  a  large  scale,  but  the  design  was  simple.  Just 
as  the  clearance  of  the  Mississippi  had  broken  the  Con 
federacy  in  two,  so  would  an  advance  to  Atlanta  break  in 
two  the  remaining  part,  all  but  isolating  Virginia  and  the 
Carolinas.  Sherman's  object  would  be  to  take  one  more 
step  on  the  great  line  from  Cairo  to  the  southeast  through 
Nashville,  Chattanooga,  Atlanta,  and  to  break  the  last 
line  of  communication  between  Richmond  and  the  south 
west. 

Having  conferred  with  Sherman,  Grant  was  quickly  back 
in  Washington,  saw  Lincoln,  listened  patiently  and  impas 
sively  to  a  preposterous  scheme  of  operations  put  forward  by 
the  President,  gave  no  man  an  inkling  of  his  own  intentions, 
and  by  the  26th  of  March  had  his  headquarters  fixed  at 
Culpeper,  ready  for  opening  the  campaign  against  Lee.  The 
affairs  of  the  Union  had  undergone  an  inconspicuous  but 
considerable  improvement  in  the  course  of  these  4ast  three 
weeks,  for  an  effective,  centralized,  and  strictly  military 
control  of  the  operations  of  the  armies  had  been  established. 
Every  man  in  the  theatre  of  war  was  now  to  respond  to  a 


174  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

single  impulse  and  to  march  where  military  considerations  and 
not  political  fears  dictated.  It  was  not  the  least  of  Grant's 
qualities  that  he  could  grasp  large  as  easily  as  small  prob 
lems.  He  viewed  the  theatre  of  war  as  one  battle-field,  and 
surveyed  hundreds  of  square  miles  as  calmly  and  as  logically 
as  a  few  acres.  He  saw  how  the  South  had  with  greatly 
inferior  forces  won  many  victories  by  rapidly  withdrawing 
troops  from  points  where  pressure  was  least  to  employ  them 
at  points  where  pressure  was  most  tense.  This,  Grant 
was  determined,  should  not  happen  in  1864.  He  was 
resolved  to  press  the  Confederate  armies  heavily  and  simul 
taneously  at  every  point  from  the  Potomac  to  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico,  and  he  knew  that  with  such  numbers  and  leadership 
as  he  could  command  their  lines  must  break  at  one  point 
or  another.  The  first  week  of  May  was  fixed  for  the 
opening  of  the  campaign. 

The  continuous  operations  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
during  the  next  thirteen  months,  from  the  Wilderness  to 
Appomattox,  were  controlled  by  Grant  and  must  now  be 
related,  but  throughout  the  whole  of  this  period  it  must  be 
remembered  that  other  great  movements  were  taking  place 
in  the  West,  of  which  Grant  was  the  supreme  director,  and 
that  were  the  complement  of  the  operations  carried  out 
under  his  immediate  eye  in  Virginia.  The  problem  before 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  itself  was  this :  Richmond  lay  less 
than  a  hundred  miles  south,  the  country  between  being 
wooded,  heavy,  and  cut  by  several  rivers.  Lee  barred  the 
way  with  about  70,000  men  well  intrenched  behind  the 
Rapidan,  a  few  miles  west  of  Fredericksburg. 

Here  a  slight  digression  must  be  indulged  in;  for  there 
are  three  questions  of  military  science  that  are  worth  con 
sidering  in  connection  with  the  position  of  the  two  contend 
ing  armies.  A  brief  discussion  of  these  will  help  the  reader 
follow  with  better  understanding  the  events  about  to  be 
narrated;  they  are,  first,  the  question  of  transportation; 


ULYSSES   S.    GRANT  175 

second,  that  of  the  relation  of  a  field  army  to  a  fortress; 
third,  that  of  the  true  strategic  objective. 

To  transport  the  mass  of  supplies  necessary  for  an  army 
intended  to  total  150,000  men  was  a  difficult  matter.  Lee 
had  more  than  once  demonstrated  the  comparative  mobility 
of  the  Southern  army  and  its  consequent  power  of  striking 
its  opponents'  line  of  communications.  But  as  against  this 
Grant  had  a  factor  in  his  favor  of  which  McClellan  had 
already  demonstrated  the  utility,  the  control  of  the  sea. 
The  coast  of  Virginia  was  broken  at  numerous  points  by 
deep  inlets  up  which  ships  might  bring  supplies  to  the  im 
mediate  rear  of  an  army  operating  towards  Richmond,  so  long 
as  that  army  kept  in  touch  with  the  coast.  It  was  this 
factor  that  decided  Grant  to  make  his  first  move  against 
Lee,  and,  as  it  turned  out,  every  move  that  followed,  by  the 
left  flank.  Curiously  enough,  Lee  acted  in  a  converse  way, 
and  that  brings  us  to  the  second  point,  the  question  of  the 
relation  of  a  field  army  to  a  fortress. 

It  is  generally  agreed  that  from  a  strictly  military  point 
of  view  a  field  army  should  never  assume  the  role  of 
garrisoning  a  fortress;  the  protection  it  should  afford  the 
fortress  is  by  means  of  operations  in  the  field  against 
the  enemy's  main  force.  In  this  case  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia  was  the  army  in  the  field,  Richmond  the 
fortress.  Lee  understood  his  military  duty  to  be  to  pro 
tect  Richmond  by  conducting  operations  in  the  field  for 
the  destruction  or  defeat  of  the  Federal  army.  Should 
he  be  worsted,  however,  in  the  first  encounters,  then  he 
ought  not  to  fall  back  on  and  garrison  Richmond,  but  en 
deavor  to  continue  operations  from  outside  it.  To  do  this 
he  would  require  a  new  line  of  supplies;  that  line  could  only 
be  back  to  Lynchburg  and  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  giving 
him  an  ex-centric  and  threatening  position  on  the  flank  of 
the  invader.  This  was  the  underlying  reason  that  deter 
mined  all  Lee's  movements  in  the  ensuing  campaign  up  to 


176  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

the  moment  when  he  abandoned  his  positions  on  the  North 
Anna.  But  war  is  only  a  factor  in  the  larger  game  of  politics; 
Richmond  might  from  a  strict  military  point  of  view  be  no 
more  than  a  fortress,  but  from  the  larger  political  standpoint 
it  was  the  capital  of  the  Confederacy.  Lee's  constant  desire 
to  act  on  sound  military  principle  was  as  constantly  neutral 
ized  by  the  despairing  cry  of  the  Southern  leaders  that 
Richmond  must  be  defended  at  all  costs,  and  Lee's  army 
eventually  became  its  garrison  and  thereby  doomed  to 
destruction. 

This  naturally  brings  us  to  the  third  point, — what  was  the 
true  strategic  objective  of  Grant's  army?  He  might  aim  at 
the  capture  of  Richmond  or  at  the  destruction  of  the  Con 
federate  army.  As  a  matter  of  strict  rule  the  latter  was  the 
correct  course,  and  from  Grant's  memoirs  it  seems  clear 
that  what  he  set  out  to  do  was  to  attack  and  if  possible 
destroy  Lee.  This  being  so,  a  criticism  often  made  falls  to 
the  ground.  It  is  said  that  when  Grant  finally  placed  his 
army  on  the  Chickahominy,  he  had  only  succeeded  in  doing 
after  a  hard  campaign  marked  by  terrific  fighting  what 
McClellan  had  accomplished  without  difficulty  by  making 
use  of  sea  transportation.  If  Grant's  objective  had  been 
Richmond,  the  criticism  would  be  correct,  but  Grant  set 
out  to  destroy  Lee,  and  to  do  that  it  was  best  to  attack 
him  as  far  from  intrenched  positions  as  possible.  There 
was  also  an  incidental  advantage  in  this  course, — that  it 
kept  the  Federal  army  between  Lee  and  Washington.  And 
yet  it  will  be  seen,  as  the  narrative  of  the  campaign  pro 
gresses,  how  closely  Grant's  two  possible  objectives  became 
identified;  when  he  failed  to  crush  Lee  he  turned  against 
Richmond,  and  when  he  failed  to  take  Richmond  he  turned 
against  Lee  again.  In  practice  Grant's  objective  became  a 
shifting  one,  But  his  splendid  courage  and  resolute  sense  of 
maintaining  the  offensive  never  wavered  for  an  instant. 

Before  one  o'clock  on  the  morning  cf  the  4th  of  May,  1864, 


ULYSSES  S.   GRANT  177 

the  Army  of  the  Potomac  opened  what  was  to  be  its  last  cam 
paign.  By  a  rapid  and  well-conducted  movement  it  was 
thrown  across  the  Rapidan  beyond  the  extreme  right  of  Lee's 
position,  and  soon  the  army  was  advancing  into  the  Wilder 
ness.  Grant's  intention  was  to  turn  Lee's  right  and  to  get 
into  the  open  country  beyond  the  Wilderness,  where  he 
might  hope  to  fight  him  to  advantage  and  to  throw  him  back 
towards  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  When  his  staff  officers 
brought  him  word  that  the  columns  were  crossing  unopposed 
and  effecting  a  lodgment  on  the  farther  bank,  he  concluded 
that  he  had  surprised  and  outgeneralled  Lee.  That  conclu 
sion  was  a  mistaken  one.  Grant's  powerful  mind  and  char 
acter  carried  him  to  high  achievement  and  made  him  an 
adversary  that  the  greatest  captain  might  well  have  feared, 
but  in  the  subtler  aspects  of  the  military  art  Lee  always 
remained  his  superior.  The  Confederate  general  was  not 
to  be  beaten  by  such  a  simple  move  as  his  adversary  had 
carried  out;  he  was  perfectly  willing  that  Grant  should 
engage  his  army  in  the  Wilderness,  for  once  there,  offering 
its  flank,  he  was  determined  to  strike  it  a  blow  from  which 
it  might  not  recover.  To  defend  Richmond  he  intended  to 
paralyze  its  attacker,  and  the  whole  Confederate  army  was 
thrown  on  to  Grant's  left  before  he  could  reach  the  clear 
country  south  of  Chancellorsville. 

On  the  5th  and  6th  of  May  the  two  armies  were  locked 
in  the  bloody  contest  of  the  Wilderness.  After  his  troops  had 
succeeded  in  staying  the  first  fierce  rush  of  the  Confederate 
infantry,  Grant  strove  hard  to  take  up  the  attack  himself. 
Through  the  dark  tangle  the  struggle  wore  on,  musket 
against  musket,  nearly  beyond  the  control  of  the  generals 
owing  to  the  denseness  of  the  woods.  On  the  evening  of  the 
6th  of  May  both  armies,  both  generals,  were  fought  to  a 
standstill,  and  it  was  clear  that  neither  could  possibly  win 
a  decisive  advantage  on  that  ground.  Under  such  circum 
stances  most  of  Grant's  predecessors  in  the  command  of  the 


178  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

Army  of  the  Potomac  would  have  recrossed  the  Rappahan- 
nock  and  called  up  reinforcements  with  a  view  to  starting 
again  later;  Grant  was  cast  in  a  different  mould.  In  his  me 
moirs,  writing  with  reference  to  an  incident  of  his  early  days, 
he  says:  "One  of  my  superstitions  had  always  been,  when  I 
started  to  go  anywhere  or  to  do  anything,  not  to  turn  back 
or  stop  until  the  thing  intended  was  accomplished.  I  have 
frequently  started  to  go  to  places  where  I  had  never  been, 
.  .  .  and  if  I  got  past  the  place  without  knowing  it,  in 
stead  of  turning  back  I  would  go  on  until  a  road  was  found 
turning  in  the  right  direction,  take  that,  and  come  in  by  the 
other  side."  It  was  precisely  this  that  took  him  from  the 
front  of  Lee's  inexpugnable  intrenchments  at  the  Wilder 
ness  and  that  brought  him  out  a  few  weeks  later  at  Peters 
burg  on  the  south  side  of  Richmond. 

Grant  determined  at  all  hazards  to  retain  the  offensive, 
and  ordered  about  the  only  forward  move  that  Lee  had  left 
open  to  him.  Meade  was  directed  to  advance  to  the  left  on 
Spottsylvania  Court-house,  leaving  in  the  enemy's  front  a 
sufficient  force  to  mask  the  movement.  That  force  was 
Hancock's  corps,  and  late  at  night  as  its  soldiers  saw  Grant 
and  Meade  with  a  large  staff  riding  by,  heading  the  march 
of  the  army  southwards,  they  cheered  and  cheered  again; 
all  their  sacrifices  had  not  been  in  vain  if  their  new  com 
mander  would  not  accept  Lee's  superiority  in  the  field. 

Grant  failed  to  reach  Spottsylvania  in  time.  Lee  watched 
the  Federal  movements  so  closely  that  little  escaped  him. 
He  was  on  the  march  nearly  as  soon  as  his  opponent;  his 
cavalry  was  swung  around  into  Grant's  path  and  delayed  his 
advance  just  long  enough  to  enable  the  Confederates  to 
reach  Spottsylvania  in  time  to  secure  favorable  positions  for 
giving  battle.  The  challenge  was  accepted  and  the  two 
armies  grappled  once  more  to  decide  the  question  left  un 
settled  at  the  Wilderness.  The  fighting  that  took  place  at 
Spottsylvania  was  even  more  stubborn  than  that  which  had 


ULYSSES  S.   GRANT  179 

marked  the  earlier  contest.  From  the  8th  to  the  i8th  of  May 
the  two  armies  were  locked  in  deadly  embrace,  and  although 
that  of  the  South  saved  its  honor  and  held  its  ground,  it 
received  a  mortal  wound  from  which  it  never  recovered. 
Over  and  over  again  Grant  sent  the  Federal  corps  to  assault 
the  log  and  earth  intrenchments  thrown  up  by  the  Confed 
erates.  Among  the  hills  and  woods,  brigades  and  divisions 
were  shifted  about  to  favorable  positions  and  a  constant 
effort  was  maintained  to  pierce  the  enemy's  lines.  On  the 
nth  of  May  Grant  wrote  a  memorable  letter  to  Halleck,  then 
filling  the  functions  of  Chief  of  Staff  at  Washington.  In  it 
he  said:  "We  have  now  ended  the  sixth  day  of  very  hard 
fighting.  The  result  up  to  this  time  is  much  in  our  favor. 
But  our  losses  have  been  heavy  as  well  as  those  of  the  enemy. 
We  have  lost  to  this  time  eleven  general  officers  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing,  and  probably  twenty  thousand  men. 
I  think  the  loss  of  the  enemy  must  be  greater — we  having 
taken  over  four  thousand  prisoners  in  battle,  whilst  he  has 
taken  from  us  but  few  except  a  few  stragglers.  I  am  now 
sending  back  to  Belle  Plain  all  my  wagons  for  a  fresh  supply 
of  provisions  and  ammunition,  and  purpose  to  fight  it  out 
on  this  line  if  it  takes  all  summer."  It  was  to  take  more 
than  a  summer  to  fight  it  out,  but  Grant's  resolution  stayed 
to  the  end  and  compelled  ultimate  success. 

On  the  day  after  this  letter  was  written  occurred  the 
fiercest  fighting  that  marked  what  is  known  as  the  battle  of 
Spottsylvania,  and  Grant  for  a  few  minutes  was  nearer  a  vic 
tory  than  he  ever  was  in  a  general  engagement  against  Lee.  A 
point  had  been  discovered  at  which  the  Confederate  intrench 
ments  ran  far  forward  at  a  salient  angle  from  the  rest  of  the 
line;  it  was  determined  to  attack  it.  A  desperate  struggle 
took  place,  and  the  position  was  at  one  time  captured  by 
Grant's  troops,  though  not  held  permanently.  For  some 
minutes  it  looked  as  though  a  hole  would  be  driven  straight 
through  the  Confederate  centre;  but  Lee,  although  he  lost 


180  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

an  entire  division  as  prisoners  of  war  and  suffered  heavily 
in  killed  and  wounded,  succeeded  in  re-establishing  his 
lines. 

Grant  quailed  not  at  the  appalling  character  of  the  strug 
gle.  In  the  course  of  his  attempts  to  find  a  vulnerable  point 
he  had  been  continuously  shifting  from  right  towards  left, 
and  he  now  decided  to  repeat  his  manoeuvre  of  the  Wil 
derness.  Several  days  of  drenching  rain  followed  the  i2th 
of  May,  and  little  more  than  heavy  skirmishing  took  place 
between  the  armies.  Finally,  in  the  early  hours  of  the  2ist, 
the  Federal  corps  were  moved  once  more  to  the  left  in  a 
second  attempt  to  swing  around  Lee's  right. 

Grant's  new  movement  was  accompanied  by  a  change  of 
base  to  Port  Royal,  and  it  brought  his  main  line  of  advance 
on  to  the  road  that  runs  due  south  from  Fredericksburg  to 
Richmond  through  Hanover  Court-house.  Lee  once  more 
kept  in  touch  with  his  opponent's  movements  and  fell  back 
rapidly  to  the  North  Anna,  the  next  possible  line  of  defence. 

Grant,  moving  south,  soon  found  that  Lee  was  again  in 
his  front,  and,  still  holding  the  offensive,  he  properly  deter 
mined  to  seek  out  and  attack  the  enemy.  The  Federal 
commander  thought,  not  without  some  justification,  that 
even  though  he  had  won  no  great  victory,  yet  the  morale  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  had  been  reduced  by  its 
desperate,  costly,  and  unsuccessful  efforts  to  throw  back  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  To  a  certain  extent  he  was  war 
ranted  in  believing  that  its  power  of  attack  was  reduced, 
and,  in  fact,  after  the  Wilderness  it  never  repeated  its  tre 
mendous  charges,  those  led  by  Longstreet  at  the  Second  Ma- 
nassas,  by  Jackson  at  Chancellorsville,  and  by  Pickett  at  Get 
tysburg.  But  the  spirit  of  Lee's  army  was  only  reduced,  far 
from  quenched,  and  Grant  at  first  failed  to  perceive  the  re 
markable  strategic  and  tactical  value  of  the  position  it  now 
occupied.  Lee  meant  to  strike  once  more  at  the  flank  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  just  as  he  had  at  the  Wilderness,  but 


ULYSSES  S.   GRANT  181 

Grant,  although  wary,  failed  to  penetrate  his  opponent's  in 
tentions.  These  were,  in  fact,  not  carried  out,  partly  owing 
to  the  fact  that  Lee  was  for  some  days  disabled  and  not  fit  to 
leave  his  tent.  As  it  was,  the  two  armies  manoeuvred  and 
skirmished  until  Grant,  finding  Lee  too  strongly  posted, 
gave  up  all  idea  of  a  battle,  and  concluded  once  more  to 
break  away  towards  his  left  and  march  nearer  to  Richmond. 
The  decision  was  a  prudent  one;  the  movement  was  carried 
out  swiftly  and  almost  unperceived.  That  Grant  managed 
to  slip  away  unscathed  from  the  very  delicate  position  into 
which  Lee  had  drawn  him  on  the  North  Anna  is  enough  in 
itself  to  stamp  him  as  a  general  of  the  greatest  ability. 

Once  more  Grant  was  manoeuvring  by  his  left  against 
Lee's  right,  and  once  more  a  change  of  base  had  become 
necessary,  this  time  to  White  House  on  the  Pamunkey  River. 
This  point,  together  with  Hanover  Court-house,  where  Grant 
crossed  the  Pamunkey,  and  Richmond,  mark  the  three  angles 
of  a  triangle  of  which  Cold  Harbor  is  the  centre.  Both 
armies  were  now  rapidly  marching  to  get  possession  of  Cold 
Harbor,  Grant  so  as  to  cover  the  roads  running  towards 
White  House,  Lee  so  as  to  interpose  between  the  Federals 
and  Richmond  and  so  as  to  strike  at  their  communications 
if  possible.  The  two  armies  were  soon  in  contact  again, 
their  march  was  about  equal,  and  on  the  3d  of  June  they 
met  at  the  point  both  were  struggling  to  reach. 

The  battle  of  Cold  Harbor  was,  after  Shiloh,  Grant's 
least  brilliant  effort.  His  indefatigable,  undefeated  enemy 
was  once  more  before  him,  and  Grant,  in  a  hasty  moment, 
giving  unrestrained  vent  to  his  rooted  conviction  in  the  effi 
cacy  of  attack,  ordered  the  whole  army  to  advance.  There 
was  apparently  no  reconnoitring,  no  attempt,  as  at  Spottsyl- 
vania,  to  locate  the  enemy's  true  positions,  to  discover  points 
of  tactical  value,  to  manoeuvre  so  as  to  take  advantage  of 
them.  Orders  were  merely  issued  to  three  army  corps  to 
attack  in  any  way  their  commanders  thought  best,  and  to  the 


1 82  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

two  other  army  corps  to  demonstrate  strongly  and  attack  if 
possible.  The  Confederate  army  was  not  yet  so  outnum 
bered  that  such  crude  tactics  could  avail.  Lee,  with  his  mar 
vellous  eye  for  ground,  had  got  his  men  well  covered,  and 
when  the  Federal  lines  began  to  roll  forward  on  the  morning 
of  the  3d  of  June  they  were  thrown  back  with  the  utmost  ease. 
In  one  disastrous  hour  the  Federal  army  lost  over  10,000 
men  and  all  heart  for  further  fighting ;  and  so  dispirited  were 
some  of  the  divisions  that  had  Lee  attempted  a  rapid  coun- 
terstroke  it  is  possible  that  he  might  have  driven  Grant's 
whole  army  from  the  field. 

Cold  Harbor  was  fought  within  sight  of  Richmond; 
four  or  five  miles  in  Lee's  rear  were  the  fortifications  that 
protected  the  Confederate  capital.  Grant  quickly  made 
up  his  mind  that  it  would  be  useless  to  attempt  to  continue 
his  advance  at  this  point  and  so  cast  about  for  another  line 
of  approach.  Having  failed  to  defeat  Lee,  or  to  interpose 
between  him  and  Richmond,  there  remained  the  possibility 
of  starving  out  the  Confederate  army  and  the  capital  itself. 
Virginia  was  devastated,  and  supplies  in  any  bulk  could 
reach  Richmond  only  from  the  west  and  south.  To  the 
west  ran  a  line  of  rail  through  Lynchburg  and  Chattanooga; 
this  Grant  hoped  to  cut  with  his  western  army  under  Sher 
man  and  with  a  corps  operating  up  the  Shenandoah  Valley 
towards  Staunton.  To  the  south  ran  another  line  connect 
ing  Richmond  with  the  Carolinas  and  Georgia;  this  Grant 
undertook  to  break  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  It  was 
undoubtedly  the  best  course  he  could  adopt  under  the 
circumstances. 

Availing  himself  once  more  of  his  command  of  the  sea, 
Grant  started  to  describe  a  half-circle  from  the  north  of 
Richmond  around  by  the  east  to  the  south.  He  got  his  army 
first  over  the  Chickahominy,  then  over  the  James,  with 
prudence,  skill,  and  celerity.  From  the  James  it  was 
only  a  few  miles  to  the  little  town  of  Petersburg  on  the 


ULYSSES   S.    GRANT  183 

Appomattox  River,  the  key  of  Richmond,  and  only  about 
twenty  miles  to  the  south  of  it  by  rail.  This  was 
Grant's  objective.  The  troops  were  hurried  to  seize  the 
town,  but  Confederate  reinforcements  arrived  in  time  and 
the  Federal  army  had  to  intrench  within  a  short  distance 
of  it. 

On  the  1 8th  of  June,  1864,  began  the  long  siege  of  Peters 
burg,  or  siege  of  Richmond.  The  essential  features  of  this 
tedious  operation  were  the  natural  consequences  that  flowed 
from  the  plans  which  Grant  had  consistently  adhered  to. 
It  was  still  his  aim  to  crush  Lee's  army,  or  at  least  to 
keep  it  under  such  constant  pressure  that  no  detachments 
could  be  made  to  help  the  other  Confederate  generals;  and 
so  the  siege  was  marked  by  a  continuous  series  of  attacks 
along  the  Richmond-Petersburg  line,  of  which  the  best  known 
was  the  so-called  Petersburg  mine.  Alongside  of  this  was 
a  constant  effort  to  cut  Lee's  line  of  communications  by 
outflanking  him  beyond  Petersburg,  and  it  was  at 
this  point  that  success  finally  crowned  Grant's  superb 
obstinacy. 

The  winter  of  1864-65  saw  the  Confederate  Government 
reduced  well-nigh  to  despair.  The  Federal  armies  were 
triumphant  all  along  the  line,  and  Sherman,  who  had 
pierced  through  Georgia  to  Savannah  before  Christmas, 
had  thence  turned  northwards  and  captured  Charleston 
in  February.  The  Confederacy  was  fast  melting  away. 
Lee's  army  was  now  hardly  larger  than  one  of  Grant's 
corps.  Richmond  was  starving.  The  end  was  approach 
ing. 

The  instant  that  the  roads  had  recovered  sufficiently 
from  the  winter  rains  to  permit  the  movement  of  artillery 
Grant  issued  the  orders  that  were  to  seal  the  fate  of  the  Con 
federacy;  he  probably  did  not  realize  how  rapid  and  dra 
matic  the  end  would  be.  Moving  by  his  left  flank  as  on 
previous  occasions,  he  placed  a  large  force,  the  2d  and  5th 


1 84  LEADING   AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

corps  with  Sheridan's  cavalry,  south  of  Petersburg.  On 
the  3ist  of  March  and  ist  of  April  heavy  fighting  took  place 
at  White  Oak  Roads,  Dinwiddie  Court-house,  and  Five 
Forks,  in  which  the  troops  detached  by  Lee  to  check  this 
movement  were  completely  defeated.  At  the  same  time 
Grant,  faithful  to  one  of  his  favorite  principles,  pressed  the 
Confederate  lines  at  various  points  between  Petersburg 
and  Richmond,  and  succeeded  in  forcing  his  way  through 
early  on  the  morning  of  the  2d. 

Lee  was  now  in  a  hopeless  position.  He  made  several 
attempts  during  the  2d  to  recapture  the  Petersburg  lines, 
but  he  was  losing  heavily  in  guns  and  prisoners  and  could 
only  hope  to  gain  time  to  retreat.  That  night  he  abandoned 
Richmond. 

On  the  morning  of  the  3d  of  April  Petersburg  was  found 
to  be  evacuated,  and  Grant  rode  in  with  Meade  at  the  heels 
of  the  retreating  Confederates.  Not  a  moment  was  lost 
in  turning  the  victory  to  account.  The  case  was  one  of 
those  in  which  time  is  the  most  essential  factor  of  the  situa 
tion.  Grant  realized  this  fully.  He  knew  that  with  such 
a  general  as  Lee  the  gain  or  the  loss  of  even  half  an  hour 
might  mean  all  the  difference  between  the  destruction  and 
the  salvation  of  his  army.  The  Federal  columns  were 
immediately  headed  west  up  the  valley  of  the  Appomattox 
to  strike  in  if  possible  between  Lee  and  his  line  of 
retreat. 

With  Sheridan  in  the  van,  and  the  troops  elated  with 
victory,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  pressed  on  regardless  of 
hunger  and  fatigue.  The  two  armies  were  marching  west 
on  parallel  lines,  and  each  trying  to  head  the  other.  In 
this  contest  Grant's  moral  and  material  superiority  won. 
At  every  encounter  the  Confederate  resistance  became 
weaker,  prisoners  came  in  with  greater  readiness.  On  the 
yth  Grant's  headquarters  were  at  Farmville,  and  he  thence 
wrote  the  following  letter: 


ULYSSES   S.    GRANT  185 

"HEADQUARTERS  ARMIES  OF  THE  U.  S., 
5  P.M.,  April  7,  1865. 

''GENERAL  R.  E.  LEE, 

Commanding  C.  S.  A. 

"The  results  of  the  last  week  must  convince  you  of  the 
hopelessness  of  further  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  in  this  struggle.  I  feel  that  it  is  so, 
and  regard  it  as  my  duty  to  shift  from  myself  the  responsi 
bility  of  any  further  effusion  of  blood,  by  asking  of  you  the 
surrender  of  that  portion  of  the  Confederate  States  army 
known  as  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 

"U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieut.-General." 

This  letter  was  not  premature,  as  Lee  himself  acknowl 
edged  by  an  immediate  answer  in  which  he  asked  what 
terms  would  be  granted.  The  reply  was  that  officers  and 
men  would  be  paroled  and  sent  back  to  their  homes. 

During  the  8th  Lee  continued  his  retreat;  on  the  morning 
of  the  gth  he  found  himself  at  Appomattox  Court-house 
with  Sheridan  across  his  path  and  the  Federal  corps  closing 
in  on  his  flanks  and  rear.  There  was  now  nothing  left  but 
to  send  a  flag  of  truce  and  accept  the  conqueror's  terms. 

Early  in  the  afternoon  of  the  9th  of  April  Grant  and  Lee 
met  to  arrange  for  the  surrender  in  McLean's  house  at 
Appomattox.  The  scene  is  so  characteristic  as  told  by 
Grant  in  his  memoirs  that  his  account  of  it  must  be  repro 
duced  here: 

"I  had  known  General  Lee  in  the  old  army  and  had 
served  with  him  in  the  Mexican  War;  but  did  not  suppose, 
owing  to  the  difference  in  our  age  and  rank,  that  he  would 
remember  me;  while  I  would  more  naturally  remember 
him  distinctly,  because  he  was  the  chief  of  staff  of  General 
Scott  in  the  Mexican  War. 

"When  I  had  left  camp  that  morning  I  had  not  expected 
so  soon  the  result  that  was  then  taking  place,  and  conse 
quently  was  in  rough  garb.  I  was  without  a  sword,  as  I 
usually  was  when  on  horseback  on  the  field,  and  wore  a 


1 86  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

soldier's  blouse  for  a  coat,  with  the  shoulder-straps  of  my 
rank  to  indicate  to  the  army  who  I  was.  When  I  went  into 
the  house  I  found  General  Lee.  We  greeted  each  other, 
and  after  shaking  hands  took  our  seats.  I  had  my  staff 
with  me,  a  good  portion  of  whom  were  in  the  room  during 
the  whole  of  the  interview. 

"What  General  Lee's  feelings  were  I  do  not  know.  As 
he  was  a  man  of  much  dignity,  with  an  impassible  [sic]  face, 
it  was  impossible  to  say  whether  he  felt  inwardly  glad  that 
the  end  had  finally  come,  or  felt  sad  over  the  result,  and 
was  too  manly  to  show  it.  Whatever  his  feelings,  they  were 
entirely  concealed  from  my  observation;  but  my  own  feel 
ings,  which  had  been  quite  jubilant  on  the  receipt  of  his 
letter,  were  sad  and  depressed.  I  felt  like  anything  rather 
than  rejoicing  at  the  downfall  of  a  foe  who  had  fought  so 
long  and  valiantly,  and  had  suffered  so  much  for  a  cause, 
though  that  cause  was,  I  believe,  one  of  the  worst  for  which 
a  people  ever  fought,  and  one  for  which  there  was  the  least 
excuse.  I  do  not  question,  however,  the  sincerity  of  the 
great  mass  of  those  who  were  opposed  to  us. 

"General  Lee  was  dressed  in  a  full  uniform  which  was 
entirely  new,  and  was  wearing  a  sword  of  considerable 
value,  very  likely  the  sword  which  had  been  presented  by 
the  State  of  Virginia;  at  all  events,  it  was  an  entirely  different 
sword  from  the  one  that  would  ordinarily  be  worn  in  the  field. 
In  my  rough  travelling  suit,  the  uniform  of  a  private  with 
the  straps  of  a  lieutenant-general,  I  must  have  contrasted 
very  strangely  with  a  man  so  handsomely  dressed,  six  feet 
high  and  of  faultless  form.  But  this  was  not  a  matter  that 
I  thought  of  until  afterwards. 

"We  soon  fell  into  a  conversation  about  old  army  times. 
He  remarked  that  he  remembered  me  very  well  in  the  old 
army;  and  I  told  him  that  as  a  matter  of  course  I  remem 
bered  him  perfectly,  but  from  the  difference  in  our  rank 
and  years  (there  being  about  sixteen  years'  difference  in 


ULYSSES   S.   GRANT  187 

our  ages),  I  had  thought  it  very  likely  that  I  had  not 
attracted  his  attention  sufficiently  to  be  remembered  by  him 
after  such  a  long  interval.  Our  conversation  grew  so 
pleasant  that  I  almost  forgot  the  object  of  our  meeting. 
After  the  conversation  had  run  on  in  this  style  for  some 
time,  General  Lee  called  my  attention  to  the  object  of  our 
meeting,  and  said  that  he  had  asked  for  this  interview  for 
the  purpose  of  getting  from  me  the  terms  I  proposed  to  give 
his  army.  I  said  that  I  meant  merely  that  his  army  should 
lay  down  their  arms,  not  to  take  them  up  again  during  the 
continuance  of  the  war  unless  duly  and  properly  exchanged. 
He  said  that  he  had  so  understood  my  letter. 

"Then  we  gradually  fell  off  again  into  conversation  about 
matters  foreign  to  the  subject  which  had  brought  us  together. 
This  continued  for  some  little  time,  when  General  Lee  again 
interrupted  the  course  of  the  conversation  by  suggesting 
that  the  terms  I  proposed  to  give  his  army  ought  to  be 
written  out.  I  called  to  General  Parker,  secretary  on 
my  staff,  for  writing  materials,  and  commenced  writing 
out  the  following  terms : 

"  'APPOMATTOX  C.  H.,  VA., 

Apl.  Qth,  1865. 

"'Gen.  R.  E.  LEE,  Comd'g  C.  S.  A. 

"'Gen.:  In  accordance  with  the  substance  of  my  letter 
to  you  of  the  8th  inst.,  I  propose  to  receive  the  surrender  of 
the  Army  of  N.  Va.  on  the  following  terms,  to  wit:  Rolls 
of  all  the  officers  and  men  to  be  made  in  duplicate.  One 
copy  to  be  given  to  an  officer  designated  by  me,  the  other 
to  be  retained  by  such  officer  or  officers  as  you  may  designate. 
The  officers  to  give  their  individual  paroles  not  to  take  up 
arms  against  the  Government  of  the  United  States  until 
properly  exchanged,  and  each  company  or  regimental  com 
mander  to  sign  a  like  parole  for  the  men  of  their  commands. 
The  arms,  artillery,  and  public  property  to  be  parked  and 
stacked,  and  turned  over  to  the  officer  appointed  by  me  to 
receive  them.  This  will  not  embrace  the  side-arms  of  the 
officers,  nor  their  private  horses  or  baggage.  This  done, 


i88  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

each  officer  and  man  will  be  allowed  to  return  to  their  homes, 
not  to  be  disturbed  by  United  States  authority  so  long  as 
they  observe  their  paroles  and  the  laws  in  force  where  they 
may  reside. 

"'Very  respectfully, 

"'U.  S.  GRANT,  Lt.-Gen.' 

"When  I  put  my  pen  to  the  paper  I  did  not  know  the  first 
word  that  I  should  make  use  of  in  writing  the  terms.  I  only 
knew  what  was  in  my  mind,  and  I  wished  to  express  it 
clearly,  so  that  there  could  be  no  mistaking  it.  As  I  wrote 
on  the  thought  occurred  to  me  that  the  officers  had  their 
own  private  horses  and  effects,  which  were  important  to  them, 
but  of  no  value  to  us;  also  that  it  would  be  an  unnecessary 
humiliation  to  call  upon  them  to  deliver  their  side-arms. 

"No  conversation,  not  one  word,  passed  between  General 
Lee  and  myself,  either  about  private  property,  side-arms,  or 
kindred  subjects.  He  appeared  to  have  no  objections  to 
the  terms  first  proposed ;  or  if  he  had  a  point  to  make  against 
them  he  wished  to  wait  until  they  were  in  writing  to  make 
it.  When  he  read  over  that  part  of  the  terms  about  side- 
arms,  horses,  and  private  property  of  the  officers,  he  re 
marked,  with  some  feeling,  I  thought,  that  this  would  have 
a  happy  effect  upon  his  army. 

"Then,  after  a  little  further  conversation,  General  Lee 
remarked  to  me  again  that  their  army  was  organized  a  little 
differently  from  the  army  of  the  United  States  (still  main 
taining  by  implication  that  we  were  two  countries);  that  in 
their  army  the  cavalrymen  and  artillerists  owned  their  own 
horses;  and  he  asked  if  he  was  to  understand  that  the  men 
who  so  owned  their  horses  were  to  be  permitted  to  retain 
them.  I  told  him  that  as  the  terms  were  written  they  would 
not;  that  only  the  officers  were  permitted  to  take  their 
private  property.  He  then,  after  reading  over  the  terms  a 
second  time,  remarked  that  that  was  clear. 

"I  then  said  to  him  that  I  thought  this  would  be  about 


ULYSSES   S.    GRANT  189 

the  last  battle  of  the  war — I  sincerely  hoped  so;  and  I  said 
further  I  took  it  that  most  of  the  men  in  the  ranks  were 
small  farmers.  The  whole  country  had  been  so  raided  by 
the  two  armies  that  it  was  doubtful  whether  they  would  be 
able  to  put  in  a  crop  to  carry  themselves  and  their  families 
through  the  next  winter  without  the  aid  of  the  horses  they 
were  then  riding.  The  United  States  did  not  want  them, 
and  I  would  therefore  instruct  the  officers  I  left  behind  to 
receive  the  paroles  of  his  troops  to  let  every  man  of  the  Con 
federate  army  who  claimed  to  own  a  horse  or  mule  take  the 
animal  to  his  home.  Lee  remarked  again  that  this  would 
have  a  happy  effect. 

"He  then  sat  down  and  wrote  out  the  following  letter: 

"  '  HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 
April  9,  1865. 

"' General:  I  received  your  letter  of  this  date  contain 
ing  the  terms  of  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia  as  proposed  by  you.  As  they  are  substantially  the 
same  as  those  expressed  in  your  letter  of  the  8th  inst.,  they 
are  accepted.  I  will  proceed  to  designate  the  proper  officers 
to  carry  the  stipulations  into  effect. 

"'R.  E.  LEE,  General.' 

"'Lieut.-General  U.  S.  GRANT.'" 

The  surrender  of  Appomattox  was  virtually  the  end  of  the 
Civil  War,  and  to  Grant  more  than  to  any  other  soldier  was 
due  the  honor  of  having  brought  about  this  consummation. 
Rome  would  have  formulated  his  chief  merit  with  classic 
preciseness  by  thanking  him  for  never  having  despaired  of 
defeating  Robert  Lee,  and  it  is  certain  that  nothing  less  than 
military  abilities  of  the  highest  order  supported  by  an  iron 
resolution  could  have  forced  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
from  the  Wilderness  to  Appomattox. 

The  gratitude  of  his  countrymen,  intensified  by  the  tragic 
end  of  Lincoln,  assassinated  less  than  a  week  after  Lee's 
surrender,  went  out  to  the  victor.  The  great  cities  greeted 


190  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

him;  mobs  of  enthusiasts  wrung  his  hand;  frantic  but 
useless  efforts  were  made  to  get  him  to  attempt  popular 
oratory.  At  last  he  escaped  from  the  turmoil  and  reached 
Galena,  the  little  Illinois  town  whence  but  four  years  before 
he  had  started  for  the  war  with  a  carpetbag  in  his  hand. 
And  Grant  felt  that  it  was  pleasant  to  be  back  once  more 
among  his  plain  country  neighbors,  even  though  he  was  now 
the  most  conspicuous,  the  most  honored,  of  them  all.  The 
war  had  been,  in  his  mind,  for  just  this  one  simple  thing, 
that  in  every  American  community  there  should  be  homely 
content,  freedom,  social  equality,  and  duly  rewarded  labor. 
Here  was  the  normal  and  satisfying  atmosphere  of  democracy, 
and  Grant  settled  down  to  enjoy  it  unreservedly.  When  a 
neighbor  asked  him  if  the  quiet  were  not  trying  and  if  he  did 
not  long  for  camp-life  again,  he  replied  decisively,  "No;  I 
never  want  to  see  a  uniform  again." 

It  was  only  for  a  few  weeks  that  Grant  could  be  per 
mitted  to  enjoy  the  repose  he  had  so  well  earned.  He  was 
commander  of  the  armies  of  the  United  States  and  still  had 
duties  to  perform.  The  Southern  States  were  under  military 
occupation  and  many  details  of  this  necessary  but  painful 
service  had  to  be  supervised.  During  the  four  years  of 
Johnson's  agitated  presidency  Grant  rose  even  higher  in  the 
esteem  of  his  countrymen.  In  his  military  administration  of 
the  South  he  was  firm  but  ever  mindful  of  that  high  patriotic 
duty  of  charitableness  that  had  marked  his  conduct  at 
Appomattox.  In  his  often  difficult  relations  with  the  poli 
ticians  at  Washington  he  never  forgot  that  his  duty  was 
that  of  a  soldier.  Much  against  his  will  he  became  involved 
in  some  of  President  Johnson's  quarrels  with  Congress,  but 
the  country  could  not  doubt  his  undeviating  sense  of  veracity 
and  duty,  and  when  the  Republican  Convention  met  to 
nominate  a  new  President  in  May,  1868,  an  absolutely  unani 
mous  vote  designated  Ulysses  Grant  of  the  State  of  Illinois. 
In  the  electoral  campaign  itself  Grant  declined  to  take  any 


ULYSSES  S.   GRANT  191 

part.  "If  the  people  wish  to  make  me  President,  they  will 
do  so,"  he  said,  and  his  saying  was  justified,  for  he  easily 
carried  the  country. 

The  record  of  Grant's  administration  from  1869  to  1877, 
for  he  served  two  terms,  does  not  affect  his  character  as  a 
soldier,  and  may  therefore  be  passed  over  briefly.  As  a 
statesman  he  was  not  altogether  successful.  The  maze  of 
political  intrigue  and  venality  by  which  he  was  soon  sur 
rounded  proved  too  subtle  for  him.  He  was  true  to  his 
friends,  good  and  bad;  he  was  easy  with*  all  men;  and  he 
was  made  great  use  of.  His  political  career  ended  in  a  storm 
of  scandal  that  for  a  moment  injured  his  reputation  and 
that  has  placed  on  record  the  limitations  of  his  good  judg 
ment.  Renominated  by  the  unanimous  vote  of  his  party  in 
1872,  he  hardly  had  a  friend  left  five  years  later  when  he  left 
the  White  House. 

Grant  had  served  his  country  faithfully  and  without 
intermission  in  positions  of  the  greatest  responsibility  for 
sixteen  years,  and  he  decided  to  seize  the  opportunity  now 
presented  for  a  long  rest.  He  proceeded  on  an  extended 
tour  around  the  world,  from  which  he  returned  to  the  United 
States  shortly  before  the  Convention  of  1880.  In  the  mean 
while  his  popularity  had  revived  and  once  more  he  became 
a  candidate  for  the  presidential  nomination,  only,  however, 
to  be  defeated  by  James  Garfield. 

During  the  last  few  years  of  his  life  Grant  resided  in  New 
York.  His  sons  were  interested  in  financial  affairs,  and 
he  himself  became  partner  in  the  firm  of  Grant  &  Ward, 
a  hazardous  concern  run  by  a  young  speculator  who  had 
become  acquainted  with  Ulysses  Grant,  Jr.  It  is  clear  that 
General  Grant  took  no  active  share  in  the  management,  and, 
as  in  the  record  of  his  presidency,  in  the  unfortunate  result 
it  was  more  his  judgment  than  his  integrity  that  was  in 
question.  A  crash  soon  came.  Ward  and  Fish,  the  two  ac 
tive  partners,  were  sentenced  to  long  terms  of  imprisonment, 


192  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

and  Grant,  to  satisfy  the  creditors,  sold  all  his  belongings, 
even  his  swords  of  honor  and  the  trophies  of  the  war.  He 
was  not  destined  to  survive  this  misfortune  long,  for  not 
many  weeks  later  he  felt  the  first  symptoms  of  a  cancer  in 
the  throat  that  was  to  prove  fatal. 

His  last  days  were  of  pathetic  interest.  He  was  relieved 
from  immediate  pressure  by  the  action  of  Congress  reinstat 
ing  him  in  the  army  with  the  rank  of  general.  Yet,  anxious 
to  earn  for  his  family  if  not  for  himself  the  large  reward 
offered  by  a  firm  of  publishers,  he  devoted  himself  with  the 
same  iron  courage  that  had  broken  down  the  Southern 
Confederacy  and  Robert  Lee  to  writing  his  memoirs. 
Through  an  agony  prolonged  for  many  months  he  held  fast 
to  his  task, — as  he  had  held  fast  to  Vicksburg  and  to  Rich 
mond, — and  with  his  last  breath  accomplished  it.  On  the 
23d  of  July,  1885,  he  passed  away. 

During  his  last  days,  when  the  whole  country  was  rever 
ently  watching  by  his  side,  he  more  than  once  gave  expres 
sion  to  those  simple  and  just  feelings  with  which  he  had 
always  met  his  old  opponents  of  the  Civil  War.  A  few  days 
before  his  death  General  Buckner,  who  twenty-three  years 
earlier  had  accepted  the  unconditional  surrender  of  Fort 
Donelson,  called  on  him,  and  when,  on  the  8th  of  August,  he 
was  interred  with  great  pomp  in  the  city  of  New  York, 
among  the  pall-bearers  Sherman  and  Sheridan  were  sup 
ported  by  Buckner  and  Joseph  Johnston.  That  was  the 
greatest  tribute  to  his  memory  and  to  his  worth;  it  was 
perhaps  his  greatest  achievement. 


WILLIAM   T.   SHERMAN 

WILLIAM  TECUMSEH  SHERMAN,  sixth  son  of  Judge  Sher 
man  of  Lancaster  in  the  State  of  Ohio,  was  born  on  the  8th 
of  February,  1820.  His  family  was  much  given  to  politics, 
his  younger  brother,  John,  eventually  attaining  considerable 
distinction  as  a  United  States  Senator.  William,  however, 
chose  the  army  as  a  profession.  He  secured  a  nomination 
to  West  Point,  graduating  in  1840,  sixth  in  a  class  of  forty 
two.  He  served  in  the  artillery  and  on  staff  duty  from  1840 
to  1853,  but  owing  to  his  battery  being  sent  to  California  saw 
no  active  service  at  the  time  of  the  Mexican  War.  In  1850, 
General  Taylor  being  President,  Sherman  married  Ellen 
Ewing,  daughter  of  the  Hon.  Thomas  Ewing,  Secretary  of 
the  Interior,  thus  strengthening  his  political  connections.  On 
resigning  his  commission  three  years  later  he  passed  through 
a  varied  experience  of  civil  life,  being  in  turn  manager  of 
a  bank  in  California,  president  of  a  newly  founded  military 
institute  in  Louisiana,  and,  on  that  State's  seceding  from  the 
Union,  president  of  a  street  traction  company  in  St.  Louis. 
It  was  there  that  the  war  found  him. 

Sherman  did  not  reveal  at  the  outset  his  rare  abilities  as 
a  general,  but  he  did,  from  the  very  first  moment,  show  his 
strongly  marked  character.  No  sooner  had  the  war  broken 
out  than  he  was  offered  an  important  post  at  the  War  De 
partment,  and  declined;  he  was  offered  the  appointment  of 
brigadier-general  of  volunteers  with  the  command  at  St. 
Louis,  and  again  declined.  He  was  not  prepared  to  sacrifice 
the  welfare  of  his  family  for  the  sake  of  a  temporary  if  lucra- 


194  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

tive  employment.  But  when,  on  the  izjlh  of  May,  1861,  he 
received  notice  of  his  appointment  as  colonel  of  the  i3th 
regiment  of  United  States  regular  infantry,  he  accepted 
with  alacrity. 

The  regiment  which  Sherman  had  been  selected  to  com 
mand  was  not  yet  raised,  and  the  Secretary  of  War  decided 
that  the  task  of  enrolling  recruits  should  be  left  to  the  lieu 
tenant-colonel,  while  the  colonel  did  inspector's  work  for  the 
volunteer  regiments  now  rapidly  assembling  at  Washington. 
A  few  weeks  later  even  more  important  duties  were  imposed 
on  him:  he  was  placed  in  charge  of  a  brigade  of  Tyler's 
division  of  McDowell's  army. 

With  that  army  Sherman  took  part  in  the  battle  of  Bull 
Run,  and  there  are  several  points  in  connection  with  this 
event  that  deserve  mention.  In  the  first  place  it  appears 
that  Sherman's  brigade  was  one  of  those  that  had  the  least 
distance  to  cover  before  reaching  the  field,  crossing  Bull 
Run  not  far  above  the  stone  bridge.  The  brigade  conse 
quently  got  into  action  in  a  fresher  condition  than  many  of  the 
Union  troops  to  its  right.  Again,  it  appears  clear  that  Sher 
man,  with  no  scouts  and  no  staff  to  help  him,  led  his  brigade 
most  skilfully  to  the  very  spot  at  which  its  services  were  most 
required — the  base  of  the  Henry  House  plateau.  At  this 
point,  however,  his  lack  of  knowledge  of  the  high  command 
of  troops  found  him  out.  He  had  never  before  seen  a  battle; 
he  had  handled  a  brigade  for  just  three  weeks;  he  had  had 
no  training  in  the  art  of  command — and  so  he  failed.  His 
brigade  was  placed  under  the  brow  of  the  hill,  and  then,  one 
regiment  at  a  time,  was  sent  up  to  face  the  woods,  where 
Stonewall  Jackson's  line  was  pouring  out  destruction.  For 
raw  troops  Sherman's  battalions  fought  well,  as  their  casual 
ties  show,  but  the  action  was  too  hot  for  them  and,  last  of 
McDowell's  army,  they  gradually  melted  away  from  the 
fire  in  their  front  and  were  driven  from  the  field.  Sherman, 
following  the  example  of  a  regiment  of  regulars  on  his  right, 


WILLIAM   T.    SHERMAN  IQ5 

tried  to  get  his  men  into  square,  but  cohesion  could  not  be 
maintained,  and  before  long  his  brigade,  through  no  fault 
of  his,  had  merged  into  the  rest  of  the  disbanded  army. 

After  Bull  Run  the  dispirited  soldiers  needed  fresh  mettle 
for  a  new  start,  and  this  Sherman  and  his  brother  generals 
set  about  to  instil  into  them  with  great  vigor.  McClellan 
took  chief  command ;  drill  and  organization  were  the  order 
of  the  day.  Just  at  this  moment  Sherman  was  moved  once 
more,  this  time  to  command  a  brigade  under  Major  Robert 
Anderson,  the  defender  of  Fort  Sumter,  under  whom  he  had 
formerly  served  in  the  Third  Artillery.  Anderson  was  now 
a  general  and  in  command  of  the  District  of  the  Cumberland, 
a  charge  that  proved  altogether  too  great  for  his  capacity. 
He  soon  gave  up,  and  Sherman,  much  to  his  regret,  had  to 
assume  the  position.  Sherman  felt,  and  it  was  to  his  credit 
for  he  felt  rightly,  that  he  was  unequal  to  the  command 
thrust  upon  him,  and  he  urged  the  authorities  at  Washing 
ton  to  relieve  him.  This  they  eventually  did  by  sending 
General  Buell  to  take  over  the  district. 

It  was  while  Sherman  was  exercising  this  command  that 
occurred  a  curious  and  well-known  incident.  The  Hon. 
Simon  Cameron,  Secretary  of  War,  passed  through  Louis 
ville  and  had  an  interview  with  Sherman  there.  The  mili 
tary  situation  was  discussed,  and  Sherman,  basing  his  opinion 
on  the  fact  that  the  Department  of  the  Cumberland  was  the 
connecting  link  between  East  and  West  and  had  a  frontier 
of  three  hundred  miles,  declared  that  to  carry  the  offensive 
into  the  enemy's  country  a  force  of  200,000  men  was  neces 
sary.  The  estimate,  as  events  proved,  was  not  excessive; 
but  at  that  time,  when  the  district  had  not  much  more 
than  a  tenth  of  those  numbers,  it  appeared  to  civilians  wildly 
extravagant.  Cameron,  who  knew  little  of  Sherman  and 
far  less  of  war,  referred  in  a  letter  to  the  general's  remark  as 
crazy;  enterprising  journalism  fastened  on  the  word;  head 
lines  arose;  and  presently  Sherman  found  himself  with  a 


196  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

national  notoriety  as  a  lunatic  general.  No  man  could  be 
expected  to  bear  such  a  ridiculous  yet  fatal  reputation  with 
patience.  Sherman  chafed  himself  to  the  verge  of  sickness, 
and  had  not  Grant  taken  Fort  Donelson  and  given  the  press 
another  lead,  there  is  no  telling  what  might  have  been  the 
result  of  the  criminal  irresponsibility  of  the  journalists. 

Fortunately  great  events  were  making,  and  Sherman  was 
destined  to  be  part  of  them.  In  November  Buell  relieved 
him  at  Louisville  and  he  proceeded  thence  to  report  to  Hal- 
leek,  commanding  at  St.  Louis.  He  was  sent  to  Paducah 
to  forward  troops  to  Grant,  then  operating  up  the  Tennessee 
River,  and  before  long  Sherman  was  in  command  of  a  divi 
sion  and  at  the  front  under  the  orders  of  the  commander  he 
was  to  serve  so  long  and  so  faithfully.  From  the  moment 
Grant  and  Sherman  met  they  understood  and  admired  one 
another;  their  friendship,  their  mutual  reliance  and  esteem 
was  uninterrupted  and  constant  through  good  and  through 
evil  report. 

When  Sherman  reached  the  front  the  army  was  encamped 
at  Pittsburg  Landing  on  the  western  bank  of  the  Tennessee, 
about  twenty  miles  from  Corinth,  where  the  Confederates 
were  concentrating  in  force  under  Albert  Sidney  Johnston. 
It  fell  to  Sherman's  lot  to  occupy  with  his  troops  camps  about 
Shiloh  Church  at  the  point  nearest  to  the  Confederate  line 
of  approach.  In  the  first  days  of  April  the  Southern  cavalry 
displayed  a  good  deal  of  activity,  and  on  the  4th  and  5th 
reconnaissances  were  sent  out  to  feel  the  enemy.  But  Sher 
man,  although  he  was  fast  learning  the  art  of  generalship, 
was  not  quite  out  of  the  blundering  stage  yet.  Like  his 
commander-in-chief  he  had  allowed  a  fixed  idea  to  take 
possession  of  him, — that  the  Federals  were  on  the  offensive 
and  that  no  serious  attack  was  therefore  to  be  expected  from 
the  Confederates.  His  reconnaissances  were  either  not 
pushed  far  enough,  or  were  skilfully  checked  by  the  enemy's 
calvalry,  and  he  failed  to  ascertain  that  the  whole  Confederate 


WILLIAM   T.   SHERMAN  197 

army  had  been  brought  up  into  close  proximity  for  an  attack 
early  the  next  day.  When  that  attack  came,  however,  at 
dawn  on  Sunday,  the  6th  of  April,  Sherman  showed  his  mettle 
and  his  powers.  Nearly  all  accounts  agree  in  assigning  to 
Sherman  the  greatest  share  of  merit  for  saving  the  Federal 
army  from  a  disastrous  rout  that  day.  His  division  was 
made  up  of  raw  troops;  many  of  his  men  ran  away;  a  whole 
brigade  lost  its  organization;  but  Sherman  continued  un 
daunted,  manoeuvring  and  hanging  on  alternately  with  the 
coolest  tenacity  and  judgment  until  night  drew  down.  He 
was  wounded  and  had  horses  shot  under  him,  but  through 
all  the  dangers  and  difficulties  of  that  terrible  and  well-nigh 
lost  field  he  showed  a  quality  of  inborn  leadership  that  his 
troops  and  that  Grant  never  forgot. 

After  Shiloh  Grant  suffered  a  temporary  eclipse.  Halleck 
took  command,  but  proved  entirely  lacking  in  initiative.  The 
great  army  under  his  orders  was  wasted,  and  its  generals 
were  afforded  no  opportunity  of  distinguishing  themselves. 
It  was  not  until  some  months  later,  with  Grant  once  more  in 
charge  of  the  northern  Mississippi  valley,  that  Sherman's 
opportunity  came.  On  the  8th  of  December  Grant  in 
structed  his  lieutenant  to  move  down  the  Mississippi  from 
Memphis  with  about  30,000  men  to  attack  Vicksburg,  while 
he  held  the  Confederate  army  under  Pemberton  in  check 
north  of  Jackson. 

The  move  against  Vicksburg  was  in  the  nature  of  an 
attempted  surprise,  but  the  surprise  failed.  The  troops  were 
disembarked  in  the  lowlands  just  north  of  the  city,  and  on 
the  29th  of  December  were  sent  forward  to  effect  a  lodgment 
on  a  line  of  bluffs  along  which  ran  the  intrenchments  and 
batteries  of  the  Confederates.  The  ground  was  swampy  and 
cut  by  bayous,  so  that  there  were  only  two  narrow  points  at 
which  an  attack  could  be  pressed  home,  and  these  points 
were  well  guarded  by  the  enemy.  The  attack  was  poorly 
executed  and  was  never  near  success.  The  troops  were  drawn 


198  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

off,  and,  heavy  rains  ensuing  and  flooding  the  lowlands,  the 
attempt  against  Vicksburg  was  abandoned  with  a  loss  of 
1500  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners. 

Sherman  was  now  superseded  in  the  command  by  McCler- 
nand,  a  political  general  and  friend  of  Lincoln's,  who  had 
obtained  from  the  President  an  order  to  take  charge  of 
the  expedition.  Sherman,  in  the  capacity  of  a  corps  com 
mander,  accompanied  McClernand  in  a  successful  attack 
against  Arkansas  Post,  but  soon  found  himself  under  Grant 
once  more  on  that  general's  arriving  to  take  supreme  com 
mand  of  the  operations  against  Vicksburg. 

From  the  2ist  of  January  to  the  4th  of  July,  1863,  Sher 
man  led  one  of  Grant's  divisions  in  the  operations  against 
Vicksburg,  showing  the  greatest  zeal,  skill,  and  energy. 
This  remarkable  campaign,  in  which  he  took  a  conspicuous 
share,  completed  his  military  education  and  left  him  an 
accomplished  general  fit  for  the  highest  commands.  When 
Grant  decided  to  move  below  Vicksburg  and,  abandoning 
his  base  and  line  of  supplies,  to  strike  in  behind  the  city 
towards  Jackson,  Sherman  went  to  his  chief  and  begged  him 
to  reconsider  his  decision.  Sherman's  own  operations  in 
Georgia  a  year  later  show  how  rapidly  he  assimilated  the  lesson 
that  Grant  then  gave  him,  a  lesson  in  audacity,  a  lesson  in 
living  on  the  enemy's  resources. 

Sherman's  corps  was  in  the  fighting  at  Jackson  on  the  i4th 
of  May  and  on  the  Big  Black  three  days  later.  On  the  i8th 
he  and  Grant,  riding  side  by  side,  arrived  in  sight  of  the 
defences  of  Vicksburg  and  of  the  Mississippi  River,  Sherman 
declaring  enthusiastically  to  his  chief  that  this  was  the  end 
of  one  of  the  greatest  campaigns  in  history. 

On  the  i Qth  and  22d  of  May  Sherman's  corps  took  part  in 
the  assaults  on  Vicksburg  ordered  by  General  Grant.  Those 
assaults  failed  at  every  point,  and  the  plain  reason  of  such 
failure  may  be  found  in  Sherman's  own  words.  "I  have 
since  seen  the  position  at  Sevastopol,"  he  wrote,  "and  with- 


WILLIAM   T.   SHERMAN  199 

out  hesitation  I  declare  that  at  Vicksburg  to  have  been  the 
more  difficult  of  the  two."  It  was  at  all  events  so  strong  that 
Grant  decided  to  abandon  active  operations  for  a  blockade 
and  entrusted  to  Sherman  the  task  of  covering  the  rear  of  the 
army  from  any  efforts  that  Joseph  Johnston  might  make  to 
relieve  Pemberton  from  the  direction  of  Jackson.  The  task 
proved  anxious,  but  the  Confederate  army  was  never  strong 
enough  to  deal  an  effective  blow  against  its  skilfully  in 
trenched  adversary,  and  Vicksburg  fell  on  the  4th  of  July 
with  Sherman  quietly  in  position  between  the  Big  Black  and 
Haine's  Bluff. 

On  that  very  day  heavy  reinforcements  were  started  for 
the  front  and  Sherman  received  orders  to  attack  Johnston. 
But  the  Confederate  commander  was  wary  and  skilful,  a 
past  master  in  the  art  of  retreat.  He  had  caused  extensive 
fortifications  to  be  built  about  Jackson,  and  promptly  retired 
to  their  shelter.  He  held  back  the  Federal  advance  at  that 
point  for  a  week,  and  then  quietly  slipped  away  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Meridian.  Sherman  made  an  unsuccessful  attempt 
to  strike  a  blow  at  Johnston's  rear  guard,  and  was  then  ordered 
back  to  Vicksburg.  For  his  share  in  the  campaign  Sherman 
received  the  rank  of  brigadier-general  in  the  regular  army. 

For  some  weeks  the  Union  cause  seemed  triumphant,  for 
Meade  at  Gettysburg  had  rivalled  Grant's  exploit  at  Vicks 
burg.  The  armies  at  the  east  and  west  were  eased  in  their 
work  and  all  seemed  promising,  when  disaster  suddenly 
overtook  the  central  army  and  made  necessary  once  more 
the  most  strenuous  activity.  Rosecrans  had  been  badly 
defeated  by  Bragg  at  Chickamauga;  his  army  had  been 
driven  into  Chattanooga,  where  it  was  in  danger  of  being 
starved  into  surrender.  Orders  were  at  once  sent  to  Sher 
man  to  move  his  corps  up  the  Mississippi  from  Vicksburg 
to  Memphis,  and  thence  to  march  on  Chattanooga. 

On  the  2d  of  October  Sherman  was  at  Memphis,  and 
there  occurred  an  incident  in  his  family  life  that  must  be 


200  LEADING   AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

briefly  touched  on,  for  it  gives  a  glimpse  of  a  side  of  his 
character  that  had  much  to  do  with  the  devotion  and  response 
his  troops  always  gave  him.  His  family  had  been  with  him 
at  Vicksburg,  where  his  oldest  boy,  Willie,  had  contracted 
typhoid  fever  just  before  leaving.  He  died  at  Memphis,  and 
the  soldiers  of  the  i3th  regulars — his  favorite  playmates  of 
the  camp — followed  him  to  the  grave.  To  their  commanding 
officer  Sherman  wrote  the  following  letter: 

"MY  DEAR  FRIEND:  I  cannot  sleep  to-night  till  I  record 
an  expression  of  the  deep  feelings  of  my  heart  to  you,  and 
to  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  battalion,  for  their  kind 
behavior  to  my  poor  child.  I  realize  that  you  all  feel  for 
my  family  the  attachment  of  kindred,  and  I  assure  you  of 
full  reciprocity. 

"Consistent  with  a  sense  of  duty  to  my  profession  and 
office,  I  could  not  leave  my  post,  and  sent  for  the  family  to 
come  to  me  in  that  fatal  climate,  and  in  that  sickly  period 
of  the  year,  and  behold  the  result!  The  child  that  bore  my 
name,  and  in  whose  future  I  reposed  with  more  confidence 
than  I  did  in  my  own  plan  of  life,  now  floats  a  mere  corpse, 
seeking  a  grave  in  a  distant  land,  with  a  weeping  mother, 
brother,  and  sisters  clustered  about  him.  For  myself  I  ask 
no  sympathy.  On,  on  I  must  go,  to  meet  a  soldier's  fate,  or 
live  to  see  our  country  rise  superior  to  all  factions,  till  its 
flag  is  adored  and  respected  by  ourselves  and  all  the  powers 
of  the  earth. 

"But  Willie  was,  or  thought  he  was,  a  sergeant  in  the  Thir 
teenth.  I  have  seen  his  eye  brighten,  his  heart  beat,  as  he 
beheld  the  battalion  under  arms,  and  asked  me  if  they  were 
not  real  soldiers.  Child  as  he  was,  he  had  the  enthusiasm, 
the  pure  love  of  truth,  honor,  and  love  of  country  which 
should  animate  all  soldiers. 

"God  only  knows  why  he  should  die  thus  young.  He  is 
dead,  but  will  not  be  forgotten  till  those  who  knew  him  in 
life  have  followed  him  to  that  same  mysterious  end. 

"Please  convey  to  the  battalion  my  heartfelt  thanks,  and 
assure  each  and  all  that  if  in  after-years  they  call  on  me  or 
mine  and  mention  that  they  were  of  the  Thirteenth  Regulars 


WILLIAM   T.   SHERMAN  201 

when  Willie  was  a  sergeant,  they  will  have  a  key  to  the 
affections  of  my  family  that  will  open  all  it  has;  that  we  will 
share  with  them  our  last  blanket,  our  last  crust! 
"Your  friend 

"W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major-General." 

Sherman  could  not  linger  at  his  son's  tomb,  duty  urged 
him  incessantly  forward.  On  the  24th  his  troops  were 
crossing  the  Tennessee  not  far  from  the  battle-field  of  Shiloh, 
and  on  the  same  day  he  was  notified  that  Grant  had  been 
placed  in  charge  of  all  the  West  and  that  the  command  of 
the  Army  of  the.  Tennessee  had  thereby  devolved  on  him. 
General  Blair  succeeded  to  the  command  of  Sherman's  corps, 
while  the  other  two  corps  constituting  his  army,  under  Hurl- 
but  and  MacPherson,  were  at  Memphis  and  Vicksburg. 
Three  days  later  a  message  came  from  Chattanooga  from 
Grant  in  which  he  ordered  Sherman  to  move  to  his  assistance 
with  the  utmost  despatch.  The  order  was  literally  carried 
out. 

On  the  24th  and  25th  of  November  Sherman's  army  was 
with  Grant  on  the  field  of  Chattanooga,  330  miles  from 
Memphis.  Straight  from  its  long  and  arduous  march,  it 
was  sent  to  attack  the  extreme  right  of  the  Confederate  posi 
tion,  where  Missionary  Ridge  sinks  down  to  the  Tennessee. 
While  Sherman  struggled  slowly  forward  on  the  left,  Hooker 
pressed  on  with  good  success  on  the  right,  and  to  meet  these 
attacks  on  either  wing  Bragg  gradually  depleted  his  centre. 
That  was  the  result  that  Grant  aimed  at,  and  with  Thomas' 
army  he  finally  drove  in  a  wedge  through  the  Confederate 
centre  that  carried  Missionary  Ridge  and  put  the  enemy  to 
flight.  But  Grant  had  not  yet  done  with  Sherman's  services. 

One  hundred  and  thirty  miles  northeast  of  Chattanooga 
was  Knoxville,  and  at  Knoxville  was  a  Federal  army  under 
Burnside,  hard  pressed  by  a  larger  force  under  Longstreet. 
Sherman  was  immediately  detached  to  disengage  Burnside. 


202  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

He  marched  on  Knoxville  with  the  same  energy  he  had 
shown  in  marching  on  Chattanooga,  and  at  his  approach 
Longstreet  decided  to  withdraw. 

During  the  next  three  months  Sherman  was  not  engaged 
in  operations  of  sufficient  importance  to  be  recorded  here. 
On  the  1 8th  of  March,  1864,  following  the  promotion  of 
Grant  to  command  all  the  armies  of  the  United  States,  he 
was  placed  in  charge  of  the  Mississippi  valley.  It  is  at  this 
moment  that  he  really  first  appears  as  an  independent  com 
mander  of  a  large  army,  and  that  his  career  becomes  of 
national  interest. 

Grant's  plan  for  the  operations  of  1864  was  strong  and 
simple.  He  intended  that  every  army  in  the  field  should 
press  on  the  enemy  simultaneously.  For  three  years,  profit 
ing  from  interior  lines  and  from  the  fact  that  the  Federals 
never  combined  their  attacks,  the  Southern  generals  had  been 
able  to  move  reinforcements  from  the  points  at  which  pres 
sure  was  relaxed  to  those  where  it  was  heavy.  This  was  to 
be  permitted  no  longer.  Sherman  was  instructed  to  this 
effect.  He  was  to  press  the  enemy  continuously,  and  if 
necessary  he  was  to  follow  him  even  to  Richmond.  Grant 
expected  to  take  the  offensive  all  along  the  line  during  the 
first  week  in  May,  and  it  was  on  the  8th  of  that  month  that 
Sherman  opened  his  campaign. 

Johnston  was  on  the  railroad  a  few  miles  south  of  Chat 
tanooga  at  Dalton.  Sherman,  with  double  his  numbers, 
made  a  wide  flanking  movement  towards  the  right  and  rear, 
threatening  Resaca.  Johnston  fell  back.  In  all  the  move 
ments  that  followed,  Sherman  was  constantly  attempting  to 
bring  his  wary  adversary  to  a  pitched  battle,  Johnston  was 
as  constantly  attempting  to  gain  time  while  avoiding  general 
engagements  except  under  circumstances  that  would  be 
especially  advantageous.  Resaca  was  abandoned  on  the 
1 5th  of  May,  the  Confederates  retreating  towards  Cassville, 
where  for  a  few  hours  Sherman  hoped  he  would  be  able  to 


WILLIAM   T.    SHERMAN  203 

fight  a  decisive  battle.  But  Johnston,  who  had  for  a  moment 
decided  to  risk  an  engagement  on  what  appeared  to  be 
favorable  ground,  thought  better  of  it,  and  on  the  20th  once 
more  slipped  way. 

The  Federal  army  now  crossed  the  Etowah  River  and, 
avoiding  the  direct  road  which  led  through  difficult  country, 
marched  by  its  right  towards  Marietta.  Johnston's  cavalry 
under  Wheeler  was  very  active,  however,  and  the  Confederate 
commander  realized  his  opponent's  intentions  in  time  to 
throw  himself  across  his  line  of  march  at  a  point  just  south 
of  the  little  town  of  Dallas.  There,  on  the  25th  of  May, 
began  one  of  those  long-protracted  struggles  in  which  the 
woody  nature  of  the  country,  a  large  use  of  intrenchments. 
and  the  undaunted  bravery  of  the  combatants  made  it  diffi 
cult  for  either  side  to  win  a  substantial  advantage.  Stub 
bornly  the  struggle  continued  until  the  4th  of  June,  Sherman 
gradually  extending  his  left  until  he  was  once  more  astride 
the  railroad  that  marked  the  direct  line  of  advance  on  Mari 
etta.  The  Federal  front  was  now  so  extended  that  Johnston 
could  no  longer  prevent  his  wings  from  being  overlapped; 
he  therefore  abandoned  his  lines  on  the  night  of  the  4th  of 
June,  falling  back  a  few  miles  to  a  new  position  about  Kene- 
saw  Mountain  immediately  in  front  of  Marietta.  Sherman 
slowly  followed. 

On  the  loth  of  June  the  armies  were  once  more  within 
cannon-shot.  Johnston's  position  was  a  commanding  one 
and  well  fortified,  but  too  extensive  for  his  numbers.  For 
two  weeks  there  was  continuous  fighting  and  intrenching  on 
both  sides,  the  Federals  constantly  working  to  the  right  and 
left  to  overlap  the  Confederates,  who  as  persistently  fell  back 
to  more  contracted  positions,  until  finally  Johnston  was  placed 
very  much  as  Lee  had  been  at  the  North  Anna  three  weeks 
before.  His  centre  was  at  Kenesaw  Mountain ;  his  right  and 
left,  both  sharply  thrown  back,  covering  Marietta,  formed 
the  two  sides  of  a  very  acute  angle.  The  Confederate  posi- 


204  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

tion  was  now  so  compact,  so  favorable  for  a  strong  counter- 
stroke,  that  Sherman  would  not  venture  on  extending  his 
lines  farther.  He  ordered  instead  a  general  frontal  attack; 
this  took  place  on  the  2yth  of  June  and  virtually  failed 
(battle  of  Kenesaw  Mountain). 

Sherman  was  now  faced  by  a  problem  very  similar  to  that 
of  Grant  in  Virginia.  A  Confederate  army  in  such  a  coun 
try,  and  skilfully  led,  could  hardly  be  forced  from  an  in 
trenched  position.  There  was  only  one  remedy,  which  was 
to  manoeuvre.  So  Sherman,  like  Grant  after  the  Wilderness 
and  Spottsylvania,  decided  that  all  he  could  do  was  to 
attempt  to  get  around  the  enemy.  Supplies  were  collected 
to  enable  the  army  to  leave  the  rail  for  ten  days,  and  on 
the  2d  of  July  Sherman  began  shifting  troops  towards 
his  right.  On  the  following  morning,  however,  Kenesaw 
Mountain  was  found  to  be  evacuated;  Johnston  had  aban 
doned  Marietta  and  moved  south  in  the  night;  so  skilfully 
was  his  retreat  conducted  that  all  Sherman's  efforts  to  strike 
at  his  rear  proved  ineffective. 

Atlanta  was  now  in  sight,  the  last  link  that  held  together 
the  southwestern  half  of  the  Confederacy  with  the  north 
eastern;  so  long  as  the  leadership  of  the  Federal  army  re 
mained  with  its  skilled  and  resolute  commander,  it  could 
now  be  only  a  question  of  time  when  the  city  fell.  Johnston 
felt  this;  he  could  but  gain  time  and  keep  watching  for  an 
opportunity  which  his  well-matched  antagonist  appeared 
very  unlikely  to  afford  him.  For  some  days  he  held  the  tide 
of  invasion  back  at  the  Chattahoochee  River,  then,  once 
more  outflanked,  he  fell  back  to  Atlanta,  around  which,  for 
weeks  past,  miles  of  carefully  planned  fortifications  had  been 
erected. 

On  the  i  yth  Sherman  crossed  the  Chattahoochee  and 
advanced,  wheeling  towards  the  cast  and  south  of  Atlanta, 
where  he  hoped  to  cut  the  railroad  near  Decatur,  thus  sever 
ing  the  Confederacy  in  two.  Johnston  expected  the  move- 


WILLIAM  T.   SHERMAN  205 

ment,  he  recognized  its  gravity,  he  perceived  its  difficulty 
and  danger,  and  he  determined  to  strike  a  blow  at  the  Fed 
eral  army  before  the  movement  could  be  completed.  Just 
at  that  moment,  however,  President  Davis  removed  from 
command  the  ablest  general  save  one  in  the  Confederate 
service,  and  substituted  for  him  General  Hood,  an  officer  of 
lesser  abilities  from  whom  a  far  less  skilled  defence  was  met. 

On  the  22d  Hood  made  a  strong  offensive  movement. 
Fighting  raged  all  along  the  eastern  side  of  Atlanta  for  many 
hours,  but  the  Confederates  were  thrown  back  at  all  points. 
It  was  in  this  battle  of  Atlanta,  as  it  was  called,  that  General 
MacPherson  was  killed ;  the  vacant  command  of  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee  was  assigned  to  General  O.  O.  Howard.  Once 
more,  on  the  28th,  Hood  attacked,  this  time  Sherman's 
extreme  right,  but  with  no  greater  result  than  to  lose 
many  lives  and  to  leave  his  army  correspondingly  de 
pressed. 

Sherman  could  not  hope  to  take  Atlanta  by  assault,  nor 
yet  to  lay  close  siege  to  the  city — its  fortifications  were  too 
strong  and  too  extensive;  his  best  plan  was  the  one  he 
followed:  to  cut  its  lines  of  communication.  His  superi 
ority  in  numbers  and  the  reduction  of  the  fighting  efficiency 
of  the  Confederate  army  by  Hood's  injudicious  attacks  en 
abled  him  in  August  to  stretch  to  the  southwest  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Eastport  and  there  sever  the  last  line  of  railroad  by 
which  Atlanta  could  still  be  supplied.  On  the  28th  of 
August  the  Federal  army  worked  its  right  wing  across  this 
line  about  8  miles  southeast  of  Atlanta,  and  three  days  later 
Hood  attempted  to  regain  control  of  his  communications  by 
fighting  the  battle  of  Jonesboro,  where  once  more  he  was 
defeated.  On  the  night  of  the  ist  of  September,  Atlanta 
being  no  longer  tenable,  the  Confederate  general  began  to 
burn  and  blow  up  such  stores  as  he  could  not  carry  away, 
and  on  the  following  morning  Slocum's  corps  entered  the 
city. 


206  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

All  through  the  operations  that  had  just  been  brought  to 
this  victorious  close  Sherman  had  been  anxious  as  to  his 
own  line  of  communications,  the  railroad  connecting  him 
with  Chattanooga,  140  miles  to  the  north  through  the  ene 
my's  country.  Constant  attempts  had  been  made  to  break 
it  up,  but  in  force  insufficient  for  the  purpose.  Now,  how 
ever,  the  tide  of  war  being  so  decidedly  unfavorable  that 
bold  resolves  appeared  the  only  reasonable  ones,  the  Southern 
leaders  decided  to  throw  Hood's  whole  army  between  Sher 
man  and  Chattanooga,  thus  hoping  to  carry  the  war  back 
into  Tennessee. 

To  further  this  scheme  Hood,  on  abandoning  Atlanta, 
marched  north  towards  Chattanooga,  and  as  a  consequence 
the  Federal  plan  of  operations  was  completely  changed. 
Sherman  at  first  was  drawn  after  Hood,  as  the  Confederates 
had  hoped,  and  during  October  the  two  armies  manoeuvred 
against  one  another  in  the  country  between  Chattanooga 
and  the  Chattahoochee.  This  followed  the  original  plan  of 
Grant  for  pressing  the  Southern  armies  continuously,  so  as 
to  prevent  the  transference  of  reinforcements  from  the  one 
to  the  other.  Sherman,  however,  soon  came  to  the  con 
clusion  that  this  plan  could  no  longer  be  adhered  to  owing 
to  the  ex-centric  character  of  Hood's  operations.  Another 
one,  which  Sherman  pressed  warmly  on  Grant,  was  substi 
tuted  for  it.  Thomas,  with  a  subsidiary  army,  was  to  hold 
Hood  in  check;  while  Sherman,  abandoning  his  line  of  sup 
ply,  was  to  live  on  the  country  and  to  march  across  Georgia 
to  Savannah,  there  establishing  a  new  base  with  the  help  of 
the  navy.  By  doing  this  he  would  retain  the  offensive 
instead  of  following  Hood's  movements;  he  would  destroy 
many  supplies  intended  for  the  Southern  armies;  he  would y 
by  marching  through  the  enemy's  country,  deal  his  prestige 
a  mortal  blow,  and  he  would  eventually,  from  his  new  base, 
sweep  up  the  coast  line  and  join  hands  with  Grant  under 
the  walls  of  Richmond.  The  plan  was  bold  and  brilliant; 


WILLIAM   T.   SHERMAN  207 

its  conception  and  its  execution  are  both  to  the  credit  of 
Sherman. 

On  the  1 5th  of  November,  at  the  head  of  62,000  seasoned 
soldiers,  he  started  on  his  famous  march  to  the  sea,  and 
plunged  into  Georgia,  burning  his  bridges  behind  him.  Every 
building  and  storehouse  of  Atlanta  that  might  be  converted 
to  use  by  the  Confederates  was  burnt,  as  were  many  private 
houses.  Sherman  was  determined  not  only  to  live  off  the 
country,  but  that  the  enemy  should  find  no  subsistence 
wherever  he  had  passed.  In  his  front  there  was  no  opposi 
tion;  the  weather  was  glorious ;  the  men  were  in  high  spirits, 
and  as  they  swung  along  singing  "John  Brown's  body  lies 
a-mouldering  in  the  grave,"  they  were  answered  by  swarms 
of  negroes  dancing  with  delight  at  the  sight  of  their  victorious 
liberators.  The  army  believed  it  was  marching  on  Rich 
mond,  and,  strong  in  its  faith  and  in  its  leader,  it  would  have 
been  difficult  to  hold  in  battle;  few  among  its  officers  and 
men  suspected  that  their  fighting  days  were  nearly  over. 

On  the  gth  of  December,  three  and  a  half  weeks  after 
leaving  Atlanta,  the  army  reached  Savannah — a  march  of 
over  three  hundred  miles.  There  had  been  virtually  no 
resistance;  the  soldiers  had  found  abundant  supplies;  a 
broad  belt  of  destruction  had  been  swept  through  Georgia. 
At  Savannah,  however,  resistance  was  once  more  met  with. 
General  Hardee  had  assembled  a  force,  mainly  militia,  for 
the  defence  of  the  city,  and  for  two  weeks  held  Sherman  at 
bay.  On  the  23d,  however,  he  abandoned  the  city,  and  on 
Christmas  Day,  1864,  the  Federal  army  was  established  in 
a  secure  base  on  the  Atlantic  seaboard. 

For  a  while  Grant  thought  of  transferring  Sherman's 
army  to  Virginia  by  sea  to  deal  the  death-stroke  to  Lee;  but 
for  three  months  to  come  the  roads  about  Richmond  were 
likely  to  be  impassable,  and  it  was  as  well  to  let  his  lieutenant 
turn  this  time  to  account  by  operating  in  the  Carolinas, — the 
more  so  as  Thomas  had  just  crushed  Hood's  army  at  Nash- 


208  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

ville.  So  Sherman  was  given  a  free  hand  to  operate  from 
Savannah  northwards  up  the  Atlantic  seaboard  towards 
Richmond.  Grant  and  the  Government  had  complete  con 
fidence  in  him,  and  Congress  on  the  loth  of  January  passed 
a  joint  resolution  thanking  him  and  his  army  for  their  gal 
lantry  and  good  conduct. 

Early  in  January  Sherman  started  on  his  last  advance: 
it  was  to  meet  with  little  more  resistance  than  had  the  march 
to  the  sea.  The  resources  of  the  Confederacy  were  now 
nearly  exhausted  and  no  army  could  be  collected  sufficient 
to  check  the  triumphant  march  of  the  Federals  northwards. 
With  remarkable  rapidity  Sherman  swept  through  South 
Carolina  and  into  North  Carolina.  Columbia  was  burnt 
down;  destruction  was  mercilessly  carried  out:  as  Sherman 
grimly  remarked,  "War  is  hell!"  The  Richmond  govern 
ment  was  now  so  alarmed  that  Johnston  was  called  back  to 
active  service.  He  succeeded  in  collecting  20,000  or  30,000 
men,  a  small  enough  force  to  resist  the  90,000  advancing 
Federals. 

On  the  iQth  of  March  Sherman's  columns,  on  a  wide 
front,  were  marching  towards  Goldsboro,  N.  C.,  when 
Slocum  on  the  left  was  unexpectedly  attacked.  Johnston 
had  concentrated  in  force  against  this  wing,  hoping  to  over 
come  it  before  it  could  be  supported.  At  first  Slocum  was 
pretty  severely  handled,  but  Howard  soon  came  up,  and 
Sherman  ordered  a  general  movement  in  the  direction  of 
Bentonville.  Johnston  could  not  risk  an  engagement  against 
his  opponent's  main  force,  and,  as  he  had  so  often  done 
before,  disengaged  himself  cleverly  and  retreated.  This  was 
the  last  serious  fighting  in  which  Sherman  participated.  On 
the  23d  of  March  he  reached  Goldsboro,  over  four  hundred 
miles  from  Savannah  and  only  one  hundred  and  fifty  from 
Petersburg,  where  Grant  was  just  preparing  for  the  final 
move. 

On  the  loth  of  April  the  army  was    once  more  on  the 


WILLIAM   T.    SHERMAN  209 

march,  but  on  the  following  day  received  the  glorious  news 
that  on  the  gth  Lee  had  surrendered  to  Grant  at  Appomattox. 
On  the  i3th,  the  day  on  which  Lincoln  was  assassinated, 
Johnston  sent  in  a  flag  and  offered  to  follow  the  example  of 
his  commander-in -chief.  A  conference  was  quickly  held,  and 
at  this  the  Confederate  commander  extracted  from  his  over- 
generous  opponent  terms  covering  not  only  the  surrender  of 
his  army  but  the  political  status  of  the  Southern  States. 
The  convention  was  very  properly  disavowed  by  the  authori 
ties  at  Washington,  much  to  Sherman's  mortification,  and 
it  was  not  till  two  weeks  later  that  he  finally  concluded  an 
arrangement  for  the  surrender  of  Johnston's  army  on  the 
same  terms  as  those  accorded  to  Lee's  at  Appomattox. 

After  the  war  Sherman  was  placed  in  command  of  the 
Division  of  the  Mississippi.  In  1866  he  was  promoted 
lieutenant-general,  and  on  Grant's  election  to  the  Presidency 
he  became  commander-in-chief.  In  1874  he  retired  at  his 
own  request,  and  seventeen  years  later,  on  the  i/|.th  of  Janu 
ary,  1891,  he  died  in  the  city  of  New  York.  He  was  an 
excellent  soldier  and  citizen,  stanch  to  his  friends  and 
country;  his  triumphs  are  worthily  commemorated  by  St. 
Gaudens'  splendid  equestrian  statue  erected  in  New  York. 


PHILIP  H.   SHERIDAN 

THE  Sheridans  were  a  couple  of  Irish  emigrants  who, 
reaching  this  country  in  1830,  settled  in  Albany,  N.  Y., 
where  their  son  Philip  was  born  in  the  following  year.  Soon 
afterwards  they  moved  farther  west  to  the  State  of  Ohio, 
where  the  little  town  of  Somerset,  Perry  County,  saw  the 
boy  develop  into  a  young  man.  His  chances  of  education 
were  of  the  slenderest,  until  at  the  age  of  seventeen  he  had 
the  good  fortune  to  secure  a  nomination  to  West  Point.  He 
worked  hard,  but  had  so  much  leeway  to  make  up  that  when 
he  graduated  in  1853  he  was  no  higher  placed  than  thirty- 
fifth  in  a  class  of  fifty-two. 

During  the  eight  years  of  army  life  that  followed  his 
graduation  Sheridan  got  no  opportunity  for  distinction  and 
made  no  mark.  Yet  his  experience  in  those  years  was  of 
the  most  valuable  character.  He  was  first  appointed  to  the 
infantry;  then  went  to  California  and  served  with  the  dra 
goons  on  Indian  service.  He  was  reliable  and  resourceful, 
and  so  was  generally  selected  for  independent  commands. 
He  learned,  on  a  small  scale,  a  hundred  mysteries  of  the  sol 
dier's  art:  transport  and  provisioning,  outmanoeuvring 
Indians,  caring  for  horses,  keeping  soldiers  in  good  trim, 
winning  their  confidence.  These  things,  the  secret  of  which 
Phil  Sheridan  mastered  in  his  scouting  expeditions,  he  ap 
plied  on  a  broader  scale  when  he  held  large  commands  in 
later  years,  and  that  is  the  reason  why  the  troops  he  led  were 
always  in  a  state  of  high  efficiency  and  why  they  followed 
their  general  with  blind  devotion. 

210 


PHILIP   H.   SHERIDAN  211 

When  the  war  broke  out  all  regular-army  officers  were 
immediately  on  promotion;  Sheridan  was  appointed  a  cap 
tain  in  the  Thirteenth  Infantry,  the  phantom  organization  of 
which  Sherman  had  just  been  made  colonel;  neither  of  them 
remained  long  enough  with  it  to  see  the  regiment  assume 
consistency.  Sherman  went  to  Washington  to  command  a 
brigade  at  Bull  Run;  Sheridan  was  ordered  to  report  to 
Halleck  at  St.  Louis  for  staff  duty.  In  Halleck's  office  his 
qualities  proved  so  valuable  that  during  the  early  months  of 
the  war  it  appeared  probable  that  he  might  never  become  a 
field-officer.  His  capacity  for  detail,  his  energy,  his  unfear- 
ing  sense  of  duty,  were  exactly  fitted  to  solve  the  numerous 
questions  of  administration  and  transport  that  constantly 
arose,  and  to  check  the  beating  tide  of  corruption  that  was 
always  surging  about  army  contracts.  Sheridan  was  a 
conspicuous  success  in  his  new  field,  but  he  chafed  con 
stantly  at  being  out  of  the  fighting,  and  finally  succeeded  in 
getting  sent  to  the  front  when  Halleck  proceeded  up  the 
Tennessee  to  take  command  after  Shiloh.  Even  then  he 
seemed  at  first  no  better  off  than  before,  for  Halleck  set  him 
to  road -building  and  transport  duties.  At  last,  on  the  2yth 
of  May,  1862,  his  opportunity  came.  The  Second  Michigan 
Cavalry  had  lost  its  colonel;  the  regiment  was  inefficient  and 
under  poor  discipline.  The  governor  of  the  State  decided, 
therefore,  to  obtain,  if  possible,  a  regular-army  officer  to 
command  it,  and  Sheridan  was  recommended.  The  selec 
tion  proved  fortunate  for  him  and  for  his  country. 

As  a  cavalry  officer  Sheridan  instantly  made  his  mark. 
His  men  were  soon  more  comfortable,  more  disciplined, 
more  confident.  They  quickly  discovered  that  their  leader 
was  as  solicitous  for  their  welfare  as  for  their  success.  He 
never  wasted  labor  or  lives,  but  he  also  never  hesitated  to  call 
for  the  greatest  sacrifices  when  an  adequate  object  was  to  be 
gained;  this  was  the  way  to  appeal  to  the  citizen  soldiers 
who  had  volunteered  to  fight  for  the  maintenance  of  the 


212  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

Union.  Cavalry  leaders  were  scarce,  Sheridan's  qualities 
conspicuous,  and  in  a  few  weeks  he  was  in  command  of  a 
brigade  of  horse.  At  the  head  of  this  little  body  he  won  a 
considerable  skirmish  at  Booneville  on  the  ist  of  July,  which 
in  its  conduct  was  a  model  of  what  cavalry  work  should  be. 
Other  good  services  followed,  and  a  few  days  later  Rose- 
crans  and  all  his  brigadiers  signed  a  joint  appeal  to  head 
quarters  declaring  that  Sheridan  was  worth  his  weight  in 
gold  and  urging  that  he  should  receive  the  rank  of  brigadier- 
general.  From  that  moment  he  was  a  marked  man. 

In  the  autumn  of  1862  we  find  Sheridan  at  Louisville  in 
command  of  a  division  in  Buell's  army.  On  the  advance  of 
that  general  against  Bragg,  who  had  boldly  carried  the  Con 
federate  arms  nearly  to  the  Ohio,  Sheridan  came  in  for  some 
severe  fighting.  At  Perryville,  on  the  8th  of  October,  his 
division  was  skilfully  handled ;  it  prevented  the  Confederates 
from  overwhelming  McCook  on  the  left,  and  at  the  close  of 
the  day  advanced  and  drove  the  enemy  out  of  Perryville. 
Bragg  now  retreated,  Buell  following  him.  On  the  3oth  of 
October  Rosecrans  superseded  Buell  and,  after  several  weeks 
of  indecisive  operations,  the  two  armies  came  into  contact 
once  more  at  Murfreesboro,  just  south  of  Nashville.  And 
here  Sheridan  played  an  even  more  conspicuous  part  than 
at  Perryville. 

Rosecrans  and  Bragg  were  evenly  matched  and  both  bent 
on  the  offensive.  On  the  evening  of  the  3oth  of  December 
the  two  armies  were  facing  one  another  and  each  commander 
issued  orders  for  the  following  day.  Rosecrans  had  three 
corps :  Crittenden  on  the  left,  Thomas  in  the  centre,  McCook 
on  the  right.  He  proposed  taking  the  offensive  and  deal 
ing  a  heavy  flanking  blow  with  his  left,  while  his  right  con 
tained  the  enemy.  Unfortunately  the  general  to  whom  the 
latter  task  was  entrusted  was  a  careless  and  overconfident 
officer,  a  good  fighter  but  presumptuous  and  apt  to  over 
look  details.  McCook  was  confident  that  he  could  hold 


PHILIP  H.    SHERIDAN  213 

back  the  Confederates  while  Rosecrans  won  the  battle  on  the 
centre  and  left,  but  he  did  not  take  all  the  precautions  he 
should  have.  He  placed  his  three  divisions,  under  Generals 
Johnson,  Davis,  and  Sheridan,  in  an  ill-selected  position, 
and  made  no  effort  to  foresee  or  forestall  any  movement  the 
enemy  might  attempt  against  him.  But  Sheridan  was 
anxious.  He  was  up  all  night,  listening  to  sounds  that  told 
him  the  enemy  was  massing  heavily  in  his  front,  warning  his 
corps  commander  of  approaching  danger,  seeing  to  the  dis 
position  of  his  troops.  Before  it  was  light  Sheridan's  men 
had  had  their  breakfast,  and  when  at  dawn,  before  Rose 
crans  had  begun  to  move,  the  Confederates  marched  in 
overwhelming  numbers  on  McCook's  position,  Sheridan's 
division,  and  his  only,  was  ready  to  repel  the  assault.  From 
early  morning  till  late  at  night  that  division  fought,  losing 
40  per  cent  of  its  numbers,  including  all  its  brigade  com 
manders,  but  maintaining  its  organization  intact.  On  the 
right  Johnson's  and  Davis'  divisions  were  swept  from  the 
field,  but  Sheridan  doggedly  beat  back  attack  after  attack,  and 
when  compelled  to  fall  back  did  so  with  such  skill,  with  such 
a  bold  front,  that  he  still  held  the  enemy  in  check.  If 
Rosecrans  succeeded  in  reforming  a  line  of  battle  to  the  rear 
with  which  he  was  eventually  able  to  check  Bragg's  advance, 
it  was  entirely  owing  to  the  resolute  fighting  and  splendid 
skill  of  Sheridan  and  his  brave  men.  In  the  report  on 
Murfreesboro  made  by  the  commanding  general  Sheridan 
received  scant  justice,  for  he  was  commended  in  the  same 
terms  as  the  most  inefficient  of  his  brother  generals.  Rose 
crans  was  unduly  comprehensive  in  his  allotment  of  praise; 
but  the  army  knew  that  Phil  Sheridan  had  saved  the  day, 
and  that  was  enough  reward  for  such  a  gallant  soldier. 

After  Murfreesboro  the  army  under  Rosecrans  remained 
inactive  until  the  end  of  June,  1863,  when  it  was  decided 
to  initiate  operations  for  driving  Bragg  out  of  Chattanooga. 
After  several  weeks  of  manoeuvring  Rosecrans  cleverly 


214  LEADING   AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

crossed  the  Tennessee  and  advanced  from  the  west  towards 
the  line  of  rail  running  back  from  Chattanooga  to  Atlanta. 
On  finding  his  flank  turned  Bragg  abandoned  the  city  and 
fell  back  in  the  direction  of  Dalton  to  avoid  being  cut  off. 
He  halted  along  the  banks  of  the  Chickamauga,  was  there 
reinforced  by  Longstreet's  corps,  and  then  struck  a  crush 
ing  blow  at  the  Federal  army. 

Rosecrans,  who  had  shown  ability  in  his  movement  across 
the  Tennessee,  failed  in  his  subsequent  operations.  His 
army  became  somewhat  scattered  and  out  of  hand ;  his  plans 
were  nebulous.  On  the  igth  of  September  Bragg  attacked 
him  vigorously  at  Chickamauga;  and  on  the  2oth  the  battle 
was  renewed.  Rosecrans'  right  and  left  wings  were  broken, 
and  had  not  Thomas  held  firm  with  the  centre  a  great 
disaster  might  have  resulted.  Sheridan's  division  was 
swept  away  in  the  decisive  attack  made  by  Longstreet's 
corps  on  the  second  day  of  the  battle,  but  he  so  far  succeeded 
in  rallying  his  men  that  when  the  army  retreated  into  Chat 
tanooga  it  was  Sheridan's  division  that  formed  the  rear-guard. 

After  Chickamauga  changes  were  made  in  the  command 
of  the  Federal  army.  McCook,  Sheridan's  corps  com 
mander,  was  replaced  by  Gordon  Granger,  and  Rosecrans 
was  succeeded  by  Thomas.  This  was  not  in  itself  sufficient 
to  save  the  Federal  army  now  partly  blockaded  in  Chatta 
nooga  by  Bragg.  Grant  was  summoned  from  Vicksburg 
to  relieve  Chattanooga,  and  immediately  initiated  the  ener 
getic  operations  that  culminated  in  the  battles  of  Lookout 
Mountain  and  Missionary  Ridge. 

To  disengage  the  army  of  Thomas  that  of  Sherman  and 
that  of  Hooker  had  been  brought  up.  Each  of  these  generals 
attacked  one  flank  of  the  Confederate  position,  and  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  25th  of  November  Thomas'  divisions  were 
sent  to  break  through  Bragg's  now  weakened  centre.  Sheri 
dan,  Wood,  and  Johnson  were  ordered  to  attack  and  carry 
the  line  of  rifle-pits  at  the  base  of  the  precipitous  Missionary 


PHILIP  H.   SHERIDAN  215 

Ridge,  and  then  to  await  further  orders.  The  attack  was 
gallantly  and  successfully  delivered,  but  Wood  and  Sheridan, 
as  well  as  their  men,  came  at  once  to  the  conclusion  that  it 
was  easier  to  attack  the  ridge  itself  than  to  remain  in  the 
rifle-pits  exposed  to  the  murderous  fire  of  the  Confederate 
artillery  above  them.  Spontaneously  the  whole  line  con 
tinued  its  advance,  and  step  by  step  threaded  its  way  up  the 
slope  to  the  ridge.  A  short  struggle  ensued  on  top  with  the 
surprised  Confederates  and  the  day  was  won.  Sheridan  now 
showed  a  quality  displayed  by  very  few  of  the  Federal  com 
manders.  Having  won  a  victory  he  was  anxious  to  push  it 
home  to  the  farthest  point.  His  men,  without  delay, 
marched  on  in  pursuit  of  the  retreating  enemy.  They  fought 
and  marched  through  the  evening,  through  the  night,  till 
the  morning  at  2  o'clock,  when,  under  a  bright  moon,  Sheri 
dan  paused  only  half  a  mile  from  Chickamauga  Station.  He 
had  been  constantly  sending  messages  to  headquarters  asking 
for  support,  and  had  other  troops  followed  his  there  can 
hardly  be  a  doubt  that  the  whole  of  Bragg's  right  wing,  which 
passed  through  Chickamauga  Station  some  hours  later,  would 
have  been  cut  off.  It  was  in  this  brilliant  attack  and  dashing 
pursuit  that  he  first  displayed  those  remarkable  offensive 
qualities  that  stamped  all  his  operations  in  the  campaigns 
of  '64-'65. 

Chattanooga  was  followed  by  a  period  of  comparative 
rest  for  Sheridan's  command.  During  the  winter  it  went 
into  quarters  and  the  general  was  able  to  snatch  a  few 
weeks'  furlough,  which  he  spent  at  his  home  in  Ohio,  his 
first  visit  there  since  joining  the  army.  Immediately  after 
returning  to  his  duties  he  was  summoned  by  telegraph  to  re 
port  to  Washington  (March  23,  1864),  and  found  that  he 
was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  cavalry  corps  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  He  took  charge  a  few  days  later  at 
Brandy  Station. 

From  the  first,  as  might  have  been  expected  from  an 


216  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

officer  coming  straight  from  the  command  of  an  infantry 
division,  Sheridan  cleariy  showed  his  purpose  of  using  the 
cavalry  of  Grant's  army  in  mass  and  strictly  as  mounted 
infantry;  and  this,  providing  a  sufficient  number  of  horse 
men  were  detached  for  scouting  and  orderly  duties,  was 
undoubtedly  the  best  service  such  a  body  could  render.  It 
was  not  without  some  opposition  that  Sheridan  so  employed 
his  corps,  but  it  was  not  long  before  Grant  recognized  his 
great  ability  in  handling  this  mass  of  horsemen  and  gave 
him  a  free  hand. 

The  campaign  began  by  Grant's  marching  his  army 
through  the  Wilderness;  Sheridan  with  two  of  his  divisions 
was  on  the  left  flank,  away  from  the  fighting,  observing  the 
roads  running  towards  Fredericksburg.  On  the  yth  of  May, 
when  the  army  was  directed  to  march  on  Spottsylvania,  he 
was  in  the  van  and  was  engaged  for  some  hours  with  Wade 
Hampton's  and  Lee's  cavalry.  On  the  following  day  Grant 
decided  that  he  could  not  employ  his  mounted  men  to  such 
good  advantage  about  Spottsylvania  as  in  sending  them 
against  Lee's  lines  of  communication,  and  so  Sheridan  was 
despatched  on  the  first  of  his  great  raids. 

On  the  gth  of  May  Sheridan  with  9000  horsemen  and  40 
guns  moved  around  Lee's  right  flank  and,  riding  diagonally, 
across  the  rear  of  his  positions  towards  the  southwest, 
reached  Beaver  Dam  Creek  station  on  the  Virginia  Central 
on  the  following  day.  There  he  destroyed  the  rails  for  ten 
miles  and,  turning  southeast,  made  for  Ashland  on  the  Rich 
mond  and  Fredericksburg  road,  where  once  more  the  rails 
were  seriously  damaged.  On  the  nth  he  headed  south  for 
Richmond,  his  real  objective  being  Haxall's  Landing,  where 
he  expected  to  get  into  touch  with  Butler's  army  and  obtain 
supplies.  At  Yellow  Tavern,  nine  miles  north  of  Richmond, 
he  found  his  advance  barred  by  Stuart,  who  with  three 
brigades  of  cavalry  had  been  detached  from  Lee's  army  to 
head  him  off.  Here  a  vigorous  engagement  took  place, 


PHILIP  H.   SHERIDAN  217 

resulting  in  the  defeat  of  the  Confederates  and  in  the  death 
of  their  commanding  general.  Sheridan  pushed  on  closer  to 
Richmond,  passed  the  outer  line  of  defences,  and,  on  the 
1 2th,  made  an  attempt  to  force  his  way  through  the  inner 
line  near  Fair  Oaks.  Failing  in  this  he  marched  southeast 
for  Haxall's  Landing,  which  he  reached  on  the  i4th  of  May. 

Three  days  were  spent  at  Haxall's  Landing,  and  on  the 
iyth  the  cavalry  corps  started  back.  Its  return  journey 
was  unmarked  by  any  striking  incident,  and  on  the  25th  it 
rejoined  the  army,  then  facing  Lee's  position  on  the  North 
Anna.  On  the  very  next  day  Grant  decided  to  slip  away 
from  the  North  Anna,  marching  towards  his  felt,  so  as  to 
reach  Hanover  Court-house  before  Lee;  Sheridan's  corps 
was  ordered  to  lead  the  army. 

In  the  advance  from  the  North  Anna  to  Cold  Harbor 
Sheridan  constantly  led  the  way,  and  came  in  for  some  pretty 
severe  fighting.  On  the  28th  of  May  there  was  a  heavy 
engagement  in  the  woods  near  Hawes's  shop,  and  on  the  3oth 
near  Cold  Harbor.  On  the  3ist  the  cavalry  occupied  Cold 
Harbor  and,  on  Meade's  urgent  orders  to  hold  it  at  all  risks, 
succeeded  in  driving  back  several  Confederate  attacks  until 
relieved  by  the  advancing  columns  of  Federal  infantry. 

After  the  unsuccessful  attack  on  Lee  at  Cold  Harbor  on 
the  3d  of  June,  Grant  decided  to  operate  against  Petersburg, 
and,  having  no  present  use  for  a  large  force  of  cavalry,  once 
more  detached  Sheridan.  With  two  of  his  divisions  he 
started  on  the  yth  of  June  on  his  Trevylian  raid,  his  objective 
being  Charlottesville  on  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Railway. 
The  raid  is  not  specially  noteworthy,  nor  was  it  productive 
of  any  great  results. 

On  the  ist  of  August  Sheridan  was  relieved  of  his  com 
mand  of  the  cavalry  corps  to  take  up  new  and  more  im 
portant  duties.  Lee  had  brought  Grant's  operations  virtu 
ally  to  a  standstill  before  the  fortifications  of  Richmond,  but 
his  situation  there  was  highly  precarious.  The  country  to  the 


218  LEADING   AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

north  had  been  overrun  and  ravaged  by  the  Federals;  Grant 
was  threatening  to  work  around  Petersburg  to  the  south,  and 
Lee's  sole  line  of  supply  was  one  running  due  west  towards 
the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah.  This  region,  bounding  to  the 
west  the  great  theatre  on  which  during  four  years  the  armies 
of  the  Potomac  and  of  Northern  Virginia  had  performed  their 
evolutions,  had  played  a  conspicuous  part.  Both  sides  had 
in  turn  overrun  it,  and  now  that  Lee  was  tightly  held  in 
Richmond  it  only  remained  to  sweep  the  Shenandoah  valley 
to  close  up  every  avenue  of  supply  and  of  escape  save  only 
the  line  of  rail  running  from  Petersburg  to  Lynchburg.  To 
accomplish  this  task  Grant  wanted  the  most  efficient  subor 
dinate  he  could  lay  his  hands  on,  and  although  there  were 
other  claims  in  the  way,  Grant  overrode  them  and  selected 
Sheridan  for  this  new  duty. 

When  Sheridan  took  up  his  new  command  the  situation 
was  as  follows:  In  May  and  June  General  Hunter  with  a 
Federal  army  had  penetrated  the  Shenandoah  valley  and 
reached  Lynchburg.  Lee,  however,  had  felt  able  to  detach 
Early's  corps  after  Cold  Harbor,  and  Early  had  driven 
Hunter  out  of  the  valley  and  across  the  mountains  into 
western  Virginia.  He  had  then  marched  north,  crossed  the 
Potomac,  and  made  an  attack  or  demonstration  against 
Washington.  In  the  middle  of  July  he  recrossed  the  Potomac 
and  fell  back  into  the  Shenandoah  valley,  only  to  move  north 
once  more,  sending  his  cavalry  raiding  into  Maryland  two 
weeks  later. 

Sheridan  had  under  his  orders  three  infantry  corps,  those 
of  Wright,  Crook,  and  Emory,  with  Torbert's  division  of 
cavalry;  he  was  to  be  strengthened  by  two  more  divisions  of 
cavalry.  On  the  loth  of  August  he  began  operations, 
marching  on  Winchester  from  the  east.  Early  was  outnum 
bered  and,  as  he  was  expecting  reinforcements,  decided  to 
fall  back.  He  abandoned  Winchester,  but,  fifteen  miles 
south,  halted  in  a  very  strong  position  at  Fisher's  Hill. 


PHILIP   II.    SHERIDAN  219 

Sheridan  advanced  cautiously  and,  on  being  informed  that 
heavy  Confederate  reinforcements  under  R.  H.  Anderson 
were  at  hand,  in  turn  decided  it  would  be  more  prudent  to 
fall  back.  He  retreated  towards  Harper's  Ferry,  his  rear 
guard  getting  into  action  with  Early  as  it  was  withdrawing 
from  Winchester  on  the  lyth.  For  the  next  three  weeks  the 
armies  manoeuvred  warily  between  Harper's  Ferry  and  Win 
chester,  at  the  end  of  which  time  Grant's  continued  pressure 
at  Petersburg  caused  Lee  to  recall  R.  H.  Anderson,  leaving 
the  advantage  of  numbers  once  more  with  Sheridan. 

Early  had  grown  overconfident.  The  caution  which  his 
opponent  had  so  far  shown  had  deluded  him  into  a  feeling 
of  security.  Instead  of  falling  back,  on  Anderson's  depar 
ture,  south  of  Winchester  to  one  of  the  many  strong  posi 
tions  that  bar  the  valley  road,  he  preferred  to  remain  in  the 
more  plentiful  but  more  open  country  to  the  north  of  that 
town.  This  proved  Sheridan's  opportunity;  and  now  that 
he  felt  able  to  strike  at  his  opponent  his  caution  and  patience 
were  exchanged  for  rapidity  and  daring. 

On  the  igth  of  August  Sheridan  struck  the  Confederate 
army  just  north  of  Winchester.  Early  was  partly  surprised 
and  largely  outnumbered,  but  made  a  good  struggle.  Severe 
fighting  lasted  all  day,  the  Federals  gaining  ground  con 
stantly.  At  evening  Sheridan's  cavalry  had  outflanked 
Early  right  and  left,  and  in  the  partial  rout  that  followed 
pursued  his  flying  infantry  till  10  o'clock  at  night.  The 
victory  was  complete;  it  had  cost  Early  4000  casualties, 
more  than  a  quarter  of  his  total,  and  5  guns. 

Early 's  retreat  continued  through  Strasburg,  but  just 
beyond  was  the  very  strong  position  of  Fisher's  Hill,  and 
there  he  decided  to  rally  his  army  and  make  another  stand. 
But  the  Confederates  had  been  badly  shaken  at  Winchester, 
and  Sheridan  gave  them  no  time  to  recover  their  morale. 
He  succeeded  in  masking  the  movement  of  one  of  his  divi 
sions,  and,  late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  22d,  it  suddenly 


220  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

emerged  on  the  left  flank  and  rear  of  Early's  position.  The 
surprise  was  complete,  an  attack  along  the  whole  line  quickly 
sent  the  Confederates  flying  and  gave  16  pieces  of  artillery 
as  a  trophy  to  Sheridan. 

After  Fisher's  Hill  Early  made  no  farther  stand,  but  re 
treated  rapidly  to  the  lower  end  of  the  valley.  Sheridan  pur 
sued  vigorously  as  far  as  Harrisonburg.  He  had  now  twice 
defeated  Early's  army,  and  he  occupied  the  greater  part  of 
the  Shenandoah  valley;  it  remained  to  carry  out  the  chief 
military  object  that  Grant  had  in  view  in  sending  him  into 
that  quarter :  this  was  to  render  the  valley  useless  as  a  source 
of  subsistence  for  Lee's  army.  On  the  6th  of  October  Sheri 
dan  ordered  his  army  to  fall  back  by  the  way  it  had  come, 
but  as  it  marched  back  it  stretched  its  columns  across  the 
valley  from  side  to  side  and  swept  it  clear  of  all  its  resources. 
Crops  and  cattle  were  seized  or  destroyed;  barns  and  mills 
were  burned;  destruction  was  ruthlessly  applied. 

As  Sheridan  fell  back,  Early,  once  more  reinforced  by  Lee 
and  eager  as  ever  for  battle,  followed.  At  Tom's  Brook, 
south  of  Strasburg,  the  cavalry  of  the  two  armies  engaged, 
success  once  more  resting  with  the  Federals.  But  the  retire 
ment  continued  until,  on  the  loth  of  October,  the  Federals 
were  in  the  triangle  formed  by  Strasburg,  Winchester,  and 
Front  Royal.  Early  halted  at  Newmarket,  twenty  miles 
south,  and  awaited  developments. 

Although  the  Federal  Government  had  now  appointed  a 
commander-in-chief,  it  could  not  altogether  abstain  from 
its  old  habit  of  interfering  in  the  details  of  the  campaigns  of 
its  generals.  Just  at  this  moment  it  was  engaged  in  a  com- 
flict  of  opinion  with  Sheridan  as  to  his  ulterior  operations, 
and  as  it  was  generally  assumed  that  Early  was  in  no  posi 
tion  to  take  the  offensive,  it  was  decided  that  Sheridan  had 
better  proceed  to  Washington  for  a  conference.  He  left  his 
headquarters  and  started  for  the  capital  on  the  i5th. 

Three  days  later  Early  decided  to  attack  the  Federals  at 


PHILIP  H.   SHERIDAN  221 

Cedar  Creek  near  Strasburg.  The  ground  gave  the  Con 
federates  an  excellent  opportunity  for  getting  their  troops  in 
position  without  being  observed,  nor  had  the  Federal  com 
manders  taken  sufficient  precautions  to  prevent  a  surprise. 
In  the  early  hours  of  the  igth  of  October  the  attack  was 
delivered,  so  suddenly,  so  skilfully,  that  by  sunrise  the  corps 
of  Emory  and  Crook  were  streaming  northwards  in  confu 
sion,  leaving  many  guns  behind  them  in  the  hands  of  the 
enemy.  Ricketts's  corps,  farther  to  the  rear,  stood  firm,  how 
ever,  and  by  six  o'clock  the  Confederate  rush  was  stopped. 
Sheridan  had  reached  Winchester  the  night  before,  and  at 
half-past  eight  in  the  morning  of  the  igth  received  the  news 
that  a  battle  was  in  progress  twelve  miles  to  the  south.  He 
at  once  got  into  the  saddle  and  rode  to  the  front,  turning 
back  the  fugitives  from  the  rout  of  the  early  morning  as  he 
came  up  to  them.  When  he  reached  the  new  Federal  line  there 
was  a  pause  in  the  fighting,  and  preparations  were  being  made 
to  take  the  offensive  and  drive  Early  back.  Sheridan  at 
once  took  charge  and,  after  repelling  an  attempt  to  turn  one 
of  his  flanks,  ordered  a  general  advance  at  four  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon.  There  was  a  stubborn  resistance,  but  at  last 
a  weak  point  was  found  in  Gordon's  division,  and  presently 
the  Confederates  were  in  full  retreat  all  along  the  line. 
Custer's  cavalry  charged  brilliantly,  the  retreat  turned  to 
confusion,  and,  as  night  came  on,  the  Confederates  fled 
routed  back  over  Cedar  Creek.  Early  lost  over  3000  men, 
all  the  artillery  he  had  captured  in  the  morning,  and  24  of 
his  own  guns  besides.* 

This  was  virtually  the  end  of  the  campaign  of  1864  in  the 
Shenandoah.  Sheridan's  brilliant  successes  received  the 
approbation  of  the  country.  He  was  promoted  to  the  rank 
of  major-general  in  the  regular  army;  he  received  the  thanks 

*  A  strictly  historical  account  is  often  so  unlike  that  of  the  contemporary 
journalist  or  poet  that  it  appears  necessary  to  explain  that  this  is  the  incident 
that  gave  rise  to  the  well-known  poem  of  "Sheridan's  Ride,"  by  T.  B.  Read. 


222  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

of  Congress;  the  press  acclaimed  him,  and  deservedly,  as  a 
national  hero.  It  was  with  a  reputation  second  only  to  that 
of  Grant  and  Sherman  that  he  entered  on  his  last  campaign 
in  the  spring  of  1865. 

Richmond  and  Lee's  soldiers  had  barely  survived  the 
winter.  The  shrinkage  in  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy  had 
been  enormous.  Lee  still  had  an  army  at  Petersburg;  John 
ston  had  hardly  more  than  an  army  corps  to  hold  back 
Sherman;  there  were  no  troops  left  to  fight  for  the  desolate 
valley  of  the  Shenandoah.  Sheridan  had  a  clear  field  before 
him  and  he  moved  early  to  take  advantage  of  it.  On  the 
27th  of  February,  with  10,000  sabres  behind  him,  he  started 
up  the  valley.  He  occupied  Staunton  on  the  ist  of  March, 
and  on  the  following  day  Custer  dispersed  a  small  force 
that  Early  had  collected  at  Waynesborough.  The  Federals 
crossed  the  Blue  Ridge,  occupied  Charlottesville,  and  tore 
up  the  rail  north  and  south.  Sheridan's  instructions  were  to 
occupy  Lynchburg  if  possible;  but  he  decided  instead  to 
rejoin  Grant  under  Petersburg,  which  he  did  on  the  igih  of 
March,  just  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  closing  scenes  of  the 
great  war. 

On  the  27th  of  March  Sheridan  was  placed  on  the  extreme 
left,  south  of  Petersburg;  his  command  was  independent  of 
Meade's  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  was  placed  under  the 
direct  control  of  the  commander-in-chief. 

On  the  29th  of  March  Grant  began  his  outflanking  move 
ment,  circling  southwest  of  Petersburg  to  get  around  Lee's 
right  and  rear.  Sheridan  was  on  the  extreme  left  with  a 
large  discretion  as  to  his  eventual  movements.  Grant  even 
foresaw  eventualities  that  would  make  it  advisable  for  Sheri 
dan  to  break  away  towards  the  south  and  effect  a  junction 
with  Sherman.  On  the  3oth  Sheridan  was  in  touch  with  the 
enemy;  on  the  3ist  he  occupied  Dinwiddie  Court-house, 
but  was  there  furiously  attacked  by  the  Confederates.  War 
ren's  corps  on  his  right  gave  him  no  support,  and  it  was  only 


PHILIP  H.   SHERIDAN  223 

by  the  most  resolute  efforts  that  he  succeeded  in  holding  his 
position  till  night.  On  the  following  morning  the  Confed 
erates  retired  in  face  of  the  greater  numbers  opposed  to 
them,  and  Grant  gave  Sheridan  discretionary  powers  to 
relieve  Warren  from  his  command  if  necessary.  Both  were 
good  officers,  but  Warren  was  methodical,  Sheridan  im 
petuous,  and  the  moment  had  come  when  impetuosity  was 
essential  to  success.  On  the  ist  of  April  fighting  was  re 
newed  at  Five  Forks,  and  in  its  course  Sheridan  exercised 
the  discretion  Grant  had  given  him  removing  Warren  from 
command. 

Beaten  at  Five  Forks  and  along  the  lines  in  front  of  Peters 
burg  on  the  following  day,  Lee  commenced  his  retreat  on 
the  night  of  the  2d  of  April;  he  directed  his  army's  march 
due  west  towards  Burkesville  Junction  and  Lynchburg. 
Grant  followed  in  the  morning,  his  army  marching  on  a 
line  south  of  and  parallel  with  Lee's.  Sheridan  was  in  the 
van,  and  the  question  was,  could  he  march  fast  enough  to 
interpose  between  Lee  and  his  line  of  retreat,  and  then  hold 
him  there  long  enough  to  enable  the  rest  of  the  army  to  get 
up  and  deal  the  final  stroke.  The  first  race  was  for  Burkes 
ville  Junction,  forty-five  miles  from  Petersburg,  where  Lee 
might  have  reached  the  rail  leading  southeast  to  Danville. 
Sheridan  and  his  cavalry  moved  more  swiftly  than  the  Con 
federates.  At  four  o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of  the  4th  he 
reached  the  Danville  railroad  just  north  of  Burkesville,  and 
at  that  moment  Lee  was  not  quite  concentrated  a  few 
miles  to  the  northeast  at  Amelia  Court-house  and  Jeters- 
ville. 

On  the  5th  Lee  had  to  continue  his  march  westwards;  his 
only  hope  now  was  to  reach  Lynchburg,  via  Appomattox,  be 
fore  his  pursuers.  On  the  6th  Meade  succeeded  in  striking 
Lee's  rear,  and  brought  him  to  partial  action  at  Sailor's  Creek. 
In  this  engagement  the  Confederates  lost  heavily,  and  that 
owing  in  great  part  to  the  action  of  Sheridan;  E  well's  corps 


224  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

and  one-half  of  Anderson's  were  captured  with  many  guns 
and  supplies.  It  was  plain  now  that  the  Confederacy  was 
reaching  its  end.  A  few  more  efforts,  a  few  more  painful 
miles,  and  the  final  catastrophe  must  be  reached.  Without 
rest,  with  unquenched  fire,  Sheridan  once  more  took  up  the 
pursuit.  Circling  to  the  south,  his  jaded  troopers  reached 
Appomattox  Station  on  the  evening  of  the  8th  of  April  in 
front  of  Lee,  between  Lee  and  Lynchburg,  his  last  possible 
refuge.  It  was  now  merely  a  question  of  whether  Sheridan 
and  the  cavalry  could  hold  on  long  enough  for  the  Federal 
infantry  to  get  up. 

At  the  same  moment  as  Sheridan  was  reaching  Appomat 
tox  Station,  Lee's  advance  had  occupied  Appomattox  Court 
house,  an  hour's  march  to  the  northeast.  At  early  dawn  of 
the  gth  of  April  the  two  armies  were  in  contact,  Lee  anxious 
to  brush  aside  the  cavalry  that  blocked  the  road,  Sheri 
dan  intent  on  holding  him  back  long  enough  for  Ord's  corps, 
which  had  been  marching  all  night,  to  reach  him.  Fitz- 
hugh  Lee  and  Gordon  with  30  guns  advanced  on  Sheridan. 
The  Confederates,  even  in  this  last  hopeless  plight,  had  not 
forgotten  how  to  fight.  Slowly  but  surely  Sheridan's  troopers 
were  forced  back,  but  not  rapidly  enough  to  save  Lee.  At 
9  o'clock  Ord's  columns  reached  the  field.  They  were  rap 
idly  deployed,  and  when  the  Confederates  found  that  they 
no  longer  had  merely  carbine  fire  in  their  front,  their  attack 
ceased.  Lee  was  now  convinced  that  there  was  no  hope 
and  that  honor  was  satisfied.  There  was  nothing  left  but 
to  surrender  his  army  and  close  the  war. 

The  credit  of  Lee's  capitulation  at  Appomattox  is  clearly 
due  first  and  foremost  to  the  Federal  commander-in-chief, 
Ulysses  Grant.  But  the  chief  subordinate  factor  was  the 
employment  of  the  cavalry  in  the  form  of  a  massed  division 
of  mounted  infantry  and  its  brilliant  leading  by  Philip  Sheri 
dan.  The  march  of  his  corps  from  Petersburg  to  Appomat 
tox  is  a  great  military  object-lesson,  and  in  no  war  from  that 


PHILIP  H.   SHERIDAN  225 

day  to  this  has  there  been  seen  so  effective   strategical  and 
tactical  employment  of  mounted  men. 

Sheridan  was  still  young  at  the  close  of  the  war,  and  that, 
together  with  his  great  military  abilities,  designated  him  as 
the  man  to  send  to  the  Mexican  frontier,  where  the  Govern 
ment  anticipated  the  possibility  of  intervention  against  the 
Emperor  Maximilian.  Sheridan  spent  several  years  of  un 
pleasant  duty  in  the  South  during  the  period  of  reconstruction, 
but  got  into  political  difficulties  and  was  removed  to  the  West, 
where  he  saw  a  little  active  service  once  more  against  the 
Indians.  In  1870  he  obtained  leave  of  absence  to  follow  the 
Franco-Prussian  war  operations.  He  was  with  King  Wil 
liam's  staff  at  Gravelotte,  Beaumont,  Sedan,  and  Paris,  and 
was  favorably  impressed  by  many  of  the  good  points  of  the 
German  armies.  But  he  came  to  the  conclusion  that  they 
had  no  idea  of  the  tactical  employment  of  cavalry,  and  on 
that  point  Phil  Sheridan  knew  what  he  was  talking  about 
and  his  opinion  was  undoubtedly  correct. 

On  the  4th  of  March,  1869,  the  inauguration-day  of  Presi 
dent  Grant,  Sheridan  was  promoted  lieutenant-general;  in 
1884,  on  Sherman's  retirement,  he  succeeded  to  the  post  of 
commander-in-chief.  Four  years  later,  at  the  compara 
tively  early  age  of  fifty-seven,  he  died  somewhat  suddenly. 
In  the  same  year  Congress  had  passed  a  bill  restoring  in  his 
favor  the  grade  of  general. 


GEORGE  B.   McCLELLAN 

GEORGE  BRINTON  MCCLELLAN  was  born  on  the  3d  of 
December,  1826,  at  Philadelphia.  At  the  age  of  sixteen  he 
entered  West  Point,  in  the  same  class  with  Stonewall  Jack 
son,  and  distinguished  himself  as  a  student.  He  graduated 
at  the  head  of  his  class  in  1846,  just  in  time  to  participate 
in  the  Mexican  War.  He  served  with  Scott  as  an  engineer 
officer,  having  as  his  two  immediate  superiors  Beauregard 
and  Robert  Lee,  and  did  much  useful  work  that  came 
under  the  notice  of  the  commander-in-chief.  For  his  ser 
vices  he  received  brevets  of  first  lieutenant  and  captain. 
Soon  after  his  return  from  the  war  McClellan  was  sent 
west,  where  he  was  employed  mostly  on  topographical  work, 
in  which  he  showed  skill,  method,  and  zeal.  He  was  later 
recalled  to  Washington,  and  so  highly  were  his  talents  and 
his  personality  esteemed  that  when  the  Crimean  War  broke 
out  he  was  selected  as  one  of  the  officers  sent  to  follow  the 
operations  of  the  Allies.  In  1857,  however,  he  resigned  his 
commission  to  embark  in  railroad  enterprises  that  his  large 
technical  knowledge  and  organizing  powers  made  him  spe 
cially  fit  to  conduct.  He  became  chief  engineer  and  later 
vice-president  of  the  Illinois  Central;  from  that  road  he 
transferred  his  services  to  the  Ohio  and  Mississippi,  of  which 
he  was  elected  president.  The  outbreak  of  the  war  found 
him  residing  in  Cincinnati. 

Among  McClellan's  numerous  friends  and  admirers  was 
Governor  Denison  of  Ohio,  who  offered  him  the  command  of 

a  brigade  of  volunteers  which  that  State  had  raised  for  the 

226 


GEORGE  B.  McCLELLAN  227 

war.  The  appointment  was  a  good  one:  McClellan's  army 
career  had  been  brilliant,  and  his  civilian  experience  of  large 
administrative  work  was  a  further  recommendation.  That 
experience  was  characteristic,  as  it  turned  out,  of  both  his 
strong  and  weak  points.  General  Scott  warmly  approved 
Governor  Denison's  choice,  and  shortly  after,  on  the  forma 
tion  of  the  military  department  of  the  Ohio,  comprising 
the  States  of  Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Illinois,  he  caused  McClellan 
to  be  placed  in  charge  of  it  with  the  rank  of  major-general. 

McClellan  was  busy  organizing  and  drilling  the  new 
levies  when  instructions  reached  him  from  headquarters 
that  plunged  him  into  active  operations.  A  line  of  rail, 
the  Baltimore  and  Ohio,  ran  nearly  due  west  from  Wash 
ington  to  the  Ohio  River,  forming  a  direct  line  of  com 
munications  between  the  capital  and  the  Middle  States. 
Westwards  the  Ohio  made  a  good  frontier,  but  eastwards 
this  line  of  rail  was  covered  by  no  natural  feature  and  was 
liable  to  be  cut  at  any  point  by  the  Confederate  forces 
assembling  in  Virginia.  The  Federal  Government  had 
already  formed  two  armies  to  protect  the  Baltimore  and 
Ohio,  the  first  under  McDowell  in  front  of  Washington, 
the  second  under  Patterson  at  Harper's  Ferry;  it  was 
now  anxious  to  cover  the  remainder  of  this  line,  the  part 
that  ran  through  western  Virginia.  There  was  a  further 
inducement  to  operate  in  this  quarter,  which  was  that  the 
people  of  western  Virginia  had  clearly  shown  unionist  senti 
ments;  a  Federal  advance  would  doubtless  confirm  and 
strengthen  that  feeling. 

The  troops  marked  out  for  conducting  these  operations 
were  clearly  those  of  the  Department  of  the  Ohio,  and 
McClellan  therefore  received  instructions  to  advance.  On 
the  26th  of  May  he  ordered  two  small  columns  across  the 
Ohio  which  occupied  Grafton,  an  important  junction; 
a  few  days  later  they  cleverly  dispersed  a  force  of  Virginia 
militia  at  Philippi.  This  first  success  so  far  encouraged 


228  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

the  inhabitants  of  western  Virginia  that  a  few  days  later 
they  formed  a  State  government,  formally  announced  their 
secession  from  Virginia,  and  declared  for  the  Union.  Among 
the  first  acts  of  the  new  government  was  to  raise  troops,  and 
thus  McClellan  found  his  command  increased  and  his  hold 
strengthened. 

But  the  Confederate  Government  and  its  advisers  were 
fully  aware  of  the  importance  of  breaking  the  line  between 
Washington  and  the  West;  a  force  under  General  Wise  was 
sent  to  the  Kanawha  valley,  another  under  General  Garnett 
to  Beverly.  Garnett  immediately  occupied  two  important 
passes  at  Rich  Mountain  and  Laurel  Hill;  he  proposed  to 
hold  these  positions  until  he  could  be  reinforced.  McClellan 
with  much  superior  forces  promptly  moved  against  him. 

On  the  nth  of  July  McClellan,  after  some  clever  and 
rapid  movements,  turned  Pegram's  strong  position  at  Rich 
Mountain  threatening  Garnett's  line  of  retreat  through 
Beverly.  Pegram  lost  6  guns,  and  after  a  vain  attempt  at 
escape,  surrendered  with  over  500  men  on  the  i3th.  Gar 
nett  meanwhile  had  been  attempting  to  get  clear  by  a  rapid 
retreat,  but  his  rear-guard  was  overtaken  at  Carrick's  Ford 
on  the  same  day,  and  he  there  turned  back  and  offered  bat 
tle.  A  heavy  skirmish  followed  in  which  Garnett  was  killed, 
and  his  command  lost  a  gun  and  was  routed.  McClellan 
made  one  more  effort  to  surround  the  Confederates,  but 
had  to  be  content  with  driving  them  from  western  Vir 
ginia.  His  energy  had  been  great;  his  promptitude  con 
siderable;  his  numerical  superiority  overwhelming;  his 
results  satisfactory;  and  his  rhetoric  was  now  to  crown 
the  edifice  by  creating  a  legend.  He  recorded  his  campaign 
in  the  following  concise  and  dramatic  dispatch  sent  to 
headquarters  from  Huttonsville,  Va.,  on  the  i/jth  of  July: 

" Garnett  and  forces  routed;  his  baggage  and  one  gun 
taken;  his  army  demoralized;  Garnett  killed.  We  have 
annihilated  the  enemy  in  western  Virginia  and  have  lost 


GEORGE   B.   McCLELLAN  229 

thirteen  killed  and  not  more  than  forty  wounded.  We 
have  in  all  killed  at  least  two  hundred  of  the  enemy,  and 
their  prisoners  will  amount  to  at  least  one  thousand.  Have 
taken  seven  guns  in  all.  I  still  look  for  the  capture  of  the 
remnant  of  Garnett's  army  by  General  Hill.  The  troops 
defeated  are  the  crack  regiments  of  eastern  Virginia,  aided 
by  Georgians,  Tennesseeans,  and  Carolinians.  Our  success 
is  complete  and  secession  is  killed  in  this  country."  This 
dispatch  had  an  instantaneous  press  success.  McClellan 
was  hailed  as  the  "  young  Napoleon,"  the  coming  saviour 
of  his  country,  and  when,  exactly  one  week  later,  McDowell 
was  defeated .  at  Bull  Run,  public  opinion  immediately 
pointed  out  McClellan  as  the  man  to  redeem  the  failure. 
President  Lincoln  followed  the  lead,  and  on  the  2yth  of 
July  McClellan  was  placed  in  command  of  the  troops 
assembled  at  Washington. 

The  problem  confronting  the  young  general  was  complex. 
He  not  only  had  to  create  from  raw  material  an  army 
large  and  efficient  enough  to  beat  down  the  resistance  of 
the  South,  he  not  only  had  to  organize  a  system  of  trans 
portation  for  such  an  army,  but  he  had  to  contend  against 
the  self-sufficient  ignorance  of  his  political  superiors,  and 
to  support  the  application  of  press  and  caucus  methods 
to  the  operations  of  war.  McClellan  was  in  many  respects 
well  fitted  to  solve  this  problem.  His  talent  for  organization 
was  of  the  first  order;  he  had  a  wide  knowledge  of  military 
theory,  and  he  knew  not  only  how  an  army  should  be  ordered 
but  how  to  win  his  soldiers'  affection.  His  qualifications 
went  even  farther,  for  his  correspondence  with  General 
Scott  during  the  campaign  of  western  Virginia  shows  a 
certain  mental  suppleness  that  would  not  be  at  disadvantage 
when  dealing  with  the  authorities  at  the  Federal  capital. 
His  letters  to  the  commander-in-chief  display  an  obvious 
anxiety  to  please  by  deference  to  the  veteran's  authority, 
to  win  his  good  opinion  by  references  to  the  campaign  of 


230  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

Mexico.  And  alongside  of  this  may  be  felt  the  note  of 
ambition,  of  the  young  general  anxious  to  increase  his 
command  and  to  strike  telling  blows,  of  the  intellectual 
man  trying  to  emphasize  the  value  of  his  intelligence. 
" Assure  the  general,"  he  writes,  "that  no  prospect  of  a 
brilliant  victory  shall  induce  me  to  depart  from  my  inten 
tion  of  gaining  success  by  manoeuvring  rather  than  by 
fighting.  I  will  not  throw  these  raw  men  of  mine  into  the 
teeth  of  artillery  and  intrenchments  if  it  is  possible  to  avoid 
it.  Say  to  the  general,  too,  that  I  am  trying  to  follow  a 
lesson  long  ago  learned  from  him;  i.e.,  not  to  move  until 
I  know  that  everything  is  ready,  and  then  to  move  with 
the  utmost  rapidity  and  energy."  Grant  was  to  comment 
cruelly  on  these  words  three  years  later  at  Spottsylvania 
when  he  declared  that  he  was  in  the  field  not  to  manoeuvre 
but  to  fight. 

On  the  4th  of  August  McClellan  handed  a  memorandum 
to  President  Lincoln  on  the  conduct  of  the  war.  The 
document  is  able  and  foresees  many  of  the  essential  strategic 
factors  of  the  great  struggle, — the  control  of  the  Mississippi, 
the  mastery  of  the  sea,  the  attack  of  the  seaboard,  the  taking 
in  reverse  of  Richmond.  Its  first  paragraph  runs  as  follows : 

"The  object  of  the  present  war  differs  from  those  in  which 
nations  are  usually  engaged  mainly  in  this,  that  the  purpose 
of  ordinary  war  is  to  conquer  a  peace  and  make  a  treaty  on 
advantageous  terms.  In  this  contest  it  has  become  neces 
sary  to  crush  a  population  sufficiently  numerous,  intelligent, 
and  warlike  to  constitute  a  nation.  We  have  not  only  to 
defeat  their  armed  and  organized  forces  in  the  field  but  to 
display  such  an  overwhelming  strength  as  will  convince  all 
our  antagonists,  especially  those  of  the  governing,  aris 
tocratic  class,  of  the  utter  impossibility  of  resistance.  Our 
late  reverses  make  this  course  imperative.  Had  we  been 
successful  in  the  recent  battle  [Manassas]  it  is  possible  that 
we  might  have  been  spared  the  labor  and  expenses  of  a 


GEORGE   B.   McCLELLAN  231 

great  effort."  From  these  unexceptionable  premises  McClel- 
lan  concluded  that  for  field  operations  that  should  sweep 
Virginia  and  the  Atlantic  seaboard  an  army  of  273,000  men 
was  necessary.  The  figure  was  somewhat  large  and  in 
volved  a  transportation  problem  that  might  have  consumed 
the  whole  faculties  of  the  commander-in-chief;  yet,  making 
allowance  for  the  fact  that  he  probably  asked  for  more  than 
he  expected  to  get,  the  memorandum  as  a  whole  shows  a 
clear  appreciation  both  of  the  nature  of  the  military  prob 
lem  and  of  the  means  whereby  it  could  best  be  solved.  It 
was  not  in  this  respect  that  McClellan  was  deficient. 

Before  coming  to  the  great  military  events  that  mark 
the  next  stage  of  McClellan's  career  there  is  one  incident 
that  must  be  briefly  dealt  with.  No  sooner  had  he  reached 
Washington  from  western  Virginia  than  Mr.  Lincoln  and 
his  advisers  took  him  into  their  counsels  and  immediately 
made  him  their  adviser-in-chief.  This  was  natural  under 
the  circumstances,  but  was  nevertheless  a  mistake  on  both 
sides.  The  President  ought  to  have  consulted  General 
Scott,  commanding  the  army  of  the  United  States;  McClellan 
ought  not  to  have  given  advice  to  the  government  behind 
the  back  of  his  superior  officer.  The  politicians  who 
were  directing  the  affairs  of  the  nation  may  be  excused  for 
tampering  with  the  mechanism  of  a  delicately  adjusted 
organization  of  the  proper  working  of  which  they  had  no 
conception;  but  for  McClellan  there  was  no  excuse.  He 
knew  what  military  discipline  and  duty  were,  and  he  had 
moreover,  for  weeks  previously,  been  fervently  protesting 
his  admiration  for  the  military  genius  of  his  chief.  That 
admiration  was  not  misplaced.  Scott,  even  at  75  years  of 
age,  was  a  far  better  soldier  than  McClellan,  and  his 
was  the  only  keen  military  judgment  to  be  discerned  on  the 
Northern  side  during  the  early  weeks  of  the  war.  He  was 
old,  incapable  of  getting  into  the  saddle,  and  testy,  but  he 
was  nevertheless  a  safe  and  expert  adviser  and  the  head 


232  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

of  the  army.  McClellan  was  neither  the  one  nor  the 
other,  but,  carried  away  by  his  sudden  popularity,  he 
at  once  revealed  his  weakness  at  the  contact  of  political 
influence. 

The  capital  was  in  a  state  of  panic  from  the  disastrous 
result  of  Bull  Run.  Journalists  and  politicians  had  seen 
the  rout  and  thought  everything  lost.  The  Government 
shared  the  public  sentiment,  and  McClellan,  a  man  of 
nervous  and  impressionable  temperament,  succumbed  to  the 
atmosphere.  He  saw  the  President,  he  saw  the  Secretary  of 
War,  he  saw  everybody,  and  then  wrote  a  letter  to  General 
Scott  which,  beneath  a  cool  and  official  form,  revealed  bad 
judgment,  panic,  and  disregard  for  Scott's  official  position. 
The  old  general  flamed  up  at  this  open  evidence  of  the  fact 
that  his  subordinate  was  acting  as  the  adviser  of  the  Govern 
ment.  Perhaps  Scott  alone  saw  matters  as  clearly  then  as  we 
can  now.  He  realized  that  McDowell  and  his  routed  army 
had  really  done  well  and  had  come  within  an  ace  of  success ; 
he  realized  that  Johnston's  numbers  were  small  and  that 
there  was  not  the  remotest  probability  of  his  attempting  to  ad 
vance  on  Washington.  On  finding  that  his  subordinate,  after 
consulting  with  the  Government,  believed  that  the  enemy 
had  100,000  men  and  was  preparing  to  march  on  the  capital, 
which  was  in  danger  of  capture,  he  immediately  wrote  an 
angry  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War  tendering  his  resigna 
tion;  in  that  letter  he  stated  unequivocally  that  Washington 
was  perfectly  safe,  and  history  emphatically  indorses  the 
veteran's  judgment.  President  Lincoln  attempted  to  smooth 
matters  over,  but  Scott,  seeing  that  the  politicians  were  not 
likely  to  deal  properly  with  military  matters  and  feeling  that 
he  was  really  past  work,  persisted  and  retired.  It  must  be 
added  that  although  his  letters  reflected  anger  and  heat, 
yet  they  contain  not  one  statement  of  which  the  substance 
was  unfounded,  and  he  even  acknowledged  McClellan's  real 
talents,  stating  that  he  "has,  unquestionably,  very  high 


GEORGE  B.   McCLELLAN  233 

qualifications  for  military  command."     Those  qualifications 
were  about  to  be  severely  tested. 

McClellan  had  to  pay  a  heavy  price  for  the  support  of 
the  politicians;  it  was  the  road  to  promotion,  it  was  also 
the  road  to  political  interference.  Those  in  whose  hands 
the  conduct  of  affairs  had  been  placed  were,  some  of  them, 
men  of  high  character  and  endowed  with  a  keen  perception 
of  the  aspirations  of  the  community,  but  they  had  no 
knowledge  of  the  art  of  war  and  of  the  lessons  of  history. 
They  threw  at  the  head  of  the  commander  of  their  choice 
ridiculous  plans  erected  on  a  scaffolding  of  newspaper 
data  and  ignorant  fears.  McClellan  was  powerless  in  their 
hands.  President  Lincoln  was,  in  constitutional  theory, 
commander-in-chief  of  the  armed  forces  of  the  United 
States,  and  it  was  only  after  a  long,  bitter,  and  expensive 
apprenticeship  that  he  learned  that  he  was  not  competent 
to  exercise  any  such  function.  It  must  be  said  in  fairness 
to  McClellan  that  rarely  has  a  general  been  more  deeply 
enmeshed  in  the  toils  of  civilian  incompetence  and  rarely 
has  one  met  it  with  greater  dexterity.  But  it  may  be 
surmised  that  when  President  Lincoln,  on  the  27th  of 
January,  1862,  in  direct  opposition  to  his  military  advisers, 
issued  a  preposterous  order  whereby  all  the  armies  of  the 
Federal  Government  were  to  advance  simultaneously  on 
Washington's  Birthday,  had  General  Scott  still  been  com 
mander-in-chief  he  would  instantly  have  resigned.  General 
McClellan  chose  the  other  alternative,  and  dragged  to  the  end 
of  his  career  the  political  chains  he  had  himself  riveted. 

General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  in  command  of  the  Con 
federate  army  at  Manassas,  was  so  far  from  thinking  of 
an  attack  on  Washington  that  he  considered  his  position 
too  advanced  to  be  held  safely  against  such  superior  numbers 
as  might  be  brought  against  him.  In  the  early  part  of 
March,  1862,  he  withdrew  his  army  to  the  line  of  the  Rap- 


234  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

pahannock  and  Rapidan.  McClellan  immediately  moved 
forward,  but  was  not  able  to  get  into  contact  with  the  enemy. 
This  was  partly  owing  to  the  impassable  condition  of  the 
roads,  partly  owing  to  the  fact  that  McClellan  was  just 
ready  to  open  operations  along  a  different  line  and  had  no 
wish  to  be  drawn  down  to  the  Rappahannock. 

To  attack  Richmond  and  the  army  defending  it  was 
largely  a  question  of  transportation,  and  the  successful 
operations  of  the  navy  of  the  United  States  in  the  winter 
and  spring  of  1861-2  had  greatly  simplified  this  problem 
by  securing  control  of  the  sea.  McClellan  could  advance  by 
land  towards  Richmond  along  the  line  Manassas — Fredericks- 
burg — Hanover,  which  would  extend  his  communications  to 
a  dangerous  length;  or  he  could  take  ship  and,  disembarking 
at  a  secure  point  such  as  Fortress  Monroe,  march  thence  on 
Richmond.  Both  plans  were  feasible;  the  first  involved 
a  greater  problem  of  transportation,  but  kept  Washington 
covered;  the  second  promised  quicker  and  more  effective 
action.  McClellan,  who  realized  clearly  the  strategic  value 
of  the  command  of  the  sea,  was  for  the  second  plan,  and 
after  a  long  wrangle  with  the  Administration  he  was  finally 
allowed  to  put  it  into  effect. 

During  the  second  half  of  the  month  of  March  the  bulk  of 
McClellan's  army  was  transferred  by  sea  to  the  point  of 
the  narrow  peninsula  which,  running  northwest  between 
the  York  and  the  James  rivers,  leads  from  Fortress  Monroe 
to  Richmond,  75  miles  as  the  crow  flies.  His  intention  was 
to  march  on  the  Confederate  capital  as  rapidly  as  possible 
before  defensive  works  could  be  thrown  up,  trusting  to  his 
numbers  to  beat  down  any  opposition  that  might  be  offered. 
McClellan's  theory  was  not  altogether  sound.  The  strength 
of  Richmond  was  equivalent  to  that  of  the  Confederate  army 
in  the  field,  and  McClellan's  true  objective  was  not  so  much 
Richmond  as  Johnston.  Yet  Johnston  was  bound  to  cover 
the  capital,  and  the  question  might  in  one  sense  be  narrowed 


GEORGE  B.  McCLELLAN  235 

down  to  whether,  from  Fortress  Monroe,  McClellan  could 
operate  advantageously  against  Johnston. 

The  scheme  on  which  McClellan  had  embarked  implied  a 
prompt  and  vigorous  offensive,  but  his  movements  when  he 
reached  the  Peninsula  were  marked  by  the  most  extreme 
caution,  and  the  great  battles  that  ensued  were  each  and  all 
fought  on  the  defensive  against  an  enemy  greatly  inferior  in 
numbers.  The  essential  truth  of  the  matter  lay  in  this,  that 
McClellan,  with  military  abilities  that  might  have  made  him 
an  ideal  chief-of-staff,  lacked  the  courage  that  stamps  the 
great  general.  Like  an  engineer  or  railroad  president,  he 
wanted  every  detail  accurately  and  completely  worked  out 
and  all  statistics  verified.  He  would  only  try  for  a  certainty, 
and  could  not  perceive  perhaps  the  most  delicate  point  of 
the  art  of  war,  that  in  dealing  with  conditions  that  can 
never  be  entirely  ascertained  it  is  only  the  man  who,  with 
open  eyes,  will  risk  making  mistakes  that  can  compel  suc 
cess;  McClellan  hoped  to  remain  faultless  where  Frederick, 
Napoleon,  or  Lee  would  have  risked,  and  confessed,  an 
error.  At  the  same  time  he  was  not  without  excuse.  His 
relations  with  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  War  were 
no  longer  so  good  as  they  had  been.  Lincoln  had  already 
detected  McClellan's  lack  of  determination,  and  had  lost 
confidence;  besides  this,  his  nervous  fears  for  the  safety  of 
Washington  and  his  poor  judgment  of  military  matters  re 
mained  unabated,  so  that  whereas  McClellan  expected  to 
move  on  Richmond  from  Fortress  Monroe  with  little  less 
than  150,000  men,  he  was  gradually  deprived  of  various 
corps  and  commands,  his  plans  were  disarranged,  and  he 
lost  that  sense  of  support  which  every  Government  ought  to 
inspire  in  its  generals. 

Advancing  up  the  Peninsula  with  about  80,000  men 
McClellan  found  General  Magruder  strongly  posted  behind 
a  line  of  field-works  stretching  from  the  York  to  the  James 
at  Yorktown.  The  Confederate  force  was  small,  little  more 


236  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

than  10,000  men,  yet  it  was  so  admirably  posted  that  it 
brought  McClellan  to  a  halt.  He  implored  the  Government 
for  reinforcements.  "It.  seems  clear,"  he  wrote,  "that  I 
shall  have  the  whole  force  of  the  enemy  on  my  hands — prob 
ably  not  less  than  100,000  men,  and  probably  more."  In 
reply  Lincoln  urged  him  on.  "The  country  will  not  fail  to 
note,"  he  replied  on  the  pth  of  April,  "that  the  present  hesi 
tation  to  move  on  an  intrenched  enemy  is  but  the  story  of 
Manassas  repeated." 

Magruder  was  quickly  reinforced.  Johnston  transferred 
his  army  from  the  Rappahannock  to  Yorktown,  and  McClellan 
settled  down  to  siege  operations.  A  month  was  occupied  in 
this  way,  and  when  finally  the  Federal  siege-guns  were  in 
position  and  ready  to  open  fire,  Johnston  abandoned  his  posi 
tions  and  fell  back  towards  Richmond  (May  3),  fighting  a 
vigorous  rear-guard  action  at  Williamsburg  on  the  5th  to 
cover  his  retreat.  McClellan  followed  cautiously,  and  on 
the  2ist  reached  a  point  about  ten  miles  east  of  Richmond, 
his  left  flank  on  the  Chickahominy,  his  right  on  the  Pa- 
munkey,  his  base  immediately  in  the  rear  of  the  troops,  at 
the  White  House  on  the  latter  river.  He  now  proposed, 
by  extending  towards  his  right,  to  effect  a  junction  with 
McDowell,  who  was  at  the  head  of  40,000  men  and  100 
guns  in  central  Virginia  north  of  the  Rappahannock.  The 
two  armies  combined  would  defeat  any  force  the  Confederacy 
could  put  in  the  field  and  occupy  Richmond. 

Once  more  the  Federal  plans  were  dislocated  by  the  timid 
ity  and  interference  of  the  Government.  Just  at  the  moment 
when  McClellan  was  preparing  the  way  for  the  combined 
movement  against  Richmond,  Stonewall  Jackson  began  the 
brilliant  series  of  marches  and  battles  generally  known  as 
his  Shenandoah  campaign.  With  only  a  handful  of  men  he 
defeated  superior  forces  in  detail,  and  so  alarmed  the  Federal 
authorities  that  McDowell  was  compelled  to  detach  rein- 
forcemeats  to  the  Valley  and  eventually  to  give  up  all  idea 


GEORGE   B.   McCLELLAN  237 

of  a  movement  towards  Richmond.  That  capable  but  little 
appreciated  general  protested  that  the  sure  way  to  clear  the 
Shenandoah  valley  and  to  protect  Washington  was  to  crush 
the  Confederate  army  under  the  walls  of  Richmond,  but  all 
in  vain,  and  so  McClellan  had  once  more  to  see  his  well- 
founded  hopes  and  plans  completely  wrecked. 

Between  McClellan  and  Richmond  lay  the  Chickahominy, 
a  small  stream,  but  difficult  of  access  and  with  few  fords. 
Expecting  McDowell  to  join  him  towards  his  right  flank,  he 
felt  bound  to  retain  the  Pamunkey  as  his  base  of  sup 
plies,  and  therefore  to  keep  part  of  the  army  to  the  north 
of  the  Chickahominy  to  protect  this  line.  Consequently, 
when  on  the  2oth  of  May  McClellan  began  to  cross  to  the 
south  side  of  the  Chickahominy,  he  was  putting  himself  into 
a  false  position,  placing  a  difficult  river  between  the  two 
wings  of  his  army  in  the  immediate  front  of  the  enemy. 
Johnston,  who  had  long  and  patiently  waited  for  an  oppor 
tunity,  seized  it  now  that  it  was  presented.  On  the  3oth  of 
May  he  issued  orders  that  were  to  concentrate  virtually  his 
whole  army  on  two  corps  of  McClellan's,  those  of  Heintzel- 
mann  and  Keyes;  this  wing  of  the  Federals  had  reached  a 
point  about  six  miles  east  of  Richmond  to  the  south  of  the 
Chickahominy. 

On  the  3ist  of  May  the  Confederates  attacked,  and  had 
not  Johnston's  staff  arrangements  broken  down  and  his 
various  corps  failed  to  combine  their  movements,  there  can 
be  little  doubt  that  the  Federals  would  have  been  severely 
handled.  As  it  was,  Longstreet  was  slow  and  Huger  failed 
to  get  into  action,  while  Keyes  and  Heintzelmann  offered 
stubborn  resistance  and  could  not  be  broken.  The  close  of 
the  day  found  the  Confederates  in  possession  of  the  field  of 
battle,  but  the  Federal  line  was  intact  one  mile  behind  the 
morning's  position,  and  McClellan  was  transferring  Sum- 
ner's  corps  across  the  Chickahominy  to  reinforce  his  left 
wing. 


238  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

On  the  ist  of  June  the  battle  was  renewed,  but  with  less 
vigor.  Johnston  had  been  struck  down;  his  movement  had 
been  only  partly  successful;  the  Federals  now  outnum 
bered  the  Confederates.  The  fighting  on  the  second  day 
soon  showed  that  McClellan's  troops  could  not  be  driven 
farther,  and  the  Confederates  were  withdrawn  about  noon. 
McClellan  lost  about  6000  of  50,000  engaged;  Johnston 
4500  out  of  40,000. 

Seven  Pines  was  claimed  as  a  victory  by  both  sides;  it 
may  perhaps  be  most  fairly  described  as  a  drawn  battle, 
the  balance  of  tactical  advantage  being  on  the  Confederate 
side.  Johnston's  successor,  Lee,  who  knew  McClellan's 
character  well  from  the  time  of  the  campaign  of  Mexico, 
realized  that  after  Seven  Pines  he  need  not  fear  a  determined 
offensive  against  Richmond.  Although  McClellan  had 
about  100,000  men  present,  double  Lee's  numbers,  the  Con 
federate  general  boldly  detached  troops  to  reinforce  Jackson 
in  the  Shenandoah,  and  coolly  watched  events  develop  until 
the  moment  should  be  ripe  for  repeating  Johnston's  stroke 
with  even  greater  force.  Meanwhile  McClellan  sent  to 
Washington  constant  demands  for  reinforcements,  constant 
reports  that  the  army  in  his  front  was  two,  three,  and  even 
four  times  as  large  as  it  really  was,  and  edged  slowly 
towards  Richmond  by  trenching  and  siege-works.  In  his 
approach  to  Richmond  McClellan  showed  that  he  was  es 
sentially  an  engineer;  he  had  witnessed  the  operations  before 
Sebastopol;  and  his  natural  timidity  sought  intellectual 
comfort  in  solving  the  hard  problems  of  war  by  intricate 
calculations  of  geometry  and  ballistics.  It  was  his  weakest 
point  both  in  the  theory  and  in  the  practice  of  the  art  of  war 
that  he  dearly  loved  intrenchments ;  in  one  of  his  reports  he 
even  committed  himself  on  paper  to  the  following  amazing 
statement:  "...  The  history  of  every  former  war  has  con 
clusively  shown  the  great  advantages  which  are  possessed 
by  an  army  acting  on  the  defensive  and  occupying  strong 


GEORGE   B.   McCLELLAN  239 

positions,  defended  by  heavy  earthworks."  Napoleon 
thought  the  contrary,  and  declared  emphatically  that  troops 
remaining  behind  fortified  positions  must  in  the  long  run 
always  be  beaten.  Lee's  practice  conformed  to  the  better 
opinion;  he  knew  that  in  war  the  offensive  is  half  the  battle, 
and  he  now  seized  it  with  an  energy  that  suddenly  sent 
McClellan  reeling  back  to  his  ships. 

Johnston  had  shown  military  insight  by  making  use  of  the 
fact  that  the  Chickahominy  divided  McClellan's  army  to 
attack  him  in  detail,  but  Lee  showed  military  genius  in  that, 
repeating  Johnston's  offensive  stroke,  instead  of  attacking 
on  the  right  bank,  that  is,  on  the  Richmond  side,  he  attacked 
on  the  left  bank.  McClellan  was  now  so  heavily  intrenched 
and  so  judiciously  posted  on  the  right  bank  that  an  attack 
would  certainly  have  failed;  yet  he  was  so  cautious  that  he 
would  probably  not  reply  to  an  attack  on  the  left  bank  by 
pushing  straight  on  Richmond  by  the  right;  he  was  so  de 
pendent  on  his  line  of  communication  that  a  movement  that 
threatened  it  would  assuredly  cause  him  to  fall  back.  So 
Lee  calculated,  and  his  judgment  proved  correct. 

Swiftly,  secretly,  suddenly,  Stonewall  Jackson  stole  away 
from  the  Shenandoah.  The  Confederate  strength  was  rap 
idly  massed  on  Richmond,  and  on  the  26th  of  June  Lee 
transferred  the  bulk  of  his  forces  to  the  left  bank  of  the 
Chickahominy,  striking  McClellan's  detached  right  at  Me- 
chanicsville.  On  the  2yth  Jackson's  joot-cavalry  reached 
the  scene  of  the  conflict,  and  at  Games'  Mill  Fitz  John 
Porter  was  overpowered  and  driven  across  to  the  south  side 
of  the  Chickahominy  with  great  loss.  At  no  time  during 
these  two  days  did  McClellan  apparently  think  of  making  a 
counter-attack;  he  believed  that  Lee  had  three  times  his 
actual  numbers,  and  from  the  first  moment,  before  more 
than  a  quarter  of  his  army  had  been  engaged,  he  began  to 
plan  a  retreat.  In  this  congenial  operation  the  Federal 
commander  once  more  showed  his  remarkable  grasp  of  the 


240  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

theory  of  war.  Lee  doubtless  expected  that  McClellan 
would  now  be  compelled  to  force  a  passage  back  over  the 
Chickahominy  to  recover  his  line  of  communications  with  his 
base  on  the  Pamunkey,  and  the  Confederate  general  was 
probably  sanguine  that,  posted  behind  the  Chickahominy, 
he  could  successfully  beat  back  the  attack  of  the  whole  Fed 
eral  army.  But  McClellan  cleverly  replied  to  Lee's  brilliant 
check.  With  his  superior  numbers  and  virtually  intact  army 
his  best  move  would  clearly  have  been  to  march  on  the  feeble 
detachments  left  by  Lee  to  protect  Richmond ;  as  it  was,  he 
decided  on  the  second-best  move.  With  clear  perception  of 
the  possibilities  of  a  sea-base,  he  had  been  for  some  days 
preparing  to  shift  his  depots  by  ship  from  the  Pamunkey  to 
the  James.  He  now  ordered  the  change  made,  and  instead 
of  attempting  to  force  the  passage  of  the  Chickahominy,  took 
up  a  line  of  retreat  for  the  James  River.  His  movements  were 
skilfully  planned  and  well  executed. 

Baffled  for  a  moment,  Lee  was  soon  across  the  river  in  hot 
pursuit,  and  threw  his  army  at  his  retreating  opponent. 
On  the  29th  there  was  heavy  fighting  at  Savage's  Station 
and  Frazier's  Farm;  on  the  3oth  a  severe  action  was  fought 
at  various  points  in  the  region  of  White  Oak  Swamp,  and 
that  night  McClellan  wrote  to  President  Lincoln:  "If  none 
of  us  escape,  we  shall  at  least  have  done  honor  to  the  country. 
I  shall  do  my  best  to  save  the  army.  Send  more  gunboats." 
On  the  ist  of  July  Lee  discovered  the  whole  Federal  army 
strongly  concentrated  in  an  admirable  position  at  Malvern 
Hill,  overlooking  the  James  River.  A  desperate  but  ill- 
concerted  attack  was  delivered  by  the  Confederates  late  in 
the  afternoon,  but  was  crushingly  repulsed.  That  night 
McClellan  continued  his  retreat  a  few  miles  farther  to  Har 
rison's  Bar,  and  there,  under  cover  of  earthworks  and  with 
men-of-war  protecting  each  flank,  he  was  safe.  His  retreat 
had  been  disgraceful,  but  his  conduct  of  it  masterly. 

If  Lincoln  and  his  advisers  were  not  always  faultless  in 


GEORGE   B.   McCLELLAN  241 

their  management  of  the  early  stages  of  the  war,  yet  there  are 
occasional  incidents  in  which  their  behavior  calls  for  high 
praise  and  admiration.  Among  these  none  is  more  note 
worthy  than  the  manner  in  which  they  supported  McClellan 
in  his  hour  of  defeat.  There  was  no  recrimination.  His 
glowing  eulogies  of  his  troops  and  his  rhetorical  descriptions 
of  battles  he  described  as  victories,  his  roseate  promises  of 
a  speedy  advance  on  Richmond,  were  officially  indorsed  and 
promulgated.  On  the  surface  McClellan  retained  the  full 
confidence  of  the  Administration,  but  in  reality  there  was 
distrust,  justified  distrust. 

McClellan's  army  remained  at  Harrison's  Bar  over  a 
month.  In  August  it  was  gradually  transferred  by  ship  back 
towards  Washington.  McClellan  himself  arrived  in  the  Po 
tomac  just  at  the  moment  when  Lee,  following  his  success  in 
the  Peninsula,  had  driven  Pope  back  from  the  Rappahan- 
nock  and  brought  him  to  the  verge  of  disaster  at  the  second 
battle  of  Manassas  on  the  3oth  of  August.  Once  more 
Washington  was  panic-stricken,  and  in  the  sudden  emergency 
there  seemed  no  other  course  open  than  to  place  the  whole 
conduct  of  affairs  in  McClellan's  hands. 

With  great  skill  and  coolness  McClellan  drew  the  army  to 
gether  at  Washington;  with  wonderful  zeal  and  magnetic 
power  he  restored  the  morale  of  the  troops;  and  in  less  than 
a  week  from  Pope's  defeat  he  had  begun  a  new  campaign. 
Lee  had  crossed  the  Potomac  and  must  be  checked;  so  the 
whole  field  army,  between  80,000  and  90,000  men,  was  cau 
tiously  set  in  motion  westwards  towards  the  enemy.  On  the 
1 3th  McClellan  reached  Frederick,  where  an  intercepted 
dispatch  revealed  the  fact  that  Lee  was  only  a  few  miles  to 
the  west  h,nd  that  he  had  divided  his  army,  one-half  under 
Jackson  having  been  detached  to  capture  Harper's  Ferry. 
"I  think  Lee  has  made  a  gross  mistake,"  McClellan  wrote, 
"and  that  he  will  be  severely  punished  for  it." 

Moving  more  rapidly  than  usual,  yet  not  rapidly  enough, 


242  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

McClellan  struck  Lee's  rear  near  South  Mountain  on  the 
1 4th,  inflicting  severe  losses  on  the  enemy.  On  the  i5th  he 
followed  the  retreating  Confederates,  but  was  too  late  to 
relieve  Harper's  Ferry,  of  which  Jackson  received  the  sur 
render  that  morning.  On  the  i6th  he  discovered  the  enemy 
in  position  near  Sharpsburg,  where  Lee  was  hastily  concen 
trating  his  scattered  divisions  behind  the  Antietam.  An 
immediate  attack  would  have  found  little  more  than  half  the 
Confederate  army  in  position,  but  McClellan  delayed  until 
he  could  get  his  corps  posted  to  the  greatest  advantage  and 
once  more  let  opportunity  slip  through  his  fingers. 

On  the  iyth  of  September,  1862,  was  fought  the  battle  of 
the  Antietam.  McClellan  attacked  along  the  whole  line  and 
was  repulsed  at  every  point  by  an  enemy  hardly  more  than 
half  his  numbers.  On  the  i8th  Lee  was  still  in  position  and 
McClellan  assumed  a  defensive  attitude;  it  was  so  strong 
that  the  Confederate  general  reluctantly  gave  up  all  idea  of 
attack  and  in  the  night  ordered  a  retreat  across  the  Potomac. 
On  the  igth  McClellan  pursued  and  claimed  the  Antietam 
as  a  victory.  Strategically  it  was.  Since  June  Lee  had 
constantly  maintained  the  offensive,  had  gained  victory 
after  victory;  now  he  was  compelled  to  retreat  from 
a  battle-field,  to  abandon  his  invasion  of  Maryland,  and  to 
return  to  the  defence  of  the  Rappahannock.  McClellan 
might  have  accomplished  more,  but  he  had  done  much  to 
wrest  victory  from  such  an  opponent  as  Lee,  and  he 
should  without  question  have  been  allowed  to  conduct  the 
ensuing  operations  in  his  own  way  until  one  more  trial  had 
proved  his  value  or  his  incompetence.  This  opportunity  was 
not  given  him.  Once  more  the  press  and  the  Administration 
were  impatient,  once  more  McClellan  was  cautious  and  slow, 
and  when  he  finally  followed  Lee  into  Virginia  it  was  too  late 
to  redeem  himself.  On  the  yth  of  November,  while  manoeu 
vring  on  the  upper  Rappahannock  and  in  expectation  of  a 
battle,  he  was  ordered  to  turn  over  the  command  of  the  Army 


GEORGE   B.   McCLELLAN  243 

of  the  Potomac  to  General  Burnside.     He  was  destined  to 
see  no  more  military  service. 

Notwithstanding  his  failure  as  a  general  McClellan  re 
tained  many  friends  and  supporters.  He  was  of  a  pleasing, 
magnetic  disposition,  and  won  the  esteem  and  affection  of 
all  who  served  under  him.  Even  officers  of  ability  clung 
firmly  to  the  belief  that  he  was  a  great  soldier,  and  Lee  him 
self  often  expressed  high  opinions  of  his  military  attainments. 
He  was  in  fact  a  brilliant  man,  but  unfitted  for  the  highest 
responsibility  of  a  soldier  by  the  lack  of  just  one  quality, 
the  quality  that  is  as  necessary  in  the  general  as  it  is  in  the 
private — daring. 

In  1864,  shortly  after  Grant's  appointment  to  be  com- 
mander-in-chief,  McClellan  resigned  his  commission.  In 
August  of  the  same  year  he  accepted  the  Democratic  nomina 
tion  for  the  Presidency  in  opposition  to  Lincoln,  on  a  plat 
form  that  declared  the  war  a  failure  and  compromise  neces 
sary.  He  was  as  unsuccessful  against  Lincoln  as  he  had 
been  against  Lee.  In  1877  he  was  elected  governor  of  New 
Jersey,  and  died  eight  years  later  at  Orange  in  the  same  State. 


GEORGE  GORDON   MEADE 

RICHARD,  the  father  of  George  Gordon  Meade,  was  a 
Philadelphia  merchant,  residing  at  Cadiz  in  Spain,  where 
his  son  was  born  on  the  3ist  of  December,  1815.  Soon 
after  this  event  the  family  returned  to  America,  and,  in  1831, 
George  obtained  a  cadetship  at  the  Military  Academy  and 
entered  West  Point.  His  four  years  there  were  uneventful. 
His  scholarship  was  moderate,  his  aptitude  for  military 
discipline  far  from  marked.  He  succeeded  in  graduating, 
however,  and,  in  July,  1835,  was  appointed  second -lieutenant 
in  the  Third  Artillery.  But  Meade  had  no  real  taste  for  a 
military  life,  or  rather  for  what  military  life  stood  translated 
into  terms  of  academy  and  garrison  duties.  His  mind, 
though  repelled  by  routine  formulas,  was  keen  to  get  into 
touch  with  realities,  and  no  sooner  did  he  obtain  a  three 
months'  furlough  on  leaving  the  academy  than  he  plunged 
into  civilian  activities,  working  with  a  railroad  surveying 
party.  After  such  a  start  it  is  not  surprising  to  find  that 
one  year  after  receiving  his  commission  Meade  resigned  it 
to  enter  civil  life. 

A  natural  taste  for  engineering,  his  West  Point  education, 
and  a  family  connection  got  him  work  on  the  Alabama, 
Florida,  and  Georgia  Railroad,  then  being  constructed. 
Later  came  surveying  work,  some  of  it  for  the  United  States 
Government  on  the  Texas  border  and  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Mississippi.  In  1842  he  reentered  the  army  as  a  topo 
graphical  engineer  in  order  to  take  charge  of  lighthouse 

construction  in  the  Delaware  district. 

244 


GEORGE  GORDON  MEADE          245 

Three  years  later  Meade  saw  military  life  once  more. 
He  was  ordered  to  join  Taylor's  army  in  Texas,  and  served 
in  the  Mexican  campaign,  first  with  Taylor  from  Palo  Alto 
to  Monterey,  and  later  with  Scott  at  Vera  Cruz.  He  appears 
to  have  accomplished  the  staff  duties  of  an  engineer  officer 
to  the  satisfaction  of  his  superiors,  and  at  Monterey  he 
earned  mention  for  gallantry.  After  the  capture  of  Vera 
Cruz  he  returned  to  Philadelphia  to  resume  his  former 
duties. 

In  the  twelve  years  that  elapsed  between  the  Mexican  and 
the  Civil  War,  Meade  was  engaged  mostly  on  one  great 
work,  the  geodetic  survey  of  the  Great  Lakes.  But  when, 
in  the  spring  of  1861,  the  armed  conflict  between  North  and 
South  broke  out,  he  was  called  from  his  isolated  pursuits 
to  bear  a  conspicuous  part  before  the  world.  Meade, 
through  his  wife,  had  influential  political  friends,  and  this, 
together  with  the  dearth  of  trained  officers  and  his  own 
merit,  led  to  his  appointment  to  command  a  brigade  in  the 
corps  known  as  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves ;  the  other  briga 
diers  were  Ord  and  Reynolds,  so  that  it  will  be  no  exag 
geration  to  say  that  there  was  no  better  commanded  division 
at  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 

The  Pennsylvania  Reserves  were  called  up  to  Washington 
after  Bull  Run,  became  part  of  McClellan's  army,  and  were 
first  seriously  engaged  in  that  general's  unsuccessful  cam 
paign  of  the  Peninsula.  On  the  2yth  of  June  the  Pennsyl 
vania  division  was  with  Porter  at  Games'  Mill  and  saw 
severe  work.  Meade's  brigade  was  used  as  a  support  for 
the  first  line  and  went  into  action  piecemeal.  One  of  its 
regiments  was  captured  whole  by  the  enemy,  another  was 
routed  and  escaped  across  the  Chickahominy,  others  were 
broken,  reformed  by  Meade  and  brought  back  more  than 
once;  by  the  greatest  efforts  of  the  generals,  Meade  con 
spicuous  among  them,  some  sort  of  line  was  maintained 
until  darkness  gave  Porter  a  chance  of  saving  his  army  by 


246  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

crossing  the  Chickahominy.  Meade's  brigade  had  lost 
about  1000  men  and  had  learned  a  pretty  severe  lesson  in 
the  art  of  war.  But  worse  was  to  follow. 

After  the  defeat  of  Porter  at  Games'  Mill,  McClellan 
ordered  a  general  retreat  to  the  James  River.  This  was 
a  difficult  move  to  accomplish  with  a  long  train  over  poor 
roads  in  a  swampy  and  wooded  country,  and  in  the  face 
of  a  victorious  and  active  enemy.  That  McClellan  succeeded 
in  it  was  partly  due  to  good  fortune.  For  two  or  three 
days  the  operations  on  both  sides  were  of  a  very  blind 
character.  Lee  expected  that  McClellan  would  retreat  to 
the  York  River,  and  lost  time  preparing  to  cut  him  off  on 
the  north  bank  of  the  Chickahominy;  both  the  Northern 
and  Southern  corps  commanders  groped  in  the  dark,  un 
certain  as  to  the  location  and  strength  both  of  the  enemy 
and  of  their  own  supports.  Engagements  occurred  at 
several  points,  .and  on  more  than  one  occasion  McClellan' s 
line  of  retreat  was  seriously  jeopardized.  In  one  of  these 
engagements  Meade  bore  a  conspicuous  part. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  3oth  of  June  near  Charles  City 
Cross  Roads  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves  became  engaged 
with  the  whole  of  Longstreet's  corps.  A  fierce  conflict 
followed,  gradually  inclining  in  favor  of  the  Confederates, 
but  that  so  slowly  that  when  night  closed  in  the  Federal 
division,  though  it  had  lost  all  its  general  officers  and  1600 
men,  was  still  unbroken.  Meade  in  holding  his  men  to 
their  task  had  exposed  himself  constantly  and  had  been 
twice  wounded.  He  was  carried  from  the  field  before  the 
close  of  the  fighting. 

Meade's  wounds  kept  him  from  the  army  for  about  two 
months,  and  he  rejoined  his  brigade  only  just  in  time  to  par 
ticipate  in  Pope's  ill-fated  campaign  of  the  Rappahannock. 
The  division  was  now  under  Reynolds,  with  McDowell 
as  corps  commander.  On  the  2yth  of  August  Pope  began 
the  movement  of  retreat  that  culminated  in  the  second 


GEORGE  GORDON  MEADE          247 

battle  of  Manassas  three  days  later.  Reynolds'  division 
was  on  the  left,  and,  on  the  28th,  received  orders  to 
march  from  near  Gainesville  towards  Manassas  Junction, 
where  Pope  expected  to  cut  off  Stonewall  Jackson.  But 
Jackson  was  in  reality  far  from  where  Pope  thought ;  he  had 
circled  around  Pope's  front  and  was  now  in  position  near 
Groveton,  facing  east.  Meade,  leading  the  march  of  Rey 
nolds'  division  eastward  from  Gainesville,  was  suddenly 
fired  on  by  two  field-pieces  from  his  left  front.  He 
deployed,  and  Reynolds,  taking  command,  soon  silenced 
the  Confederate  gunners,  who  retired  northwards.  Rey 
nolds  and  McDowell  both  supposed  this  to  be  a  detached 
party,  and  leaving  Jackson  undisturbed  pressed  on  towards 
Manassas.  Meade,  however,  concluded  at  once  that  the 
march  to  Manassas  was,  as  in  fact  it  proved,  a  mistake 
and  that  Jackson  was  to  be  looked  for  in  the  other  direc 
tion. 

On  the  following  day,  the  29th,  Pope,  having  now  dis 
covered  where  Jackson  was,  made  a  strong  effort  to  crush 
him  before  the  Confederates  could  concentrate,  but  failed 
to  dislodge  him  from  his  positions.  On  the  3oth  the  fighting 
was  resumed,  but  with  Longstreet's  corps  in  the  battle  and 
Lee  on  the  field.  Late  in  the  afternoon  a  general  advance 
of  the  whole  Confederate  line  proved  irresistible  and  nearly 
ended  in  complete  disaster  for  Pope.  During  these  two 
days  it  is  well  attested  that  Reynolds'  division  was  one  of 
the  best  handled  in  the  army.  It  was  swept  away  by 
Longstreet's  advance  on  the  3oth,  but,  reforming  on  the 
Henry  Hill,  successfully  held  that  position  from  which  the 
Confederate  guns  would  have  commanded  the  bridge  over 
Bull  Run  by  which  Pope's  army  must  effect  its  retreat. 

After  the  Second  Manassas  Reynolds  left  the  army 
to  organize  the  defence  of  Pennsylvania,  and  Meade,  as 
senior  brigadier,  succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  division. 
It  was  placed  in  Hooker's  corps  and  with  it  took  a  prominent 


248  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

part  in  the  fighting  at  South  Mountain  on  the  i4th  of 
September  and  at  the  Antietam  on  the  iyth.  In  the  former 
engagement  it  was  steadily  successful,  in  the  latter  it  was 
thrown  back  with  very  heavy  loss  by  Jackson's  corps. 
Hooker  was  wounded  before  noon  at  the  Antietam,  and 
Meade,  by  right  of  seniority,  took  command  of  the  corps. 
This  he  held  until  the  return  of  Reynolds  shortly  after  the 
battle. 

After  the  Antietam  came  the  two  miserable  experiments 
of  Burnside  and  Hooker  as  commanders-in-chief.  At 
Fredericksburg,  on  the  i3th  of  December,  Meade's  division 
was  selected  to  deliver  the  main  attack  on  the  Confederate 
right.  Burnside  ordered  that  it  should  have  supports; 
Franklin,  in  command  of  the  left  wing,  passed  the  order  on 
to  Reynolds;  Reynolds  informed  Meade  that  the  other  two 
divisions  of  the  corps  would  support  him  to  the  right  and 
left;  but  the  essential  support,  that  which  should  have  been 
behind  Meade,  was  left  unattended  to.  The  mistake,  a 
common  one  in  military  history,  led  to  a  very  gallant  and 
partly  successful  attack  being  converted  into  a  costly  repulse. 
Of  4500  men  Meade  had  present  for  duty  on  the  morning 
of  the  battle,  he  could  count  only  1853  at  night. 

On  the  23d  of  December,  1862,  Meade  was  assigned  to 
the  command  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  and  it  was  as  a  corps  com 
mander  that  he  fought  his  next  battle,  this  time  under  the 
orders  of  Hooker,  who  had  superseded  Burnside.  At 
Chancellorsville  on  the  2d  and  3d  of  May,  although  his 
corps  saw  little  of  the  fighting,  Meade  rose  even  higher  than 
he  stood  before  in  the  esteem  of  the  army,  and  especially  of 
his  fellow  corps-commanders.  After  Jackson  had  routed 
Howard's  corps  he  not  only  showed  prompt  resource  that 
helped  stave  off  a  worse  disaster,  but  kept  resolutely  in 
favor  of  a  strong  offensive,  the  only  safe  policy.  He  and 
Reynolds  proved  the  crutches  on  which  Hooker,  overborne 
by  responsibility,  had  to  lean,  and  after  Chancellors- 


GEORGE  GORDON  MEADE          249 

ville  these  two  generals  were  clearly  pointed  to  as  the 
corps  commanders  who  might  best  be  chosen  to  replace 
Hooker. 

The  change  in  command  was  not  long  deferred.  Hooker 
would  evidently  not  do,  and  was  driven  to  send  in  his 
resignation.  Reynolds,  very  properly,  refused  to  accept 
the  command  unless  he  could  be  left  free  to  direct  his  army 
untrammelled  by  Washington  control,  and  Meade,  as  the 
fittest  of  the  corps  commanders,  was  assigned  to  the  com 
mand  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  This  was  on  the  night 
of  the  2yth  to  the  28th  of  June,  1863. 

The  military  situation  at  this  moment  was  highly  crit 
ical.  Lee  had  just  crossed  the  Potomac  and  was  vaguely 
known  to  be  near  the  Pennsylvania  border,  but  whether 
intending  to  strike  north  towards  Philadelphia  or  east 
towards  Baltimore  and  Washington  was  quite  uncertain. 
Meade  knew  nothing  of  the  position  of  the  enemy  and  little 
of  that  of  his  own  troops  save  that  the  army  was  following 
Lee's  movement  at  a  distance  and  that  its  corps  were  in 
the  vicinity  of  Frederick.  The  order  to  assume  command 
was  far  from  gratifying  at  such  a  moment,  and  it  was  only 
because  it  was  a  positive  order  that,  obedient  to  duty,  he 
assumed  the  heavy  burden. 

Lee's  great  victories  had  firmly  established  the  moral 
ascendency  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  Meade's 
numbers  indicated  a  strong  offensive  and  an  attempt  to 
cut  Lee's  line  of  communications,  but  the  long-continued 
ill  success  of  the  North  apparently  justified  a  prudent 
course.  He  ordered  his  march  northwards  to  interpose 
between  Lee  and  Baltimore,  and,  if  necessary,  to  meet  him 
in  battle.  On  the  3oth  of  June  the  army,  still  somewhat 
dispersed,  was  nearing  Gettysburg,  and  Meade,  aware 
that  Lee  was  probably  bringing  his  scattered  divisions 
together  somewhere  to  the  north  and  west  of  that  town, 
decided  to  concentrate  there  himself;  he  would  have  acted 


250  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

more  prudently  had  he  concentrated  first  and  marched  on 
Gettysburg  afterwards. 

As  it  was,  the  two  armies  came  together  at  that  point  on 
the  ist  of  July.  Reynolds,  whom  Meade  had  desired  as 
commander-in-chief  and  whom  he  had  placed  in  charge 
of  the  advance,  engaged  his  own  and  Howard's  corps  beyond 
Gettysburg  in  the  morning.  For  this  there  was  no  sufficient 
reason;  only  one  corps,  the  Third,  was  within  supporting 
distance,  and  the  whole  tenor  of  Meade's  instructions  should 
have  prompted  Reynolds  to  occupy  the  strong  defensive 
position  back  of  the  town  where  the  battle  was  actually 
fought  on  the  two  following  days.  Reynolds  paid  the 
penalty  for  his  ill-considered  advance;  he  was  killed  early 
in  the  fighting,  and  only  the  arrival  of  the  Third  Corps  in 
the  afternoon  prevented  a  complete  rout.  This  partial 
defeat  had,  however,  a  compensating  advantage,  for  by  it 
these  three  corps  were  driven  back  to  a  strong  line  of  hills 
on  which  Meade  was  able  to  get  the  greater  part  of  his 
army  well  disposed  early  the  next  day. 

Meade's  whole  object  now  was  to  hold  his  position.  He 
overestimated  Lee's  numbers.  He  knew  that  his  own 
army  was  not  equal  to  the  enemy  in  morale,  in  mobility, 
and  in  fitness  for  action.  He  was  certain  Lee  would  attack, 
and  he  believed  he  could  maintain  his  position.  So  he  took 
up,  not  without  considerable  justification,  a  passive  attitude, 
a  thing  generally  condemned  by  military  science. 

It  was  not  till  late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  2d  that  the 
Confederates  attempted  to  improve  their  success  of  the 
previous  evening.  Then  came  a  furious  onslaught  in  which 
Longstreet  for  some  moments  threatened  to  pierce  Meade's 
left  and  in  which  the  Third  Corps  suffered  very  heavily 
and  lost  much  ground.  When  night  came  Meade  still 
held  his  main  positions,  but  a  great  part  of  his  army  was 
badly  shaken,  his  corps  had  got  somewhat  confused,  and 
his  losses  had  been  great.  Under  these  circumstances  he 


GEORGE  GORDON  MEADE          251 

called  his  corps  commanders  in  consultation;  should  the 
army  remain  where  it  was,  they  were  asked,  or  should  it  fall 
back  to  a  stronger  position  in  the  rear?  The  answer  was 
practically  unanimous  for  fighting  it  out,  and  as  this  had 
been  Meade's  own  opinion  before  the  council  met,  the  action 
was  renewed  on  the  following  day. 

The  3d  of  July,  the  last  day  of  Gettysburg,  was  marked 
by  the  memorable  attack  of  Pickett's  division  on  the  Union 
centre.  It  had  been  prepared  by  the  somewhat  ineffective 
bombardment  of  that  point  by  the  massed  artillery  of  Hill 
and  Longstreet,  115  guns.  Meade  sent  orders  that  the 
Federal  batteries  were  to  cease  firing  and  reserve  their 
ammunition,  a  very  able  tactical  disposition  of  which  the 
effect  was  to  induce  the  Confederate  gunners  into  the  belief 
that  they  had  silenced  Meade's  batteries.  But  when  Pick 
ett's  division  advanced  up  the  slope  of  Cemetery  Hill 
Meade's  guns,  well  commanded  by  General  Hunt,  burst  out 
again,  and,  at  short  range,  against  serried  masses  of  infantry, 
did  murderous  execution.  Pickett's  repulse  marked  the  final 
defeat  of  Lee's  efforts. 

On  the  4th  of  July  the  two  armies  still  held  the  lines  on 
which  they  had  fought  so  stubbornly  for  two  days,  but  Lee 
had  already  made  up  his  mind  to  retreat,  and  Meade  felt 
assured  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  accomplished 
victory.  That  night  Lee  broke  camp  and  moved  south, 
never  again  seriously  to  threaten  the  North  with  invasion. 

Gettysburg  came  as  an  immense  relief  to  a  very  tense 
situation.  Philadelphia,  Baltimore,  New  Jersey,  Washing 
ton,  had  been  in  a  state  of  panic  while  Lee's  army  threatened 
them.  After  the  Peninsula,  the  Second  Manassas,  Freder- 
icksburg,  and  Chancellorsville,  the  Southern  general  was 
viewed  with  terror,  and  even  brave  and  capable  men  lost 
something  of  their  resourcefulness  in  his  presence.  But 
Gettysburg  had  broken  the  spell.  It  was  not  a  brilliant 
victory;  it  had  left  the  defeated  army  still  with  superior  if 


252  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

diminished  morale;  it  had  been  marked  on  Meade's  part 
by  little  real  generalship.  Yet  he  had  shown  fair  capacity, 
good  sense,  and  true  courage  in  a  situation  in  which  his 
predecessors  in  command  would  probably  have  faltered. 
He  had  deserved  well  of  the  country;  Congress  was  not 
slow  in  offering  him  a  vote  of  thanks,  and  he  was  promoted 
to  the  rank  of  brigadier-general  in  the  regular  army. 

Lee  had  foreseen  the  possibility  that  his  invasion  of  the 
North  might  result  in  a  forced  retreat,  and  had  secured  his 
passage  of  the  Potomac.  After  Gettysburg  he  retreated  to  a 
strongly  fortified  position  about  Haggerstown,  to  which  he 
was  followed  by  Meade.  But  the  works  were  too  strong  to 
be  attacked,  and  Lee  was  able  to  get  his  army  safely  over 
into  Virginia.  It  was  at  this  moment,  now  that  he  had  suc 
cessfully  carried  the  country  through  the  crisis,  that  Meade, 
like  his  predecessors,  began  to  suffer  from  the  interference 
of  Washington.  The  Austrian  Aulic  Council,  a  committee  of 
experts,  has  inscribed  its  name  in  the  pages  of  history  as  the 
traditional  label  for  incompetent  interference;  but  how  infi 
nitely  more  incompetent  and  interfering  than  the  Aulic  Coun 
cil  was  the  group  of  politicians  that  paralyzed  the  military 
action  of  the  North  during  the  first  three  years  of  the  war! 
Even  Meade,  who  from  the  beginning  had  tacitly  accepted 
guidance  from  headquarters  as  a  condition  of  his  command, 
was  driven  to  offer  his  resignation  within  a  fortnight  of  his 
great  victory.  And  after  Lee's  retreat  into  Virginia  it  is 
hardly  too  much  to  say  that  Meade  had  constantly  to  struggle 
against  two  enemies — his  foes  in  the  field,  his  friends  at 
Washington. 

Meade  was  across  the  Potomac  nearly  as  soon  as  Lee,  and 
he  now  assumed  a  more  vigorous  offensive.  Pressing  his 
march  he  made  an  attempt,  while  Lee  was  still  in  the  valley 
of  the  Shenandoah,  to  get  between  him  and  Richmond. 
Only  a  partial  engagement  resulted,  however,  and  Meade  just 
failed  to  accomplish  his  object.  Lee  retreated  to  the  Rapi- 


GEORGE  GORDON  MEADE          253 

dan,  a  line  that  he  showed  every  intention  of  holding.  On 
Meade's  army  being  depleted  to  send  troops  to  New  York, 
where  riots  were  taking  place,  the  Southern  government  de 
tached  Longstreet  from  Lee  to  reinforce  Bragg.  Meade  was 
just  on  the  point  of  seizing  the  opportunity  which  this  weak 
ening  of  his  opponent  seemed  to  afford,  when  two  of  his 
corps  were  detached,  also  to  be  sent  west.  But  whereas  Long- 
street  was  sent  to  Bragg  just  in  time  to  enable  that  general 
to  win  his  great  victory  at  Chickamauga,  the  two  corps  de 
tached  from  Meade  were  sent  to  Rosecrans  after  that  battle 
was  fought,  and  the  only  result  was  that  Lee  was  given  a 
chance  of  striking  a  blow  at  Meade. 

Lee  moved  the  instant  he  knew  Meade's  numbers  had 
been  reduced.  On  the  nth  of  October  he  succeeded  in 
crossing  the  Rappahannock  high  up,  and  got  well  on 
Meade's  flank,  threatening  his  rear,  before  his  intentions 
were  guessed.  Meade  made  up  his  mind  to  fall  back  as  far 
as  Bull  Run  before  offering  battle,  so  as  to  cover  his  com 
munications  with  Washington,  and  a  race  between  the  two 
armies,  following  parallel  lines,  ensued.  There  were  four 
days  of  forced  marching,  with  many  skirmishes,  but  Lee 
could  not  quite  secure  his  object,  his  troops  were  for  once 
outmarched,  and  with  Meade  strongly  placed  in  the  Centre- 
ville  position  behind  Bull  Run,  Lee  gave  up  and  turned  back 
to  his  old  quarters. 

The  offensive  now  passed  back  to  Meade.  Lee,  after  tear 
ing  up  railroads  and  doing  similar  damage,  fell  back  behind 
the  Rappahannock,  and  Meade  prepared  to  outflank  him  in 
the  direction  of  Fredericksburg,  but  was  prevented  from 
carrying  out  his  intentions  by  orders  from  Washington. 
That  he  ought,  in  the  interests  of  the  army  and  of  the  country, 
to  have  resigned  on  this  as  on  several  previous  occasions  is 
clear,  but  his  reading  of  duty  was  to  accept  political  control 
of  the  operations  of  the  army  and  to  accomplish  whatever 
was  possible  under  that  limitation.  The  Federal  army  was 


254  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

therefore  marched  up  to  the  Confederate  positions  under 
conditions  that  promptly  convinced  Meade  that  to  press 
home  an  attack  would  be  folly.  There  were  several  partial 
engagements  and  then  the  army  was  skilfully  and  rapidly 
withdrawn,  the  campaign  of  1863  ending  inconclusively. 
In  his  operations  since  Gettysburg,  Meade,  although  he 
had  won  no  positive  success,  showed  steady  improvement, 
handling  his  troops  well,  marching  rapidly,  and  displaying 
initiative. 

Before  the  campaign  of  1864  opened  Grant  was  made 
commander-in-chief.  He  was  in  character  and  education 
too  unlike  Meade  to  make  friendship  or  sympathy  between 
them  possible.  Yet  it  is  infinitely  to  the  credit  of  both  men 
that,  placed  as  they  were,  they  should  have  co-operated  so 
closely  until  the  end  of  the  war.  Meade  offered  to  resign  his 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Grant  not  only 
refused  this  offer,  but  declared,  as  was  indeed  just,  that 
no  man  could  command  it  better  than  Meade.  But  in 
actual  practice  the  command  was  transferred  to  Grant. 
He  was  with  the  army  in  all  its  movements  from  the  Wilder 
ness  to  Appomattox.  He  planned  every  advance  and 
shouldered  every  responsibility.  Meade  became  merely  the 
medium  through  which  the  orders  for  the  various  corps 
were  put  into  shape  and  through  which  a  general  super 
vision  was  maintained.  The  arrangement  was  clumsy  and 
occasionally  of  great  disadvantage;  Meade  concurred  in  it 
as  a  matter  of  duty,  and  Grant  because  he  would  not  do 
an  injustice  to  so  good  a  soldier  as  Meade. 

From  the  Wilderness  to  Appomattox  Court-house  the 
war  records  testify  to  the  constant  skill  displayed  by  Meade 
in  carrying  out  Grant's  orders,  to  the  constant  suggestions 
he  was  able  to  throw  out,  and  to  the  nearly  as  constant 
adoption  of  these  suggestions  by  the  commander-in-chief. 
There  was  much  ill  feeling  in  that  army,  much  tension  of 
nerves,  and  in  particular  a  marked  animosity  between 


GEORGE  GORDON  MEADE         255 

Sheridan  on  the  one  hand  and  the  generals  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  on  the  other,  but  Grant  and  Meade  in  their 
relations  with  one  another  rose  above  such  things. 

During  the  last  march,  from  Petersburg  to  Appomattox, 
Meade  was  suffering  severely  from  the  effect  of  the  wound 
he  had  received  three  years  before  in  the  Peninsula.  He 
could  hardly  endure  the  saddle  and  had  to  be  conveyed  in 
an  ambulance.  The  close  of  the  war  found  him  like  too 
many  brave  soldiers,  crippled  in  health  and  with  but  few 
years  of  life  left.  He  had,  at  Grant's  recommendation, 
been  promoted  to  the  rank  of  major-general,  and,  after  the 
disbandment  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  he  was  appointed 
to  the  military  department  of  the  Atlantic  with  headquarters 
at  Philadelphia.  He  was  for  a  time  transferred  to  the 
South,  taking  charge  of  the  Carolinas,  Georgia,  Alabama, 
and  Florida  while  those  States  were  in  the  throes  of  recon 
struction.  In  this  command  he  distinguished  himself, 
as  might  have  been  expected,  for  prudence,  integrity,  and 
moderation.  He  returned  to  Philadelphia  to  his  first  com 
mand,  and  there  died  on  the  6th  of  November,  1872. 
His  memory  is  still  cherished  by  that  city,  with  which  he  was 
so  long  and  so  honorably  connected.  He  is  worthy  of  the 
distinction,  for  if  he  never  accomplished  that  which  would 
place  him  in  the  rank  of  our  greatest  soldiers,  it  may  truly 
be  said  that  his  opportunities  were  few  and  that  he  was  the 
best  of  the  generals  who  commanded  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac. 


ROBERT   EDWARD  LEE 

ROBERT  LEE:  what  name  in  our  history  evokes  a  more 
instant  throb  of  pained  affection,  of  admiration  tempered 
with  pity,  of  regret,  of  love,  of  sorrow?  Noble  leader  of  a 
hopeless  cause,  he  bled  where  others  only  plotted,  he  shed 
the  lustre  of  his  superb  leadership  and  unwavering  greatness 
over  a  movement  that  but  for  him  might  be  associated  with 
such  things  only  as  are  sordid  and  treasonable.  Long  did 
he  save  the  South  from  defeat,  and  for  ever  from  reproach, 
for  he  stands  out  in  bold  relief  as  the  unanswerable  wit 
ness  that  in  those  terrible  years  his  people  were  not  so 
much  wrongdoing  as  misguided.  And  the  South  is  its  own 
witness,  for  even  in  failure  and  adversity  it  set  up  its  defeated 
general  as  its  hero;  a  race  that  chooses  such  heroes  has 
nothing  to  fear  from  the  future. 

Robert  Edward  Lee  was  born  on  the  igth  of  January,  1807, 
of  an  ancient  family  of  Virginia.  His  earliest  American 
progenitor  was  Richard,  grandson  of  Sir  Henry  Lee  who 
served  Queen  Elizabeth.  Richard  crossed  the  Atlantic  in 
the  year  1641,  accompanying  Sir  William  Berkeley,  Governor 
of  Virginia,  in  the  capacity  of  secretary.  He  settled  in  the 
colony,  and  in  due  course  his  descendants  multiplied.  Early 
in  the  eighteenth  century  one  of  them,  Thomas  Lee,  became 
governor,  and  built  the  family  mansion  named  Stratford 
in  the  county  of  Westmoreland,  the  county  of  the  Fairfaxes 
and  Washingtons.  Another  descendant,  Richard  Henry, 
towards  the  end  of  that  same  century,  presented  a  remarkable 

256 


ROBERT   EDWARD    LEE  257 

resolution  to  the  delegates  of  the  several  colonies  then  meet 
ing  in  joint  session;  he  moved,  on  the  loth  of  June,  1776, 
"that  these  united  colonies  are,  and  of  right  ought  to  be,  free 
and  independent  States."  His  brother  Henry  took  the  same 
view  of  the  existing  political  conditions,  and  proceeded  to  raise 
a  body  of  cavalry  with  which  he  joined  his  neighbor  George 
Washington.  In  the  War  of  the  Revolution  he  won  the 
rank  of  colonel  and,  better  still,  the  nickname  of  "Light-horse 
Harry."  He  outlived  his  general,  and  was  called  on  to 
pronounce  his  funeral  eulogy,  in  which  he  delivered  himself 
of  the  memorable,  true,  but  deplorably  rhythmic  sentiment, 
that  George  Washington  was  "first  in  war,  first  in  peace, 
first  in  the  hearts  of  his  countrymen."  Light-horse  Harry 
was  father  of  the  boy  who  was  destined  to  be  the  most 
illustrious  of  the  Lees. 

From  his  earliest  youth  Robert  Lee  showed  many  of  the 
traits  that  were  to  distinguish  him  through  life.  Brought 
up  for  some  years  as  the  only  companion  of  his  invalid 
mother,  his  sense  of  duty  and  of  affection  became  very 
marked.  His  neatness,  that  was  always  so  distinctive, 
was  probably  then  developed;  it  never  forsook  him,  and 
even  at  the  distressing  interview  of  Appomattox  Court 
house  where  he  surrendered  the  torn  remnant  of  his  gal 
lant  army,  he  appeared  irreproachably  attired  in  a  new 
uniform.  In  another  man  this  might  have  been  thought 
the  act  of  a  coxcomb,  in  Lee  it  was  merely  that  of  a 
gentleman  with  a  pronounced  taste  for  being  well  and 
cleanly  dressed.  His  sense  of  duty,  of  honorable  conduct, 
took  him  through  West  Point  without  a  single  demerit ;  his 
sense  of  cleanliness  made  him  avoid  tobacco;  stimulants 
he  held  in  horror,  and  rarely  touched  even  in  his  later  years. 
His  nature  was  affectionate  and  compelled  a  general  re 
sponse.  A  friend  wrote  of  him:  "Everybody  and  every 
thing — his  family,  his  friends,  his  horse,  and  his  dog — loves 
Colonel  Lee."  His  fondness  for  animals  indeed  was  very 


258  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

marked.  He  once  wrote  of  a  favorite  charger,  Grace  Dar 
ling,  that  he  had  started  on  a  "route  I  was  induced  to  take 
for  the  better  accommodation  of  my  horse,  as  I  wished  to 
spare  her  as  much  annoyance  and  fatigue  as  possible,  she 
already  having  undergone  so  much  suffering  in  my  service." 
His  terrier  Spec  would  not  let  him  go  anywhere  unaccom 
panied,  followed  him  to  his  office  at  Washington,  and  even 
became  a  regular  church  attendant. 

In  1829  Lee  graduated  from  West  Point,  second  of  his 
class,  and  was  appointed  to  the  Engineers.  He  was  then 
as  striking  in  person  as  in  character.  Tall,  erect,  and 
graceful,  his  well-poised  head  was  largely  developed,  his 
strong  nose,  handsome  eyes,  well-cut  mouth,  and  prominent 
chin  were  expressive  of  the  utmost  resolution.  He  might  well 
have  been  chosen  as  the  young  Bayard  of  the  army  of  the 
United  States,  a  knight  truly  without  fear  and  without 
reproach. 

A  young  man  of  such  handsome  appearance,  fine  manners, 
ancient  family,  and  wearing  a  uniform  withal,  was  bound  to 
make  conquests.  While  yet  at  West  Point  he  became  en 
gaged  to  a  charming  Virginian  neighbor,  Mary  Custis, 
granddaughter  of  Martha  Washington  and  her  first  husband, 
heiress  of  the  great  estate  of  Arlington.  In  1831  the  mar 
riage  took  place;  it  resulted  most  happily,  and  Mrs.  Lee  bore 
her  husband  many  children,  of  whom  more  than  one  was  to 
prove  himself  worthy  of  an  honorable  place  in  history. 

For  the  fifteen  years  that  followed  his  marriage  there  is 
little  that  need  be  dwelt  on  in  the  life  of  Robert  Lee.  He 
was  constantly  employed  on  engineering  work  by  the  War 
Department,  and  that  chiefly  in  the  Mississippi  valley.  In 
1838  he  became  captain.  In  1846  war  broke  out  with 
Mexico,  and  his  opportunity  had  come. 

Lee  took  part  in  the  earlier  operations  of  the  war,  on  the 
Texas  border,  serving  on  the  staff  of  General  Wool,  but  had 
little  chance  of  gaining  distinction.  In  February,  1847,  now" 


ROBERT  EDWARD   LEE  259 

ever,  on  the  appointment  of  Winfield  Scott  to  take  command 
of  an  expedition  against  the  city  of  Mexico,  Lee  was  selected 
by  that  general  for  duty  on  his  staff  as  engineer  officer. 
From  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  his  services  proved  of 
the  utmost  value.  After  Cerro  Gordo,  Scott  wrote:  "I 
am  compelled  to  make  special  mention  of  Captain  R.  E. 
Lee,  Engineer.  This  officer  was  again  indefatigable  during 
these  operations  in  reconnaissances  as  daring  as  laborious, 
and  of  the  utmost  value.  Nor  was  he  less  conspicuous  in 
planting  batteries  and  in  conducting  columns  to  their  stations 
under  the  heavy  fire  of  the  enemy." 

Before  the  battle  of  Contreras  Lee  performed  a  very  bril 
liant  reconnaissance,  showed  great  military  judgment  in 
making  his  knowledge  available  to  Scott's  brigadiers,  and, 
by  a  tremendous  physical  effort,  carried  intelligence  to  the 
commanding  general  that  insured  proper  dispositions  being 
made  for  the  battle.  Scott's  acknowledgment  was  hand 
some;  he  wrote:  "Captain  Lee,  .  .  .  having  passed  over  the 
difficult  ground  by  daylight,  found  it  just  possible  to  return 
to  San  Augustin  in  the  dark — the  greatest  feat  of  physical  and 
moral  courage  performed  by  any  individual,  in  my  knowl 
edge,  pending  the  campaign." 

At  Chapultepec  Lee  was  wounded  and  once  more  was 
prominently  mentioned.  His  reward  was  as  conspicuous  as 
his  service;  he  received  three  brevets  for  the  campaign- 
major,  lieutenant-colonel,  and  colonel.  His  service  on  the 
staff  had  brought  him  into  contact  with  all  the  general  and 
with  many  of  the  younger  officers  of  the  army.  They  learned 
to  respect  him,  he  learned  to  judge  them;  that  lesson  was  of 
the  utmost  value  when,  a  few  years  later,  Lee  was  in  the 
field  commanding  some,  opposing  others.  For  in  Scott's 
army  that  took  Mexico,  McClellan  and  Beauregard  were 
lieutenants  of  engineers;  Magruder  and  Stonewall  Jackson 
served  in  the  same  battery;  Grant,  Joseph  Johnston,  Pickett, 
Twiggs,  Shields,  Wilcox,  and  many  others  served  in  the 


200  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

infantry.  What  wonder  is  it,  then,  that  some  years  later  Lee 
over  and  over  again  judged  a  situation  by  the  light  of  the 
men  who  were  to  deal  with  it,  framed  his  own  actions  accord 
ingly,  and  was  justified  by  results  ? 

Lee  returned  from  the  Mexican  War  with  an  army  reputa 
tion  so  brilliant  that  he  was  soon  selected  for  important 
duties.  In  1852  he  was  appointed  Superintendent  at  West 
Point.  Three  years  later  the  Government  decided  to  form 
the  First  and  Second  Cavalry  regiments  for  service  on  the 
Western  frontier,  and  the  best  available  officers  were  picked 
to  command  them.  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  was  made 
Colonel  of  the  Second  Cavalry  with  Lee  as  Lieutenant- 
Colonel,  while  Lee's  life-long  friend,  Joseph  Johnston,  ob 
tained  corresponding  rank  in  the  First  Cavalry.  In  its 
subordinate  ranks  the  Second  Cavalry  was  as  distinguished 
as  in  its  commanding  officers,  for  among  the  captains  and 
lieutenants  were  Hood,  Fitzhugh  Lee,  Kirby  Smith,  Thomas, 
and  others  who  were  soon  to  earn  a  national  reputation. 

During  1855-56-57  Lee  was  engaged  in  the  endless  and 
monotonous  round  of  scouting  and  skirmishing  necessitated 
by  the  restless  state  of  the  Comanches  along  the  Texas  and 
New  Mexico  borders.  In  the  latter  year  he  succeeded 
Johnston  as  colonel  of  the  regiment.  Two  years  more  of 
duty  on  the  plains  followed,  and  then  came  an  incident  that 
aroused  the  attention  of  the  whole  civilized  world.  In  the 
summer  of  1859  the  colonel  of  the  Second  Cavalry  was  enjoy 
ing  a  short  furlough  at  Arlington.  One  day  he  was  unex 
pectedly  summoned  to  Washington  by  the  Secretary  of  War. 
A  sudden  emergency  had  arisen ;  General  Scott  was  absent ; 
Colonel  Lee  was  the  best  man  to  deal  with  it.  He  was 
directed  immediately  to  take  four  companies  of  marines  to 
Harper's  Ferry  and  there  to  arrest  John  Brown  and  a  small 
band  of  Abolitionists  who  had  seized  the  United  States 
arsenal  at  that  place. 

In  the  capture  of  John  Brown  Lee  merely  fulfilled  a  plain 


ROBERT  EDWARD   LEE  261 

military  duty.  Judging  from  the  few  references  to  the 
matter  that  are  to  be  found  in  his  letters  and  papers,  it 
appears  that  he  viewed  the  whole  business  in  a  very  detached 
sort  of  way,  as  a  necessary,  but  in  no  way  difficult  or  im 
portant,  military  duty;  the  full  significance  of  the  incident  as 
a  precursor  of  the  Civil  War  seems  to  have  escaped  him — 
but  probably  he  did  not  read  the  New  York  or  Boston  papers. 
After  the  arrest  of  John  Brown  Lee  returned  for  a  short 
time  to  the  Texan  frontier,  and  it  was  then  that  he  wrote  a 
remarkable  letter  on  the  subject  that  had,  since  John  Brown's 
raid,  rapidly  become  uppermost  in  the  minds  of  all  Americans. 
"The  South,  in  my  opinion,  has  been  aggrieved  by  the  acts  of 
the  North,  as  you  say.  I  feel  the  aggression,  and  am  willing 
to  take  every  proper  step  for  redress.  It  is  the  principle  I 
contend  for,  not  individual  or  private  benefit.  As  an  Ameri 
can  citizen  I  take  great  pride  in  my  country,  her  prosperity, 
and  her  institutions,  and  would  defend  any  State  if  her 
rights  were  invaded.  But  I  can  anticipate  no  greater  calam 
ity  for  the  country  than  a  dissolution  of  the  Union.  It  would 
be  an  accumulation  of  all  the  evils  we  complain  of,  and  I 
am  willing  to  sacrifice  everything  but  honor  for  its  preserva 
tion.  I  hope,  therefore,  that  all  constitutional  means  will  be 
exhausted  before  there  is  a  resort  to  force.  Secession  is 
nothing  but  revolution.  The  framers  of  our  Constitution 
never  exhausted  so  much  labor,  wisdom,  and  forbearance  in 
its  formation,  and  surrounded  it  with  so  many  guards  and 
securities,  if  it  was  intended  to  be  broken  by  every  member 
of  the  Confederacy  at  will.  It  is  intended  for  'perpetual 
union,'  so  expressed  in  the  preamble,  and  for  the  establish 
ment  of  a  government,  not  a  compact,  which  can  only  be 
dissolved  by  revolution  or  the  consent  of  all  the  people  in 
convention  assembled.  ...  If  the  Union  is  dissolved  and 
the  Government  disrupted  I  shall  return  to  my  native  State 
and  share  the  miseries  of  my  people,  and  save  in  defence  will 
draw  my  sword  on  none." 


262  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

The  question  of  slavery  had  with  Lee,  as  with  many  at 
that  time,  become  obscured  behind  that  of  State  rights,  but 
it  is  hardly  necessary  to  say  that  as  a  slaveholder  he  was 
kind  and  humane.  In  a  mild  way  he  was  prepared  to  defend 
the  institution  on  biblical  grounds,  and  for  the  reason  that 
the  negro  needed  control.  At  the  same  time,  like  a  large 
number  of  Virginians,  he  was  heartily  in  favor  of  some  meas 
ure  of  gradual  emancipation.  He  released  many  slaves  of 
his  own,  and  in  1862,  in  the  full  tide  of  the  Civil  War,  we 
find  him  freeing  slaves  and  providing  them  with  money  to 
cross  the  lines  of  the  armies  and  proceed  north. 

Within  a  very  few  days  of  writing  the  letter  just  quoted 
Lee  was  summoned  to  Washington  for  staff  duty.  Winfield 
Scott,  his  old  commander,  was  general-in-chief.  Anxiety 
was  already  felt  as  to  the  movement  in  the  Southern  States, 
as  to  what  would  happen  after  the  inauguration  of  Mr. 
Lincoln,  as  to  the  possibility  of  a  civil  war.  Lee  reported 
to  Scott  on  the  ist  of  March;  six  weeks  later  occurred  the 
bombardment  of  Fort  Sumter;  and  on  the  1 5th  of  April  the 
President  issued  his  call  for  75,000  volunteers. 

War  was  coming  fast ;  the  time  had  arrived  for  mustering 
armies  and  for  finding  men  to  command  them.  The  two 
Johnstons  and  Lee  were  the  three  men  most  clearly  desig 
nated  by  army  opinion  for  high  command.  Scott  indeed 
had  declared  that  Lee  had  more  military  genius  than  any 
other  officer  in  the  army,  and  he  made  the  greatest  efforts 
to  secure  his  services  at  this  crisis.  He  was  sounded  on 
behalf  of  the  President,  and  was  virtually  offered  the  com 
mand  of  the  army  that  was  about  to  be  placed  in  the  field. 
Lee,  however,  refused  the  offer.  He  was  for  his  State  above 
all  things,  and  just  as  his  father  had  helped  the  united  colo 
nies  fling  off  the  yoke  of  Great  Britain,  so  was  he  prepared 
to  help  Virginia  fling  off  the  yoke  of  the  other  States  should 
they  attempt  to  coerce  her.  On  the  i8th  of  April  he  took 
the  course  that  was  followed  by  nearly  every  Southern  officer 


ROBERT   EDWARD   LEE  263 

in  the  United  States  army,  and  resigned  his  commission 
rather  than  fight  against  his  State.  He  did  it  after  a  long 
inward  struggle,  and  in  the  letter  explaining  his  step  he 
wrote:  "Save  in  defence  of  my  native  State  I  never  desire 
again  to  draw  my  sword." 

On  the  1 7th  of  April,  1861,  Virginia  passed  the  ordinance 
of  secession;  a  few  days  later  she  offered  the  command  of 
her  armies  to  Robert  Lee.  At  a  specially  convened  session 
of  the  legislature  the  State  formally  delivered  its  trust  to  its 
military  commander.  The  President  of  the  Assembly  ad 
dressed  Lee  and  adjured  him  in  the  following  impressive 
terms:  "  Yesterday  your  mother,  Virginia,  placed  her  sword 
in  your  hands  upon  the  implied  condition — which  we  know 
you  will  keep  to  the  letter  and  in  the  spirit — that  you  will 
draw  it  only  in  defence,  and  that  you  will  fall  with  it  in 
your  hand  rather  than  the  object  for  which  it  was  placed 
there  shall  fail."  Lee  replied  in  modest  terms  that  he 
would  fulfil  his  trust,  and  history  has  recorded  that  he  did 
all  that  mortal  man  could  to  accomplish  it. 

During  the  early  months  of  the  war,  until,  in  fact,  Joseph 
Johnston  was  wounded  at  Seven  Pines  on  the  315!  of  May, 
1862,  Lee's  functions  were  for  the  most  part  those  of  a  chief 
of  staff  or  military  secretary.  Jefferson  Davis,  the  Con 
federate  President,  was  a  West  Point  graduate  and,  more 
over,  a  good  judge  of  men;  unlike  Lincoln  he  made  few 
mistakes  in  his  early  appointments,  and  from  the  first  he 
chose  Lee  as  his  adviser  in  military  matters.  It  was  Lee  who 
selected  Bull  Run,  protecting  Manassas  Junction,  as  the  first 
line  of  resistance  should  Virginia  be  invaded,  and  it  was 
Lee  who  rapidly  organized  the  troops  with  which  that  line 
might  be  held.  Major  Jackson,  commandant  of  the  Virginia 
Military  Institute  at  Lexington,  was  ordered  to  Richmond 
with  his  cadets,  who  were  at  once  turned  into  drillmasters 
for  the  volunteers  and  militia  collecting  at  Camp  Lee. 
Drilling,  however,  was  only  a  small  matter.  Arms  had  to 


264  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

be  found,  old  flintlocks  must  be  converted  into  percussion- 
guns.  Country  blacksmiths  unable  to  forge  cavalry  sabres 
must  be  taught  to  hammer  out  rough  lances.  Uniforms  must 
be  provided,  and  ammunition.  Artillery  must  be  impro 
vised;  fortifications  erected;  generals  appointed;  plans 
made;  applications  attended  to;  staff,  administration,  com 
missariat,  transportation  organized. 

Lee  conducted  the  vast  amount  of  business  thrown  on  his 
shoulders  with  wonderful  efficiency.  Never  flurried,  neat, 
precise,  and  definite,  he  grappled  with  chaos  successfully. 
His  judgment  of  men  and  singleness  of  purpose  selected  the 
competent  and  rejected  the  incompetent  however  influential 
their  support.  He  sent  on  to  Beauregard  at  Manassas  and 
to  Joseph  Johnston  in  the  Shenandoah  valley  the  troops 
with  which  they  won  the  first  great  battle  of  the  war. 

Lee's  work  at  Richmond  was  interrupted  at  the  end  of 
three  months.  Virginia  was  being  attacked  from  the  north 
at  three  points,  and  although  Johnston  and  Beauregard  de 
feated  McDowell  at  Manassas  on  the  2ist  of  July,  it  became 
necessary  a  few  days  later  to  send  a  capable  officer  to  western 
Virginia,  where  the  Federals  were  meeting  with  considerable 
success.  It  was  just  at  the  same  moment  that  the  Federal 
Government  called  from  western  Virginia  to  Washington 
the  young  general  who  had  been  conducting  the  campaign 
there,  George  McClellan. 

For  several  weeks  Lee  struggled  to  get  the  Confederate 
forces  of  western  Virginia  into  action;  his  manoeuvres 
finally  drove  his  opponent,  Rosecrans,  into  a  retrograde 
movement.  But  there  was  no  serious  fighting,  no  con 
spicuous  success,  indeed  some  measure  of  failure  on  the 
part  of  subordinates,  and  Southern  opinion,  as  represented 
by  the  press,  became  hostile  to  Lee.  It  was  with  diminished 
prestige  that  he  left  western  Virginia  at  the  close  of  the 
year  to  take  up  another  command,  that  of  the  Southeast, 
including  the  States  of  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  and  Florida. 


ROBERT  EDWARD   LEE  265 

In  his  new  department  Lee  remained  several  weeks 
engaged  in  arduous  but  inconspicuous  labors.  The 
Federal  forces  controlling  the  sea  threatened  the  coast  at 
many  points,  and  it  was  necessary  to  plan  defences,  to 
construct  them,  and  to  man  them.  These  problems  and 
Lee's  solutions  might  prove  useful  matter  for  study  to  spe 
cialists  in  the  military  art;  for  the  general  reader  they 
present  no  salient  features. 

Early  in  March,  1862,  Jefferson  Davis  recalled  General 
Lee  to  Richmond  to  act  as  his  adviser,  and  on  the  i3th  of 
that  month  he  was  "  charged  with  the  conduct  of  military 
operations  in  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy."  This  was 
undoubtedly  a  wise  choice  on  the  part  of  the  President  of 
the  Southern  Confederacy,  but  it  was  partly  dictated  by  the 
fact  that  he  had  never  liked  and  never  worked  harmoniously 
with  the  general  commanding  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia, 
Joseph  Johnston.  The  appointment  of  Lee  virtually  placed 
him  over  Johnston;  but  the  relations  of  the  two  generals, 
largely  owing  to  Lee's  confidence  in  his  old  friend,  and  to 
his  tact,  remained  what  they  had  been. 

Johnston  had  withdrawn  from  Manassas,  where  he  was 
threatened  by  superior  Federal  forces.  For  eight  months 
past  McClellan  had  been  organizing  a  formidable  army 
with  which  the  war  was  to  be  brought  to  an  end  by  the 
capture  of  Richmond.  The  problem  therefore  arose: 
How  was  Richmond  to  be  approached?  McClellan's 
solution  of  the  question  was  as  follows: 

The  main  Federal  army  was  to  be  transported  by  ship  to 
Fortress  Monroe.  This  fortified  base,  less  than  100  miles 
southeast  of  Richmond,  lay  at  the  extremity  of  the  peninsula 
inclosed  between  the  James  and  York  rivers;  McClellan 
relied  on  his  control  of  the  sea  to  facilitate  his  progress 
up  the  Peninsula.  A  second  army  under  the  orders  of 
McDowell  was  to  co-operate  with  the  first  by  advancing 
through  Manassas  and  Fredericksburg  to  the  Pamunkey 


266  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

River,  thence  stretching  out  southeast  to  effect  a  junction 
with  McClellan.  A  third  army  was  detached  to  the  Shenan- 
doah  valley,  whence  it  might,  as  occasion  offered,  co-operate 
with  McDowell.  Each  one  of  these  armies  was  larger  than 
the  force  opposed  to  it  by  the  Confederates. 

Lee  took  charge  of  Richmond  just  as  McClellan  was 
embarking  his  army  for  the  Peninsula  and  just  as  Johnston 
was  falling  back  from  Manassas  to  positions  nearer  the 
Confederate  capital.  During  the  months  of  April  and 
May,  from  his  office  at  Richmond,  he  supported  Johnston 
and  the  army  in  the  field  with  all  his  might,  but  he  clearly 
showed  a  somewhat  more  subtle  appreciation  of  the  strategic 
necessities  of  the  situation  than  his  colleague.  Johnston 
urged  constantly  both  on  Lee  and  on  the  President  that 
every  available  man  should  be  concentrated  for  a  decisive 
stroke  at  the  main  Federal  army.  That  was  sound  strategy 
and,  in  a  broad  sense,  had  Lee's  support.  But  there  are 
cases  in  which  an  outlying  detachment  is  best  not  drawn  in, 
as  for  instance  when  it  is  neutralizing  a  large  force  of  the 
enemy  which  might  otherwise  be  more  effectively  employed. 
Such  was  the  case  with  several  bodies  that  Johnston 
wished  called  up  to  reinforce  him,  and  notably  with  Stone 
wall  Jackson's  command  in  the  Shenandoah  valley.  That 
brilliant  officer  was  given  the  fullest  scope  by  Lee,  who 
recognized  his  genius,  and  who  realized  to  the  full  what 
a  disconcerting  influence  on  the  plans  of  McClellan  was 
being  exercised  by  the  handful  of  swiftly  marching  soldiers 
in  the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah.  Jackson,  with  Lee's  con 
currence  and  support,  was  able  to  divert  McDowell  with  his 
50,000  men  from  the  Pamunkey  towards  the  Shenandoah, 
and  even  at  one  moment  to  frighten  the  Washington  admin 
istration  into  notifying  McClellan  that  the  Federal  capital 
was  in  danger  and  -that  his  army  of  125,000  men  might  be 
called  back  from  the  Peninsula  for  its  defence. 

McClellan  had  slowly  and  methodically  crept  up  from 


ROBERT   EDWARD   LEE  267 

Fortress  Monroe  towards  Richmond.  At  first  he  kept 
extending  towards  his  right  or  towards  the  Pamunkey, 
in  which  direction  he  hoped  to  effect  a  junction  with  Mc 
Dowell.  When,  however,  that  general  was  ordered  by 
the  Government  to  discontinue  his  advance  for  fear  of 
Stonewall  Jackson,  McClellan  then  gradually  shifted  his 
weight  towards  his  left,  that  is  towards  the  James  River. 
In  the  course  of  this  operation  he  had  to  get  his  army  across 
the  Chickahominy,  and  Johnston,  who  had  long  and  patiently 
waited  for  an  opportunity,  struck  when  the  Federal  army 
was  divided  in  two  by  that  stream.  The  indecisive  battle 
of  Seven  Pines  resulted  on  the  3ist  of  May,  and  Johnston  t 
late  in  the  afternoon,  was  severely  wounded.  On  the 
following  day  President  Davis  appointed  Lee  to  the  com 
mand  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 

The  problem  confronting  the  new  general  was  the  same 
as  that  which  had  faced  his  predecessor;  he  attempted 
its  solution  on  similar  lines.  McClellan  was  still  astride 
the  Chickahominy,  his  left  and  centre  on  the  southern  bank 
threatening  Richmond,  his  right  on  the  northern  bank 
protecting  the  line  of  communications  back  to  Fortress 
Monroe  and  ready  to  stretch  a  helping  hand  to  any  force 
coming  from  the  direction  of  Fredericksburg.  Johnston 
had  struck  at  the  wing  on  the  south  side  of  the  Chickahom 
iny,  that  which  more  directly  threatened  Richmond;  Lee 
decided  to  strike  at  that  to  the  north  of  the  river,  for  behind 
it  lay  the  vital  point  of  the  Federal  army,  its  line  of  com 
munications;  that  line  once  threatened,  McClellan  would 
surely  retreat.  While  the  Federal  commander  with  over 
100,000  men  was  concentrating  his  anxieties  on  the  avoid 
ance  of  defeat  and  the  securing  of  reinforcements,  Lee 
with  less  than  70,000,  not  counting  Jackson,  was  turning 
his  attention  solely  to  the  crippling  or  destroying  of  his 
adversary.  Lee  realized,  as  every  great  captain  has,  that 
a  lack  of  resolution  is  more  fatal  than  a  lack  of  numbers, 


268  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

and  that  the  art  of  the  soldier  does  not  so  much  consist  in 
mustering  large  armies  on  paper  as  in  making  the  best  use 
of  every  available  man  at  that  point  where  the  greatest 
result  may  be  obtained.  It  is  curious  to  note  how  largely 
the  literature  of  the  Civil  War  produced  by  gallant  and 
honorable  soldiers  who  took  part  in  it  consists  of  explana 
tions  of  defeats  that  would  never,  according  to  the  writers, 
have  occurred  had  the  defeated  general  only  employed 
certain  troops  that  were  left  idle.  Military  history  shows 
conclusively  that  it  is  only  the  great  captain  who  succeeds 
in  getting  his  force  into  action  as  a  whole  and  in  the  most 
effective  way;  it  is  hardly  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  the 
profoundest  secret  of  grand  tactics  lies  in  just  that  one  thing. 

In  the  Shenandoah  Jackson  was  striking  right  and  left, 
yet  ready  at  a  moment's  notice  to  move  swiftly  on  Richmond. 
Lee,  with  beautifully  timed  patience,  gave  his  subordinate 
full  opportunity  for  doing  all  that  was  possible  in  that  region, 
and  keenly  watched  McClellan  the  while.  Farther  to 
paralyze  the  movements  of  the  two  Federal  armies  on  the 
Rappahannock  and  Shenandoah,  Lee  ordered  heavy  rein 
forcements  to  be  sent  to  Jackson  under  General  Whiting 
on  the  loth  of  June.  Those  reinforcements  were  marched 
far  enough  to  produce  the  desired  effect,  but  before  they 
reached  the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah  Jackson  turned 
them  back.  The  time  was  ripe  for  dealing  with  McClellan; 
the  concentration  had  been  ordered;  Jackson  was  expected 
to  reach  the  banks  of  the  Chickahominy  on  the  24th  of 
June. 

Lee's  campaign  of  the  Peninsula,  if  not  faultless,  contains 
some  brilliant  episodes;  first  of  these  was  Stuart's  raid. 
On  the  nth  of  June  Lee  gave  orders  to  the  commander 
of  his  cavalry  to  penetrate  to  the  rear  of  the  Federal  army, 
doing  as  much  damage  as  possible  to  the  lines  of  communica 
tion,  and  especially  obtaining  information  as  to  the  position 
of  the  various  corps.  In  additions  to  these  objects  the 


ROBERT  EDWARD   LEE  269 

Confederate  general  had  another  which  does  not  appear  on 
the  face  of  his  instructions  to  Stuart;  this  was  to  alarm 
McClellan  and  to  prevent  his  making  any  offensive  move 
ment  precisely  at  the  moment  when  the  Confederate  army 
was  weakened  by  the  march  of  Whiting's  division  to  join 
Jackson.  Stuart  fulfilled  his  mission  admirably;  his  raid 
carried  him  entirely  around  McClellan's  lines;  it  angered 
and  demoralized  in  various  degrees  the  general,  the  army, 
the  Government,  and  the  press  of  the  North;  it  resulted  in 
some  damage  and  brought  in  much  useful  information. 

On  the  24th  Lee  issued  his  orders  for  the  decisive  move 
ment.  He  had  about  65,000  men  facing  McClellan's  left 
and  centre  south  of  the  Chickahominy.  To  the  north  of 
the  river  was  Porter  with  25,000  men  covering  the  Federal 
line  of  communications;  Jackson  was  on  the  march  with 
18,000  men  and  was  expected  to  establish  contact  with  Lee's 
extreme  left,  on  the  25th.  The  movements  ordered  were  to 
send  nearly  40,000  men  over  the  Chickahominy  early  on  the 
26th  to  co-operate  with  Jackson;  Magruder  with  less  than 
30,000  was  to  be  left  in  position  in  front  of  Richmond  to 
contain  McClellan,  while  the  rest  of  the  army  aimed  a  crush 
ing  blow  at  Porter.  This  movement  has  been  criticised 
for  exposing  Richmond  to  McClellan,  as  it  undoubtedly 
did.  Had  that  general  sacrificed  Porter  and  moved  reso 
lutely  forward,  the  Confederate  capital  could  undoubtedly 
have  been  captured  before  nightfall  on  the  27th.  But 
success  in  war  always  involves  the  calculation  of  chances, 
and  Lee  grounded  his  plan  firmly  on  an  intimate  knowledge 
of  his  opponent's  character.  "No  one  but  McClellan 
could  have  hesitated  to  attack,"  Johnston  had  written  some 
weeks  earlier,  and  Lee  knew  McClellan  as  well  as  Johnston 
did.  He  also  knew  that  in  strategy  the  personal  factor  is 
decisive,  that  the  move  which  against  Napoleon  or  Frederick 
might  be  fatal,  against  McClellan,  or  Burnside,  or  Pope, 
or  Halleck  would  spell  victory.  The  rules  of  war  are  not 


270  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

as  the  laws  of  the  Medes  and  Persians,  for  they  vary  with 
circumstances  and  with  the  personalities  to  whom  they  are 
applied,  a  fundamental  fact  frequently  ignored  by  the 
apologists  of  mediocre  generals. 

On  the  26th  of  June  the  Confederate  generals  carried  out 
only  a  part  of  the  contemplated  operations.  Jackson's 
troops,  weary  from  their  long  march,  failed  to  reach  their 
station;  the  crossing  of  the  Chickahominy  proved  a  some 
what  more  arduous  operation  than  had  been  anticipated; 
the  staff  service  fell  far  short  of  perfection,  and  the  com- 
mander-in-chief  was  not  able  to  keep  in  touch  with  the 
advancing  columns.  There  was  partial  failure  on  Jack 
son's  part  too.  The  country  in  which  he  was  now  operating 
was  unknown  to  him,  roads  were  few  and  bad,  communica 
tion  difficult,  obstacles  numerous.  He  barely  succeeded 
in  getting  into  action  on  the  26th,  and  the  Confederate 
operations  for  that  day  were  of  little  or  no  effect. 

It  was  not  till  past  noon  of  the  2yth  that  the  Confederates 
reached  the  front  of  Porter's  main  position.  McClellan 
might  have  sent  large  reinforcements  to  his  subordinate, 
or  might  have  marched  on  Richmond,  but  Jackson's  sudden 
arrival  and  Lee's  bold  offensive  had  apparently  hypnotized 
him;  he  believed  that  he  was  outnumbered  two  to  one,  and 
he  turned  all  his  great  abilities  to  a  consideration  of  how  he 
might  secure  the  retreat  of  his  unbeaten  army  from  his 
inferior  opponents.  Porter,  left  to  his  own  resources, 
fought  a  skilful  and  determined  defensive  action,  but  could 
not  withstand  the  impetuosity  and  the  numbers  of  the  Con 
federate  infantry.  Only  nightfall  saved  the  Federals  from 
being  driven  into  the  Chickahominy,  and  under  cover  of 
darkness  the  remnants  of  Porter's  corps  crossed  the  river. 

Here  may  be  placed  an  incident  trifling  enough  in  itself, 
yet  intensely  characteristic  of  the  war  and  especially  of 
the  Confederate  commander-in-chief.  Robert  Lee  and  his 
wife  had  a  large  family,  including  three  sons.  Of  these 


ROBERT   EDWARD   LEE  271 

three  the  two  elder,  Custis  Lee  and  W.  H.  F.  Lee,  were  of 
an  age  to  take  part  in  the  war  from  its  beginning,  and  did 
so.  The  youngest,  Robert,  was  a  youth  at  college,  and  at 
first  continued  his  studies.  But  he  could  not  long  be  kept 
from  the  field,  nor  would  his  father  intervene  to  save  even 
one  son  from  the  danger  of  serving  the  common  cause.  So 
Robert,  young  and  inexperienced,  went  to  the  war,  and  as 
his  father  did  not  believe  in  placing  inexperienced  persons 
in  positions  of  responsibility,  he  entered  the  army  as  a 
private  in  the  artillery.  His  battery  was  with  Jackson  in 
the  Shenandoah  and  followed  him  to  the  Peninsula.  The 
day  after  the  battle  of  Games'  Mill,  as  young  Robert  Lee 
relates  in  his  memoirs,  "was  the  first  I  met  my  father  after 
I  had  joined  General  Jackson.  The  tremendous  work 
StonewalPs  men  had  performed,  including  the  rapid  march 
from  the  valley  of  Virginia,  the  short  rations,  the  bad  water, 
and  the  great  heat,  had  begun  to  tell  upon  us,  and  I  was 
pretty  well  worn  out.  On  this  particular  morning  my 
battery  had  not  moved  from  its  bivouac-ground  of  the 
previous  night,  but  was  parked  in  an  open  field  all  ready, 
waiting  orders.  Most  of  the  men  were  lying  down,  many 
sleeping,  myself  among  the  latter  number.  To  get  some 
shade  and  to  be  out  of  the  way,  I  had  crawled  under  a 
caisson,  and  was  busy  making  up  many  lost  hours  of  rest. 
Suddenly  I  was  rudely  awakened  by  a  comrade,  prodding 
me  with  a  sponge-staff  as  I  had  failed  to  be  aroused  by  his 
call,  and  was  told  to  get  up  and  come  out,  that  some  one 
wished  to  see  me.  Half  awake  I  staggered  out,  and  found 
myself  face  to  face  with  General  Lee  and  his  staff.  Their 
fresh  uniforms,  bright  equipments,  and  well-groomed 
horses  contrasted  so  forcibly  with  the  war-worn  appearance 
of  our  command  that  I  was  completely  dazed.  It  took  me 
a  moment  or  two  to  realize  what  it  all  meant,  but  when  I 
saw  my  father's  loving  eyes  and  smile  it  became  clear  to  me 
that  he  had  ridden  by  to  see  if  I  was  safe  and  to  ask  how  I 


272  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

was  getting  along.  I  remember  well  how  curiously  those 
with  him  gazed  at  me,  and  I  am  sure  that  it  must  have 
struck  them  as  very  odd  that  such  a  dirty,  ragged,  unkempt 
youth  could  have  been  the  son  of  this  grand-looking  victo 
rious  commander." 

Early  on  the  28th  long  columns  of  dust  arising  to  the 
south  revealed  to  Lee  the  fact  that  McClellan  had  decided 
to  fall  back  with  his  whole  army;  partial  success  was  already 
achieved.  With  the  enemy  intimidated  and  retreating  the 
military  problem  was  simplified.  There  was  no  longer 
danger  to  be  feared  for  Richmond;  the  problem  now  was 
simply  how  to  cause  most  damage  to  the  enemy's  retreating 
columns. 

Lee  was  now  astride  McClellan's  line  of  communications 
and  prepared  to  dispute  the  passage  of  the  Chickahominy 
should  his  opponent  attempt  to  force  his  way  over.  But 
McClellan  cleverly  shifted  his  base  by  sending  his  ships 
around  from  the  York  to  the  James  River.  On  the  2gth 
Lee  had  to  give  up  hope  of  the  Federals  attacking  him  on  the 
Chickahominy,  and  he  issued  orders  for  a  general  pursuit 
in  the  direction  of  the  James  River.  A  series  of  engage 
ments  quickly  resulted.  In  the  afternoon  of  the  2Qth 
Magruder  fought  the  rear-guard  of  the  enemy  at  Savage 
Station.  On  the  3oth  Jackson  long  tried,  but  in  vain,  to 
force  a  passage  at  the  narrow  defile  leading  through  White 
Oak  Swamp.  Huger,  Holmes,  Hill,  and  Longstreet  attacked 
farther  to  the  right,  where  the  retreating  army  defended 
itself  for  some  hours  successfully  while  its  convoy  was 
hurried  on.  This  was  the  battle  of  Frazier's  Farm,  a 
victory  for  Lee  in  that  the  Federals  retreated  at  nightfall. 
Had  Jackson  succeeded  that  same  day  in  forcing  the  passage 
of  White  Oak  Swamp,  McClellan's  army  would  unquestion 
ably  have  been  placed  in  the  utmost  danger.  On  the  ist 
of  July  McClellan  drew  up  his  whole  force  in  an  admirable 
defensive  position  on  Malvern  Hill,  commanding  the  James 


ROBERT   EDWARD   LEE  273 

River.  Here  he  had  decided  to  make  a  stand  that  should 
cover  his  last  movement  back  to  his  transports. 

Jackson  and  Lee,  riding  in  advance  of  the  troops,  reached 
the  front  of  the  Federal  position  about  noon,  and,  notwith 
standing  its  strength,  the  Confederate  general  decided  to 
attack.  Was  this  decision  right?  The  Federal  position 
was  strong,  so  strong  that  even  Jackson  advised  against  a 
frontal  movement.  The  whole  of  the  enemy's  army  was 
in  position  supported  by  formidable  batteries  of  artillery, 
while  the  Confederates  could  not  count  on  Longstreet  and 
Hill,  who  were  some  way  to  the  rear.  These  considerations 
might  well  have  dissuaded  the  most  capable  and  courageous 
of  generals,  and  if  Lee  decided  to  face  the  issue  it  was 
because  other  and  even  more  important  considerations 
weighed  with  him.  His  enemy,  although  defeated  and 
discouraged,  was  still  more  numerous  and  had  greater  re 
sources  to  draw  from ;  should  the  moral  superiority  Lee  had 
established  be  relaxed  for  one  instant  it  was  still  possible 
that  the  Federal  army  would  recover  its  equilibrium  and 
surge  back  towards  Richmond.  Even  if  the  attack  failed, 
the  mere  fact  that  it  was  attempted  would  tend  to  keep 
McClellan  in  his  present  mind,  and  success,  however 
remote,  was  splendidly  worth  trying  for.  Delay,  even  for 
a  few  hours,  would  give  McClellan  time  to  regain  composure, 
time  to  intrench  himself,  time  to  get  his  transports  to  the 
James  River,  time  to  urge  McDowell  to  strike  at  unprotected 
Richmond.  Lee  realized  to  the  utmost  the  decisive  influence 
of  lost  minutes  and  of  lost  opportunities,  and  so  he  decided 
to  take  the  risk  and  attack.  The  attack  took  place;  the 
Confederates  were  easily  repulsed,  yet  Lee's  decision  was 
unquestionably  that  of  a  great  general. 

The  unsuccessful  attack  on  Malvern  Hill  took  place  late 
in  the  afternoon  of  the  ist  of  July;  it  was  badly  concerted, 
and  resulted  in  heavy  loss;  but  the  Federal  commander 
felt  no  inclination  to  take  advantage  of  his  success.  In  the 


274  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

night  McClellan  retired  to  Harrison's  Landing,  where,  what 
with  intrenchments  and  gunboats,  he  had  skilfully  impro 
vised  a  secure  base.  This  was  the  last  move  of  the  campaign. 
In  the  course  of  the  seven  days'  fighting  the  Confederate 
army  had  lost  over  20,000  men,  about  one  quarter  of  its 
numbers,  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  McClellan, 
fighting  on  the  defensive,  had  lost  6000  killed  and  wounded, 
10,000  prisoners,  and  52  guns. 

The  brilliant  campaign  that  had  driven  McClellan  from 
before  Richmond  stamped  the  soldier  who  had  conducted 
it  as  the  necessary  leader  of  the  South.  From  this  moment, 
through  victory  and  through  defeat,  the  South  was  constant 
to  Lee.  The  natural  distinction  and  elevation  that  marked 
him  out  in  every  assemblage  are  qualities  that  do  not  neces 
sarily  connote  practical  success;  but  when  success  goes  with 
them,  then  the  man  in  whom  that  rare  blend  is  found  may 
safely  be  trusted  as  a  leader.  Instinctively  the  South  turned 
to  Robert  Lee;  it  had  found  the  man  with  whom  victory 
was  possible  and  with  whom  defeat  could  never  spell  dis 
honor  or  demerit. 

While  Lee  pressed  McClellan  down  the  Peninsula  to  the 
James  River,  he  was  still  watching  closely  the  little  cloud 
on  the  northern  horizon  of  war  whence  McDowell  might  at 
any  moment  discharge  his  bolt  at  Richmond.  If  McDowell 
could  have  had  his  way,  he  would  have  acted  precisely  as 
Lee  feared,  but  the  strategists  of  Washington  controlled  his 
operations,  and  on  the  failure  of  the  campaign  vented  their 
ill  humor  on  the  general  whose  plans  they  had  overruled. 
President  Lincoln,  who  was  not  given  to  practising  his  wise 
theory  of  never  swapping  horses  while  crossing  a  stream, 
superseded  McDowell  and  appointed  General  Pope  to  the 
command  of  the  army  in  central  Virginia  on  the  26th  of 
June,  the  day  before  the  battle  of  Games'  Mill. 

Pope  was  a  man  of  much  courage  and  some  capacity,  who, 
pitted  against  mediocre  generals,  might  have  met  with 


ROBERT   EDWARD   LEE  275 

considerable  success.  He  proposed  at  all  events  to  march 
against  the  enemy  and  fight,  not  alarmed  at  any  possible 
disproportion  of  numbers,  and  very  firmly  resolved  to 
concede  not  one  jot  of  moral  superiority.  Pope  and  McClel- 
lan  rolled  into  one  had  the  makings  of  a  good  general. 

Pope  soon  became  active.  He  issued  a  bombastic  procla 
mation  to  his  troops  in  which  he  said:  "I  have  come  to  you 
from  the  west,  where  we  have  always  seen  the  backs  of  our 
enemies,  from  an  army  whose  business  it  has  been  to  seek 
the  adversary  and  beat  him  when  found,  whose  policy  has 
been  attack  and  not  defence  ..."  He  tried  hard,  very 
hard,  to  make  these  words  good,  and  might  have  succeeded 
but  for  the  extraordinary  strategy  of  Lee  that  led  to  his 
complete  bewilderment  and  eventual  defeat. 

On  the  1 4th  of  July  Pope  ordered  a  forward  movement 
towards  Gordonsville.  The  possession  of  this  point  by  the 
Federals  would  have  cut  off  the  Shenandoah  valley  from 
Richmond.  Lee  replied  instantly  by  detaching  Jackson's 
corps  to  hold  back  Pope.  In  the  course  of  the  next  three 
weeks,  as  McClellan  gradually  appeared  more  and  more 
certain  to  remove  his  whole  army  back  from  the  James  to 
the  Potomac,  more  Confederate  divisions  were  shifted 
towards  the  Rappahannock.  "I  want  Pope  to  be  sup 
pressed,"  Lee  wrote  to  Jackson  on  the  27th  of  July;  but  it 
was  not  until  the  whole  army  was  assembled  and  Lee 
himself  in  the  field  that  this  wish  could  be  fulfilled.  On 
the  gth  of  August  Jackson  struck  the  corps  of  Banks  a 
heavy  blow  at  Cedar  Run,  and  behind  him  Lee  concen 
trated  his  troops  for  the  decisive  move.  From  the  first  he 
appears  to  have  contemplated  a  flanking  movement,  for, 
on  the  i4th  of  August,  he  was  already  feeling  his  way  to 
throwing  Stuart  around  Pope's  left  and  threatening  his  com 
munications  with  Fredericksburg  and  Manassas. 

But  Pope  was  wary.  He  felt  that  the  forces  opposite  him 
were  swelling;  he  knew  that  before  long  heavy  reinforce- 


276  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

ments  would  reach  him  from  the  Potomac,  and  so,  prudently, 
he  fell  back  to  a  strong  line  covered  by  the  Rappahannock. 
Lee  followed  him,  constantly  feeling  for  an  opportunity 
to  turn  one  of  his  flanks. 

It  was  at  this  moment,  while  the  Federal  and  Confederate 
armies  faced  one  another  along  the  Rappahannock,  that 
was  initiated  perhaps  the  most  brilliant  strategic  move 
of  the  war,  the  great  flank  march  known  as  Jackson's 
raid.  The  question  must  therefore  be  discussed,  however 
briefly,  to  whom  should  the  credit  of  the  successful 
strategy  of  the  Confederates  be  ascribed — to  Lee  or  to 
Jackson  ? 

The  answer  must  of  necessity  be  a  somewhat  complex 
one,  for  it  involves  the  whole  question  of  the  relations  of 
the  two  greatest  generals  of  the  South.  Few  things  were  more 
remarkable  about  Lee  than  the  intuition  with  which  he 
judged  men,  and  the  tact  and  self-effacement  with  which 
he  handled  them.  In  Jackson  he  felt  from  the  first  moment 
that  he  had  a  subordinate  who  was  a  master  of  the  art  of 
war.  He  treated  him  accordingly  with  a  quick  sympathy 
and  response  that  won  the  full  esteem  and  obedience  of 
Jackson,  and  that  made  of  the  two  men  little  more  than 
two  parts  of  the  same  machine.  Whereas  Lee  generally 
placed  his  headquarters  near  those  of  Longstreet,  whom 
he  knew  to  be  skilled  and  impetuous  in  action,  but  head 
strong  in  counsel  and  slow  on  the  march,  he  always  gave 
Jackson  the  widest  discretion,  knowing  that  he  would 
leave  undone  no  fraction  of  the  possible.  With  Longstreet 
he  could  accomplish  certain  things;  with  Hood,  with 
Beauregard,  with  Jackson,  others;  and  he  acted  accordingly, 
proving  thereby  once  more  how  in  war  the  fixed  rules  of 
the  theorist  become  fluid  in  the  hands  of  the  practitioner. 
Between  Lee  and  Jackson  there  was  a  natural  concordance 
of  ideas,  and  it  was  rarely,  as  at  Malvern  Hill  and  the 
Antietam,  that  they  were  not  in  perfect  agreement.  March- 


ROBERT   EDWARD   LEE  277 

ing  against  Pope  on  the  Rappahannock,  they  both  felt 
to  the  utmost  the  necessity  of  striking,  and  of  striking 
promptly;  they  both  knew  that  the  most  effective  way  to 
strike  was  to  aim  at  Pope's  line  of  communications,  and 
that  this  involved  a  flanking  movement.  From  the  first 
Lee  was  feeling  for  an  opportunity  to  carry  out  some  such 
movement,  and  Jackson  with  the  left  wing  was  shifted 
higher  and  higher  up  the  river  to  find  an  unguarded  spot  at 
which  a  passage  might  be  effected.  But  up  till  the  evening 
of  the  24th  of  August  the  natural  difficulties  of  the  Rap 
pahannock  and  the  careful  defensive  of  Pope  had  made  all 
attempts  futile. 

That  night  Lee  rode  over  from  his  headquarters  to  consult 
with  the  general  commanding  his  left  wing.  He  was 
determined  to  carry  his  offensive  movement  out,  and  had 
already  taken  the  preliminary  step  that  nearly  always  pre 
ceded  his  decisive  operations.  Stuart  had  just  raided  Pope's 
lines  and,  by  good  fortune,  had  even  captured  many  of 
that  commander's  papers.  From  these  Lee  had  become 
aware  that  McClellan's  troops  were  rapidly  being  sent  to 
reinforce  Pope.  It  was  with  this  knowledge  that  he  rode 
to  consult  Jackson.  Neither  general  has  left  any  account 
of  what  took  place  at  their  interview,  but  an  eye-witness, 
Dr.  McGuire,  has  placed  it  on  record  that  he  saw  Jackson 
talking  earnestly  and  indicating  movements  while  the  com- 
mander-in-chief  listened  gravely.  If  this  slender  testimony 
may  be  trusted,  and  it  appears  not  improbable,  it  was 
Jackson  who  proposed  the  wide  turning  movement  that  was 
eventually  carried  out,  while  Lee  merely  assented  to  his  sub 
ordinate's  proposal.  Yet  it  must  be  said  that  Lee  was 
striving  to  outflank  Pope,  that  he  assumed  the  responsibility 
of  the  movement  suggested  by  his  subordinate,  that  he  de 
cided  its  feasibility  and  judged  the  capacity  of  the  agent  to 
whom  he  intrusted  it.  To  Lee  and  to  Jackson  both  the 
credit  of  the  achievement  belongs  in  the  highest  measure: 


278  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

to  Lee  as  commander-in-chief ,  to  Jackson  as  his  command 
ing  officer's  right  hand. 

An  account  of  Jackson's  raid  belongs  more  properly  to  that 
general's  biography  than  to  that  of  Lee;  here  the  chief  con 
cern  will  be  to  follow  the  movements  of  that  part  of  the 
army  that  remained  under  the  immediate  command  of  the 
general-in-chief.  Early  in  the  morning  of  the  25th  of 
August  Jackson  started  on  a  wide  flanking  march  that  was 
intended  to  circle  around  Pope's  right  by  Thoroughfare 
Gap  and  thence  to  strike  at  his  communications  and  depots 
at  Manassas.  Lee  had  two  courses  open:  one  to  remain  in 
position  in  front  of  Pope,  awaiting  developments;  the  other 
to  hold  Pope  long  enough  to  enable  Jackson  to  reach  his 
rear,  and  then  to  take  up  the  same  line  of  march  as  his 
lieutenant.  The  latter  course  was  adopted. 

On  the  25th  of  August  Jackson  started  northwards,  while 
Lee  remained  in  Pope's  front,  cannonading  vigorously.  On 
the  26th  Jackson  struck  eastwards,  marched  across  Pope's 
lines  of  communication,  and  at  midnight  reached  Manassas. 
On  the  27th  of  August  Jackson  remained  stationary  at  Man 
assas,  drawing  in  that  direction  Pope's  columns  now  retiring 
from  the  Rappahannock.  That  night  he  slipped  away,  and 
by  noon  of  the  28th,  circling  to  the  north  and  west,  was 
strongly  placed  on  Bull  Run,  near  the  road  that  runs  from 
Thoroughfare  Gap  through  Gainesville  to  Centreville. 
Along  that  road  Lee  was  marching  with  the  remainder  of 
the  Confederate  army. 

Lee  had  been  in  constant  receipt  of  news  from  Jackson, 
and  appears  to  have  kept  in  relatively  close  touch  with  the 
complicated  conditions  arising  from  that  general's  remark 
able  movements.  During  the  25th  he  remained  in  position 
opposite  Pope  along  the  Rappahannock,  but  on  the  follow 
ing  morning  started  the  army  on  the  route  which  Jackson 
had  previously  taken.  On  the  26th,  27th,  and  28th  the  long 
column  marched,  meeting  with  some  resistance  at  Thorough- 


ROBERT   EDWARD   LEE 


279 


JACKSON'S  RAID 


280  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

fare  Gap,  and  getting  just  clear  of  that  obstacle  on  the  evening 
of  that  day.  On  the  2pth  the  march  was  continued  on 
Gainesville,  which  Pope  had  neglected  to  hold,  just  as  he  had 
failed  to  hold  Thoroughfare  Gap.  Near  Gainesville  Stuart's 
cavalry  was  met,  and  the  column  was  hurried  towards  Grove- 
ton,  where  Jackson's  guns  could  now  be  plainly  heard. 
That  general  had  been  heavily  engaged  in  the  afternoon  of 
the  28th,  and  now  Pope  was  concentrating  his  whole  force 
to  overwhelm  him.  Lee  had  arrived  in  the  very  nick  of 
time. 

The  Confederate  army  was  at  this  time  divided  into  two 
commands  or  corps,  and  the  larger  half  was  under  the  orders 
of  Longstreet.  This  general,  although  he  handled  his  troops 
with  great  tactical  skill  and  courage,  was  usually  slow  in 
elaborating  his  dispositions  for  battle.  Lee  was  anxious,  as 
his  troops  formed  up  in  the  woods  on  Jackson's  right,  that 
an  attack  should  be  made  on  Pope's  left  at  the  earliest 
possible  moment.  He  reconnoitred  the  enemy  from  an 
eminence,  and,  fearing  that  the  furious  assaults  against 
Jackson's  line  would  overwhelm  him,  three  times  ordered 
Longstreet  to  advance,  but  all  in  vain.  While  the  Con 
federate  left  bore  the  brunt  of  the  day,  the  right  failed  to 
get  into  effective  action. 

On  the  3oth  the  battle  was  renewed ;  Pope,  as  on  the  day 
before,  turning  all  his  efforts  to  overwhelming  Jackson. 
Gallantly  the  left  wing,  strengthened  by  a  number  of  fresh 
batteries,  maintained  its  ground;  closely  did  Lee  from  the 
centre  watch  the  battle,  holding  back  Longstreet  behind  the 
screening  woods,  waiting  for  the  moment  when  Jackson's 
need  should  compel  movement,  or  when  his  successful  re 
sistance  should  have  worn  the  enemy  down  and  made  him 
powerless  to  resist  the  long-deferred  onset  of  the  right.  A 
little  after  four  o'clock  the  divisions  of  Porter's  corps,  the 
last  fresh  troops  of  Pope's  army,  were  hurled  back  after  a 
desperate  attempt  to  drive  Jackson  from  his  position,  and 


"for  the  whole  army  to 


28l 


then  at  last  Lee  gave  tl 
advance. 

Longstreet  had  already  put  his  infantry  in  motion;  Jack 
son's  exhausted  battalions  took  up  the  movement,  nerved  to 
one  more  effort  by  the  sudden  promise  of  long-deferred 
victory.  The  whole  Confederate  army,  on  a  front  of  four 
miles,  moved  irresistibly  to  the  attack.  On  swept  the  gray 
lines,  loudly  shouting  amidst  the  rattling  musketry  and  the 
bursting  shells,  loudly  shouting  as  hill  after  hill  was  won. 
Pope  was  beaten,  but  his  soldiers  saved  him  from  total  rout. 
Stubborn  in  defeat,  brave  in  disaster  as  their  opponents 
were  in  victory,  battalions,  brigades,  batteries  struggled 
together,  held  on  where  they  could,  and  at  six  o'clock  suc 
ceeded  in  making  good  the  last  stand  that  saved  the  Henry 
hill,  the  last  position  from  which  a  retreat  across  Bull  Run 
could  be  covered. 

Lee's  victory  was  complete.  In  the  operations  against 
Pope  his  army  had  inflicted  great  losses  on  a  superior  enemy. 
13,500  Federals  had  been  killed  and  wounded,  7,000  taken 
prisoners;  20,000  rifles  and  30  guns  had  been  captured. 
Last,  but  not  least,  a  pitched  battle  had  been  won  that 
stamped  the  victorious  general  as  a  strategist  of  the  first 
order;  for  the  most  eminent  professional  authority  on  the 
Civil  War  has  declared:  "In  the  rapidity  with  which  the 
opportunity  was  seized,  in  the  combination  of  the  three  arms, 
and  in  the  vigor  of  the  blow,  Manassas  is  in  no  way  inferior 
to  Austerlitz  or  Salamanca."* 

It  might  have  been  expected  that  immediately  after  his 
victory  at  the  Second  Manassas  Lee  would  press  on  against 
Pope's  defeated  army  and  against  Washington.  But  the 
fortifications  of  Washington,  manned  by  Pope's  and  McClel- 
lan's  combined  armies,  would  have  been  far  too  strong  for 
Lee  to  carry,  and  for  this  reason  it  appeared  as  though  his 

*  Henderson,  Stonewall  Jackson,  II,  232. 


282  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

last  chance  lay  in  threatening  to  invade  the  North  and 
manoeuvring  for  another  opportunity  to  defeat  the  Federal 
commanders  in  the  field.  There  lay,  in  fact,  the  radical 
weakness  of  the  South,  that  her  resources  were  not  sufficient 
to  destroy  the  North,  and  that  her  victories  were  never  de 
cisive,  never  more  than  a  putting  off  of  the  inevitable  hour 
of  defeat.  Lee  felt  this.  At  all  times  through  the  war  his 
operations  were  based  on  the  fundamental  idea  that  the  great 
object  was  to  repel  invasion  and  gain  time.  It  was  with 
this  in  mind  that  after  the  Second  Manassas  he  turned  aside 
from  Washington,  crossed  the  Potomac  to  the  west  of  the 
capital,  and  invaded  Maryland.  This  invasion  was  intended 
to  divert  the  enemy's  attention  from  Richmond;  it  was  in 
tended  to  alarm  him  for  the  safety  of  Washington,  Baltimore, 
Philadelphia;  it  was  intended  to  raise  recruits  among  the 
numerous  Marylanders  who  were  Southern  sympathizers; 
but  as  a  military  step  it  was  a  half-measure  that  could  lead 
to  no  decisive  results. 

Lee  must  have  seen  this  as  clearly  as  we  who  live  forty 
years  later;  and  is  not  this  the  explanation  of  the  following 
letter  which  he  wrote  to  Jefferson  Davis  on  the  8th  of  Sep 
tember  from  Frederick  in  Maryland  ? — 

"  Mr.  President :  The  present  position  of  affairs,  in  my  opin 
ion,  places  it  in  the  power  of  the  Government  of  the  Confed 
erate  States  to  propose  with  propriety  to  that  of  the  United 
States  the  recognition  of  our  independence.  For  more  than  a 
year  both  sections  of  the  country  have  been  devastated  by 
hostilities  which  have  brought  sorrow  and  suffering  upon 
thousands  of  homes,  without  advancing  the  objects  which 
our  enemies  proposed  to  themselves  in  beginning  the  contest. 
Such  a  proposition,  coming  from  us  at  this  time,  could  in 
no  way  be  regarded  as  suing  for  peace;  but,  being  made 
when  it  is  in  our  power  to  inflict  injury  upon  our  adversary, 
would  show  conclusively  to  the  world  that  our  sole  object  is 
the  establishment  of  our  independence  and  the  attainment 
of  an  honest  peace.  The  rejection  of  this  offer  would  prove 


ROBERT  EDWARD   LEE  283 

to  the  country  that  the  responsibility  of  the  continuance  of 
the  war  does  not  rest  on  us,  but  that  the  party  in  power  in 
the  United  States  elect  to  prosecute  it  for  purposes  of  their 
own.  The  proposal  of  peace  would  enable  the  people  of 
the  United  States  to  determine  at  their  coming  elections 
whether  they  support  those  who  favor  a  prolongation  of  the 
war,  or  those  who  wish  to  bring  it  to  a  termination  which 
can  but  be  productive  of  good  to  both  parties  without 
affecting  the  honor  of  either.  Your  obedient  servant, 

R.  E.  LEE."  * 

It  was  peace  that  Lee  prayed  for  through  victory;  it  was 
the  hope  of  compromise,  of  successful  defence,  that  inspired 
his  strategy;  but  the  opponents  who  met  him  in  the  field, 
especially  the  last  and  most  powerful  of  all,  based  their 
calculations  on  a  more  potent  principle,  the  most  decisive 
in  war,  that  of  the  destruction  of  the  enemy. 

The  Confederate  army  at  Frederick  had  two  objects  of 
special  interest  to  observe.  Fifty  miles  to  the  east  was 
Washington,  where  the  bulk  of  the  Federal  armies  was 
assembled.  Twenty  miles  to  the  west  was  Harper's  Ferry, 
at  which  point  were  14,000  Federals  and  large  depots. 
Even  with  his  inferior  numbers  and  insufficiently  equipped 
troops,  Lee  might  have  turned  on  McClellan;  perhaps 
Jackson,  who  always  pushed  military  principles  to  their 
ultimate  consequences,  would  have  done  so;  as  it  was, 
Harper's  Ferry  was  made  the  first  objective  of  the  Con 
federate  army;  its  capture  meant  a  considerable  loss  for 
the  enemy  and  the  opening  of  a  much-needed  line  of  supplies. 

Lee,  playing  on  his  knowledge  and  experience  of  McClel 
lan,  decided  that  that  general  would  probably  advance 
cautiously;  he  therefore  took  the  risk  of  dividing  his  army. 
Jackson  was  ordered  to  recross  the  Potomac  and  capture 
Harper's  Ferry,  while  the  main  body  should  remain  on  the 
Maryland  side  observing  McClellan  and  falling  back  west- 

*  War  Records,  Ser.  I,  XXV,  II,  600. 


284  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

wards  towards  Sharpsburg  and  Hagerstown  behind  the 
Catoctin  and  South  Mountain  ranges. 

Jackson  conducted  the  enterprise  intrusted  to  him  with 
his  usual  skill  and  success,  but  during  his  absence  Lee's 
army  was  put  to  very  serious  danger  and  suffered  some 
damage;  with  a  bolder  opponent  even  worse  might  have 
befallen. 

Pope's  failure  had  led  to  his  removal,  and  McClellan  was 
now  once  more  in  command.  About  150,000  men  had 
been  collected  in  the  Federal  capital  as  a  result  of  the  with 
drawal  from  the  Peninsula  and  of  Pope's  disaster;  from 
these  troops  two  armies  were  constituted,  one  for  the  defence 
of  Washington,  the  other  for  field  operations;  the  latter 
amounted  to  about  85,000  men. 

Slowly  McClellan  moved  towards  his  formidable  opponent. 
At  Frederick,  on  the  gth,  Lee  had  issued  the  order  divid 
ing  his  army  for  the  blow  against  Harper's  Ferry;  that 
day  McClellan  lay  about  25  miles  to  the  east.  On  the 
1 3th  he  had  crept  on  as  far  as  Frederick,  and  there,  by  a 
piece  of  good  fortune,  a  copy  of  Lee's  order  of  the  gih 
fell  into  his  hands.  It  is  idle  to  speculate  what  Lee  or 
Jackson  would  have  done  on  this  revelation  of  the  enemy's 
weakness;  it  will  suffice  to  say  that  it  stimulated  McClellan 
into  comparative  activity.  He  pressed  on  after  Lee's 
retiring  columns  with  unwonted  speed,  and  on  the  i4th 
with  three  of  his  corps  he  caught  up  with  and  attacked 
D.  H.  Hill  in  the  neighborhood  of  South  Mountain.  A 
fierce  fight  raged  until  late  at  night,  and  Hill,  although 
reinforced  by  Longstreet,  was  outflanked  and  defeated; 
he  retreated  in  the  course  of  the  night. 

Lee  was  now  anxious  about  the  situation  of  his  army. 
Fortunately  Jackson  obtained  the  surrender  of  Harper's 
Ferry  on  the  morning  of  the  i5th,  fortunately  McClellan 
relapsed  into  caution  and  did  not  follow  up  his  success. 
From  Harper's  Ferry  Jackson's  troops  were  hastened 


ROBERT   EDWARD   LEE  285 

towards  Sharpsburg,  and  behind  the  Antietam,  a  stream 
that  flows  close  to  that  town,  Lee  determined  to  concentrate 
and  await  McClellan's  attack.  He  was  bound  to  fight,  for 
to  have  retreated  without  a  battle  would  have  been  to  throw 
away  all  the  results  won  at  the  Second  Manassas,  to  confess 
inability  to  maintain  the  offensive. 

On  the  i  yth  of  September,  1862,  was  fought  the  battle  of 
the  Antietam  or  Sharpsburg.  Lee,  with  a  force  which  in 
his  official  report  he  states  to  have  been  less  than  40,000 
men,  resisted  every  effort  of  McClellan  to  dislodge  him  from 
the  strong  positions  he  had  selected.  And  although  the 
Federal  commander  reported  that  he  had  87,000  men 
present,  although  his  artillery  was  superior  and  more 
numerous,  yet  it  was  only  the  skilful  tactical  disposition  he 
made  of  his  troops  that  saved  him  from  a  counter-attack. 
Lee  urged  Stuart,  urged  Jackson,  urged  the  officers  of  his 
staff,  not  only  on  the  day  of  the  battle  but  on  that  following, 
to  find  some  point  on  McClellan's  right  at  which  he  could 
launch  a  decisive  stroke,  and  it  was  only  on  the  unanimous 
verdict  of  his  subordinates  that  he  reluctantly  consented 
to  accept  an  inconclusive  result.  But  in  one  matter  he 
overrode  the  opinion  of  all.  On  the  night  of  the  battle 
even  Stonewall  Jackson  counselled  retreat,  in  view  of  the 
terrible  losses  and  material  weakness  of  the  army.  Regi 
ments  numbered  less  than  20  men,  brigades  less  than  200-, 
ammunition  was  short;  the  enemy  was  numerous;  the 
Potomac  flowed  between  the  army  and  safety.  Lee's 
courage  and  strategic  insight  rose  to  considerations  higher 
than  these.  He  resolved  to  maintain  his  positions  on  the 
following  day.* 

During  the  whole  of  the  i8th  of  September  the  two  armies 
remained  face  to  face  along  the  banks  of  the  Antietam, 
the  Confederates  firmly  awaiting  an  attack  that  the  Federals 

*  This  remarkable  decision  suggests  a  comparison  with  that  of  Napoleon 
not  to  evacuate  the  island  of  Lobau  after  Aspern  and  Essling, 


286  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

did  not  venture  to  deliver;  Lee's  courage  remained  higher 
than  McClellan's.  But  that  night  the  Confederate  general 
acknowledged  the  inevitable.  He  had  done  all  that  was 
humanly  possible,  and  now,  swiftly  and  skilfully,  he  ordered 
his  retreat.  The  army  that  had  during  the  past  eight  weeks 
toiled  and  accomplished  so  much  withdrew  from  its  first 
invasion  of  Northern  soil  for  a  few  days  of  well-earned 
repose. 

In  the  high  tide  of  his  successful  operations  against  Pope 
Lee  had  never  been  carried  away  into  unjustified  confidence. 
Even  at  that  moment  his  balanced  judgment  was  calmly 
weighing  the  future,  and  he  constantly  urged  on  President 
Davis  the  necessity  of  fortifying  the  capital.  Behind  the 
glamor  of  victory  lurked  the  fact  that  the  Confederate  army 
was  engaged  in  operations  that  were,  after  all,  essentially 
defensive;  all  it  had  accomplished,  however  brilliant  ap 
pearances  might  be,  was  merely  to  relieve  the  pressure  on 
Richmond  for  a  brief  moment.  This  view  of  the  military 
situation  was  quicky  justified  by  events. 

After  recruiting  his  army  in  the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah 
Lee  fell  back  to  Fredericksburg,  covering  the  line  of  the 
Rappahannock  and  Rapidan.  The  Federals  followed  slowly, 
first  under  McClellan,  and  later,  after  his  removal  from 
command,  under  Burnside.  Lee's  position  at  Fredericks- 
burg  was  strong  for  defence  but  weak  for  attack.  He 
occupied  a  line  of  hills  parallel  to  the  river  and  one  or  two 
miles  south.  The  town  lay  in  front  of  him,  but  close  to 
the  river,  and  could  not  be  held  on  that  account.  For  the 
northern  bank  was  bordered  by  high  ground  where  batteries 
could  be  placed  completely  commanding  the  southern  bank 
and  the  town.  These  circumstances  made  it  probable  that 
in  the  event  of  any  force  attacking  the  Confederate  position 
being  repulsed  it  could  be  withdrawn  in  safety  under  cover 
of  artillery  fire.  For  this  reason  some  of  the  Confederate 
generals,  notably  Jackson,  were  of  opinion  that  it  would 


ROBERT  EDWARD  LEE  287 

be  wiser  to  fall  back  as  far  as  the  North  Anna,  where  more 
favorable  ground  for  attack  could  be  found.  Lee,  however, 
decided  otherwise,  chiefly  for  reasons  affecting  his  com 
missariat  department. 

Burnside  was  unquestionably  the  weakest  general  that 
Lee  ever  had  to  face,  and  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg 
proved  the  least  costly  of  Lee's  victories.  Burnside  realized 
the  value  of  the  bluffs  on  the  north  side  of  the  Rappahan- 
nock;  he  lined  them  with  heavy  batteries,  and  judged  that 
with  this  protection  he  could  cross  and  recross  the  river  in 
safety.  But  he  did  not  realize  what  the  war  had  already  so 
completely  demonstrated,  that  to  dislodge  Lee's  infantry  by 
a  frontal  attack,  however  large  the  attacking  force,  was  a 
well-nigh  hopeless  proposition.  Although  his  numbers  gave 
him  all  the  scope  necessary  for  attempting  a  turning  move 
ment,  he  marched  his  brave  army  straight  up  to  the  Con 
federate  position  and  paid  the  inevitable  penalty. 

On  the  nth  of  December  Burnside  began  crossing  the 
Rappahannock;  on  the  i3th  he  attacked.  The  details  of 
the  battle  of  Fredericksburg  present  few  salient  features. 
The  Federal  soldiers  did  their  duty  and  marched  up  to  the 
intrenched  positions  they  were  ordered  to  capture.  The 
Confederates  at  nearly  every  point  held  their  own  with  ease, 
mowing  down  their  opponents  in  great  numbers.  By  half- 
past  three  in  the  afternoon  the  whole  Northern  line  on  a 
front  of  nearly  two  miles  had  been  so  severely  handled  that 
about  one-half  of  the  army  was  in  a  state  of  demoralized 
confusion.  The  Confederates  were  unshaken,  compara 
tively  fresh,  eager  to  advance.  How  was  it  that  Lee,  the 
general  who  at  the  Second  Manassas  had  so  long  waited  for 
and  had  so  decisively  judged  the  precise  moment  for  launch 
ing  his  counterstroke, — how  was  it  that  Lee  now  remained 
fast  in  his  positions,  leaving  his  practically  beaten  opponent 
to  reform  and  refresh  his  troops  ?  The  historian  who  is  not  an 
apologist  must  reply  plainly :  because  he  committed  an  error 


288  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

of  judgment.  There  were,  it  is  true,  reasons  that  made  a 
counterstroke  difficult,  perhaps  impracticable:  the  Confed 
erate  dispositions  had  been  made  solely  with  a  view  to 
defence;  the  batteries  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Rappahan- 
nock  would  have  covered  the  retreating  Federals.  Yet  the 
attempt  would  clearly  have  been  made  had  Lee  accurately 
gauged  the  extent  of  the  disorder  into  which  the  enemy  had 
been  thrown  after  being  flung  back  from  Longstreet's  front. 
He  gave  the  Federals  too  much  credit,  and  supposed  that 
with  their  great  army  they  would  come  to  the  attack  once 
more;  this  is  shown  by  the  following  extract  from  a  letter 
which  he  wrote  to  his  wife  after  the  battle:  "I  believe  they 
[the  army]  share  with  me  my  disappointment  that  the  enemy 
did  not  renew  the  combat  on  the  i3th.  I  was  holding  back 
all  day  and  husbanding  our  strength  and  ammunition  for  the 
great  struggle  for  which  I  thought  I  was  preparing.  Had  I 
divined  that  was  to  have  been  his  only  effort,  he  would  have 
had  more  of  it." 

Fredericksburg  was  an  empty  victory.  The  heavy  losses 
of  the  North  were  rapidly  made  good.  The  unsuccessful 
Burnside  was  replaced  by  the  untried  and  over-confident 
Hooker;  and  the  two  armies  continued  to  face  one  another 
along  the  banks  of  the  Rappahannock.  Many  weeks  of  in 
action  went  by,  weeks  of  struggle  against  bad  weather,  mud, 
and  snow,  weeks  of  anxious  organizing,  recruiting,  and  com 
missariat  work.  Letters  written  by  Lee  during  this  interval 
to  his  daughter  Agnes  give  us  a  glimpse  of  the  headquarters 
at  Fredericksburg  and  also  of  the  heart  of  the  Confederate 
commander : 

"My  precious  little  Agnes,  I  have  not  heard  of  you  for  a 
long  time.  I  wish  you  were  with  me,  for,  always  solitary, 
I  am  sometimes  weary  and  long  for  the  reunion  of  my 
family  once  again.  ...  I  have  only  seen  the  ladies  of  this 
vicinity  when  flying  from  the  enemy,  and  it  caused  me  acute 
grief  to  witness  their  exposure  and  suffering.  .  .  .  The 


ROBERT  EDWARD  LEE  289 

only  place  I  am  to  be  found  in  is  camp,  and  I  am  so  cross 
now  that  I  am  not  worth  seeing  anywhere.  Here  you  will 
have  to  take  me  with  the  three  stools — the  snow,  the  rain, 
and  the  mud.  .  .  .  General  Hooker  is  obliged  to  do  some 
thing.  I  do  not  know  what  it  will  be.  He  is  playing  the 
Chinese  game,  trying  what  frightening  will  do.  He  runs 
out  his  guns,  starts  his  troops  up  and  down  the  river,  and 
creates  an  excitement  generally.  Our  men  look  on  in 
wonder,  give  a  cheer,  and  all  again  subsides  in  statu  quo 
ante  bellum.  .  .  .  But  here  come  in  all  their  wet  the  adjutant- 
general  with  the  papers.  I  must  stop  and  go  to  work.  See 
how  kind  God  is:  we  have  plenty  to  do  in  good  weather 
and  bad. 


So  matters  went  on  until  the  weather  became  spring-like, 
and  Hooker  began  evolving  a  solution  of  the  difficult  prob 
lem  he  had  inherited  from  Burnside.  His  alarums  and  ex 
cursions  and  moving  of  guns  beyond  the  river  finally  resolved 
themselves  into  a  great  flank  movement  designed  to  throw 
some  60,000  men  over  10  miles  west  of  Fredericksburg 
and  beyond  the  extreme  left  of  the  Confederates.  The 
other  half  of  the  army,  of  about  equal  numbers,  was  to 
march  on  Lee's  position  behind  Fredericksburg;  the  two 
wings  were  to  press  the  Confederates  as  opportunity  offered 
with  a  view  to  effecting  a  junction  ultimately.  As  each  of 
Hooker's  wings  was  approximately  equal  to  the  whole  of 
Lee's  army,  it  was  to  be  presumed  that  at  one  point  or  another 
they  would  meet  with  slight  resistance  and  so  draw  together 
until  the  enemy  was  finally  crushed  between  them.  This 
was  much  better  strategy  than  Brunside's;  but  in  the  carry 
ing  out  it  was  found  that  Hooker's  courage  in  practice  was 
not  equal  to  his  skill  in  theory. 

By  midday  of  the  3oth  of  April  Lee  had  information 
showing  that  the  Federal  army  was  divided  into  two  bodies. 
Not  less  than  three  corps  were  nearing  Chancellorsville,  10 
miles  to  his  left ;  while  on  his  right  some  30,000  or  40,000  men 


2  go 


LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 


i 


ROBERT   EDWARD   LEE  291 

were  across  the  river  in  Jackson's  front,  threatening  attack. 
Lee  was  now  in  one  of  those  positions  a  correct  description 
of  which  depends  on  the  talent  of  the  general  who  occupies 
it:  if  he  is  resolute  and  acts  on  the  offensive  he  holds  inte 
rior  lines  and  has  victory  within  call;  if  he  is  prudent  and 
deliberate  he  is  surrounded  and  threatened  by  disaster. 
Lee  promptly  seized  the  opportunity  that  gave  him  interior 
lines.  He  decided  instantly  to  concentrate  on  one  of  the 
Federal  wings  while  they  were  still  widely  separated.  With 
Jackson  he  reconnoitred  the  force  which  Hooker  had  sent 
over  near  Fredericksburg  under  Sedgwick,  and  came  to 
the  conclusion  that  there  was  little  hope  of  a  decisive  result 
at  this  point  in  view  of  the  Federal  batteries  on  the  northern 
bank.  Orders  were  therefore  issued  for  moving  every 
available  man  against  Hooker  in  the  direction  of  Chancel- 
lorsville.  Early  with  10,000  men  was  left  to  hold  the 
Fredericksburg  positions  as  long  as  possible. 

By  daylight  on  the  ist  of  May  Lee  had  placed  45,000  men 
and  100  guns  in  battle  array,  barring  the  road  between  Chan- 
cellorsville  and  Fredericksburg  in  a  well-chosen  position  near 
the  Zoar  Church.  For  several  hours  the  roads  and  the  forest 
that  stretched  westwards  for  many  miles  were  anxiously 
scrutinized  for  signs  of  Hooker's  advance.  In  vain;  for  the 
Federal  commander,  who  had  up  till  that  moment  conducted 
his  operations  with  the  requisite  courage  and  energy,  had 
that  morning  been  seized  with  misgivings.  He  felt  not  quite 
sure  as  to  what  Lee  might  be  doing,  and  at  the  precise  mo 
ment  when  a  vigorous  offensive  was  absolutely  essential  to 
the  success  of  his  plan  he  hesitated. 

At  the  crisis  which  made  Hooker  falter,  Lee  acted.  The 
Federal  wings  must  be  kept  apart ;  Early  must  be  left  isolated 
for  as  short  a  time  as  possible;  so  if  Hooker  would  not  come 
forward  to  the  attack,  the  Confederates  must  seek  him  out 
in  his  positions.  By  n  o'clock  the  whole  army  had  plunged 
into  the  Wilderness  and  was  marching  on  Chancellorsville; 


292  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

McLaws  and  Anderson  were  on  the  right,  Jackson  on  the  left. 
Progress  was  slow.  The  roads  were  few,  the  woods  dense, 
and  Hooker's  outposts  were  soon  encountered.  There  was 
some  skirmishing,  yet  the  Confederates  were  able  to  make 
steady  progress.  At  last,  about  5  o'clock,  the  situation  sud 
denly  cleared;  Chancellorsville  was  just  in  front,  with  the 
Federal  army  strongly  intrenched  about  it. 

The  Confederate  columns  came  to  a  halt  and  deployed 
through  the  woods.  The  generals  reconnoitred,  but  none 
could  find  any  seemingly  weak  point  in  Hooker's  well- 
chosen  position.  There  was  evidently  nothing  to  be  done 
so  late  in  the  afternoon  in  such  tangled  country,  and  Lee 
contented  himself  with  discovering  as  far  as  possible  what 
the  enemy's  position  was.  He  ascertained  that  Hooker's 
left  was  strongly  posted,  covering  the  fords  of  the  Rappahan- 
nock,  that  his  centre  consisted  of  a  large  force  with  many 
guns  along  the  Chancellorsville  ridge,  and  that  his  right 
stretched  out  southwards  into  the  forest.  Lee  was  bound 
to  dislodge  Hooker  or  abandon  the  line  of  the  Rappahannock, 
and  when  he  met  Jackson,  about  sundown,  he  was  firmly 
resolved  to  attack,  though  not  yet  certain  as  to  the  point  to 
select. 

That  night  Lee  and  Jackson  consulted  long  and  anx 
iously,  and  it  was  not  till  late  that  they  came  to  any 
conclusion.  But  as  reports  kept  coming  in  it  gradually 
grew  clear  that  Hooker's  right  might  possibly  be  attacked, 
that  it  rested  neither  on  any  strong  position  nor  on  any 
covering  force  in  the  rear.  Finally  it  was  decided  that 
Jackson's  corps  should  be  thrown  wide  to  the  left  and, 
after  marching  around  Hooker's  unprotected  flank,  should 
advance  on  Chancellorsville  from  the  rear  of  the  Federal 
position,  while  Lee  attacked  in  front. 

Jackson's  great  march  on  the  2d  of  May  is  narrated 
elsewhere.  Lee,  while  his  trusted  lieutenant  was  swiftly 
circling  about  the  enemy's  flank,  remained  in  Hooker's 


ROBERT  EDWARD   LEE  293 

front  with  the  divisions  of  McLaws  and  Anderson,  a  bare 
10,000  men.  His  appearance  was  serene  and  calm  as  usual, 
but  his  feelings  must  have  been  of  the  most  intense  anxiety. 
His  little  army,  one-half  that  of  the  enemy,  was  now  divided 
into  three  widely  separated  fractions,  each  one  of  which 
might  easily  be  overwhelmed.  And  if  disaster  should 
come,  what  judgment  would  posterity  pass  on  the  general 
responsible  for  such  folly — on  the  general  who  had  neg 
lected  principles  of  the  art  of  war  worn  threadbare  by 
civilians  and  schoolboys — on  the  general  who  had  risked 
the  success  of  the  Southern  cause  on  such  a  desperate  move  ? 
So  Lee  possibly  thought  as  the  morning  hours  wore  on, 
slowly  passing  by  in  desultory  skirmishing.  But  at  any 
moment  Hooker  might  realize  that  the  cannonading  and 
movements  of  troops  in  his  front  were  merely  a  blind; 
Jackson  might  lose  his  way,  might  be  too  late,  might  be 
discovered;  news  might  come  the  very  next  minute  that 
Sedgwick  had  driven  Early's  scanty  battalions  from  their 
lines  and  was  marching  on  the  Confederate  rear.  Only 
the  most  icy  judgment  and  the  most  lofty  courage  could 
contemplate  such  a  situation  without  a  tremor  and,  with 
a  clear  conscience,  cast  the  dice  of  war  against  Fate.  That 
judgment,  as  it  proved,  weighed  Hooker,  and  Sedgwick, 
and  Jackson,  with  perfect  exactness;  and  fortune  was  not 
unkind. 

Slowly  the  hours  passed,  and  at  last,  at  six  o'clock,  Jack 
son's  guns  were  heard  booming  towards  the  west.  The 
time  had  come  to  act.  McLaws'  and  Anderson's  divisions 
were  now  sent  forward  in  earnest  towards  Chancellorsville 
and  towards  the  left.  In  the  closing  hours  of  light  Jack 
son's  impetuosity  nearly  pierced  the  Federal  centre,  but  at 
nightfall,  when  the  rapid  gain  of  a  few  more  hundred  yards 
would  have  completed  Hooker's  overthrow,  Lee's  most 
trusted  lieutenant  was  shot  down. 

During  the  night  of  the  2d  to  the  3d  of  May  Lee  spent 


294  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

some  anxious  hours.  Fighting  continued  during  the  dark 
ness  and  orders  had  to  be  sent  for  the  next  day.  Stuart 
was  ordered  to  take  command  of  Jackson's  corps,  to  resume 
the  attack  in  the  morning,  and  to  bear  towards  his  right. 
Lee  on  his  side  made  corresponding  dispositions.  When 
dawn  came  Stuart  led  his  troops  brilliantly,  captured  the 
positions  in  his  front  and  got  into  touch  with  Anderson, 
whose  left  was  thrown  out  to  effect  the  desired  junction. 
Then  followed  a  combined  advance  of  the  whole  Confederate 
line,  like  that  which  had  marked  the  Second  Manassas,  and 
the  Federals  fell  back  at  every  point  towards  the  Rappahan- 
nock,  where  Hooker  had  thrown  up  heavy  intrenchments 
to  cover  the  passage  of  the  river. 

It  was  barely  noon,  and  Lee  had  no  intention  of  resting 
on  his  laurels.  Orders  were  sent  out  to  reform  the  troops, 
now  somewhat  confused,  preparatory  to  an  attack  on 
Hooker's  new  position.  Just  at  this  moment,  however, 
a  dispatch  reached  the  commander-in-chief  containing 
important  information.  Sedgwick  had  at  last  taken  the 
offensive,  and,  a  few  hours  before,  had  driven  Early  from 
his  positions  at  Fredericksburg. 

The  arrival  of  this  information  at  precisely  that  moment 
throws  too  valuable  a  light  on  the  strategy  of  the  campaign 
to  be  passed  over  without  comment.  Lee  had  the  resolu 
tion,  courage,  and  judgment  never  to  waste  time,  in  which 
respect  he  closely  resembled  Napoleon.  Time  was  the 
essential  card  in  the  great  game  of  strategy  played  by  the 
opposing  generals.  If  Lee  had  not  attacked  with  the 
earliest  dawn  on  the  3d,  if  at  any  time  he  had  wasted  a 
single  hour,  Sedgwick's  move  would  have  held  him  back, 
and  Hooker  might  have  been  saved  from  defeat.  If  Hooker 
on  his  side  had  pressed  forward  both  his  wings  resolutely 
from  the  beginning,  the  Confederate  army  would  have  been 
caught  in  a  circle  of  bayonets  from  which  it  would  have 
found  some  difficulty  in  escaping.  As  it  was,  Sedgwick's 


ROBERT   EDWARD   LEE  295 

advance,  though  tardy,  immediately  relieved  the  pressure  on 
Hooker.  Confident  that  the  army  he  had  just  driven  from 
Chancellorsville  was  reduced  to  impotence,  Lee  at  once  sent 
heavy  reinforcements  to  Early,  while  the  remainder  of  the 
troops  were  given  a  short  period  of  repose  observing  Hooker's 
position. 

The  operations  that  followed  were  dominated  by  the 
fact  that  at  Chancellorsville  Lee  had  won  an  undeniable 
victory.  There  was  no  spirit  left  in  the  Federal  army,  no 
confidence  in  its  leaders.  In  the  afternoon  of  the  3d  of 
May  Sedgwick  was  brought  to  a  standstill.  On  the  4th 
Lee  concentrated  against  that  general  and  drove  him  over 
the  Rappahannock  with  heavy  losses,  Hooker  remaining 
inactive.  On  the  5th,  having  now  cleared  his  right,  he 
turned  back  once  more  towards  Chancellorsville  and 
prepared  to  throw  his  whole  army  at  Hooker  in  his  in- 
trenchments.  That  day,  however,  the  floodgates  of  heaven 
opened  and  the  country  was  deluged;  the  troops  marched 
with  alacrity,  but  with  great  difficulty.  Hooker,  for  once, 
seized  the  opportunity  and  did  the  right  thing  with  prompt 
ness:  that  night  he  decamped,  and  on  the  6th  of  May  was 
safely  back  on  the  northern  bank  of  the  Rappahannock. 

Chancellorsville  proved  to  be  the  last  of  Lee's  great 
victories,  and  like  most  of  them  it  was  won  against  great 
odds.  The  brilliant  result  of  the  Confederate  operations 
was  chiefly  due  to  the  ability  of  the  general-in-chief,  who 
employed,  at  their  highest  tension,  the  military  means  at 
his  disposal.  Among  those  means  were  two  entitled  to 
chief  distinction:  the  superb  dash  of  the  Confederate 
infantry,  and  Stonewall  Jackson.  It  was  part  of  Lee's 
genius  that  with  Jackson  he  risked  moves  that  with  another 
lieutenant  would  have  been  madness;  and  with  the  splendid 
infantry  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  he  stormed 
positions  that  with  other  troops  he  would  have  respected. 
And  yet  in  all  Lee's  achievements  there  was  something 


296  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

lacking.  Chancellorsville  was  a  great  victory,  but  it 
accomplished  nothing.  There  was  no  pursuit,  no  rout  of 
the  defeated  army,  no  gain  of  important  positions. 

Lee's  conduct  after  Chancellorsville  again  demonstrated 
the  inherent  emptiness  of  his  victory.  For  the  moment 
Richmond  was  safe  from  attack,  yet  Hooker's  army  on  the 
farther  bank  of  the  Rappahannock  was  so  large  and  so 
well  posted  that  Lee  could  not  venture  to  molest  it.  In 
theory  he  should  have  done  so;  in  practice  he  resolved 
on  a  half-measure  which  was,  very  possibly,  all  he  was 
justified  in  attempting.  He  decided  once  more,  just  as  he 
had  after  the  Second  Manassas,  to  invade  Maryland,  partly 
to  alarm  the  North,  partly  to  relieve  the  Shenandoah  valley, 
partly  to  open  up  new  sources  of  supply,  partly  in  hopes 
that  as  the  armies  manoeuvred  some  opening  would  present 
itself  for  dealing  an  effective  blow.  And  in  addition  to  these 
military  reasons  was  another,  a  political  one,  ever  present 
with  him  though  rarely  expressed,  and  then  generally  only 
in  his  private  correspondence:  the  hope  that  sooner  or  later 
the  Confederacy  would  be  recognised  by  France  and  Great 
Britain,  the  hope  that  peace  might  come.  Lee  was  strug 
gling  not  to  crush  his  enemy,  a  task  which,  unlike  Jackson, 
he  never  appears  to  have  thought  possible,  but  only  to 
gain  time. 

And  so  once  more  the  Confederate  army  turned  north, 
and  about  the  middle  of  the  month  of  June,  after  some 
elaborate  but  unsuccessful  manceuvring  designed  to  delude 
Hooker  into  a  false  move,  crossed  the  Potomac.  A  few 
days  later  the  Confederates  were  over  the  Pennsylvania 
border,  directing  their  movements  towards  the  Susque- 
hanna  in  the  direction  of  Harrisburg. 

While  on  the  march,  on  the  28th  of  June,  information 
reached  Lee  that  the  Federal  army,  to  the  command  of 
which  General  Meade  had  just  been  appointed,  was  unex 
pectedly  and  dangerously  near,  in  the  direction  of  Frederick. 


ROBERT   EDWARD   LEE  297 

Orders  were  at  once  sent  out  to  concentrate  the  widely 
scattered  Confederate  columns  on  Gettysburg.  It  was 
towards  the  same  point  that  Meade  was  directing  his  own 
columns,  and  on  the  ist  of  July  the  two  armies  got  into 
contact,  a  few  miles  north  and  west  of  the  town. 

Gettysburg,  70  miles  north  of  Washington,  marks  an 
important  intersection  of  roads.  Southeast,  50  miles,  lies 
Baltimore;  northeast  is  York;  north,  Harrisburg;  west, 
Chambersburg;  south,  Frederick.  With  the  two  armies 
face  to  face  in  its  immediate  vicinity,  to  occupy  the  town 
became  for  each  an  object  of  vital  importance.  Meade 
was  first  in  possession,  but  his  advance,  under  Reynolds, 
was  met  by  the  approaching  Confederates,  who  eventually, 
after  heavy  fighting,  drove  Reynolds  in  disorder  beyond 
Gettysburg,  on  the  evening  of  the  ist  of  July.  The  Federals 
fell  back  to  a  line  of  hills  to  the  south  and  east  of  the  town, 
where  Meade's  whole  army  was  eventually  drawn  up  for 
battle. 

Lee  was  not  particularly  anxious  for  a  general  engage 
ment,  and  the  battle  which  he  fought  at  Gettysburg  on 
the  2d  and  3d  of  July  was  the  result  of  circumstances,  not 
of  foresight.  The  two  armies  happened  to  be  face  to  face; 
the  point  at  which  they  were  was  of  strategic  importance; 
neither  could  give  way.  Lee,  who  had  ridden  up  in  time 
to  see  the  defeat  of  Reynolds'  two  corps,  had  the  bulk 
of  his  army  within  six  or  seven  miles  of  Gettysburg  that 
evening,  and  judging,  as  was  in  fact  the  case,  that  Meade 
was  probably  not  as  strongly  concentrated,  he  issued 
orders  for  a  combined  movement  forward  on  the  following 
morning.  Ewell's  corps  was  on  the  left,  A.  P.  Hill's  in 
the  centre,  Longstreet's  on  the  right, — totalling  about 
70,000  men.  It  was  essential  to  Lee's  scheme  that  the  attack 
should  be  made  promptly,  and  it  was  arranged  that  Long- 
street  should  move  first  against  the  Federal  left. 

On  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  July  Lee  was  early  in  the 


298  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

saddle,  riding  to  various  points  to  consult  with  his  corps 
commanders,  or  reconnoitring  the  enemy.  All  along 
the  Confederate  line  the  signal  for  attack  was  eagerly 
expected,  but  from  the  left,  where  Longstreet's  guns  should 
have  opened,  there  came  no  sound.  Lee  impatiently 
watched  the  Federal  positions,  observing  signs  that  told 
his  practised  eye  that  every  hour  was  adding  strength 
to  Meade's  army.  Opportunity  was  gradually  fading,  and 
all  because  of  Longstreet's  usual  deliberation,  rendered 
even  more  deliberate  on  this  occasion  because  a  plan  of 
attack  that  he  had  proposed  had  been  rejected  by  the 
commander-in-chief.  It  was  not  till  four  in  the  afternoon 
that  the  Confederate  right  was  at  last  ready,  and  the  hour 
had  long  since  passed  when  an  effective  blow  could  have 
been  struck,  for  Meade  now  had  the  greater  part  of  his 
troops  on  the  ground.  Longstreet,  an  officer  of  undeniable 
ability  and  a  splendid  fighter,  was  lacking  in  his  sense  of 
the  value  of  time,  and  also  in  that  of  subordination;  with 
Jackson  as  a  commander-in-chief  he  would  undoubtedly 
have  been  relieved  of  his  command  and  court-martialled 
for  his  conduct  at  Gettysburg.  At  four  in  the  afternoon 
Longstreet  at  last  got  into  action,  and  delivered  a  furious 
attack  on  the  Federal  left;  Hill  and  Ewell  supported  him 
by  strong  demonstrations.  For  three  hours  or  more  the 
conflict  raged,  and  as  a  result  the  Federal  line  was  driven 
from  several  outlying  positions  back  on  to  Cemetery  Ridge; 
that  position,  however,  though  more  than  once  threatened 
with  capture,  remained  in  Meade's  possession. 

On  the  night  of  the  2d  of  July  Meade,  after  long  and 
anxious  consultation  with  his  corps  commanders,  decided 
to  remain  on  Cemetery  Ridge  and  await  further  attack. 
Lee  was  fairly  satisfied  with  the  first  day's  result,  his  soldiers 
were  confident,  and  he  decided  to  carry  out  his  original 
plan. 

The  battle  of  the  3d  of  July  began  on  the  Confederate 


ROBERT  EDWARD   LEE  299 

left.  Ewell  the  day  before  had  got  a  foothold  on  Gulp's 
Hill,  and  Meade  decided  to  drive  him  off.  The  Federals 
came  persistently  to  the  attack  and  eventually  succeeded 
in  forcing  Ewell  back  to  his  original  position.  But 
the  decisive  fighting  took  place  on  the  right.  There  Lee 
massed  a  great  battery  of  115  guns  opposite  a  point  on 
Cemetery  Ridge  that  he  had  selected  as  the  key  to  the 
Federal  position.  For  over  an  hour  the  guns  roared; 
the  Federal  batteries,  1400  yards  away,  replied,  at  first 
vigorously,  then  more  slowly,  at  last  dying  away.  The 
moment  had  come.  Longstreet  ordered  forward  Pickett's 
division,  supported  on  its  left  by  Heth,  on  its  right  by 
Wilcox.  Fifteen  thousand  infantry,  in  splendid  alignment, 
moved  past  the  guns  and  over  the  crest,  swept  down  into 
the  little  plain  that  lay  between  the  two  armies,  and  then 
faced  the  ascent.  For  a  few  moments  there  had  been  a 
lull  in  the  firing,  as  though  both  armies  were  watching 
spellbound  the  most  impressive  military  spectacle  that  the 
Civil  War  was  to  afford;  but  as  soon  as  the  advancing 
gray  lines  had  reached  the  range  of  musketry  and  canister 
a  deafening  roar  burst  out  once  more.  Once  more  the 
Federal  batteries  dealt  out  destruction,  for  they  had  not 
been  put  out  of  action  by  the  Confederate  grand  battery, 
but  had  only  gradually  ceased  fire;  these  clever  artillery 
tactics  had  lured  Pickett  to  destruction.  The  fire  was  too 
terrible  to  be  withstood.  Needless  to  tell  how  bravely 
Pickett's  men  struggled  against  it;  in  the  end  they  were 
forced  back  defeated,  leaving  nearly  one-half  their  num 
bers  on  the  ground,  and  with  their  failure  there  was  no 
more  hope  for  Lee.  As  it  was,  he  had  during  three  days, 
with  70,000  men,  attacked  an  army  of  90,000  and  more 
than  once  been  not  far  from  victory. 

Pickett's  charge  marked  the  end  of  the  battle  of  Gettys 
burg.  Each  army  had  lost  nearly  20,000  men,  and  neither 
commander  would  venture  on  further  fighting.  During  the 


300  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

4th  of  July  Federals  and  Confederates  remained  face  to 
face,  but  Lee  had  already  decided  on  retreat  and  his 
baggage-train  had  started  on  the  march  for  the  Potomac. 
On  the  5th  the  army  followed,  and  after  some  anxiety 
crossed  safely  back  into  Virginia  a  few  days  later.* 

For  the  second  time  Lee  had  been  compelled  to  acknowl 
edge  defeat  on  the  enemy's  soil,  and,  as  after  the  Antietam, 
he  fell  back  to  the  line  of  the  Rappahannock.  Meade 
cautiously  followed,  and  during  the  next  few  months  the 
two  armies  manoeuvred  against  each  other  indecisively 
between  Fredericksburg  and  Manassas.  Some  of  Lee's 
movements  at  this  time  were  brilliant  demonstrations  of 
his  genius  for  strategy,  but,  as  nothing  came  of  them,  it 
will  be  best  here  to  dwell  on  another  aspect  of  the  Con 
federate  general  that  came  into  strong  prominence  in  the 
autumn  of  1863  and  in  the  winter  that  followed.  On  the 
8th  of  August  he  wrote  to  President  Davis,  offering  his 
resignation  of  the  command  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia.  The  reason  was  in  part  that  he  had  been  suf 
fering  from  various  ailments,  notably  rheumatism,  but 
chiefly  that  in  the  extreme  modesty  of  his  nature  he  thought 
the  South  could  produce  better  men  than  himself.  He 
wrote:  "A  younger  and  abler  man  than  myseli  can  readily 
be  obtained,  .  .  .  one  that  can  accomplish  more  than  I 
can  perform  and  all  that  I  have  wished."  In  Lee's  noble 


*  A  much-debated  point  in  connection  with  the  Gettysburg  campaign  is  as 
to  the  action  of  Stuart.  It  is  clear,  first,  that  if  Stuart  marched  with  the  cav 
alry  to  the  rear  of  Meade's  army  it  was  at  Lee's  own  suggestion  and  not 
contrary  to  his  orders  as  is  generally  stated  (War  Records,  Ser.  I,  XXVII,  III, 
915  and  923).  Secondly,  although  the  absence  of  the  cavalry  was  severely 
felt,  it  does  not  appear  probable  that  its  presence  would  either  have  changed 
the  circumstances  of  Meade's  march  to  Gettysburg  or  improved  the  oppor 
tunity  that  presented  itself  to  Lee  on  the  1st  of  July  and  in  the  first  few 
hours  of  the  2d.  On  the  whole,  Stuart's  march  was  probably  an  error  of 
judgment  on  the  part  of  Lee,  yet  to  say  that  it  was  the  cause  of  his  defeat  at 
Gettysburg  appears  unwarranted. 


ROBERT  EDWARD  LEE  301 

nature  modesty  was  allied  in  unusual  manner  with  the 
highest  gifts  of  a  soldier, — and  a  modesty  so  great  that 
it  took  on  at  times  an  aspect  of  religious  humility  more 
befitting  an  ascetic  than  a  general.  Behind  the  playful 
banter  with  which  he  rallied  his  friends,  behind  the  flame 
of  decisive  energy  that  carried  through  his  great  strategic 
movements,  his  heart  was  bleeding  for  the  suffering  soldiers 
whose  starvation  pittance  he  shared,  his  mind  was  full  of 
humble  resignation  to  the  decrees  of  a  divine  Providence 
whose  aid  he  constantly  invoked.  If  during  the  winter  of 
1863-64  this  aspect  of  Lee  stood  out  in  stronger  relief 
than  ever  before,  was  it  not  essentially  because,  by  an 
unrealized  process,  his  understanding  had  become  impressed 
with  a  foreboding  of  the  necessary  end  to  the  heart-rending 
conflict?  In  victory  and  in  defeat  alike,  the  mighty, 
relentless  antagonist  from  the  North  still  stood  sword  in 
hand,  menacing  the  heart  of  the  Confederacy;  and  how 
much  longer  could  the  half -naked,  half -starved,  half -shod 
ranks  of  his  shrinking  army  maintain  their  superb  defence  ? 
The  gracious  smile,  the  cheery  word,  the  gallant  bearing, 
the  noble  courage,  all  were  maintained  in  the  face  of  his 
soldiers  and  of  the  world;  but  as  the  year  1864  opened, 
as  the  heavy  Federal  battalions  began  to  move  in  their 
cantonments,  Robert  Lee  was  not  in  spirit  exactly  the 
Robert  Lee  of  the  Peninsula  and  of  the  Second  Manassas. 
Then  all  things  seemed  possible  to  the  brilliant  commander 
of  the  Confederate  armies,  while  now  there  was  about  him 
some  new  factor  faintly  suggestive,  perhaps,  of  the  martyr 
carrying  his  cross. 

In  March,  1864,  President  Lincoln  made  his  last  change 
in  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac;  nominally 
General  Meade  was  retained,  but  at  the  same  time  General 
Grant  was  appointed  commander-in-chief  of  all  the  armies 
of  the  United  States,  and  decided  to  supervise  in  person  the 
operations  in  Virginia.  Early  in  May  he  opened  the  cam- 


302  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

paign  with  an  effective  force  of  about  140,000  men;  Lee 
awaited  his  approach  with  something  over  60,000,  all  that 
the  Confederate  Government  by  the  most  desperate  efforts 
could  succeed  in  placing  in  the  field. 

Even  with  such  great  odds  against  him  Lee  was  not  yet 
prepared  to  abandon  as  hopeless  that  wise  military  maxim 
which  declares  that  the  only  sound  defensive  is  the  offensive. 
He  allowed  Grant  to  turn  his  right  flank  and  cross  the 
Rapidan  near  Chancellorsville  unopposed.  But  when  the 
Federal  army  had  got  well  into  the  great  forest  district  of 
the  Wilderness  it  was  struck  in  the  flank  by  the  whole 
of  the  Confederate  forces.  Then  followed  the  battle  of  the 
Wilderness  (May  5,  6,  7),  a  horrible  butchery  in  the  tangled 
depths  of  the  forest  and  brushwood,  in  which  the  superior 
local  knowledge  of  the  Confederates  compensated  for  the 
superior  numbers  of  their  opponents.  For  three  days  this 
hidden  slaughter  continued,  at  the  end  of  which  time  the 
two  armies  were  at  a  standstill,  each  side  covered  by  nearly 
impregnable  intrenchments.  In  so  far  as  Lee's  had  been 
an  offensive  movement  it  had  failed,  yet  Grant  had  been 
unable  to  force  him  back. 

The  Federal  commander,  seeing  that  no  result  could  be 
got  in  the  Wilderness,  decided  to  break  away  and  to  resume 
what  had  been  originally  intended  as  a  turning  movement. 
His  line  ran  roughly  north  and  south;  Lee  was  parallel 
and  to  the  west;  Richmond  lay  southeast,  towards  his  left 
flank.  He  therefore  ordered  the  army  to  abandon  its 
positions  and  to  march  by  its  left  towards  Spottsylvania 
Court-house. 

Lee  guessed  or  learned  of  Grant's  determined  move  with 
surprising  rapidity;  he  met  it  brilliantly.  Stuart's  cavalry 
was  sent  forward  to  delay  the  Federal  advance,  while  the 
rest  of  the  Confederate  army  was  started  on  a  forced  march 
that  carried  it  to  Spottsylvania  just  in  time  to  forestall  the 
enemy.  Lee  was  now  no  longer  on  Grant's  flank,  but 


ROBERT  EDWARD   LEE  303 

directly  in  his  path,  so  the  latter  settled  down  with  his 
usual  resolution  to  clear  away  the  obstacle. 

The  fighting  at  Spottsylvania  bore  the  same  general 
character  as  that  at  the  Wilderness,  but  lasted  longer, 
from  the  8th  to  the  i8th  of  May.  Each  army  intrenched  as 
it  gained  or  lost  ground,  and  in  the  densely  wooded  country 
decisive  positions  were  few  and  well  covered.  Finally,  after 
great  sacrifice  of  life,  Grant  had  to  admit  failure,  and,  as 
after  the  Wilderness,  was  compelled  to  attempt  by  marching 
what  he  could  not  gain  by  a  pitched  battle.  In  the  two 
weeks'  fighting  70,000  men  had  been  killed  and  wounded, 
and  although  the  proportion  of  these  losses  had  been  more 
than  3  to  i  against  the  Federals,  yet  a  constant  stream  of 
reinforcements  kept  their  ranks  full  while  Lee's  were 
dwindling  rapidly.  His  losses  could  not  be  repaired,  and 
not  least  was  that  among  his  generals,  for  Longstreet  had 
been  dangerously  wounded  at  the  Wilderness,  and  Stuart 
had  been  killed  at  Yellow  Tavern. 

On  the  20th  of  May  Grant  abandoned  his  positions  in 
front  of  Spottsylvania  and  marched  towards  Lee's  right 
flank  and  rear  at  Bowling  Green;  this  move  was  met  by  a 
prompt  retirement  of  the  Confederates  to  the  line  of  the 
North  Anna,  and  there  once  more  the  two  armies  were 
brought  face  to  face.  But  on  this  occasion  the  position 
taken  up  by  Lee  was  of  such  obvious  tactical  strength  that 
Grant,  chastened  by  the  two  terrible  ordeals  his  army  had 
already  passed  through,  made  no  real  attempt  at  forcing  it. 
He  manoeuvred  instead,  and  having  an  alternative  line  of 
supply  open  by  the  York  River,  moved  to  his  left  towards 
Hanover.  The  Confederate  army  kept  pace  and  withdrew, 
this  time  to  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Richmond.  Lee's 
choice  of  positions  on  the  North  Anna  has  been  lauded 
as  one  of  his  greatest  achievements.  It  certainly  was, 
though  its  full  significance  has  hardly  been  brought  out. 
This  position  faced  roughly  east,  and  was  not  directly 


304  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

across  but  to  the  west  of  the  turnpike  that  runs  nearly 
due  south  from  Bowling  Green  across  the  North  Anna 
to  Hanover  Court-house  and  thence  to  Richmond.  In 
other  words,  Lee  had  not  directly  barred  the  road  to 
Richmond  to  his  adversary,  and  his  position  was  not  only 
a  strong  one  for  defence,  the  reason  for  which  it  has  always 
been  praised,  but  strong  for  offence;  and  beyond  question 
Lee  intended  to  attack  Grant  if  that  commander  should 
attempt  to  stretch  his  left  across  the  North  Anna  towards 
Hanover  Court-house,  thus  offering  his  flank.  All  Lee's 
career  as  a  general,  every  consideration  of  strategy,  makes 
it  clear  that  it  was  an  offensive  rather  than  a  defensive 
position  he  had  assumed.  And  that  something  of  the  sort 
was  in  his  mind  is  corroborated  by  the  fact  that  when 
lying  in  bed  sick  and  disabled  he  was  heard  to  exclaim: 
"We  must  strike  them!  We  must  never  let  them  pass  us 
again!  We  must  strike  them!"  His  sickness,  the  dis 
couragement  of  his  army,  the  loss  of  Stuart,  the  skill  and 
rapidity  of  Grant's  withdrawal,  may  have  been  the  reasons 
that  prevented  the  intended  attack. 

At  last  both  armies  reached  the  Chickahominy,  almost 
within  sight  of  Richmond,  and  here  once  more  Grant 
attempted  to  break  down  the  desperate  resistance  of  his 
opponent.  At  Cold  Harbor,  on  the  ground  where  two 
years  before  Lee  had  first  led  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
to  battle,  a  new  conflict  was  waged,  and  once  more  the 
Federals  were  unable  to  claim  a  victory.  On  the  3d  of 
June  Grant  sent  his  army  at  the  Confederate  positions,  and 
was  driven  off  with  tremendous  loss;  and  yet  with  Lee 
victory  now  no  longer  spelled  success.  Two  years  before 
McClellan  had  been  triumphantly  driven  to  the  sea;  but 
Grant,  even  when  beaten,  could  with  the  utmost  difficulty 
be  held  at  bay;  when  he  failed  at  one  point  he  kept  courage, 
collected  reinforcements  and  tried  again  at  another.  It  was 
the  pitiless  falling  of  the  drop  of  water  on  the  stone,  and 


ROBERT   EDWARD   LEE  305 

the  Confederate  cause  already  showed  clear  marks  of 
wearing.  Three  failures  had  brought  Grant  to  the  walls 
of  Richmond  with  undiminished  numbers  and  increased 
confidence;  three  successes  had  reduced  Lee's  ranks  by 
a  third,  had  plucked  from  his  army  that  sting  of  attack 
which  had  been  its  greatest  virtue,  and,  most  important 
of  all,  had  reduced  it  from  an  army  in  the  field  to  the  gar 
rison  of  a  fortress.  Cold  Harbor  was  a  success  for  Lee, 
but  it  was  the  repulse  of  an  attack  on  the  fortifications  of 
Richmond  and  it  was  not  followed  by  any  offensive  move 
ment. 

His  failure  at  Cold  Harbor  and  an  inspection  of  the 
ground  led  Grant  to  the  correct  conclusion  that  the  key 
of  Richmond  was  Petersburg.  This  was  a  small  town 
rather  more  than  twenty  miles  south  of  the  capital,  situated 
on  the  Appomattox  River  and  at  a  point  where  nearly 
every  line  of  communication  with  the  Southern  States 
converged.  Having  decided  on  transferring  operations 
from  the  north  to  the  southeast  of  Richmond,  Grant  crossed 
the  Chickahominy  on  the  i3th  of  June.  On  that  same 
day  Lee  detached  Early  and  sent  him  to  the  Shenandoah, 
thence  to  invade  Maryland  and  threaten  Washington;  he 
hoped  that  the  Federal  Government  might  once  again,  as 
in  Stonewall  Jackson's  time,  become  alarmed  for  its  safety 
and  of  its  own  accord  relieve  the  tightening  pressure  on 
Richmond. 

The  operations  generally  known  as  the  siege  of  Peters 
burg  began  in  the  month  of  June,  1864,  and  closed  on  the 
2d  of  April,  1865.  The  general  aspect  of  these  operations 
recalls  what  had  taken  place  at  the  Wilderness,  at  Spottsyl- 
vania,  and  at  Cold  Harbor.  Grant  first  tried  direct  attack; 
that  failing,  he  worked  around  his  opponent's  right  flank. 
The  history  of  the  defence  of  Petersburg  is  relieved  by  a 
few  conspicuous  incidents  that  vary  the  monotony  of  an 
account  of  the  constant  construction  of  new  earthworks 


306  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

and  of  the  unremitting  vigilance  of  the  general  who  defended 
them.  On  the  3oth  of  July  Grant  made  a  formidable  but 
fruitless  attempt  to  penetrate  the  defence  by  blowing  a 
great  hole  in  the  Confederate  fortifications;  this  was  the 
so-called  Crater.  The  failure  cost  Grant  4000  men,  half 
of  them  prisoners.  Through  August,  September,  and 
October  Grant  kept  extending  his  left,  but  notwithstanding 
some  heavy  attacks  Lee's  right  kept  pace  with  him  and 
intrenched  itself  securely.  Then  came  a  lull  in  the  fighting 
through  the  midwinter  months  until  February,  when  Grant 
made  another  unsuccessful  attempt  to  outflank  Lee  at 
Hatcher's  Run. 

The  defence  of  Richmond,  and  therefore  of  Petersburg, 
was  an  operation  that  Lee  had  never  approved;  it  was 
not  sound  from  a  military  point  of  view.  Like  Napoleon 
after  Arcis-sur-Aube  he  believed  that  the  correct  line  of 
retreat  was  ex-centric,  away  from  the  capital,  and  that 
an  army  in  the  field  should  never  be  turned  into  a  garrison. 
Even  at  the  North  Anna  he  still  hoped  that  his  army  would 
not  be  called  on  to  shut  itself  up  in  Richmond,  and  his 
position  there  gave  him  a  clear  line  of  communications  to 
Gordonsville  and  the  Shenandoah.  But  President  Davis 
had  insisted  that  the  defence  of  Richmond  was  an  absolute 
political  necessity,  and  Lee  had  submitted.  He  recognised 
that  war  is  after  all  only  a  factor  of  politics,  and  that  although 
political  considerations  may  often  run  counter  to  military 
ones,  yet  it  is  for  the  general  to  make  the  best  of  what  must 
always  be  a  necessary  limitation.  From  the  beginning  he 
had  pointed  out  that  Grant  must  eventually  be  successful 
because  of  his  numerical  superiority.  One  man  behind 
intrenchments  might  be  sufficient  to  beat  back  two  assail 
ants,  but  when  the  enemy  could  compel  the  gradual  exten 
sion  of  the  intrenchments  over  a  line  many  miles  in 
length  a  point  must  sooner  or  later  be  reached  when  he 
could  either  force  a  weak  spot  or  work  around  the  open 


ROBERT   EDWARD    LEE  307 

end.  That  point  was  reached  just  as  the  spring  of  1865 
opened. 

On  the  2Qth  of  March  Grant  renewed  his  efforts  to  turn 
Lee's  extreme  right.  Two  of  his  corps  with  Sheridan's 
cavalry  were  met  by  Pickett  between  Five  Forks  and  Din- 
widdie  Court-house  on  the  3ist,  and  although  Lee  reinforced 
Pickett  with  every  man  he  could  spare,  yet  on  the  following 
day  the  Federals  won  a  complete  victory,  capturing  many 
prisoners.  On  the  2d  of  April  Grant  followed  up  his  blow 
by  another  that  pierced  a  weak  point  of  Lee's  line  midway 
between  Five  Forks  and  Petersburg. 

In  this  hour  of  defeat,  of  defeat  which  no  general  could 
have  averted,  Lee  retained  all  his  greatness  of  character. 
His  calmness,  his  courtesy,  his  fortitude  never  faltered. 
As  he  rode  off  the  field  he  said  to  one  of  his  staff:  "It 
has  happened  as  I  told  them  at  Richmond  it  would  happen. 
The  line  has  been  stretched  until  it  has  broken."  He 
spared  no  time  for  recrimination,  but  settled  down  at  once 
to  do  the  possible.  The  Confederate  Government  was 
immediately  warned  that  Richmond  must  be  evacuated 
that  night;  the  army  was  ordered  to  break  up  from  its 
positions  and  to  retire  in  the  direction  of  Lynchburg. 

The  history  of  Lee's  retreat  is  soon  told.  The  fighting 
that  had  marked  the  fall  of  Petersburg  had  largely  reduced 
his  ranks,  and  he  moved  out  with  little  over  30,000  men. 
Three  or  four  times  that  number  of  better  equipped,  better 
fed,  and  victorious  troops  followed  him  in  close  pursuit. 
Grant  pressed  on  with  the  utmost  vigor;  partial  engage 
ments  were  fought;  the  Confederate  numbers  dwindled. 
At  last  on  the  gth  of  April  at  Appomattox  Court-house, 
100  miles  west  of  Richmond,  virtually  surrounded  and 
with  no  supplies  within  reach,  Lee  gave  up  a  struggle  that 
was  absolutely  hopeless;  he  had  with  him  less  than  8000 
infantry  and  2000  cavalry,  the  glorious  remnant  of  that 
superb  army  that  compelled  the  admiration  even  of  its 


308  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

opponents.*  The  pathos  of  its  surrender  inspired  Swinton, 
the  historian  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  to  eloquence 
when  he  wrote:  "Who  that  once  looked  on  it  can  ever 
forget  it? — that  array  of  tattered  uniforms  and  bright 
muskets — that  body  of  incomparable  infantry,  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia,  which,  for  four  years,  carried  the 
revolt  on  its  bayonets,  opposing  a  constant  tront  to  the 
mighty  concentration  of  power  brought  against  it;  which, 
receiving  terrible  blows,  did  not  fail  to  give  the  like,  and 
which,  vital  in  all  its  parts,  died  only  with  its  annihilation." 

At  McLean's  house,  at  Appomattox  Court-house,  Lee 
and  Grant  met  to  arrange  the  terms  of  capitulation.  There 
were  no  surrounding  circumstances  to  lend  dramatic  interest 
to  the  scene:  just  a  plain  room  and  two  men,  one  in  gray, 
the  other  in  blue.  The  business  they  had  to  transact  was 
quickly  adjusted,  for  Grant,  who  realized  that  this  was  the 
end,  treated  his  defeated  opponent  with  perfect  considera 
tion  and  was  prepared  to  accept  the  parole  of  officers  and 
men. 

One  last  scene  Lee  endured.  He  rode  along  the  lines 
of  his  army  for  a  parting  farewell,  and  was  received  with 
such  demonstrations  of  love,  admiration,  veneration,  as 
have  rarely,  if  ever,  been  awarded  to  their  leader  by  sur 
rendered  troops.  On  the  following  day  he  mounted  his 
horse  and  with  a  small  group  of  followers  started  by  road 
for  Richmond.  The  hideous  nightmare  of  war  was  over; 
he  was  once  more  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  for  it  might 
not  untruthfully  be  said  that  the  Confederacy  died  when 
Robert  Lee  returned  his  sword  to  the  scabbard. 

Nothing  became  Lee  better  than  the  spirit  in  which  he 
accepted  the  result  of  the  war.  "The  questions  which  for 

*  Paroles  were  issued  to  28,000  men,  but  these  included  the  numerous 
prisoners  taken  in  the  fighting  immediately  preceding  the  surrender,  and 
many  stragglers  who  came  in  during  the  same  day, 


ROBERT   EDWARD   LEE  309 

years  were  in  dispute  between  the  State  and  General  Govern 
ment,"  he  wrote,  "and  which  unhappily  were  not  settled 
by  the  dictates  of  reason,  but  referred  to  the  decision  of 
war,  having  been  decided  against  us,  it  is  the  part  of  wisdom 
to  acquiesce  in  the  result,  and  of  candor  to  acknowledge 
the  fact."  Nothing  could  be  more  honest,  nothing  more 
truly  public-spirited.  During  all  the  troubles  that  marked 
the  period  of  reconstruction  Lee  firmly  maintained  an 
attitude  of  dignified  reticence.  Every  libellous  attack, 
every  aspersion  on  his  character,  and  there  were  many,  was 
allowed  to  pass  unheeded.  He  felt  that  the  South  must 
bear  her  woes  in  silence,  leaving  Time  to  heal  her  wounds 
and  to  record  the  verdict:  it  was  the  attitude  of  a  lofty 
mind  conscious  of  duty  performed  to  the  limit  of  its  powers. 

Lee's  first  thought  after  the  close  of  the  war  was  to  devote 
himself  to  farming,  but  the  South  would  not  allow  her  great 
leader  to  retire  into  private  life.  Four  months  after  Appo- 
mattox  he  was  offered  the  presidency  of  Washington  Col 
lege,  now  known  as  Washington  and  Lee  University,  at 
Lexington,  Virginia.  He  accepted,  and  in  that  quiet  coun 
try  town  spent  the  last  five  years  of  his  life,  rendering  faith 
ful  service  to  the  administration  of  the  college,  and  beloved 
by  the  whole  community. 

The  years  of  rest  that  Lee  had  so  well  earned  were  destined 
to  be  few.  He  had  suffered  severely  during  the  last  two 
years  of  the  war  from  rheumatism  in  the  region  of  the  heart. 
The  severe  strain  he  had  passed  through  had  made  him 
prematurely  old,  and  in  1868  it  became  plain  that  his  strength 
was  fatally  undermined.  For  two  years  more  he  gradually 
failed.  On  the  28th  of  September,  1870,  after  a  day  spent 
in  the  discharge  of  administrative  duties,  he  returned  home 
for  the  evening  meal.  He  stood  at  the  head  of  the  table  to 
ask  a  blessing  according  to  his  custom,  but  remained  speech 
less,  and  slowly  sank  into  his  chair.  He  was  tenderly  moved 
to  his  bed  and  there,  surrounded  by  the  anxious  love  of  the 


3IO  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

whole  South,  he  lingered  until  the  i2th  of  October.  In  his 
last  minutes  he  was  dimly  visited  by  the  mighty  shades  of  his 
faithful  comrades,  for  the  last  words  he  murmured  were: 
"Tell  Hill  he  must  come  up."  Thus  died  this  great  soldier 
and  great  man,  one  of  the  greatest  produced  by  his  race,  an 
honor  to  Virginia,  an  honor  to  the  United  States,  of  which  he 
was  born  and  of  which  he  died  a  citizen,  and  an  honor  to  the 
Anglo-Saxon  people. 


THOMAS  JONATHAN  JACKSON 

STONEWALL  JACKSON  has  a  prototype;  that  prototype  is 
Cromwell.  Each  was  superb  in  daring,  swift  in  execution, 
decisive  in  crisis,  fearful  of  one  thing  only — the  wrath  of 
God.  And  many  have  gone  so  far  in  their  admiration  of 
the  great  Confederate  general  as  to  declare  that,  had  he  lived, 
he  would  have  saved  the  cause  of  Secession.  If  that  be  so,  we 
may  the  less  regret  his  early  death, — death  that  came  before 
his  genius  had  reached  its  limits,  death  that  sought  him 
out  at  the  head  of  his  troops  and  in  the  hour  of  victory. 

Thomas  Jonathan  Jackson  was  born  on  the  2ist  of  Jan 
uary,  1824,  at  Clarksburg  in  the  western  part  of  Virginia. 
His  father  was  a  country  lawyer,  one  of  a  line  of  settlers  who 
had  taken  their  full  share  in  clearing,  improving,  and  popu 
lating  the  country  beyond  the  Blue  Ridge. 

Young  Jackson  had  lost  both  parents  by  the  time  he  was 
seven,  and  for  the  next  ten  years  he  developed  slowly  and  un 
eventfully,  helped  by  his  relatives  and  by  his  own  excellent 
qualities.  Not  that  any  one  at  that  time  suspected  the  bril 
liancy  and  greatness  of  the  conscientious,  tenacious,  blue- 
eyed  boy,  the  inconspicuous  son  of  lawyer  Jackson  of  Clarks 
burg.  Yet  from  the  first  he  showed  that  keen  sense  for  seizing 
and  for  improving  opportunity  that  was  one  of  his  marked 
traits  as  a  soldier.  In  1842,  by  exercising  this  faculty,  he 
succeeded  in  securing  an  appointment  to  West  Point; — a 
little  less  energy,  a  little  less  pertinacity  than  he  displayed, 
and  the  chance  of  his  life  would  have  been  lost,  while 

311 


312  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

America  might  never  have  heard  the  name  of  one  of  the 
most  remarkable  of  her  sons. 

On  his  arrival  at  the  Military  Academy  Jackson  was  little 
more  than  a  backwoodsman,  and  had  a  desperate  struggle  to 
reach  the  necessary  standards;  on  his  graduation,  four  years 
later,  he  stood  seventeenth  in  a  class  of  seventy.  This  was  in 
1846,  an  extremely  propitious  time  for  a  young  soldier  anxious 
to  win  promotion,  for  the  war  with  Mexico  had  just  begun, 
Zachary  Taylor  had  crossed  the  frontier,  and  American 
prowess  had  been  vindicated  at  the  battles  of  Palo  Alto 
and  Resaca.  The  young  officer,  like  most  of  his  class 
mates,  was  promptly  sent  to  the  front;  he  was  appointed 
to  the  ist  Artillery,  then  at  Point  Isabel  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Rio  Grande. 

A  lieutenant  of  artillery  cannot,  in  the  nature  of  things, 
exercise  much  influence  on  the  conduct  of  a  campaign,  and 
therefore  in  narrating  Jackson's  first  feats  of  arms  it  will 
be  better  to  dwell  on  those  personal  incidents  that  reveal 
character  than  to  attempt  to  mark  his  necessarily  insignificant 
place  in  the  whole  scheme  of  operations. 

After  a  period  of  inaction  at  Point  Isabel,  during  which 
routine  duties  and  eager  hopes  of  active  service  divided 
the  attention  of  the  young  lieutenant,  the  ist  Artillery  was 
ordered  to  join  General  Winfield  Scott's  expedition  to  Vera 
Cruz.  That  city,  feebly  defended  by  the  Mexican  troops, 
was  quickly  forced  to  surrender  by  the  artillery  fire  brought 
to  bear  against  it  (March  29,  1847).  This  was  mainly  the 
work  of  the  ist  Artillery,  and  Jackson  in  this  first  active 
duty  made  his  mark;  his  services  were  recognized  by  pro 
motion  to  the  rank  of  first  lieutenant. 

Immediately  after  the  battle  of  Cerro  Gordo  (April  18) 
came  another  opportunity  which  Jackson  did  not  let  slip. 
Captain  Magruder  of  the  ist  Artillery  had  taken  a  battery 
of  light  field-pieces  from  the  Mexicans;  the  army  was 
deficient  in  this  class  of  guns,  and  it  was  decided  to  use  the 


THOMAS  JONATHAN  JACKSON  313 

captured  material.  Magruder  was  given  the  command 
of  the  new  battery,  but  there  was  some  difficulty  in  finding 
subordinates  to  serve  with  him,  for  he  was  far  from  popular. 
Jackson,  however,  saw  only  two  things:  that  Magruder 
was  a  capable  and  dashing  officer,  and  that  the  battery  was 
certain  to  be  invaluable  to  the  army  and  constantly  employed ; 
he  volunteered,  and  in  doing  so  judged  correctly,  for  he 
had  little  trouble  with  Magruder  and,  as  he  expected,  got 
into  the  thick  of  all  the  fighting. 

At  Churubusco  and  Molino  del  Rey  Magruder's  battery 
played  a  conspicuous  part,  but  it  was  at  the  final  battle  of 
the  war,  Chapultepec  (September  13),  that  it  earned  great 
est  distinction.  With  three  guns  Jackson  was  ordered  to 
support  the  advance  of  the  i4th  Infantry.  The  Mexicans, 
from  fortified  positions,  poured  down  a  terrific  fire.  In  his 
attempt  to  get  within  effective  range  Jackson  lost  nearly 
every  horse  of  his  section;  many  of  his  men  were  killed  and 
wounded,  the  others  began  to  fall  back;  General  Worth  sent 
orders  to  withdraw  the  guns.  But  Jackson  hung  on. 
With  a  few  determined  men  he  succeeded  in  pushing  one  of 
his  pieces  over  a  ditch  and  into  position.  The  ditch  was 
full  of  dead  and  dying,  but  beyond  stood  Jackson  and  one 
sergeant,  all  that  were  now  left,  loading,  ramming,  firing, 
in  the  face  of  both  armies.  A  few  minutes  later  Magruder 
galloped  up,  got  another  gun  into  position.  Officers  worked 
with  desperation;  men  answered  nobly;  supports  were 
hurried  forward.  It  was,  in  this  part  of  the  field,  the 
crisis  of  the  day;  had  the  gunners  flinched,  a  retirement 
must  have  followed.  But  Jackson  never  flinched,  nor 
did  his  comrades  that  day.  They  kept  down  the  Mexican 
fire;  presently  the  infantry  swept  forward  once  more,  just 
as  Pillow,  to  the  right,  forced  his  way  into  the  city,  and 
the  day  was  won. 

Jackson's  conduct  had  been  too  conspicuous  to  pass 
unnoticed.  His  name  was  mentioned  in  dispatches,  and 


314  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

Winfield  Scott  singled  out  his  bravery  for  special  notice, 
a  remarkable  compliment  to  a  junior  officer  of  that  army, 
for  the  United  States  never  sent  into  the  field  a  more  bril 
liant,  capable,  and  valorous  assemblage  of  young  soldiers 
than  those  who  followed  Scott  from  Vera  Cruz  to  Mexico. 
Substantial  reward  accompanied  compliment,  and  shortly 
after  the  close  of  the  war,  less  than  two  years  after  leaving 
West  Point,  Jackson  was  bre vetted  major.  It  was  a  wonder 
ful  start  for  a  military  career. 

It  was  fated,  however,  that  the  next  thirteen  years  of 
Jackson's  life  should  be  marked  by  no  further  achieve 
ment.  He  might  have  spent  the  whole  of  this  period  in  the 
dull  routine  of  garrison  duties  had  it  not  been  for  an  offer 
made  to  him  early  in  the  year  1851.  This  was  that  he 
should  go  to  the  Virginia  Military  Institute  as  professor 
of  artillery  tactics  and  of  natural  philosophy.  Jackson 
accepted,  resigned  his  commission,  and  soon  settled  down 
to  his  new  duties  in  the  little  town  of  Lexington.  This 
change  from  the  army  to  civilian  life  enabled  him  to  take 
a  wife;  he  married  first,  in  1854,  a  daughter  of  Dr.  Junkin, 
president  of  Washington  College,  and,  after  her  death,  Miss 
Morrison,  daughter  of  a  North  Carolina  minister.  This 
second  marriage  took  place  in  1857. 

As  a  professor  Jackson  was  not  exactly  at  his  best;  a 
strain  more  intense  than  that  of  the  classroom  was  neces 
sary  to  fire  his  genius.  In  his  ten  years  at  the  Military 
Institute  he  acquired  the  respect  but  not  the  admiration 
of  his  students;  he  improved  their  discipline  and  standard 
of  conduct,  but  failed  to  arouse  in  them  a  thirst  for  mathe 
matics;  he  acquired  the  reputation  of  a  martinet,  of  a  man 
with  few  friends,  self-centred,  cold,  methodical,  and  exact 
ing.  That  reputation  he  deserved  to  some  extent,  but 
there  were  other  factors  of  the  man,  hidden  to  his  Lex 
ington  neighbors  yet  plain  enough  to  a  later  generation. 
His  strict  disciplinarianism  was  an  expression  of  a  rigid 


THOMAS  JONATHAN  JACKSON  315 

and  almost  fatalistic  sense  of  duty;  his  aloofness  was  the 
indication  of  a  mind  not  only  superior  to  those  about  him 
but  alien  to  all  compromises.  He  was  as  unsparing  to 
himself  as  he  was  to  others,  and  his  sense  of  duty  was 
happily  mixed  with  a  true  and  serene  piety  and  charity 
that  led  him  to  much  unostentatious  benevolence.  He 
taught  his  slaves  and  cared  for  them  with  the  utmost  kind 
ness;  he  served  assiduously  in  Sunday-school;  and  in 
the  immediate  circle  of  his  home  was  loved  and  obeyed 
with  unquestioning  confidence. 

There  was  another  aspect  of  his  life  at  Lexington.  Al 
though  Jackson  is  so  interesting  as  a  man,  yet  in  him  we  find 
every  intellectual  and  moral  process  consciously  subordinated 
to  the  narrow  path  he  had  chosen  through  life.  He  could 
not  for  one  moment  divest  himself  of  the  character  of  the 
soldier,  and  for  that  reason  remains  unlike  all  other  great 
American  leaders,  unlike  Washington,  and  Grant,  and  Scott, 
and  Lee.  Jackson  was  always,  and  narrowly,  a  soldier,  and 
it  was  as  a  soldier  that  he  resigned  his  commission  for  a  pro 
fessorship,  so  as  to  get  better  opportunities  for  extending  his 
knowledge  of  the  theory  of  his  profession.  There  is  surely 
nothing  more  extraordinary  in  military  history  than  to  see 
this  young  man,  at  a  period  when  no  rational  being  would 
have  dreamed  that  the  American  army  could  possibly  be 
employed  on  anything  more  complicated  than  an  Indian  war 
for  generations  to  come,  deliberately  settling  down  to  the 
task  of  fitting  himself  for  high  command.  Not  only  did  he 
study  the  scientific  side  of  war  and  the  books  in  which  the 
campaigns  of  its  great  masters  are  recorded,  but  he  viewed 
his  own  physical  self  as  a  factor  to  be  developed,  and  carried 
the  process  to  the  extent  of  never  reading  by  artificial  light, 
for  fear  of  reducing  to  some  extent  his  power  of  sight.  Bona 
parte  at  a  somewhat  similar  period  of  his  life  cut  the  barrack- 
yard  and  studied  politics  and  history.  Jackson's  intensified 
self-culture  was  relentlessly  carried  on  for  ten  years  in  the 


31 6  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

secrecy  of  his  study  and  of  his  heart,  and  when  he  was  thirty- 
seven,  in  the  prime  of  his  manhood  and  strength,  it  suddenly 
put  forth  its  fruit. 

In  the  year  1861  the  Civil  War  broke  out.  On  Friday  the 
1 2th  of  April  of  that  year,  the  military  forces  of  the  State 
of  South  Carolina  attacked  Fort  Sumter,  held  by  a  detach 
ment  of  United  States  troops. 

Virginia  had  not  yet  seceded,  but  there  could  be  no  doubt 
as  to  which  side  she  would  take.  Sumter  fell  on  the  follow 
ing  day,  Saturday  the  i3th.  On  Sunday  the  governor  of  Vir 
ginia  telegraphed  to  Lexington  ordering  Major  Jackson  to 
Richmond  with  all  the  cadets  under  his  command,  and  on  the 
same  day  Abraham  Lincoln  drafted  a  proclamation  calling 
for  75,000  volunteers  to  restore  order  in  the  seceded  States. 
The  war  had  begun. 

The  various  incidents  of  the  early  days,  the  mistakes,  the 
intrigues,  the  passions  of  persons  and  parties,  belong  more  to 
general  history  than  to  biography,  yet  the  attitude  towards 
this  great  phase  of  our  national  existence  of  one  who  was  to 
play  so  conspicuous  a  part  in  it  must  be  for  a  moment  touched 
on.  Jackson's  outlook  on  political  events  was  fatalistic. 
His  military  education  taught  him  not  to  meddle  in  civil 
affairs.  His  religious  convictions  inspired  him  to  pray  for 
peace.  He  suggested  to  the  minister  of  his  own  church  a 
meeting  at  which  prayers  for  peace  should  be  offered.  He 
sincerely  hoped  war  might  not  come;  but  if  it  did  come, 
surely  he  would  smite  the  enemy  with  all  that  force  and 
earnestness  with  which  God  had  endowed  him.  As  to  the 
merits  of  the  cause  itself,  that  was  a  matter  that  he  did  not 
apparently  debate  very  far.  Like  other  Virginians,  the  loyalty 
of  Jackson  was  first  and  foremost  for  his  State,  and  he  never 
appears  to  have  doubted  for  a  moment  where  his  duty  lay  in 
this  respect.  Regarding  slavery  his  opinions  were  narrow, 
but  his  conduct  humane.  He  thought  the  Bible  a  sure  rock 


THOMAS  JONATHAN  JACKSON  317 

on  which  to  base  the  fortunes  of  cotton-owners,  but  in  his 
dealings  with  his  own  slaves  he  showed  all  the  qualities  of  a 
benevolent  and  upright  man. 

And  so  at  home  Jackson  read  his  Bible  and  prayed  with 
earnest  and  steadfast  faith  for  the  maintenance  of  the  Union, 
while  at  the  Academy  he  urged  unceasingly  the  preparation 
of  the  lads  placed  under  his  care  for  the  day  when  Virginia 
should  call  on  them  to  perform  the  duty  of  soldiers.  Al 
though  until  then  Jackson  had  been  too  remote,  too  self- 
centred,  to  have  won  the  affection  of  the  cadets,  now  that  a 
great  crisis  had  come,  his  example,  his  high  seriousness,  made 
a  deep  impression  on  those  youthful  minds,  burned  in  on  their 
imaginations  the  simple  and  lofty  ideal  that  is  the  soldier's 
— a  disregard  for  all  considerations  not  included  in  the 
word  duty,  and  a  concentrated  determination  to  carry 
that  out  at  all  hours  of  the  night  and  day  and  at  all 
costs.  "Duty  is  ours,"  he  would  often  say,  "consequences 
are  God's." 

The  need  for  military  leadership  was  so  great,  and  Jack 
son's  qualities  were  so  well  known  among  army  men,  that 
he  was  at  once  given  an  important  command.  After  a 
few  days  at  Richmond  he  was  sent  to  Harper's  Ferry  to 
take  charge  of  the  Virginia  levies  being  assembled  there. 
Towards  the  end  of  May,  when  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston 
assumed  command,  these  troops,  the  2d,  4th,  5th,  27th,  and 
33d  Virginia,  became  the  ist  brigade  of  the  Army  of  the 
Shenandoah.  Early  in  July  Jackson  and  his  brigade  got 
their  first  taste  of  fighting,  skirmishing  between  Harper's 
Ferry  and  Winchester  with  the  advance  of  a  Federal  army 
under  the  orders  of  General  Patterson.  Already  Jackson 
had  made  an  impression  both  on  his  men  and  on  his  supe 
riors,  and  on  the  3d  of  July,  at  Johnston's  recommendation, 
he  was  appointed  brigadier-general  in  the  Confederate 
service.  The  choice,  like  many  of  those  made  by  Jefferson 


318  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

Davis  and  the  Southern  cabinet,  was  a  good  one,  as  was 
very  promptly  demonstrated. 

The  military  situation  in  July,  1861,  was  as  follows: 
The  North,  with  a  larger  population  and  the  clear  task  of 
taking  the  initiative,  was  clamoring  for  an  advance  of  the 
hastily  raised  troops;  whose  three  months'  term  of  service 
would  soon  expire.  Three  Federal  armies  were  operating 
on  the  borders  of  Virginia,  on  a  base  of  rather  more  than 
200  miles  running  east  and  west  along  the  line  of  the  Potomac 
River  and  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  between 
Washington  and  the  Ohio  River,  just  south  of  Wheeling. 
The  most  westerly  and  smallest  of  these  three  armies,  under 
General  McClellan,  had  met  with  considerable  success 
in  western  Virginia  and  might,  if  so  directed,  turn  east 
and  invade  the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah.  In  the  last- 
named  region  was  the  second  Federal  army,  15,000  men 
under  Patterson,  midway  between  Harper's  Ferry  and 
Winchester,  facing  Johnston,  who  was  about  one-third  less 
in  numbers.  The  third  army,  of  37,000  men,  was  at 
Washington  under  McDowell,  facing  some  23,000  which 
Beauregard  had  under  his  orders  at  Manassas  Junction, 
35  miles  south,  on  the  road  to  Richmond.  The  much 
smaller  armies  of  the  South  were  of  necessity  tied  to  a 
defensive  r61e;  those  of  the  North  were  irresistibly  driven 
forward  by  newspaper  opinion  to  an  offensive  movement 
they  were  not  yet  fit  to  undertake.  It  was  decided  that 
McDowell  should  attack  Beauregard  while  Patterson 
held  Johnston  in  check,  and  on  the  i6th  of  July  he  began 
his  advance. 

There  appeared  to  be  only  one  plan  whereby  the  Southern 
leaders  could  throw  back  the  approaching  invasion;  this 
was  by  rapidly  transferring  the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah  to 
the  help  of  Beauregard  at  the  moment  he  was  attacked. 
Johnston  had  shown  a  bold  front  and,  largely  by  Jackson's 
clever  handling  of  the  ist  brigade,  had  reduced  Patterson 


THOMAS  JONATHAN  JACKSON  319 

to  a  state  of  indecision.  At  one  o'clock  on  the  morning  of 
the  1 8th  of  July  he  received  orders  from  Richmond  to 
march  for  Manassas,  seventy  miles  away.  Arrangements 
were  quickly  made  to  screen  the  retreat  from  Patterson, 
and  in  a  few  hours  the  Confederates  were  marching  to 
join  their  comrades  on  the  banks  of  Bull  Run. 

It  was  on  this  march  that  the  ist  brigade  got  its  foretaste 
of  that  pedestrian  education  that  was  to  earn  for  it  the 
nickname  of  Jackson's  foot-cavalry.  It  was  first  on  the 
march  and  first  to  arrive.  At  four  o'clock  on  the  afternoon 
of  the  iQth  Jackson  reached  Manassas;  his  brigade  was 
rapidly  followed  by  those  of  Bee  and  Bartow. 

On  Sunday  the  2ist  of  July  was  fought  the  first  battle 
of  Bull  Run,  or  Manassas,  a  battle  won  for  the  Confederates 
largely  by  the  prowess  of  Jackson.  McDowell  had  slowly 
advanced  south;  he  had  reconnoitred  Beauregard's  po 
sitions  on  Bull  Run  and  found  them  too  strong  for  a 
frontal  attack;  he  had  therefore  decided  on  a  wide  flank 
ing  movement  around  the  Confederate  left  towards  the 
Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  where  he  might  hope  to  intercept 
Johnston's  expected  advance.  The  movement  was  sound, 
and  had  there  been  a  little  more  cohesion  in  the  Federal 
army,  had  not  the  major  part  of  Johnston's  forces  already 
joined  those  of  Beauregard,  McDowell  would  probably 
have  been  successful. 

For  a  while  all  went  well  with  the  movements  of  the 
Northerners.  Soon  after  sunrise  five  brigades  of  Federals 
had  been  placed  well  on  the  left  flank  of  their  opponents; 
at  nine  o'clock  they  were  discovered  advancing  parallel  to 
and  towards  the  Warrenton  turnpike. 

There  appeared  to  be  no  possible  means  of  facing  this 
powerful  and  unlooked-for  attack,  yet  the  Confederate 
officers  nearest  the  scene  did  what  they  could.  Evans, 
Bee,  Bartow,  and  Imboden,  not  waiting  for  orders  from 
Johnston,  who  was  far  away,  threw  their  feeble  commands 


320  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

into  action  with  desperate  resolve  to  hold  back  the  Federal 
advance;  but  all  in  vain.  For  two  hours  or  more  McDowell 
pressed  steadily  on,  driving  his  enemy  before  him.  At  noon 
the  broken  fragments  of  the  Confederates  were  streaming 
back  across  the  Warrenton  turnpike,  under  the  fire  of 
McDowell's  well-served  batteries  of  regular  artillery.  The 
Henry  hill  lay  in  front  of  them,  and  there  the  fortune  of  the 
day  was  to  be  decided. 

Jackson,  disregarding  his  first  orders,  had  marched  on  the 
sound  of  the  guns,  and  had  just  aligned  his  brigade,  3000 
strong,  on  the  Henry  hill,  as  the  fugitives  reached  it.  An 
incident  occurred  at  this  moment  that  can  best  be  told  in 
another's  words: 

"At  this  moment  appeared  General  Bee,  approaching  at 
full  gallop,  and  he  and  Jackson  met  face  to  face.  The  latter 
was  cool  and  composed;  Bee,  covered  with  dust  and  sweat, 
his  sword  in  his  hand  and  his  horse  foaming.  '  General,'  he 
said,  'they  are  beating  us  back!'  'Then,  sir,  we  will  give 
them  the  bayonet.'  The  thin  lips  closed  like  a  vice,  and  the 
First  Brigade,  pressing  up  the  slope,  formed  into  line  on  the 
eastern  edge  of  the  Henry  hill. 

"  Jackson's  determined  bearing  inspired  Bee  with  renewed 
confidence.  He  turned  bridle  and  galloped  back  to  the 
ravine,  where  his  officers  were  attempting  to  reform  their 
broken  companies.  Riding  into  the  midst  of  the  throng,  he 
pointed  with  his  sword  to  the  Virginia  regiments,  deployed 
in  well-ordered  array  on  the  heights  above.  'Look!  '  he 
shouted,  'there  is  Jackson  standing  like  a  stone  wall!  Rally 
behind  the  Virginians! '  The  men  took  up  the  cry;  and  the 
happy  augury  of  the  expression,  applied  at  a  time  when  de 
feat  seemed  imminent  and  hearts  were  failing,  was  remem 
bered  when  the  danger  had  passed  away."  * 

Jackson  covered  his  left  with  Stuart's  cavalry;  Johnston 
and  Beauregard  soon  arrived  and  reformed  the  broken  troops 

*  Henderson,  Stonewall  Jackson,  I,  177. 


THOMAS  JONATHAN  JACKSON  321 

to  the  right;  every  available  man  was  hurried  to  the  new 
line  improvised  to  bar  McDowell's  further  progress.  The 
crisis  of  the  battle  had  arrived  and  Jackson  displayed  in  it 
that  same  instinct  for  dogged  hanging  on  that  he  had  shown 
when  he  and  his  sergeant  had  kept  their  last  gun  thunder 
ing  at  the  gates  of  Chapultepec.  Slowly  and  coolly  he 
kept  walking  his  horse  along  the  front  of  his  regiments, 
occasionally  calling  out:  " Steady,  men!  Steady!  All's  well!" 
And  when  the  Federal  batteries  and  lines  flowed  up  on  to 
the  Henry  hill  and  the  space  between  the  combatants  filled 
with  shot,  shell,  and  smoke,  he  was  constantly  on  the  firing 
line,  animating  and  directing  the  fight.  The  Federals, 
though  poorly  led  by  unpractised  field  officers,  attacked 
again  and  again  with  great  courage  and  in  superior  numbers, 
so  that  it  appeared  that  the  pressure  must  eventually  burst 
the  Confederate  centre.  "General,"  said  an  officer,  riding 
hastily  towards  Jackson,  "the  day  is  going  against  us."  "If 
you  think  so,  sir,"  was  the  quiet  reply,  "you  had  better  not 
say  anything  about  it." 

Until  three  o'clock  the  Federals  steadily  gained;  but 
McDowell  had  no  reserves  left  and  his  troops  were  exhausted. 
Jackson  had  watched  the  battle  with  intent  judgment.  For 
three  hours  he  had  maintained  his  position.  He  now  thought 
that  the  Federals  were  gaining  so  much  on  all  sides  that  were 
he  to  continue  in  his  position  he  would  soon  be  outflanked, 
perhaps  driven  in.  His  judgment,  his  intuition  of  things 
military,  told  him  that  the  enemy,  though  still  gaming  ground, 
were  at  their  last  effort,  and  promptly  he  decided  to  assume 
the  offensive.  Sherman's  troops  were  allowed  to  advance 
to  within  50  yards,  a  murderous  volley  was  poured  in,  and 
the  whole  line  of  the  Virginians  then  dashed  forward  with 
fixed  bayonets,  uttering  loud  yells:  "Ha!  ha!  ha!  ha!  ha!" 

That  charge  decided  the  field  of  Bull  Run.  The  Federal 
troops  had  already  accomplished  a  heavy  day's  work  for  an 
army  of  raw  militia.  Regiments  broke  up  before  Jackson's 


322  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

advancing  bayonets;  the  hollow  at  the  foot  of  the  Henry 'hill 
was  soon  full  of  disbanded  troops;  defeat  turned  to  rout. 

There  was  no  pursuit,  for  the  same  lack  of  organization  that 
retarded  the  movements  of  McDowell  led  Johnston  and 
Beauregard  to  think  that  the  offensive  was  beyond  their 
power.  But  Jackson  chafed  at  the  inaction  of  his  superiors, 
and  declared  that  with  10,000  men  he  would  undertake  to 
occupy  Washington  in  twenty-four  hours;  and  it  is  barely 
possible  that  with  such  a  commander  as  Jackson  the  thing 
might  have  been  done. 

But  one  word  more  on  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  to  show  the 
spirit  in  which  Jackson  looked  on  victory.  Writing  to  his 
wife  he  declared  his  thankfulness  for  "a  great  victory  for 
which  all  the  glory  is  due  to  God  alone.  .  .  .  Whilst  credit  is 
due  to  other  parts  of  our  gallant  army,  God  made  my  brigade 
more  instrumental  than  any  other  in  repulsing  the  main 
attack.  This  is  for  your  information  only — say  nothing 
about  it.  Let  others  speak  praise,  not  myself."  Others  did 
speak  praise,  both  subordinates  and  superiors,  and  on  the 
22d  of  October  the  Confederate  Government  made  substan 
tial  and  prompt  acknowledgment  by  appointing  General 
Jackson  to  what  was  virtually  an  independent  command, 
that  of  the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah. 

The  Shenandoah  was  of  vital  importance  to  the  Southern 
cause,  for  from  the  passes  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  which  divides 
it  from  the  low  country  of  eastern  Virginia,  the  communica 
tions  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  and  of  Richmond 
itself  could  be  threatened.  Its  possession  by  the  enemy 
would  have  been  fatal,  yet  so  small  were  the  resources  of 
President  Davis  that  he  could  spare  only  a  handful  of  men 
to  defend  it,— but  that  handful  included  Stonewall  Jackson. 
If  war  were  merely  a  matter  of  numbers,  the  historian 
might  well  resign  his  functions  to  the  statistician,  but  its 
fascination  as  a  study  largely  turns  on  its  intellectual  element, 
on  its  so  frequent  demonstration  that  one  man  may  be 


THOMAS  JONATHAN  JACKSON  323 

worth  a  thousand,  on  the  play  of  those  primitive  qualities 
of  humanity  that  appear,  to  the  historian  at  all  events, 
essential  to  the  survival  of  organized  societies.  Among 
those  qualities  none  is  more  common  than  brute  courage, 
none  is  more  rare  than  the  combination  of  moral  courage, 
craft,  and  pure  intelligence  known  as  strategy.  Courage 
may  be  overborne  by  numbers,  and  as  numbers  failed  him 
it  was  strategy  that  Jackson  brought  to  the  defence  of  the 
valley  of  the  Shenandoah.  Heretofore  he  had  won  the 
reputation  of  a  resolute  fighter,  he  was  now  to  achieve  that 
of  a  brilliant  general. 

From  November,  1861,  to  February,  1862,  only  desultory 
operations  took  place,  but  towards  the  end  of  the  latter 
month  Banks  with  an  army  of  nearly  40,000  men  crossed 
the  Potomac  at  Harper's  Ferry  and  moved  towards  Win 
chester.  Jackson  with  4600  men,  all  told,  promptly  advanced 
to  give  battle.  His  study  of  military  history  and  his  own 
intuition  made  him  understand  to  the  full  one  of  the  most 
essential  maxims  of  the  art  of  war,  that  the  only  way  to 
defend  successfully  is  to  strike  hard  at  your  opponent; 
the  man  who  awaits  attack  behind  intrenchments  must 
sooner  or  later  be  beaten. 

During  the  three  months  that  followed  Jackson  and  his 
troops  carried  out  a  brilliant  series  of  marches  and  sudden 
strokes  that  can  only  be  summarized  here.  On  the  23d 
of  March  he  fought  the  battle  of  Kernstown,  in  which  he 
was  beaten  by  Shields.  In  the  course  of  the  next  38  days 
he  marched  400  miles,  fought  three  battles  and  many 
skirmishes  against  superior  numbers  and  with  unbroken 
success;  he  put  out  of  action  3500  Federals  and  took  as 
many  prisoners  with  9  guns.  The  moral  and  strategic 
results  were  even  greater.  The  blow  he  struck  at  Kerns- 
town,  even  though  unsuccessful,  so  staggered  his  opponents 
that  a  large  corps  was  diverted  from  the  Federal  army 
operating  in  eastern  Virginia  back  to  the  Valley.  His 


324  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

victories  demoralized  the  generals  opposed  to  him,  Banks, 
Fremont,  Shields,  Milroy.  His  offensive  vigor  even  alarmed 
the  Washington  Government  for  its  own  safety.  All  this 
had  been  effected  not  by  numbers,  but  by  the  brain  and 
courage  of  one  man,  of  one  great  soldier. 

Through  all  his  movements  in  the  Valley  Jackson  had 
kept  an  eye  on  the  more  important  theatre  of  war  to  the 
east.  McClellan  with  a  great  army  had  landed  at  Fortress 
Monroe  about  the  beginning  of  April  and  was  making 
steady  progress  towards  Richmond  from  the  southeast. 
Johnston,  the  Confederate  commander-in-chief,  was  greatly 
outnumbered  and  a  crisis  was  fast  approaching. 

On  the  6th  of  June  Jackson  wrote  to  Johnston  from  Port 
Republic:  " Should  my  command  be  required  at  Richmond 
I  can  be  at  Mechanic's  Run  depot,  on  the  Central  Railroad, 
the  second  day's  march."  When  this  was  written  Johnston 
was  no  longer  in  command,  having  been  severely  wounded 
at  the  battle  of  Seven  Pines.  His  successor,  Robert  Lee, 
however,  adopted  the  same  plan  of  a  swift  concentration 
against  McClellan.  With  a  secrecy  and  celerity  that  com 
pletely  deceived  the  Federal  generals  in  his  front,  and  even 
his  own  soldiers  and  officers,  Jackson  drew  his  command 
away  from  the  Shenandoah  as  though  by  enchantment,  on  the 
iyth  of  June.  On  the  26th,  when  Washington  still  believed 
Jackson  in  the  Valley,  came  word  from  McClellan  that  the 
Army  of  the  Shenandoah  was  driving  in  his  pickets  on  the 
northern  bank  of  the  Chickahominy.  On  the  27th  Lee 
fought  the  battle  of  Games'  Mill,  that  saved  Richmond  and 
was  the  prelude  of  McClellan's  overthrow  in  the  Peninsula. 
It  was  at  this  moment  that  Lee  and  Jackson  first  became 
associated  and  began  that  great  series  of  victories  that 
during  the  next  twelve  months  made  the  issue  of  the  war 
tremble  in  the  balance. 

By  a  vigorous  offensive  in  which  Lee  used  Jackson  as  his 
right  hand,  McClellan  was  driven  from  position  to  position 


THOiMAS  JONATHAN  JACKSON  325 

down  the  Peninsula.  He  was  defeated  at  Games'  Mill  on 
the  2yth  of  June,  at  Allen's  Farm  on  the  29th,  at  White 
Oak  Swamp  on  the  3oth.  On  the  ist  of  July  the  Federals 
successfully  defended  Malvern  Hill,  which  enabled  them 
to  reach  safely  a  strong  base  on  the  James  River.  Thence 
after  a  month  of  inaction  the  army  was  taken  on  board 
ship  and  moved  back  to  the  Potomac. 

During  the  period  that  preceded  Lee's  brilliant  attack  on 
McClellan  the  Federal  Government  had  been  attempting 
to  form  a  considerable  supporting  army  on  the  Rappahan- 
nock.  That  army  had  been  constantly  alarmed  and  more 
than  once  depleted  by  Jackson's  bold  movements  in  the 
valley  of  the  Shenandoah.  Now,  however,  when  McClellan 
was  already  past  help,  a  force  of  50,000  men  was  ready 
to  press  on  through  central  Virginia  under  the  command 
of  General  Pope.  He  issued  on  the  i4th  of  July  a  procla 
mation  destined  to  become  famous,  in  which  he  promised 
his  troops  a  rapid  advance  and  their  first  view  of  the  backs 
of  their  foes.  A  considerable  movement  in  the  direction  of 
Gordonsville  followed,  which  Jackson  was  sent  to  check, 
and  the  Confederate  leaders  now  began  to  think  less  of 
McClellan  and  to  concentrate  their  attention  on  this  new 
foe.  If  McClellan's  army  were  given  time  to  embark  and 
reform  on  the  Potomac,  Pope  might  be  heavily  reinforced; 
if,  on  the  other  hand,  Lee  moved  immediately  he  might 
hope  to  crush  Pope  before  McClellan's  army  could  join 
him. 

On  the  gth  of  August  the  first  engagement  of  the  new 
campaign  was  fought  at  Cedar  Creek,  Jackson,  with  su 
perior  forces,  defeating  Banks'  corps.  On  the  i3th  Long- 
street  was  started  for  the  Rapidan,  and  Lee  prepared  to 
follow  as  soon  as  McClellan  should  embark. 

Pope,  an  active  officer  who  generally  knew  something  of 
his  opponents'  movements,  suspecting  that  the  whole  Con 
federate  army  was  on  the  march  against  him,  abandoned  the 


326  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

Rapidan  and  fell  back  behind  the  Rappahannock.  This  river 
gave  him  a  very  strong  line  of  defence  and,  although  outnum 
bered,  he  had  good  hopes  of  holding  it  until  reinforcements 
could  reach  him.  From  the  Rappahannock  his  line  of  com 
munication  with  his  base  was  twofold:  first,  the  Orange 
and  Alexandria  Railroad,  running  northeast  from  Beverly 
Ford  through  Manassas  Junction  to  Alexandria,  a  dis 
tance  of  50  miles;  secondly,  parallel  and  to  the  north  a  turn 
pike  running  from  Sulphur  Springs  through  Warrenton, 
Gainesville,  Centreville,  and  Fairfax  Court-house  to 
Alexandria. 

From  the  2Oth  to  the  22d  Lee  cast  about  for  a  likely  point 
at  which  to  force  a  passage  over  the  Rappahannock,  Jackson 
finally  working  a  small  force  across  on  Pope's  extreme  right 
at  Sulphur  Springs.  But  that  night  there  came  a  flood;  the 
river  rose;  the  detachment  on  the  further  bank  was  en 
dangered,  and  Jackson  decided  to  withdraw  it. 

On  the  23d  and  24th  the  Rappahannock  was  so  full  that  the 
armies  were  separated,  but  there  was  cannonading  and 
manoeuvring,  Pope  prolonging  his  right  as  far  as  Waterloo, 
and  the  Confederates  on  the  western  bank  also  working 
higher  up.  The  delay  was  in  favor  of  the  Federals,  for  the 
first  reinforcements  from  McClellan's  army  marching  from 
Aquia  Creek  were  reaching  Pope  at  this  moment. 

On  the  24th  of  August  Lee  and  Jackson  had  a  long  and 
anxious  conference,  and  came  to  a  momentous  decision.  The 
slightest  delay  in  striking  Pope,  who  had  already  become 
their  superior  in  numbers,  meant  the  passing  of  the  present 
opportunity.  In  another  week  probably  150,000  Federals 
would  be  massed  on  the  Rappahannock,  and  Richmond 
would  once  more  be  in  deadly  peril.  Under  these  circum 
stances  an  extreme  resolve  was  come  to.  The  army  was 
to  be  divided  in  two,  and  one-half  of  it  was  to  march  with 
Jackson  by  a  wide  devour  around  Pope's  right  and  towards 
Manassas.  Military  history  may  be  searched  in  vain  for  a 


THOMAS  JONATHAN  JACKSON  327 

flanking  movement  to  equal  this  in  daring,  and  none  but  a 
great  soldier  could  hope  to  execute  it  successfully. 

Jackson's  raid,  as  it  is  sometimes  called,  began  in 
the  early  hours  of  the  25th  of  August.  Three  divisions  of 
Confederates,  Ewell,  A.  P.  Hill,  and  Taliaferro,  in  all 
about  20,000  men,  started  from  the  neighborhood  of 
Jefferson,  in  light  marching  order  and  with  three  days' 
rations.  It  soon  became  apparent  that  the  direction  was 
north  or  northwest,  and  as  the  columns  marched  away  the 
sound  of  Pope's  and  Longstreet's  guns  along  the  Rappa- 
hannock  to  the  southeast  became  gradually  fainter  and 
fainter.  Through  the  whole  day  they  toiled  on  and  on,  ever 
towards  the  north.  At  midnight  the  whole  of  the  troops  had 
reached  Salem  on  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  26  miles 
north  of  their  starting-point  and  about  the  same  distance 
due  west  of  Manassas  Junction. 

The  Confederate  soldiers  had  a  saying  that  Jackson 
always  started  at  dawn  except  when  he  started  the  night 
before.  On  this  occasion  the  stars  were  still  shining  brightly 
when  the  weary  soldiers  were  called  on  for  a  second  effort- 
In  the  early  hours  of  the  26th  of  August  the  column  filed 
through  Thoroughfare  Gap,  heading  not  north  but  east  now, 
and  soon  the  ranks  were  eagerly  discussing  the  move  they  now 
began  to  understand,  for  it  was  plain  that  Jackson  was  strik 
ing  at  Pope's  line  of  communications.  Through  all  that  day 
they  tramped  relentlessly  on.  At  noon  they  passed  through 
Gainesville,  13  miles  back  of  Warrenton,  where  Pope  still 
held  his  headquarters  unsuspicious  of  danger;  at  sunset  they 
were  at  Bristowe  Station;  at  midnight  Stuart  and  Trimble 
just  reached  Manassas  Junction. 

The  next  day  was  one  of  comparative  inaction  and  in  some 
ways  of  recreation  for  Jackson's  army.  Pope  had  been  com 
pletely  surprised.  He  had,  indeed,  carefully  guarded  his 
right  flank  in  the  direction  of  Sulphur  Springs  and  Waterloo, 
but  although  he  was  informed,  early  on  the  25th,  that  Jack- 


328  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

son  had  marched  north,  yet  a  movement  such  as  that  which 
had  just  been  successfully  executed  had  never  entered  into 
his  calculations.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  26th,  however, 
as  Jackson  and  Stuart  began  cutting  through  the  Federal 
rear,  reports  reached  both  Warrenton  and  Washington  that 
showed  trouble  was  brewing.  In  the  afternoon  of  the 
26th  considerable  detachments  were  marched  toward  Man- 
assas  and  Gainesville,  and  in  the  morning  of  the  27th,  when 
the  gravity  of  the  situation  became  clearer,  Pope  abandoned 
his  positions  on  the  Rappahannock  and  began  a  general 
movement  to  the  rear.  Thus  the  Confederates'  first  object 
was  gained;  but  there  still  remained  two  difficult  results  to 
obtain:  first,  to  extricate  Jackson's  corps  from  its  perilous 
position;  secondly,  to  deal  Pope  a  decisive  blow.  It  was  to 
accomplish  them  that  Jackson  remained  during  the  whole 
of  the  27th  of  August  inactive  at  Manassas;  an  essential 
step  in  his  plan  was  to  draw  Pope  to  that  point. 

Meanwhile  at  the  junction  the  Confederate  soldiers 
were  reaping  their  reward.  Many  millions'  worth  of  stores 
had  been  accumulated  at  this  point  for  the  supply  of  the 
Federal  armies,  and  before  setting  the  torch  to  them  the 
Southerners  had  their  fill  of  many  unwonted  delicacies 
and  reclothed  and  reshod  themselves.  At  night  the  work  of 
destruction  began,  and  a  monster  blaze  punctuated  by  the 
boom  of  exploding  magazines  told  the  retreating  Federals 
that  Stonewall  Jackson  was  at  work  in  their  rear. 

During  all  that  day  Jackson  had  been  content  to  drive 
back  one  or  two 'small  detachments  sent  against  him,  and 
to  remain  at  Manassas.  But  now  that  he  felt  confident 
that  all  Pope's  columns  must  be  marching  on  the  junction, 
now  that  night  would  screen  his  movements,  he  slipped 
away  into  the  darkness,  marching  north.  In  the  early 
morning  of  the  28th  Jackson's  troops  were  in  the  vicinity  of 
Bull  Run  and  Centreville,  and  thence,  while  Pope  advanced 
from  west  to  east  on  Manassas,  Jackson,  only  a  few  miles 
to  his  north,  filed  away  along  the  line  of  Bull  Run  from 


THOMAS  JONATHAN  JACKSON  329 

east  to  west.  By  midday  he  was  between  Sudley  Springs 
and  Groveton,  at  rest  and  in  a  strong  position  facing  towards 
Manassas.  Behind  him  he  had  a  clear  line  of  retreat 
towards  Aldie  Gap,  and  on  his  right  he  hoped  before  long 
to  get  news  of  Lee  from  Thoroughfare  Gap.  Pope's  army 
was  now  entirely  in  his  front,  except  McDowell's  corps 
that  was  still  passing  through  Gainesville,  two  miles  on 
Jackson's  right.  Behind  McDowell  it  was  probable  that 
Lee  was  advancing,  and  if  so,  Jackson  was  exactly  in 
position  to  establish  a  continuous  line  of  battle  with  his 
commander-in-chief. 

All  that  day  Pope  moved  not  only  in  the  wrong  direction, 
but  with  the  utmost  slowness.  He  entirely  failed  to  locate 
Jackson's  corps,  and  had  it  not  been  for  that  commander's 
own  initiative,  his  whereabouts  might  have  remained  un 
known  until  his  junction  with  Lee  had  been  effected.  But 
late  in  the  day,  while  Jackson  still  lay  in  his  masked  position 
north  of  Groveton,  a  Federal  division  of  10,000  men, 
General  King's,  was  discovered  marching  from  Gainesville 
to  Centreville  by  the  road  passing  along  the  front  of  the 
Confederate  line.  There  was  now  no  danger  to  be  feared 
from  the  rear,  little  from  the  right,  and  Stuart  had  just 
sent  in  word  that  Longstreet  was  skirmishing  with  the 
Federal  rear-guard  between  Thoroughfare  Gap  and  Gaines 
ville;  so  Jackson  decided  to  attack.  For  an  hour  and  a 
half,  until  darkness  set  in,  a  fierce  fight  took  place  in  which 
the  Federals,  though  partly  surprised  and  heavily  outnum 
bered,  bravely  held  their  own.  The  direct  result  was 
unimportant,  but  the  sound  of  Jackson's  guns  had  cleared 
the  situation:  Pope's  columns  were  at  once  started  towards 
Groveton,  and  Lee  and  Longstreet  knew  where  to  reach 
their  comrades. 

On  the  morning  of  the  2gth  Jackson  with  20,000  men 
and  40  guns  firmly  awaited  the  attack  of  the  Federal  army 
in  an  admirable  defensive  position.  Stuart  with  the  cav 
alry  patrolled  far  to  the  southwest  along  the  road  between 


330  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

Gainesville  and  Thoroughfare  Gap;  it  was  here  that  Lee 
must  arrive  and  join  his  lieutenant,  and  success  depended 
entirely  on  his  movements.  From  eight  to  ten  o'clock 
Sigel's  and  Reynolds'  corps  attacked  the  Confederate  posi 
tion.  Their  numbers  were  hardly  equal  to  Jackson's;  their 
leadership  was  not  brilliant;  their  discomfiture  was  com 
plete.  At  10.30  Jackson  received  the  welcome  intelligence 
that  Longstreet's  advance-guard  had  just  reached  Gaines 
ville, — Gainesville,  the  most  important  strategic  point  in 
the  whole  field  of  operations,  foolishly  abandoned  the 
day  before  by  Pope.  Two  hours'  steady  marching  would 
bring  his  heads  of  column  on  the  field. 

In  the  meanwhile  Pope  resumed  his  attack,  gradually 
getting  more  and  more  troops  into  action,  unaware  that 
Longstreet's  corps  was  now  deploying  in  the  woods  on 
Jackson's  right.  Lee  was  bending  all  his  efforts  to  mask 
the  movements  of  his  right  until  he  was  ready  to  strike  a 
crushing  blow  at  his  adversary. 

Stubbornly  Jackson  clung  to  his  position  as  the  afternoon 
wore  on  amid  furious  charges  and  counter-charges.  In 
front  of  A.  P.  Hill's  brigades  4000  dead  and  wounded 
Federals  lay  stretched,  but  the  Confederates  had  used 
nearly  all  their  ammunition,  nearly  all  their  physical  strength. 
All  Jackson's  reserves  had  been  engaged,  while  fresh 
Federal  troops  could  still  be  discerned  advancing  to  renew 
the  fight.  At  4.30  Kearney's  and  Reno's  divisions  moved 
to  the  attack.  The  first  Confederate  line  was  at  last  swept 
away,  but  Early  delivered  a  counterstroke,  and  in  turn 
drove  back  the  assailants.  This  proved  the  last  effort 
of  the  day.  Pope  had  lost  nearly  8000  men  in  the  attack 
of  Jackson's  position,  and  now  accepted  failure.  Lee, 
who  had  succeeded  in  getting  25,000  men  into  line  on 
Jackson's  right,  had  not  been  seriously  engaged. 

On  the  following  day,  the  3oth  of  August,  the  issue  was 
settled.  Lee  at  first  decided  to  maintain  the  defensive.  His 


THOMAS  JONATHAN  JACKSON  331 

total  was  about  50,000  men,  and  two  days'  march  in  his 
rear  were  reinforcements  on  their  way  to  join  him,  totalling 
about  20,000  more;  he  knew  that  his  opponent  was  superior 
in  numbers, — Pope  actually  mustered  65,000  men, — and 
that  he  could  fight  hard ;  he  further  feared  that  considerable 
reinforcements  might  have  reached  him.  Pope,  a  born 
fighter,  whose  misfortune  it  was  to  have  to  contend  against 
men  of  supreme  military  ability,  was  still  confident  of 
success  and  bent  on  attack.  At  noon,  as  yet  unaware  that 
Lee's  whole  army  was  in  his  front,  he  ordered  his  troops 
forward.  A  tremendous  onslaught  was  made  on  Jackson's 
wing,  Pope  weakening  his  left  to  achieve  his  object.  For 
four  hours  a  desperate  conflict,  often  hand  to  hand,  was 
waged  over  the  same  ground  as  the  day  before  and  with 
the  same  result.  By  four  o'clock  every  division  of  the 
Federals  had  been  engaged,  and  just  then,  as  Pope  was 
fairly  spent,  long  lines  of  advancing  gray-clad  skirmishers 
began  to  creep  forward  on  his  extreme  left.  Longstreet's 
long-held-back  forces  were  coming  into  action;  Lee  had 
assumed  the  offensive.  Steadily,  but  surely,  Jackson 
on  the  left,  Longstreet  on  the  right,  pushed  back  the  dis 
ordered  Federal  divisions  from  wood  to  wood  and  from 
hill  to  hill.  When  night  compelled  an  end,  Pope  had  been 
driven  off  the  field,  and  nothing  but  the  splendid  constancy 
of  his  infantry  and  artillery  in  defeat  saved  the  Henry  hill 
overlooking  Bull  Run,  the  last  position  that  covered  the 
passage  of  that  river.  Had  Longstreet  succeeded  in  reach 
ing  it  the  defeat  might  have  become  a  disaster. 

Lee  did  what  was  possible  to  improve  his  victory.  On 
the  following  day  Stuart  and  the  cavalry  pushed  on  towards 
Centreville,  where  Pope  was  discovered  in  position.  Long- 
street  followed  Stuart.  Jackson  was  ordered  north  to  the 
Little  River  turnpike  to  threaten  Pope's  right  and  line  of 
communications.  On  the  ist  of  September  he  fought  an  in 
conclusive  engagement  at  Chantilly  with  a  fraction  of  Pope's 


332  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

forces.  But  on  the  part  of  the  Federals  it  was  only  a  rear 
guard  action;  their  general  had  now  lost  courage;  his 
army  was  dispirited  and  he  had  decided  to  retire  to  Wash 
ington  so  as  to  place  the  Potomac  between  him  and  his 
relentless  enemy.  Lee  gave  up  hope  of  further  pursuit: 
the  campaign  against  Pope  had  come  to  an  end. 

Few  more  brilliant  achievements  than  those  of  Jackson 
in  this  campaign  are  to  be  found  in  military  history.  His 
march  of  56  miles  in  less  than  forty  hours;  his  boldness; 
his  constant  alertness  night  and  day,  are  as  nothing  com 
pared  to  the  intellectual  power  and  judgment  that  never 
failed  him.  Every  step  he  took  was  based  on  unflinching 
logic,  and  nothing  is  more  amazing  than  the  unerring 
certainty  with  which  this  great  soldier's  eye  pierced  the 
fog  of  war  through  which  his  opponents  were  hopelessly 
floundering.  That  march  will  always  be  studied  by  soldiers, 
and  if  it  stamps  with  greatness  the  general  in  direct  control, 
it  equally  stamps  with  greatness  his  commander-in -chief, 
who  accepted  the  responsibility,  who  shouldered  the  burden, 
whose  support  and  movements  Jackson  relied  on,  and 
whose  final  dispositions  earned  the  crowning  victory.* 

With  Pope  defeated  and  behind  the  Potomac,  the  question 
arose,  should  Lee  give  up  the  offensive?  If  not,  what 
should  be  his  next  move?  The  answer  was  quickly  forth 
coming.  The  very  day  after  the  fight  at  Chantilly,  Lee 
ordered  the  army  to  turn  north  and  cross  the  Potomac 
into  Maryland.  On  the  6th  Jackson,  now  in  the  rear, 

*  Ropes  and  Henderson  are  the  two  writers  best  qualified  to  express  an 
opinion  on  Jackson's  raid.  Ropes  was  a  civilian,  Henderson  a  soldier;  their 
views  are  opposite.  Ropes,  unquestionably  the  best  American  authority  on 
the  Civil  War,  criticises  Jackson  and  minimizes  his  achievement,  mainly  on 
the  ground  that  he  acted  against  the  rules  of  war;  the  Austrian  generals 
made  the  same  complaint  of  Bonaparte.  Henderson's  opinion  has  been  fol 
lowed  here,  except  in  one  particular:  the  reason  ascribed  for  Jackson's  im 
mobility  at  Manassas  on  the  27th  of  August. 


THOMAS  JONATHAN  JACKSON  333 

reached  the  river;  on  the  yth  he  marched  into  Fred 
erick. 

The  news  of  Lee's  invasion  created  the  utmost  excite 
ment  in  the  North,  and  it  was  under  this  excitement  that 
Whittier  produced  his  famous  poem  "Barbara  Frietchie," 
which,  needless  to  say,  is  not  to  be  considered  as  strictly 
historical. 

From  Frederick,  on  the  loth  of  September,  Lee  detached 
Jackson  to  attack  Harper's  Ferry,  while  the  main  part  of 
the  army  moved  slowly  west  towards  South  Mountain. 
Jackson  seized  the  surrounding  heights  and  attacked 
Harper's  Ferry  on  the  i5th  of  September;  after  an  hour's 
firing  the  commanding  officer,  General  White,  surrendered 
with  12,500  men  and  73  guns.  Immediately  after  the 
surrender,  and  in  pursuance  of  orders  previously  received, 
Jackson  started  to  rejoin  Lee  beyond  the  Potomac  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Sharpsburg,  and  to  accomplish  this  object 
kept  his  troops  on  the  march  during  the  night  of  the  i5th 
to  1 6th.  This  forced  march  saved  Lee  from  an  over 
whelming  attack. 

The  Northern  army  was  now  once  more  under  the  orders 
of  McClellan.  His  troops,  though  shaken  by  defeat,  were 
far  from  disheartened.  His  numbers  were  formidable. 
Leaving  70,000  men  under  Banks  to  defend  Washington, 
he  had  advanced  cautiously  towards  Lee  with  85,000. 
On  the  1 4th  three  of  his  corps  had  come  into  contact  with 
the  Confederates  near  South  Mountain,  and  after  a  fierce 
engagement  that  went  against  him  Lee  retired  towards 
Sharpsburg.  McClellan  followed,  and  on  the  evening  of 
the  1 5th  a  great  part  of  his  army  had  arrived  on  a  line  of 
hills  running  north  and  south  along  the  Antietam.  Beyond 
the  river  Lee  was  in  position  awaiting  Jackson's  advent 
from  Harper's  Ferry. 

On  the  1 6th  the  two  armies  faced  one  another.  Lee, 
though  heavily  outnumbered,  was  determined  not  to  give  up 


334  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

his  hold  on  Maryland  without  a  battle.  In  the  evening 
the  Federal  centre  under  Hooker  advanced,  and  there 
was  some  fighting  of  an  inconclusive  character.  On  the 
i  yth  the  fighting  developed  into  a  general  engagement. 
Jackson  was  on  the  left,  the  least  secure  part  of  Lee's  well- 
chosen  position.  From  five  to  nine  o'clock  in  the  morning 
he  supported  the  attack  of  two  of  the  Federal  corps,  losing 
some  ground,  but  maintaining  his  line  and  his  resistance. 
Hooker  and  Mansfield  were  the  attacking  generals.  Hooker 
was  wounded;  he  lost  over  100  officers  and  2400  killed  and 
wounded;  his  corps  was  badly  shattered.  Mansfield  was 
almost  as  severely  treated.  By  9  o'clock  the  Federal  ad 
vance  had  been  completely  checked. 

Elsewhere  Lee  held  McClellan  well  in  hand  and  he  now 
felt  able  to  detach  10,000  men  from  his  right  and  centre 
to  reinforce  Jackson.  But  the  latter  was  given  no  time 
for  a  counterstroke.  Summer's  corps,  18,000  strong,  was 
just  coming  into  action  in  support  of  Hooker  and  Mans 
field.  Jackson  watched  the  approaching  lines  with  steady 
nerve.  He  only  strengthened  his  weak  battalions  at  a 
few  points,  holding  back  McLaws'  and  Anderson's  fresh 
troops;  he  foresaw  the  opportunity  that  was  coming. 
Sedgwick's  division  swept  on  towards  the  Confederate  front, 
when  suddenly  McLaws  appeared  on  his  left,  and  instantly 
the  Federals  were  hopelessly  flanked  and  crumpled  up. 
Palfrey,  who  was  in  the  attack,  says:  " Nearly  2000  men 
were  disabled  in  a  moment."  The  counterstroke  was 
pressed  home;  at  every  point  the  Federals  receded,  and 
long  lines  of  gray-clad,  yelling  Confederates  poured  after 
them  unchecked  by  the  bursting  shells  hurled  from  McClel- 
lan's  batteries.  For  a  few  minutes  Jackson  followed  up 
the  movement,  in  hopes  that  he  had  broken  the  enemy's 
right  wing.  The  Federals,  however,  were  not  done  with 
yet;  they  bravely  rallied  on  a  brigade  of  Franklin's  corps 
that  was  most  opportunely  brought  up;  the  fighting  was 


THOMAS  JONATHAN  JACKSON  335 

renewed;  and  by  half-past  ten  the  Confederates  were  once 
more  in  their  first  position. 

After  this  the  stress  of  battle  bore  more  to  the  south. 
Desperate  fighting  along  the  centre  and  right  of  the  Con 
federate  position  drove  their  line  back,  but  at  such  fearful 
cost  to  the  attacking  troops  that  in  the  afternoon  Lee  was 
still  hoping  to  attempt  the  offensive  and  to  snatch  victory 
from  McClellan.  Stuart  was  sent  to  feel  McClellan's  right 
for  an  opportunity  to  outflank  him,  and  Jackson  was  to  be 
ready  to  support  him,  but  in  vain.  Night  closed  in,  leaving 
the  two  armies  still  face  to  face;  out  of  about  100,000  men 
actually  engaged  more  than  20,000  had  been  killed  and 
wounded.  One  of  the  Southern  regiments,  the  iyth  Vir 
ginia,  over  i ocx)  strong  at  the  first  battle  of  Manassas,  fifteen 
months  before,  had  but  two  officers  and  twelve  men  left  in 
the  ranks  that  night. 

The  next  day  found  the  two  armies  in  line  of  battle,  but 
exhausted.  Lee,  still  anxious  to  strike  the  enemy,  urged 
an  attack  on  McClellan's  right.  Jackson  and  Stuart  both 
reconnoitred;  they  both  thought  McClellan  too  strongly 
posted;  they  both  reported  the  movement  hopeless.  When 
Jackson  and  Stuart  agreed  that  it  was  unwise  to  attack, 
even  Lee  might  well  be  daunted.  Reluctantly  he  bowed  to 
the  inevitable,  and  at  night,  knowing  that  McClellan  was 
being  steadily  reinforced,  issued  orders  to  withdraw  across 
the  Potomac. 

From  the  terrible  field  of  the  Antietam  Lee  retired  in  good 
order  into  the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah.  McClellan,  con 
tent  with  having  stemmed  the  tide  of  Confederate  victories, 
made  no  immediate  attempt  to  carry  the  war  into  Virginia, 
and  the  weary  soldiers  of  the  South  were  able  to  enjoy  a  few 
weeks  of  well-earned  rest.  Jackson  had  earned  not  only 
rest  but  reward,  and  the  latter  came  promptly  enough.  The 
Confederate  Government,  on  Lee's  recommendation,  pro 
moted  Jackson  to  the  rank  of  lieutenant-general,  and  assigned 


336  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

him  to  the  command  of  the  2d  army  corps  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia. 

Towards  the  end  of  October  McClellan  at  last  got  into 
motion  and  crossed  the  Potomac.  On  the  yth  of  November, 
however,  he  was  superseded  and  replaced  by  Burnside,  a 
general  so  consciously  incapable  of  the  large  command 
thrust  upon  him  that  he  actually  warned  the  Washington 
government  of  his  inability  to  exercise  it.  Various  move 
ments  followed  that  left  the  two  armies  concentrated  on 
opposite  banks  of  the  Rappahannock  near  Fredericksburg. 

On  the  nth  of  December  Burnside  took  the  offensive. 
Under  cover  of  a  battery  of  150  guns  placed  along  the  high 
north  bank  of  the  Rappahannock  he  threw  pontoon  bridges 
over  and  moved  his  troops  to  the  southern  side.  The  little 
town  of  Fredericksburg  lay  along  the  water's  edge  and  was 
not  held  by  the  Confederates.  Lee's  position  ran  along  a  line 
of  hills  about  ij  or  2  miles  back  from  the  river  which  Burn- 
side's  guns  from  the  northern  bank  could  not  command 
effectively.  Longstreet  with  the  ist  corps  was  on  the  left, 
behind  Fredericksburg;  Jackson  with  the  2d  corps  on  the 
right.  It  was  not  till  late  in  the  afternoon  that  the  bridges 
were  completed,  and  Burnside  made  no  attempt  to  send 
the  bulk  of  his  troops  over  that  day. 

On  the  1 2th  the  Federal  commander  resumed  his  languid 
movements,  and  placed  four  of  his  six  corps  on  the  southern 
bank;  it  was  not  till  the  morning  of  the  i3th,  however,  that  he 
attacked,  not  till  Lee  had  had  ample  warning  and  ample 
time  to  complete  his  preparations  for  defence,  and  to  call 
in  all  his  outlying  detachments. 

Jackson  with  30,000  men  covered  a  front  of  about  ij 
miles;  opposed  to  him  was  Franklin  with  55,000;  but  of 
those  55,000  only  4500,  by  the  special  injunction  of  the 
deluded  Burnside,  were  sent  forward  to  attack  the  position 
where  Stonewall  Jackson  lay  in  wait  for  them.  Meade 
advanced  in  parade  order,  while  the  50,000  waited  and 


THOMAS  JONATHAN   JACKSON  337 

watched,  and  when  he  came  within  range  of  the  wooded 
heights  he  was  received  with  a  storm  of  fire  and  found  his 
advance  suddenly  checked.  In  a  very  short  time  his  brigades 
were  retiring  towards  the  Rappahannock  in  complete  dis 
order. 

Two  hours  later  Franklin  renewed  the  attack,  this  time 
in  full  force;  fierce  fighting  followed;  eventually  he  was 
driven  back.  Longstreet  on  the  left  had  been  as  successful 
as  Jackson,  and  by  2  or  3  o'clock  the  Federal  army  was 
thoroughly  beaten  and  demoralized.  Lee  did  not  realize 
the  extent  of  Burnside's  discomfiture;  he  was  better  placed 
for  defence  than  for  offence;  at  all  events  the  Confederates, 
though  little  damaged  and  full  of  fight,  were  not  led  for 
ward.  That  night  Burnside  decided  that  he  would  resume 
the  attack  on  the  next  day;  but  the  morning  brought  better 
counsel,  and  on  the  i5th  the  defeated  army  recrossed  the 
Rappahannock. 

At  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg  the  Federals  fought  with 
less  than  their  usual  spirit;  they  had  been  too  conscious  of 
the  incompetence  of  their  leader.  For  the  private  soldiers 
on  both  sides  constituted  an  infallible  court  of  appeal  that 
judged  generalship  without  mercy.  Before  that  tribunal 
Burnside  stood  convicted  just  as  Jackson  stood  exalted. 
The  Northern  soldiers  a  few  days  after  the  battle  showed 
how  far  their  good  sense  and  generosity  reached  by  a 
striking  demonstration.  Jackson  was  inspecting  his  line 
of  outposts  along  the  river;  on  the  further  bank  were  the 
Northern  pickets;  between  the  two  lines  there  was  a  tacit 
truce  and  some  interchange  of  chaff  and  military  amenities. 
The  commander  of  the  2d  army  corps,  despite  his  severity, 
was  the  established  favorite  of  the  Southern  army;  wher 
ever  he  appeared  he  was  greeted  with  storms  of  cheers. 
This  occasion  proved  no  exception;  loud  hurrahs  burst  out 
along  the  riverside,  and  excited  the  curiosity  of  the  Federals 
on  the  further  bank,  Presently  they  heard  that  Stonewall 


338  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

Jackson  was  in  front  of  them,  and  in  a  moment  the  Federal 
line  reechoed  the  shouts  of  their  enemies.  It  was  a  magnifi 
cent  tribute  to  Jackson,  just  as  it  was  a  scathing  criticism  of 
Burnside  and  the  Washington  Government;  and  to  us  who 
come  later  may  it  not  be  read  as  a  sign  that  the  men  who 
stood  facing  one  another  on  the  Rappahannock  were  after 
all  brothers  and  could  equally  recognize  that  in  Stonewall 
Jackson  they  were  acclaiming  a  great  representative  of  their 
race? 

Burnside's  failure  was  followed  by  another  experiment 
in  the  command  of  the  Federal  army.  He  was  relieved  and 
replaced  by  Hooker — fighting  Joe  Hooker.  Time,  however, 
was  required  to  restore  the  morale  of  the  defeated  army; 
the  winter  season  made  military  operations  difficult,  and 
it  was  not  till  April  that  Hooker  was  ready  to  begin  opera 
tions.  On  the  2Qth  of  that  month  the  roar  of  artillery  was 
heard  once  more  along  the  Rappahannock,  and  Jackson 
hurried  off  to  visit  his  outposts.  In  the  course  of  the  winter 
he  had  more  than  once  declared  that  the  spring  campaign 
of  1863  must  be  an  active  one,  and  before  many  days  had 
passed  he  more  than  redeemed  his  word. 

Hooker  had  about  110,000  men  at  his  command  for  field 
operations.  He  had  been  loud  in  his  criticism  of  Burn- 
side's  frontal  attack  beyond  Fredericksburg,  and  so  was 
committed  to  some  other  method  of  driving  Lee  from  the 
apparently  impregnable  position  that  stretched  for  20  miles 
up  and  down  stream.  He  decided  to  turn  the  Confederate 
left  by  fording  and  bridging  the  Rappahannock  some  distance 
above  Fredericksburg.  This  in  itself  was  not  an  irrational 
starting-point  for  a  plan  of  operations,  but  the  details  of 
his  scheme  were  not  altogether  happily  conceived.  Neglect 
ing  the  important  factors  represented  by  the  proved  general 
ship  of  the  Confederates,  by  the  morale  of  their  army,  by 
the  great  offensive  power  they  had  so  repeatedly  displayed, 
and  attaching  himself  instead  to  the  bare  statistical  fact 


THOMAS  JONATHAN   JACKSON  339 

that  his  army  was  exactly  twice  the  size  of  that  of  his  oppo 
nent,  Hooker  decided  on  a  weak  manoeuvre.  Few  strategic 
conceptions  are  more  attractive  than  those  of  which  the 
climax  is  reached  by  effecting  the  junction  of  two  armies 
on  the  field  of  battle.  But  such  movements  are  hazardous, 
and  they  more  generally  end  in  failure  than  in  such  suc 
cesses  as  those  of  the  Allies  at  Leipzig,  of  Moltke  at  Sadowa, 
or  of  Lee  at  the  Second  Manassas  and  Chancellorsville. 
Hooker,  perhaps  influenced  by  the  brilliant  example  of  his 
opponents,  decided  to  emulate  them.  He  divided  his  army 
into  two  nearly  equal  halves.  The  left  wing  he  placed  under 
Sedgwick  with  orders  to  demonstrate  below  Fredericksburg 
and  to  hold  the  Confederates  in  play  while  he  himself  crossed 
higher  up;  so  that  when  Lee,  as  he  anticipated,  retreated, 
Sedgwick  would  follow  and  join  the  rest  of  the  army  in  a 
crushing  attack.  Had  Hooker  been  Lee,  and  Sedgwick 
Jackson,  the  plan  would  doubtless  have  succeeded;  as  it 
was,  it  failed  miserably. 

By  the  evening  of  the  3oth  of  April  Lee  knew  that  Hooker 
and  Sedgwick  were  both  across  the  Rappahannock ;  they 
were  about  14  miles  apart  and  the  Confederate  army  lay 
between  them.  That  night  Hooker  had  marched  south  from 
the  river  as  far  as  Chancellorsville,  and  had  nearly  70,000 
men  within  call;  he  was  already  well  over  Lee's  left  flank. 

Lee  met  Hooker's  move  by  facing  the  greater  part  of  his 
army  to  the  left  to  meet  the  threatened  attack.  Leaving 
10,000  to  15,000  men  in  his  fortified  positions  at  Fredericks- 
burg  to  contain  Sedgwick,  he  aligned  45,000  men  across 
Hooker's  line  of  march  in  the  early  hours  of  the  ist  of  May; 
Jackson  took  command  of  the  left  wing.  For  some  hours 
the  army  waited  in  position;  but  Hooker  gave  no  sign; 
Lee  could  not  delay,  for  fear  Sedgwick  would  carry  the 
Fredericksburg  lines  behind  him;  and  so,  at  half -past  ten, 
the  Confederates  marched  forward  towards  Chancellorsville. 
The  Federal  skirmishers  were  soon  encountered;  soon  the 


340  LEADING  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 

dense  woods  echoed  to  the  rattle  of  musketry;  but  no  force 
large  enough  to  stay  the  Confederate  advance  was  met  with, 
and  the  troops  pushed  steadily  on.  At  5  P.M.,  when  Chan- 
cellorsville  was  nearly  reached,  Hooker's  main  force  was 
met.  Discovering  that  Lee  was  marching  on  him,  his  offen 
sive  vigor  had  lapsed  and  he  had  taken  up  a  strong  defensive 
position  covered  by  a  numerous  artillery.  He  hoped  that 
he  might  keep  the  enemy  at  bay  until  such  time  as  Sedg- 
wick  could  arrive  on  the  field.  Again  Hooker's  conception 
was  not  injudicious,  but  it  lost  sight  of  the  fact  that  his 
initial  plan  necessitated  a  vigorous  offensive  resolutely 
maintained,  and  it  made  no  allowance  for  the  fact  that  two 
such  men  as  Lee  and  Jackson  were  in  front  of  him. 

The  Confederate  generals  reconnoitred  long  and  anxiously 
as  the  sun  sank  in  the  west,  but  could  find  no  point  at  which 
Hooker's  line  invited  attack.  On  his  side  the  Federal 
commander  awaited  the  result  of  the  orders  he  had  sent  to 
Sedgwick  that  morning.  Those  orders  were  that  he  was 
to  attack  strongly  and  follow  Lee  up,  but  it  so  happened 
that  they  were  not  delivered  till  nearly  six,  when  it  was 
too  late,  and  so  the  day  came  to  an  inconclusive  end  with 
Sedgwick  inactive. 

The  hours  of  the  night  were  not  wasted  by  the  Con 
federates.  Stuart  scouting  on  the  left  sent  in  the  news 
that  Hooker's  extreme  right  was  in  the  air, — without  flank 
protection.  At  2.30  in  the  morning  Jackson  got  information 
that  a  lumber  road  passed  beyond  and  behind  the  Federal 
position;  he  also  secured  a  guide  who  knew  the  road.  An 
hour  later,  Lee,  who  had  already  made  up  his  mind  to 
attempt  Hooker's  left,  was  conferring  with  Jackson.  They 
quickly  agreed  on  a  movement  that  was  to  repeat  on  a 
smaller  scale  the  manoeuvre  that  had  brought  Pope  to  disaster. 

Once  more,  as  before  the  Second  Manassas,  Jackson 
was  separating  his  command  from  Lee's.  At  four  o'clock 
on  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  May  he  plunged  into  the  heart 


THOMAS  JONATHAN  JACKSON  341 

of  the  forest,  leaving  Lee  with  a  scanty  force  to  hold  his 
ground  as  best  he  might.  If  Hooker  had  realized  the  value 
of  the  initiative,  or  if  he  had  plucked  up  courage  enough 
to  attack,  it  would  have  fared  ill  with  Lee,  who,  during 
that  whole  day,  faced  him  with  only  10,000  bayonets. 
It  was  not  till  half-past  five  in  the  afternoon  that  Jackson 
was  in  position.  Carefully  screened  by  Fitzhugh  Lee's 
horsemen  he  had  marched  12  miles  around  Hooker's  right 
and  was  now  in  line  of  battle  with  25,000  men  in  the 
rear  of  Howard's  corps  and  of  the  whole  Federal  army. 
No  Federal  general  had  an  inkling  of  what  had  happened, 
or  of  what  was  about  to  happen,  and  Howard's  troops  had 
actually  stacked  arms  so  as  to  cook  their  dinners.  Sud 
denly  bugle-calls  rang  out,  the  rebel  yell  resounded  through 
the  forest,  and  lines  of  infantry  came  crashing  through 
the  undergrowth.  There  was  no  time  to  form  a  line;  in 
an  hour's  time  Howard's  corps  had  been  routed  and  driven 
in  confusion  from  the  ground. 

Jackson  kept  pressing  his  men  forward.  Only  half  a 
mile  more  and  Hooker's  line  of  retreat  would  be  reached; 
only  2  miles  more  and  Jackson's  right  would  join  Lee's 
left;  one  final  effort  and  Hooker's  army,  pierced  through 
its  centre,  cut  off  from  retreat,  would  be  overwhelmed  in 
disaster.  It  was  not  to  be.  The  victorious  troops  were 
much  confused  from  the  rapidity  with  which  they  had 
driven  Howard  through  the  woods;  the  sun  was  fast  sink 
ing,  and  even  Jackson  could  not  hope  to  emulate  the  most 
terrible  and  the  most  God-favored  of  the  generals  of  the 
people  of  Israel.  He  did  only  what  plain  duty  and  relent 
less  resolve  dictated.  With  a  few  staff  officers  he  galloped 
to  the  front,  beyond  even  his  most  advanced  troops,  and 
dashed  through  the  woods  in  search  of  a  spot  whence  he 
could  view  the  Federal  positions,  whence  he  could  send  back 
orders  for  the  crucial  move,  that  should  place  the  2d  corps 
on  Hooker's  line  of  retreat.  The  woods  were  dense  and 


342  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

already  dark;  Jackson  searched  in  vain,  then  turned  bridle 
and  sought  his  own  lines  once  more;  it  was  now  about 
half -past  eight.  The  i8th  North  Carolina,  the  most-to- 
be-pitied  regiment  of  the  Confederate  service,  was  in  line 
awaiting  orders  to  advance.  Suddenly  a  knot  of  horse 
men  crashed  out  from  the  forest  a  few  yards  in  front.  Who 
could  tell  in  the  darkness  that  they  were  not  enemies? 
Out  blazed  the  long  line  of  muskets,  and  truly  were  they 
aimed.  Horses  and  men  fell,  and  among  them  was  Stone 
wall  Jackson,  the  idol  and  hope  of  the  army,  shot  down 
by  his  own  soldiers  in  the  very  instant  of  victory.  He  had 
received  three  wounds,  an  artery  was  severed,  and  the  left 
arm  was  crushed  just  below  the  shoulder. 

Loving  hands  bore  the  wounded  general  from  the  field; 
surgeons  attended  him,  amputated  his  left  arm,  dressed 
his  other  wounds;  word  was  sent  to  Stuart  to  take  command, 
to  Lee  that  Jackson  had  been  wounded.  The  commander- 
in-chief  at  once  wrote  back: 

"GENERAL,  I  have  just  received  your  note  informing  me 
that  you  were  wounded.  I  cannot  express  my  regret  at  the 
occurrence.  Could  I  have  directed  events  I  should  have 
chosen  for  the  good  of  the  country  to  be  disabled  in  your 
stead. 

"I  congratulate  you  upon  the  victory,  which  is  due  to 
your  skill  and  energy. 

"Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  Servant, 

"R.  E.  LEE."* 

*  Henderson  dramatically  places  Lee's  first  knowledge  of  Jackson's 
wound  at  the  close  of  the  fighting  on  the  afternoon  of  the  3d  of  May.  Pre 
sumably  he  relies  on  Colonel  Marshall's  statement,  which,  however,  was 
made  some  years  after  the  event  and  obviously  lacks  precision.  Long 
(Memoirs,  258)  explicitly  states  that  Lee  received  the  news  at  midnight, 
which  is  far  more  probable,  and  in  addition  we  have  two  letters  from  Lee 
to  Stuart  containing  directions  for  the  movement  of  the  2d  corps  dated 
respectively  3  A.M.  and  3.30  A.M.,  May  3d.  The  inference  from  this  is 
apparently  conclusive.  (War  Records,  Ser.  I,  Vol.  XXV,  Part  II,  769.) 


THOMAS  JONATHAN   JACKSON  343 

Lee  had  indeed  lost  his  right  hand.  Although  the  victory 
of  Chancellorsville  was  completed  on  the  following  day,— 
the  troops  of  the  2d  army  corps  fighting  with  irresistible 
fury  to  the  shout  of  " Remember  Jackson!"— it  had  been 
paid  for  at  too  high  a  price.  For  never  afterwards  could 
Lee  venture  one  of  those  wide  turning  movements  that 
his  ablest  lieutenant  alone  could  bring  to  a  successful  issue. 

The  wounds  from  which  Jackson  suffered  appeared  to 
offer  fair  hope  of  his  recovery.  But,  unfortunately,  pneu 
monia  set  in.  On  the  yth  of  May  his  wife  and  child  arrived 
at  his  bedside;  he  was  then  sinking.  On  Sunday,  the  loth, 
in  the  morning,  he  was  told  that  death  was  near.  He 
whispered  to  Major  Pendleton:  "Who  is  preaching  at 
headquarters  to-day?"  He  was  told  that  it  was  a  Mr. 
Lacy,  and  that  the  whole  army  was  praying  for  him. 
" Thank  God,"  he  murmured,  "they  are  very  kind  to  me." 
At  the  end  his  mind  wandered;  he  exclaimed:  "Order 
A.  P.  Hill  to  prepare  for  action!  Pass  the  infantry  to  the 
front!  Tell  Major  Hawks  ..."  It  was  then  half -past 
three,  and  at  that  hour,  still  facing  the  problems  of  battle, 
he  passed  away. 

The  victorious  general  is  usually  worshipped  by  his 
troops.  There  are  exceptions,  however.  Grant  was  not 
beloved  by  his  army,  and  Wellington  was  well-nigh  detested 
by  his.  Jackson  was  perhaps  even  more  severe  than  Wel 
lington  and  yet  his  men  adored  him.  After  his  death  the 
brigade  that  had  fought  under  him  at  the  first  Bull  Run 
sent  the  following  petition  to  the  Secretary  of  War  at  Rich 
mond,  a  petition  that  was  immediately  granted: 

"That  in  accordance  with  General  Jackson's  wish,  and 
the  desire  of  this  brigade  to  honor  its  first  great  commander, 
the  Secretary  of  War  be  requested  to  order  that  it  be  known 
and  designated  as  the  "Stonewall  brigade,"  and  that,  in 
thus  formally  adopting  a  title  which  is  inseparably  connected 


344  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

with  his  name  and  fame,  we  will  strive  to  render  ourselves 
more  worthy  of  it  by  emulating  his  virtues,  and,  like  him, 
devote  all  our  energies  to  the  great  work  before  us  of  secur 
ing  to  our  beloved  country  the  blessings  of  peace  and  inde 
pendence." 

Another  sure  test  of  the  affection  of  troops  for  their  com 
mander  is  the  number  of  stories  about  him  that  cross  the 
camp-fire  at  night.  There  were  many  told  of  Jackson,  of 
which  the  following  is  very  typical: 

"  Stonewall  died  and  two  angels  came  down  from  heaven 
for  him.  They  went  to  his  tent;  he  wasn't  there.  They 
went  to  the  hospital;  he  wasn't  there.  They  went  to  the 
outposts;  he  wasn't  there.  They  went  to  the  prayer  meeting; 
he  wasn't  there.  So  they  had  to  go  back  without  him;  but 
when  they  reported  that  he  had  disappeared  they  found  that 
he  had  made  a  flank  march  and  got  to  heaven  before  them." 

The  soldiers  knew,  indeed,  the  greatness  of  their  leader. 
He  had  never  failed.  He  had  risen  from  one  daring  achieve 
ment  to  another.  He  had  made  the  impossible  appear 
probable.  And  many  thought  as  did  the  minister  at  New 
Orleans  whose  words  are  reported  by  the  Rev.  Dr.  Field 
in  some  such  form  as  this:  "O  Lord,  when  in  thine  inscru 
table  decrees  thou  didst  ordain  that  the  cause  of  the  Con 
federacy  should  fall,  thou  didst  find  it  necessary  to  remove 
thy  servant  Stonewall  Jackson." 

This  was  the  verdict  of  a  partisan  of  the  South;  that  of 
the  historian  is  not  widely  removed  from  it.  So  long  as  the 
United  States  need,  and  value,  military  leaders,  so  long  will 
Jackson  be  remembered  as  one  of  the  most  remarkable 
products  of  our  race;  his  personal  factor  was  so  momentous 
that  he  must  go  down  in  history  as  the  great  interrogation- 
point  of  the  Civil  War. 


JOSEPH   EGGLESTON  JOHNSTON 

JOHNSTON,  like  Lee,  belonged  to  a  planter  family  of  Vir 
ginia  with  aristocratic  and  military  traditions.  His  father, 
Judge  Peter  Johnston,  served  as  a  lieutenant  under  Light- 
horse  Harry,  father  of  Robert  E.  Lee;  and  he  himself  was 
named  Joseph  Eggleston  after  a  captain  of  the  famous 
Legion  of  the  War  of  Independence.  He  was  born  at 
Cherry  Grove,  in  Prince  Edward  County,  on  the  3d  of 
February,  1807. 

Of  his  youth  there  is  not  much  that  requires  telling.  He 
early  displayed  his  individuality  and  strength  of  character, 
and  showed  marked  predilection  for  a  military  life.  His 
father  presented  him  with  the  sword  he  had  used  in  Wash 
ington's  army:  would  he  have  done  so  had  he  foreseen  that 
his  son  would  first  wear  it  while  commanding  an  army 
striving  to  disrupt  the  American  Union? 

In  1825  young  Johnston  entered  West  Point,  in  the  same 
class  with  Robert  Lee,  who  was  in  age  only  two  weeks  his 
senior.  The  two  young  Virginians  struck  up  a  close  friend 
ship  at  the  Military  Academy  which  they  always  held  to 
steadfastly,  and  this  friendship  is  in  itself  a  remarkable 
testimonial  to  the  character  and  ability  of  Johnston.  He 
was  hampered  in  his  studies  by  a  defect  of  sight  that  pre 
vented  his  doing  night  work,  but  succeeded  in  graduating 
thirteenth  of  his  class.  He  was  especially  distinguished  in 
astronomy  and  French,  and  all  through  his  life  used  that 
language  extensively  for  reading  military  history.  It  was  in 

345 


346  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

this  way,  like  his  two  great  fellow  generals  in  the  Confed 
erate  service,  Lee  and  Jackson,  that  he  fitted  himself  for  the 
difficult  task  of  commanding  armies. 

In  1836  he  served  on  General  Scott's  staff  in  the  operations 
against  the  Florida  Indians,  and  showed  conspicuous  bravery 
and  coolness,  gaining  the  brevet  rank  of  captain  "for  gal 
lantry."  He  was  also  employed  in  various  surveying  expe 
ditions,  but  it  was  not  till  the  Mexican  War  broke  out  that  he 
was  afforded  a  real  opportunity  of  showing  his  conspicuous 
abilities.  The  year  before  the  war,  in  1845,  ne  married 
Miss  Lydia  McLane,  daughter  of  the  Hon.  Louis  McLane 
of  Maryland. 

Johnston  went  to  Mexico  with  General  Scott's  army  as  a 
captain  of  engineers,  but  was  soon  selected  by  the  com- 
mander-in-chief  to  act  as  lieutenant-colonel  of  a  battalion  of 
voltigeurs,  or  light  infantry.  He  was  twice  severely  wounded 
while  on  reconnaissance  duty  before  Cerro  Gordo,  and  won 
the  brevet  rank  of  major.  The  army  progressed  steadily 
towards  the  city  of  Mexico,  and  Johnston  had  sufficiently 
recovered  from  his  wounds  to  join  it  in  time  to  take  part  in 
the  battles  that  decided  the  issue  of  the  war.  At  Contreras 
he  led  his  regiment  to  the  assault  and  was  one  of  the  first 
to  stand  on  the  enemy's  intrenchments.  At  Chapultepec 
the  light  infantry  were  first  in  the  enemy's  works  and  Johnston 
received  three  wounds,  all,  fortunately,  slight.  The  com- 
mander-in-chief  remarked  on  this:  "Johnston  is  a  great 
soldier,  but  he  has  an  unfortunate  knack  of  getting  himself 
shot  in  nearly  every  engagement."  This  "unfortunate 
knack"  was  one  he  never  got  rid  of.  For  "gallant  and 
meritorious  conduct  in  the  battle  of  Chapultepec"  Johnston 
received  the  brevet  of  lieutenant-colonel. 

After  the  war  Johnston  returned  to  surveying  work  until 
the  year  1855,  when,  on  the  formation  of  the  Second  Cavalry 
under  Colonel  Sumner,  he  was  appointed  its  lieutenant- 
colonel.  For  five  years  following  he  served  on  the  plains 


JOSEPH  EGGLESTON  JOHNSTON  347 

in  arduous  but  obscure  duties,  until  in  1860  he  received 
a  welcome  promotion.  General  Jesup,  quartermaster- 
general,  died,  and  General  Scott  was  asked  to  select  his 
successor.  He  named  four  officers  suited  to  the  duties, 
Colonel  C.  F.  Smith,  the  colonel  and  lieutenant-colonel  of 
the  First  Cavalry,  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  and  Robert  E. 
Lee,  and  the  lieutenant-colonel  of  the  Second  Cavalry,  Joseph 
E.  Johnston.  Of  these  four  the  last  named  proved  successful, 
and  was  thereby  promoted  to  a  post  that  made  him  virtually 
the  second  highest  officer  in  the  service  and  that  carried  with 
it  the  rank  of  general.  The  appointment  was  approved 
by  army  circles  and  by  no  one  more  warmly  than  by  his  old 
friend  Lee. 

Johnston  was  not  to  enjoy  his  new  post  at  Washington 
for  long.  The  year  he  was  apppointed  was  that  in  which 
Abraham  Lincoln  was  elected  President,  and  the  winter  of 
1 860-61  was  spent  by  the  Southern  leaders  in  preparing 
for  secession.  On  the  igth  of  April,  1861,  Johnston  received 
the  news  that  Virginia  had  gone  out  of  the  Union,  and 
although,  like  the  great  majority  of  Southern  officers,  he 
had  hoped  that  secession  would  not  come,  yet,  faced  by  an 
inevitable  alternative,  he  decided  that  his  allegiance  was  to 
his  State.  He  resigned  his  commission,  proceeded  to  Rich 
mond,  and  there  was  immediately  appointed  major-general 
of  the  State  forces  by  Governor  Letcher. 

Two  armies  were  quickly  placed  on  the  border  to  defend 
Virginia,  one  to  the  east  fronting  Washington,  the  other  to 
the  west  at  Harper's  Ferry,  where  the  Shenandoah  runs 
into  the  Potomac.  The  first  was  placed  under  the  orders 
of  Beauregard,  the  second  under  those  of  Johnston.  Un 
fortunately  it  so  happened  that  Harper's  Ferry  was  a 
position  which  might  be  viewed  under  two  aspects,  military 
and  political.  As  a  military  position  it  was  poor;  it  was 
situated  in  a  hollow  and  was  commanded  by  high  hills  on 
all  sides;  without  an  army  large  enough  to  hold  the  ex- 


LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

tended  line  of  these  hills  defence  was  hopeless.  But  as 
a  political  position  it  was  of  the  utmost  value;  the  Con 
federacy  was  in  daily  expectation  that  Maryland  would 
join  the  secession  movement,  and  Harper's  Ferry  was  the 
one  point  at  which  an  effective  cooperation  between  Virginia  *9 
and  Maryland  might  be  arranged.  So  President  Davis  » 
and  his  advisers  urged  Johnston  to  maintain  himself  in 
Harper's  Ferry  at  all  costs;  but  Johnston,  on  strictly 
military  considerations,  decided  to  abandon  the  place  the 
instant  the  Federals  should  threaten  him.  And  so  it  hap 
pened  that  from  the  first  moment  Davis  and  Johnston, 
between  whom  there  had  been  some  feeling  of  antago 
nism  before  the  war,  found  themselves  at  cross-purposes. 
It  must  further  be  said  that  although  the  verdict  of  history 
is  distinctly  against  Davis  in  this  matter,  yet  Johnston  was 
constitutionally  unable  to  see  any  other  point  of  view  than 
his  own,  he  was  sharp  and  dictatorial  in  his  official  cor 
respondence,  and  he  occasionally  discounted  his  great 
military  talents  by  his  inability  to  make  minor  concessions. 

On  the  loth  of  June  General  Patterson  with  a  Federal 
army  of  about  10,000  men  threatened  the  line  of  the  Potomac, 
and  Johnston  immediately  prepared  to  retreat  on  Winchester. 
During  the  next  month  the  two  armies  manoeuvred  in  close 
proximity  of  Winchester  and  Harper's  Ferry,  Johnston  on 
two  occasions  offering  battle  on  ground  carefully  chosen 
for  defence.  Patterson,  a  timid  commander,  notwithstanding 
a  great  superiority  in  numbers,  would  not  venture  to  attack. 
These  operations  were  marked  by  a  remarkable  combina 
tion  of  prudence  and  boldness  on  the  part  of  Johnston;  it 
was  during  their  course  that  the  conspicuous  qualities  of 
Stonewall  Jackson  attracted  his  attention,  and  it  was  on 
his  recommendation  that  this  brilliant  soldier  was  appointed 
a  brigadier-general  early  in  July. 

At  one  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  i8th  of  July  Johnston 
received  a  telegram  from  headquarters  at  Richmond  stating 


JOSEPH  EGGLESTON  JOHNSTON  349 

that  Beauregard  was  attacked  and  calling  on  him  for  assist 
ance.  A  few  hours  later  his  army  was  on  the  march  from 
the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah  for  Manassas  Junction, 
Jackson's  brigade  in  the  van.  The  movement  was  skilfully 
masked  from  Patterson  by  the  cavalry,  it  was  carried  out 
promptly  and  quickly,  it  was  bold,  and  it  proved  decisive. 
The  Confederates  succeeded  in  massing  their  troops  just  in 
time  to  win  the  first  battle  of  Manassas  or  Bull  Run. 

Johnston  reached  Manassas  Junction  about  noon  on 
the  2oth,  the  bulk  of  his  troops  being  still  on  their  way. 
Although  he  ranked  Beauregard,  he  left  to  that  general  a 
considerable  discretion  in  the  disposal  of  the  troops,  as  he 
was  unacquainted  with  the  ground,  which  was  wooded 
and  difficult.  McDowell  with  the  Federal  army  was  at 
Centreville.  Johnston  thought  that  before  many  hours 
Patterson  would  follow  him  from  the  Valley  and  march  to 
effect  a  function  with  McDowell,  and  in  view  of  this  took  the 
sound  military  decision  of  attacking  before  the  enemy 
could  be  reinforced.  With  this  object  orders  were  sent  out 
for  an  attack  on  the  following  morning  by  the  roads  leading 
north  from  the  fords  of  Bull  Run  towards  Centreville. 

About  nine  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  2ist  of  July 
Johnston,  Beauregard,  and  the  Confederate  staff  were 
awaiting  the  development  of  the  expected  attack  in  the 
direction  of  Centreville,  when  it  became  apparent  that 
McDowell  was  operating  far  to  the  northwest  of  Centreville 
on  the  Confederate  left.  Soon  a  severe  engagement  was 
in  progress  in  that  part  of  the  field,  and  all  thought  of  an 
offensive  movement  was  given  up.  There  was  nothing  to 
do  but  to  shift  the  troops  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  the 
threatened  point  and  to  establish  there  as  good  a  line  of 
battle  as  might  be  improvised.  The  splendid  resistance 
of  Jackson's  brigade  on  the  Henry  House  plateau  made 
new  dispositions  possible.  Beauregard  took  immediate 
command  at  the  threatened  point,  while  Johnston  from  the 


35°  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

Lewis  House  directed  operations  as  a  whole.  The  opportune 
arrival  of  Kirby  Smith's  brigade,  the  last  to  arrive  of  the 
Army  of  the  Shenandoah,  gave  him  the  opportunity  of 
organizing  a  flank  attack  on  the  Federal  right,  and  Jackson 
at  the  same  moment  carrying  his  brigade  forward  and 
sweeping  the  Henry  House  hill  clear,  the  Federals  began 
to  give  way  all  along  the  line.  The  battle  had  been  won 
more  by  the  good  qualities  of  the  Confederate  troops  and 
of  the  brigade  and  regimental  officers  than  by  the  com 
manding  general.  Yet  to  Johnston  was  due  the  credit  of 
a  quick  appreciation  of  the  strategic  necessities  of  the  case 
and  of  the  bold  and  perfectly  executed  movement  that  had 
doubled  the  forces  in  McDowell's  front  and  made  victory 
possible.  He  received  hardly  his  fair  share  of  credit,  and 
was  in  fact  loudly  blamed  for  not  turning  the  Federal  rout 
to  more  account  by  an  active  pursuit.  It  is  indeed  possible 
that  he  might  have  attempted  a  movement  across  the 
Potomac,  but  a  great  part  of  the  army  had  been  disorganized 
by  the  day's  fighting  and  Johnston,  like  so  many  Virginians, 
was  still  possessed  by  the  idea  that  his  State's  justification 
was  that  she  was  merely  defending  her  soil.  He  had  too 
recently  held  office  in  the  capital  to  make  a  desperate  effort 
for  its  capture.  Besides  this  his  army  was  deficient  in 
ammunition,  supplies,  and  transport,  while  the  Federals 
were  still  in  superior  numbers,  and  Patterson's  undefeated 
army  was  on  the  left.  As  it  was,  he  fixed  his  headquarters 
at  Centreville  and  pushed  his  outposts  to  within  sight  of  the 
Capitol  across  the  Potomac. 

McDowell's  defeat  proved  a  blessing  in  disguise  to  the 
North;  the  need  for  a  large  and  well-trained  army  was  now 
understood,  and  during  the  autumn  and  winter  McClellan 
set  to  work  with  great  vigor,  creating  the  instrument  that 
was  eventually  to  strike  down  the  Confederacy.  In  the 
spring  of  1862  he  was  prepared  to  operate  with  an  army  of 
over  100,000  men;  Johnston  was  then  still  in  the  vicinity  of 


JOSEPH  EGGLESTON  JOHNSTON  351 

Manassas  with  less  than  50,000.  His  position  covered 
northern  Virginia,  but  was  far  too  advanced  for  prudence, 
and  if  he  had  held  it  for  so  many  months  it  was  only  by 
virtue  of  the  moral  effect  resulting  from  Bull  Run.  Johnston 
had  long  made  up  his  mind  that  the  proper  position  for  his 
army  was  behind  the  Rappahannock,  whence  he  could 
anticipate  the  Federals  on  any  of  the  lines  by  which  they 
might  choose  to  approach  Richmond,  and  as  soon  as  the 
roads  would  permit,  in  the  first  week  of  March,  the  Con 
federate  headquarters  were  shifted  from  Centreville  back  to 
Fredericksburg.  This  judicious  movement,  executed  while 
it  was  yet  time,  foiled  the  plan  drawn  up  by  McClellan  for 
an  advance  by  way  of  Urbana  and  decided  the  transfer  of 
his  army  to  Fortress  Monroe  and  the  Peninsula. 

The  month  that  followed  Johnston's  movement  to  Fred 
ericksburg  witnessed  the  gradual  assembling  of  the  Federal 
army  at  Fortress  Monroe.  Johnston's  plan  was  to  concen 
trate  all  available  forces  in  much  the  same  way  as  at  Bull 
Run  for  a  decisive  battle  with  McClellan' s  army  as  soon  as 
it  should  advance;  but  until  the  right  moment  had  come  he 
proposed  keeping  the  various  Federal  corps  not  in  the  Penin 
sula  as  fully  employed  as  possible.  One  such  corps  was 
forming  in  his  front  under  McDowell,  and  for  that  reason 
he  delayed  as  long  as  possible  transferring  his  own  army 
to  face  McClellan  southeast  of  Richmond.  There  were 
other  Federal  troops  operating  in  the  Shenandoah  valley, 
and  there  Jackson  was  in  command  and  likely  to  keep  his 
opponents  busy;  his  general  instructions,  however,  insisted 
on  the  necessity  of  keeping  a  line  of  communications  open 
and  being  ready  at  a  moment's  notice  to  march  on  Rich 
mond. 

On  the  4th  of  April  McClellan  began  his  advance  up  the 
Peninsula.  Johnston  was  immediately  informed,  and  at 
once  gave  orders  for  moving  his  army  to  Richmond,  leaving 
only  a  few  detachments  to  cover  the  line  of  the  Rappahannock. 


352  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

He  hurried  in  person  to  the  threatened  point,  where  a  small 
force  under  Magruder  faced  the  enemy,  and  after  a  careful 
reconnaissance  came  to  conclusions  that  he  presented  before 
a  council  of  war  assembled  by  President  Davis  at  Richmond. 
Secretary  Randolph  and  Generals  Lee,  Longstreet,  and  G.  W. 
Smith  were  the  others  present  at  this  council.  McClellan's 
army  was  at  this  moment  kept  back  at  the  fortified  positions 
of  Yorktown  held  by  Magruder's  division.  The  Peninsula 
at  that  point  was  narrow  and  offered  facilities  for  defence 
that  had  been  turned  to  good  account  by  the  building 
of  batteries  and  intrenchments.  Johnston,  however,  had  in 
spected  the  position  and  had  decided  that  it  was  useless  be 
cause  of  the  superiority  of  the  Federal  artillery  and  because 
McClellan,  controlling  the  water,  could  sooner  or  later  land 
troops  in  the  rear  of  the  Yorktown  lines  and  so  turn  them. 
He  faced  this  difficulty  boldly,  urged  the  abandonment  of 
Yorktown  and  a  withdrawal  towards  Richmond ;  then  when 
McClellan  had  been  drawn  far  from  his  ships  the  Con 
federate  army,  reinforced  by  every  corps  that  could  be 
called  up  from  north,  west,  or  south,  would  fall  on  him  and 
administer  a  crushing  blow.  The  plan  was  courageous, 
was  based  on  sound  strategic  principles,  and  was  largely 
justified  by  subsequent  events,  but  it  was  too  bold  to  be 
approved  by  a  council  of  war.  Johnston  was  overruled 
and  a  middle  course  adopted. 

The  lines  of  Yorktown  were  held  until  the  3d  of  May, 
then  Johnston,  threatened  by  a  bombardment  to  which  he 
could  have  made  no  reply,  evacuated  in  the  night  and  re 
treated  towards  Richmond.  On  the  5th  he  fought  a  success 
ful  rear-guard  action  at  Williamsburg  to  cover  the  move 
ment  of  his  train,  and  thence  retired  virtually  unmolested 
to  the  immediate  neighborhood  of  the  capital,  taking  up  a 
position  between  the  Chickahominy  and  the  James. 

McClellan  slowly  followed,  and  on  the  23d  of  May  began 
pushing  troops  across  to  the  south  of  the  Chickahominy  at 


JOSEPH  EGGLESTON  JOHNSTON  353 

a  point  only  10  miles  to  the  northeast  of  Richmond.  It 
was  a  movement  of  this  sort  that  Johnston  had  been  patiently 
waiting  for,  and  he  now  prepared  to  strike  at  the  enemy. 
For  some  days  past  considerable  reinforcements  had  been 
reaching  him,  although  Jackson,  who  was  keeping  in  play 
60,000  Federals  in  northern  Virginia,  was  advisedly  left  to 
continue  his  operations.  On  the  3oth  of  May  Johnston 
believed  that  McClellan  had  now  got  about  a  third  of  his 
army  across  the  Chickahominy,  and  that  night  he-  issued 
orders  for  a  combined  attack  on  the  following  morning. 
He  intended  to  throw  his  whole  army  on  McClellan's  isolated 
wing  and  to  crush  it. 

On  the  3ist  of  May  was  fought  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks  or 
Seven  Pines,  of  which  the  results  might  have  been  very 
different  had  Johnston  possessed  in  higher  degree  one  of 
the  numberless  details  of  a  sound  military  education,  the 
art  of  writing  orders.  His  strategy  had  been  excellent,  his 
leadership  prudent  or  bold  as  necessity  required,  but  when 
on  the  night  of  the  3oth  he  wrote  the  orders  for  the  move 
ments  of  the  troops  on  the  following  morning  they  were  so 
lacking  in  clearness  that  they  did  not  even  indicate  beyond 
question  that  a  combined  attack  by  the  whole  Confederate 
army  was  intended.  Hours  passed  away  on  the  morning 
of  the  3ist,  some  brigades  in  position  and  others  not,  and 
when  Longstreet  at  last  advanced  in  the  afternoon  the 
division  that  should  have  been  on  his  right  was  not  to  be 
seen,  while  that  on  his  left  remained  in  position  unaware  of 
his  movement.  The  staff  arrangements,  as  so  often  during 
the  Civil  War,  had  completely  broken  down.  Late  in  the 
afternoon,  in  confused  fashion,  the  Confederates  attacked 
Keyes',  Heintzelmann's,  and  Sumner's  corps,  driving  them 
some  distance  and  capturing  ten  guns,  five  flags,  and  many 
prisoners.  Johnston  followed  the  fighting  closely,  and  as  a 
result  was  wounded  in  the  shoulder  by  a  musket-ball.  He 
continued  in  the  saddle,  however,  but  was  soon  afterwards 


354  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

struck  again,  this  time  in  the  breast  by  a  fragment  of  an  ex 
ploding  shell.  The  wound  was  severe  and  he  was  at  once 
removed  from  the  field  to  Richmond,  the  command  de 
volving  on  the  senior  divisional  officer,  General  G.  W. 
Smith.  On  the  following  day  Lee  was  appointed  to  the 
command  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 

Lee's  appointment  to  succeed  Johnston  was  a  great  satis 
faction  to  Jefferson  Davis.  The  President  of  the  Confed 
eracy  had  been  quarrelling  with  Johnston  from  the  moment 
that  he  had  taken  up  the  command  at  Harper's  Ferry. 
Johnston  had  displayed  sensitive  punctiliousness  and  had 
adopted  a  severely  professional  attitude;  Davis  had  shown 
inability  to  subordinate  personal  feelings  to  the  interests  of 
the  Confederacy,  he  had  frequently  interfered  in  purely 
military  affairs,  he  had  constantly  shown  an  overbearing 
temper  better  suited  to  a  dictator  than  to  an  elected  execu 
tive  officer.  The  fact  was  that  he  disliked  Johnston  per 
sonally,  and  Johnston  knew  it  and  reciprocated  the  senti 
ment,  with  the  result  that  the  two  men  were  never  able  to 
co-operate  effectively. 

In  November  Johnston  had  so  far  recovered  from  his 
latest  wounds  that  he  was  able  to  take  daily  riding  exercise, 
and  he  then  reported  himself  fit  for  duty.  Although  both 
he  and  Lee  thought  it  possible  that  he  might  return  to 
the  command  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  there  was 
ample  justification  in  the  events  of  the  summer  and  au 
tumn — the  Seven  Days'  battle,  the  Second  Manassas,  An- 
tietam — for  maintaining  Lee  in  the  command.  That  was 
the  decision  of  the  Confederate  Government,  approved  by 
public  opinion,  and  Johnston  was  not  sent  back  to  his  old 
command,  but  was  utilized  at  the  next  most  critical  point,— 
the  valley  of  the  Mississippi. 

This  new  charge  extended  over  too  wide  an  area  to  be 
dealt  with  by  a  general  officer  not  exercising  a  complete 
discretion.  The  most  Johnston  felt  he  could  do,  in  view  of 


JOSEPH  EGGLESTON  JOHNSTON  355 

the  fact  that  the  Government  was  frequently  altering  the 
disposition  of  troops  in  the  west  without  referring  to  him, 
was  to  lend  assistance  and  support  to  the  two  principal 
armies  in  his  department,  that  of  Bragg  operating  in  front 
of  Chattanooga,  and  that  of  Pemberton  covering  Vicks- 
burg.  Early  in  1863  Bragg  fought  the  indecisive  battle  of 
Murfreesboro ;  his  ill  success  resulted  in  his  corps  com 
manders,  who  disliked  and  distrusted  him,  joining  in  a  request 
for  his  removal  and  for  the  appointment  of  Johnston.  But 
the  latter,  whoo  was  asked  to  proceed  to  Bragg's  headquarters 
and  report  on  the  matter,  could  find  no  reason  to  doubt 
Bragg's  capacity  and  supported  him  strongly. 

In  May,  while  with  Bragg's  army  in  Tennessee,  Johnston 
received  orders  to  proceed  to  Mississippi,  where  Grant  was 
now  operating  with  great  vigor,  threatening  to  surround 
Pemberton  in  Vicksburg.  On  the  3oth  of  April  the  Federal 
commander  had  succeeded  in  placing  his  army  on  the  east 
ern  bank  of  the  Mississippi  below  the  city.  On  the  evening 
of  the  1 3th  of  May  Johnston  reached  Jackson,  forty  miles 
east  of  Vicksburg;  that  very  day  Grant's  left  had  cut  the 
rail  a  few  miles  to  the  west.  Johnston  was  just  too  late  to 
communicate  with  Pemberton.  He  did  what  he  could, 
however.  At  Jackson  were  two  weak  brigades,  and  with 
these  there  could  be  no  question  of  holding  the  town.  On 
the  i4th,  when  Grant  attacked  it,  Johnston  withdrew 
towards  the  north,  hoping  that  the  repeated  orders  he  had 
sent  to  Pemberton  might  lead  to  his  escaping  from  Vicksburg 
and  to  a  concentration  of  the  Confederate  armies  at  some 
point  northeast  of  the  fortress.  But  Pemberton  hesitated, 
while  Grant  wasted  not  one  precious  minute  and  quickly 
won  a  decisive  advantage,  while  Johnston's  small  force  was 
reduced  to  the  r61e  of  a  spectator.  Johnston  himself  was 
chafing  with  impatience  at  seeing  Pemberton's  army  being 
gradually  drawn  into  the  net  under  his  eyes,  and  although 
he  was  ill  and  hardly  fit  for  active  service  he  appears  for  a 


356  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

moment  to  have  meditated  riding  across  the  country  with 
nothing  more  than  an  escort  to  join  Pemberton  so  as  to 
take  command  and  extricate  the  army.  As  it  was,  Grant's 
resolute  and  skilful  advance  locked  up  both  Vicksburg  and 
Pemberton's  army  on  the  igth  of  May. 

There  was  now  nothing  to  be  done  but  to  relieve  Pem 
berton,  and  the  problem  resolved  itself  into  accumulating 
at  Jackson  a  force  large  enough  to  defeat  Grant.  This 
problem  was  not  solved,  partly  owing  to  the  promptitude 
with  which  the  Federal  Government  reinforced  the  army 
before  Vicksburg,  partly  owing  to  the  lack  of  resources  of 
the  South,  partly  owing  to  the  inability  of  General  Johnston 
and  President  Davis  to  work  harmoniously  together.  The 
correspondence  that  records  the  quarrel  of  the  two  men  is 
unedifying  reading,  and  although,  on  the  whole,  the  verdict 
must  be  in  favor  of  Johnston,  one  hardly  knows  whether  to 
admire  or  to  marvel  at  the  fact  that  he  did  not  throw  up  his 
commission. 

Early  in  July  Vicksburg  fell  and  no  more  operations  of 
importance  took  place  in  that  part  of  the  theatre  of  war. 
A  few  weeks  later  Grant  defeated  Bragg  at  Chattanooga,  and 
as  a  result  Jefferson  Davis  was  compelled  by  the  irresistible 
pressure  of  public  opinion  to  place  Johnston  in  direct  com 
mand  of  the  second  army  of  the  South. 

During  the  winter  months  of  1863-64  Johnston  worked 
hard  to  restore  Bragg' s  shattered  army.  No  Southern  gen 
eral,  save  Lee  alone,  was  so  completely  trusted,  so  faithfully 
obeyed  by  officers  and  men,  and  when  Sherman  took  the 
field  in  May  he  had  to  face  a  strong  and  confident  enemy. 
Johnston's  plan  was  of  the  simplest  character.  His  oppo 
nent  far  outnumbered  him,  and  all  he  could  do  was  to  delay 
Sherman's  advance  from  Chattanooga  to  Atlanta  by  taking 
advantage  of  every  position  favorable  to  defence,  watching 
the  while  for  an  opportunity  to  strike  should  his  enemy's 
corps  become  scattered.  He  was  determined  to  take  no 


JOSEPH   EGGLESTON  JOHNSTON  357 

risk  unless  a  real  chance  for  an  effective  blow  was  pre 
sented,  and  he  relied  on  the  vicissitudes  of  warfare  and 
the  gradually  lengthening  line  of  communications  of  the 
Federals  to  give  him  that  opportunity  sooner  or  later.  He 
carried  out  his  plan  brilliantly;  his  retreat  to  Atlanta  was 
masterly,  and  there  is  no  foretelling  how  the  campaign 
would  have  ended  had  not  Jefferson  Davis  completed  Sher 
man's  work  by  relieving  Johnston  from  his  command  just 
at  the  moment  when  he  had  at  last  found  his  long-deferred 
opportunity  and  was  preparing  to  take  the  .offensive. 

The  Southern  army  had  passed  the  winter  about  Dalton, 
a  position  that  was  excellent  if  the  offensive  could  be  taken, 
but  weak  for  defensive  purposes.  When  Sherman,  with 
superior  numbers,  took  the  initiative  early  in  May  Johnston 
at  once  began  to  fall  back,  delaying  his  opponent's  advance 
for  some  days  at  Resaca.  Abandoning  Resaca  with  little 
loss  he  continued  his  retreat  to  Cassville,  where  he  drew  his 
army  up  prepared  to  give  battle.  He  changed  his  mind, 
however,  and  crossed  the  Etowah  River  to  the  south  of 
which  were  some  strong  positions.  But  Sherman  on  reach 
ing  the  Etowah  decided  to  leave  the  direct  road  leading 
through  Marietta  and  to  march  by  his  right  flank  through 
Dallas,  hoping  to  strike  in  between  Marietta  and  the  Chatta- 
hoochee  River.  Johnston  was  not  to  be  outflanked,  how 
ever,  and  promptly  parried.  He  had  resolutely  refused 
to  commit  the  false  move  constantly  pressed  on  him  from 
Richmond,  that  of  detaching  his  cavalry  to  raid  Sher 
man's  line  of  communications.  His  cavalry  was  only  just 
sufficient  to  perform  necessary  scouting  duty  in  the  front  of 
the  enemy,  and  Johnston  was  too  sound  a  theorist  ever  to 
employ  it  for  a  less  at  the  expense  of  a  more  important  duty. 
His  cavalry,  well  led  by  Wheeler,  discovered  Sherman's 
movement  to  the  right,  and  the  Confederate  army  was 
thrown  across  the  Dallas  road  just  in  time  to  bar  the 
Federal  advance. 


35^  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

Then  followed  the  battle  of  Dallas  (May  25  to  June  4), 
ten  days  of  severe  fighting  among  hills  and  woods,  both 
armies  covering  themselves  with  intrenchments  and  ex 
tending  in  longer  and  longer  lines  from  the  west  towards 
the  east.  At  last  Sherman's  left  was  again  astride  the 
railroad,  and  the  Confederate  line  was  overlapped.  Once 
more  Johnston  slipped  away,  and  fell  back  to  the  last 
position  he  could  hope  to  hold  in  front  of  Marietta,  that  of 
Kenesaw  Mountain,  and  there  he  held  out  until  the  2d  of 
July.  Here  the  operations  were  of  the  same  character 
as  at  Dallas,  but  were  marked  by  one  general  assault,  Sher 
man,  on  the  2yth  of  June,  delivering  a  frontal  attack  on  the 
Confederate  positions  at  Kenesaw  Mountain.  It  was  the  only 
time  he  ever  attempted  to  defeat  Johnston  in  that  way,  and 
it  failed.  He  had  been  constantly  foiled  in  his  attempt  at 
getting  around  Johnston's  flank,  and  in  seven  weeks  he  had 
pushed  back  the  enemy  less  than  eighty  miles,  so  he  made 
the  attempt  to  pierce  his  line;  it  failed,  and  Sherman  had 
to  fall  back  on  outflanking  manoeuvres  once  more. 

On  the  night  of  the  2d  of  July  Johnston  decided  that  he 
could  no  longer  cover  Marietta,  and  he  issued  orders  for 
a  withdrawal  towards  the  Chattahoochee.  He  had  already 
prepared  extensive  lines  covering  a  point  of  passage  over 
that  stream.  Sherman  for  a  moment  hoped  that  this  re 
treat  would  give  him  the  opportunity  for  a  blow,  but  his 
wary  antagonist  had  no  weak  joint  in  his  armor  and  from 
behind  his  new  intrenchments  presented  once  more  an 
unassailable  front.  The  position  taken  up  by  the  Con 
federate  general  was  in  some  respects  peculiar.  Nine  miles 
south  of  the  Chattahoochee  lay  Atlanta;  the  river  was 
broad  and  difficult  to  cross.  The  obvious  mode  of  defence 
was  to  hold  the  Southern  bank  and  to  construct  on  the 
northern  bank  a  tete  de  pont  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  army 
or  to  enable  it  to  debouch  on  the  enemy's  side  should  oppor 
tunity  occur.  But  Johnston  did  not  construct  a  tete  de  pont; 


JOSEPH  EGGLESTON  JOHNSTON  359 

he  constructed  instead  a  line  of  intrenchments  6  miles  long 
on  the  northern  bank,  sufficient  for  drawing  up  his  whole 
army.  Perhaps  he  hoped  that  the  threat  of  his  presence 
on  the  northern  bank  would  deter  Sherman  from  presenting 
a  flank  in  attempting  to  cross  either  above  or  below.  The 
position  was  a  curious  one  and  gained  several  days  for  the 
Confederates,  which  was  perhaps  all  Johnston  hoped  for. 

On  the  8th  of  July  Schofield's  corps  effected  the  passage 
of  the  Chattahoochee  to  the  east,  and  on  the  following  night 
Johnston  fell  back  to  the  line  of  fortifications  covering  the 
city  of  Atlanta.  On  the  i6th  Sherman  began  a  combined 
movement  against  the  city,  swinging  his  left  wing  towards 
the  east  and  south  so  as  to  cut,  near  Decatur,  the  Charleston 
railroad  that  forms  the  line  of  communications  between  At 
lanta  and  Richmond.  Johnston  foresaw  the  movement;  he 
realized  its  critical  character;  he  perceived  that  to  carry  it 
out  Sherman  must  extend  his  left  wing  so  widely  as  to  leave 
a  gap  open  to  attack.  He  had  the  strong  lines  of  Atlanta 
to  fall  back  on  in  case  of  defeat,  and,  with  this  safeguard 
against  a  serious  reverse,  he  resolved  to  strike  the  Federal 
army  before  its  movement  could  be  completed.  He  had 
carefully  studied  the  ground,  he  had  made  all  his  dispositions, 
he  was  intently  watching  Sherman's  movements,  when,  on 
the  evening  of  the  iyth  of  July,  a  telegram  arrived  from 
Richmond  relieving  him  from  command.  He  had  decided  to 
attack  on  the  following  day,  and,  as  it  was,  he  did  what  he 
could  to  make  his  successor,  Hood,  understand  his  plan  and 
dispositions. 

It  cannot  be  doubted  that  in  relieving  Johnston  as  he  did 
President  Davis  committed  a  grossly  unjust  and  a  grossly 
ill-judged  act.  Johnston  had  the  entire  confidence  of  his 
army;  he  had  maintained  its  morale  after  a  retreat  of  150 
miles— a  rare  feat;  he  had  left  his  opponents  no  trophies  to 
mark  their  successes.  The  Confederate  officers  and  men 
loudly,  all  but  insubordinately,  demonstrated  their  attach- 


360  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

ment  for  their  general  on  hearing  of  his  removal  from  their 
midst,  and  the  Federal  commanders  were  equally  unani 
mous  in  their  sense  of  relief.  One  of  them,  Hooker, 
even  went  so  far  as  to  express  the  opinion  that  Johnston's 
retreat  to  Atlanta  was  the  military  masterpiece  of  the  war. 
That  is  perhaps  going  too  far,  but  it  will  certainly  long  be 
studied  as  a  perfect  model  of  a  successful  retreat. 

Johnston  could  not  long  be  spared.  Under  Hood  the 
army  that  had  so  long  resisted  Sherman  melted  away.  In 
September  the  Federal  army  took  Atlanta,  six  weeks  later 
it  started  on  the  march  to  the  Sea.  On  the  i5th  of  December 
Sherman  reached  Savannah,  and  a  week  later  Johnston's 
army,  now  under  Hood,  was  crushed  by  Thomas  at  Nash 
ville.  Richmond  was  starving;  Lee's  troops  were  rapidly 
dwindling;  Sherman  threatened  to  sweep  up  the  Atlantic 
seaboard.  In  this  desperate  crisis  the  voice  of  the  South 
called  loudly  for  Johnston  to  be  reinstated  in  command. 
Jefferson  Davis  realized  that  the  appointment  must  be 
made,  but  had  not  the  courage  to  make  public  acknowledg 
ment  of  his  mistakes.  To  spare  himself  a  humiliating  duty 
he  arranged  that  Lee  should  become  commander-in-chief 
with  supreme  direction  of  the  war,  and  Lee  immediately 
nominated  Johnston  to  take  command  of  such  forces  as 
could  be  gathered  to  face  Sherman  in  the  Carolinas. 

In  the  last  few  weeks  of  the  war  Johnston  maintained 
untarnished  his  reputation  as  a  soldier.  With  few  resources 
and  hopelessly  outnumbered,  he  never  despaired  and  never 
failed  to  do  his  duty  to  the  utmost.  He  concentrated  every 
available  soldier  in  Sherman's  front;  he  inspired  his  officers 
and  men  with  some  of  their  old  fighting  spirit;  he  retreated 
warily  when  compelled  to,  watching  keenly  for  one  more 
chance  of  striking  a  blow  at  his  opponent.  One  such  oppor 
tunity  presented  itself,  at  Bentonville,  N.  C.  (March  19-21), 
where  he  succeeded  in  concentrating  his  whole  force  against 
Sherman's  left  wing.  The  Confederates  attacked  with  some- 


JOSEPH  EGGLESTON  JOHNSTON  361 

thing  of  their  old  fire,  but  the  days  of  victory  had  passed,  and 
though  Johnston  gained  some  ground  he  was  unable  to  win 
a  complete  success  before  Federal  reinforcements  reached 
the  field.  This  was  his  last  battle.  On  the  icth  of  April, 
near  Raleigh,  he  received  a  telegram  from  Jefferson  Davis 
stating  that  Lee  had  capitulated  to  Grant,  and  on  the  i2th 
he  was  summoned  to  a  conference  with  the  Confederate 
president  at  Greensboro.  On  the  i3th  Johnston  took  the 
lead  in  declaring  that  further  resistance  was  hopeless  and 
that  to  continue  the  war  would  be  criminal;  Davis  and 
Benjamin  trying  to  persuade  the  conference  that  there  was 
still  hope.  Finally,  with  great  reluctance,  Davis  empowered 
Johnston  to  treat  with  Sherman. 

The  negotiations  entered  into  between  the  two  generals 
resulted  eventually  in  the  surrender  and  disbandment  of 
Johnston's  army  on  the  same  terms  as  Lee's,  and  need  no 
further  description;  but  an  incident  that  then  occurred  may 
be  worth  recalling.  Right  up  to  the  bitter  end,  as  we  have 
seen,  notwithstanding  the  injustice  Davis  had  done  him, 
Johnston  had  rigidly  maintained  his  attitude  of  strict  pro 
fessional  subordination  to  the  civil  power.  But  when,  a 
day  or  two  after  the  interview  of  Greensboro,  he  received  a 
letter  from  the  fugitive  President  calling  for  the  immediate 
dispatch  to  him  of  some  40,000  silver  dollars  that  were  in 
the  hands  of  a  treasury  agent  with  the  army,  Johnston  re 
volted.  His  heart  was  full  of  compassion  for  his  ragged, 
starved,  brave  soldiers,  in  a  few  hours  to  be  turned  loose 
on  the  world  penniless  and  defeated.  He  sent  a  frigidly 
polite  note  to  President  Davis,  but  seized  the  money  for 
the  benefit  of  his  men.  And,  to  make  the  story  complete, 
it  is  said  that  after  the  surrender  had  been  accomplished 
a  ragged  private  took  his  general  aside,  and  knowing  that 
he  was  now  but  a  ruined  and  defeated  comrade,  tried  to 
make  him  accept  the  one  silver  dollar  he  had  just  received, 
doubtless  all  he  had  in  the  world. 


362  LEADING  AMERICAN   SOLDIERS 

After  the  war  Johnston's  life  was  inconspicuous.  He 
engaged  in  business,  and  was  eventually  sent  to  Congress 
by  Virginia.  Under  Cleveland's  administration  he  was 
appointed  Commissioner  of  Railroads.  In  1885  he  was 
perhaps  the  most  striking  figure  among  the  pallbearers 
of  Grant,  of  Grant  who  twenty-two  years  before,  at  Vicks- 
burg,  had  declared  to  Sherman  that  Johnston  was  the  only 
general  he  feared  on  the  Southern  side.  Six  years  later, 
in  January,  1891,  although  very  feeble  at  the  time,  he  in 
sisted  on  performing  the  same  duty  for  his  great  opponent 
Sherman,  and  in  the  performance  of  that  duty  he  contracted 
a  chill  that  resulted  fatally,  on  the  2ist  of  March. 

Johnston  was  an  accomplished  soldier.  He  lacked  some 
of  the  subtlety  of  Lee,  and  some  of  that  brilliantly  offensive 
daring  that  makes  Jackson  so  conspicuous,  but  he  fairly 
deserves  to  take  rank  with  them  as  one  of  the  three  great 
soldiers  of  the  South  in  the  terrible  struggle  that  proved 
such  a  searching  test  of  military  competence. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


(NAMES  OF   PLACES  AND   PERSONS) 


Adair,  Col.,  93 

Adams,  John,  8,  12 

Albany,  9,  32,  33 

Aldie  Gap,  329 

Allen's  Farms,  325 

Amboy,  33 

Amelia  C.-h.,  223 

Amherst,  Lord,  50 

Ampudia,  Gen.,  104,  105,  108 

Anderson,  Gen.  R.,  195 

Anderson,   Gen.   R.   H.,   219,   224, 

292-294,  334 
Andre,  Maj.,  53,  54 
Antietam,  the,  242,  248,  285,  333- 

335 
Appomattox,     185-189,     223,    224, 

307-308 

Appomattox  River,  183,  184 
Arista,  Gen.,  101,  102,  122 
Arkansas  Post,  198 
Armstrong,  Gen.,  37 
Arnold,  Benedict,  40,  51-55 
Ashland,  216 
Assumpink  River,  29-30 
Atlanta,  145,  204,  205,  207,  356-360 
Austerlitz,  281 

Banks,  Gen.,  168,  275,  323-325,  333 

Bartow,  Gen.,  319 

Baton  Rouge,  98 

Beaumont,  225 

Beauregard,   Gen.,  157,   158,   318- 

320,  322,  349 
Beaver  Dam  Creek,  216 
Bee,  Gen.,  319,  320 
Belle  Plain,  179 
Belmont,  147,  148 
Benton,  T.  H.,  88 
Bentonville,  208,  360,  361 


Berkeley,  Sir  W.,  256 

Big  Black  River,  164,  165,  167,  198, 

199 

Bonaparte,  Napoleon,  37 
Booneville,  212 
Bordentown,  26 
Boston,  8,  12,  17,  68 
Bo  wen,  Gen.,  163 
Bowling  Green,  149 
Braddock,  Gen.,  67 
Bragg,   Gen.,    109,    158,    168,    169, 

199-201,  212-215,  253,  355,  356 
Brandy  Station,  172 
Brandywine  River,  35,  36,  41,  72 
Bristowe,  327 
Brooklyn  Heights,  19-22 
Brown,  Gen.,  115-117 
Brown,  Maj.,  101 
Brown,  John,  138,  260,  261 
Bruinsburg,  162,  163 
Brunswick,  26,  30,  31,  33 
Buchanan,  Pres.,  130 
Buckner,  Gen.,  151,  152,  192 
Buell,  Gen.,  152,  154-158,  159,  196, 

212 

Buena  Vista,  107-110 
Buffalo,  115,  116 
Bull     Run,     194,     195,     329.     See 

also  Manassas 
Bunker  Hill,  9,  n,  13,  14 
Burgoyne,  Gen.,  9,  32,  33,  40,  44 
Burkesville,  223 
Burnside,  Gen.,  169,  170,  201,  243, 

248,  286-288,  336-338 
Burr,  Aaron,  87,  97 
Busaco,  21 
Butler,  Gen.,  129 


Cadwalader,  Gen.,  28,  30 


365 


366 


INDEX 


Cairo,  144-148,  153,  168 

California,  in,  112 

Camargo,  104 

Cambridge,  8,  12,  15 

Camden,  55,  74,  78,  84 

Cameron,  Simon,  195 

Canada,  13,  22 

Cape  Fear,  78 

Carleton,  Gen.,  50 

Carricksford,  228 

Carroll,  Col,  93 

Cassville,  202,  357 

Catoctin,  284 

Cedar  Creek,  275,  325 

Cedar  Run,  221 

Cerro  Gordo,  124,  125,  259 

Chadd's  ford,  35,  36 

Champion's  Hill,  164 

Champlain,  Lake,  32,  33 

Chancellorsville,  248,  289,  291-296, 

339-343 
Chantilly,  332 

Chapultepec,  128,  259,  313,  346 
Charles  City  Road,  246 
Charles  River,  15 
Charleston,  74,  75,  79,  84 
Charlotte,  N.  C.,  75 
Charlottesville,  222 
Chattahoochee  River,  120,  204,  206, 

357-359 
Chattanooga,    145,    152,    158,    168, 

160,  199,  201,  206,  214,  355,  356 
Chatterton  Heights,  23,  25 
Chesapeake  River,  58,  60 
Chester,  37 
Chickahominy  River,  182,  236-239, 

245,  246,  267-272 
Chickamauga,    168,  199,  214,  215, 

253 

Chippewa  River,  116,  117 
Churubusco,  127 
Clarksburg,  311 
Clay,  Henry,  in 
Cleveland,  Pres.,  362 
Clinton,  Gen.,  9,  44~53.  55.  59.  74, 

164 

Coffee,  Col.,  90,  93 
Cold  Harbor,   181,   182,   217,   304, 

Columbia,  208 
Columbus,  147-149 
Concord,  9 

Contreras,  126,  127,  259 
Conway,  Gen.,  40,  41 


Corinth,  152-159,  196 

Cornwallis,  Lord,  26-31,  44,  55,  58- 

62,  72-78 
Cowpens,  76 
Crawford,  T.,  84 
Crittenden,  Gen.,  212 
Crook,  Gen.,  218,  221 
Culpeper,  173 
Gulp's  Hill,  299 

Cumberland  River,  147,  149,  151 
Custer,  Gen.,  221,  222 
Custis,  Martha,  see  Washington 
Custis,  Mary,  258,  see  Lee 

Dallas,  203,  357,  358 

Dalton,  202,  214 

Dan  River,  76 

Danville,  223 

Davie,  Col,  84 

Davis,  Jefferson,  109,  no,  205,  263, 
265,  267,  282,  283,  286,  300, 
306,  322,  348,  352,  354,  356,  357, 
359,  360,  361 

Davis,  Jefferson,  Mrs.,  no 

Dearborn,  Gen.,  115 

Decatur,  204,  359 

Delaware  River,  25-28,  33,  34,  45 

Denison,  Gov.,  226,  227 

Dent,  Julia,  140 

Detroit,  141 

Dickinson,  Gen.,  46 

Dinwiddie,  Gov.,  4-5 

Dinwiddie  C.-h.,  184,  222,  307 

Donop,  Col.  von,  26,  28 

Dorchester  Heights,  14,  15,  16 

Drummond,  Sir  G.,  117 

Du  Coudray,  Gen.,  71 

Early,  Gen.,  218-222,  293-295,  305 

Eastport,  205 

East  River,  19,  22 

Eggleston,  J.,  345 

Elk  River,  34 

Emory,  Gen.,  218,  221 

Emuckfaw,  89 

Encantada,  107 

Encarnacion,  107 

Estaing,  Count  d',  50,  73 

Etowah  River,  203,  357 

Eutaw  Springs,  79 

Ewell,  Gen.,  223,  297-299,  327 

Ewing,  Ellen,  193 

Ewing,  T.,  193 


INDEX 


367 


Fair  Oaks,  see  Seven  Pines 

Farmville,  184 

Farragut,  Acim.,  159 

Fisher's  Hill,  218-220 

Five  Forks,  184,  223,  307 

Floyd,  Gen.,  150,  151 

Foote,  Com.,  149-151 

Fort  Barrancas,  89 

Fort  Donelson,  147,  149-154,  196 

Fort  Duquesne,  6 

Fort  Erie,  116 

Fort  George,  115 

Fort  Henry,  147-149,  153 

Fort  Mims,  88 

Fort  Necessity,  6 

Fortress    Monroe,    234,    235,    265, 

267 

Fort  Wabash,  98 
Fort  Washington,  23,  24,  69,  70 
P'ort  Winnebago,  98 
Franklin,  B.,  6 
Franklin,  Gen.,  248,  334,  337 
Frazier's  Farm,  240,  272 
Frederick,  241,  249,  283,  284,  296, 

333 

Frederick  the  Great,  10 
Fredericksburg,  248,'  286-288,  294, 

336-339 

Fremont,  Gen.,  147,  324 
Front  Royal,  220 

Gage,  Gen.,  9,  n,  13 

Games'  Mill,  239,  240,  245,  246,  274, 

324,  32S 

Gainesville,  247,  280,  327,  330 
Galena,  142,  143,  190 
Garneld,  Pres.,  191 
Garnett,  Gen.,  228,  229 
Gates,  Gen.,  40,  41,  55,  58,  74 
George  III.,  63 
George,  Lake,  32 
Gerrnantown,  37-39,  72 
Gettysburg,  249-251,  297-299 
Ghent,  94 
Gibbs,  Gen.,  93 
Goldsboro,  208 
Gordon,  Gen.,  221,  224 
Gordonsville,  275 
Graf  ton,  227 
Gran  by,  75 
Grand  Gulf,  162 
Granger,  Gen.,  214 
Grant,  Jesse,  138,  142 
Grant,  U?  S.,  biography,  137-19*; 


mentioned,  129,  196-202,  207,  216, 
217,  222-224,  254,  255,  301-308, 

355.  356 

Grant,  Ulysses,  Jun.,  191 
Grant  and  Ward,  191 
Gasse,  Count  de,  57-60,  81 
Gravelotte,  225 
Graves,  Adm., '60 
Gravesend  Bay,  20 
Greene,    Nath.,    biography,    66-80; 

mentioned,  15-20,  24,  28,  30,  36, 

39,  42,  44,  47.  48,  55,  5» 
Greensboro,  361 
Groveton,  247,  280,  329 
Guilford  C.-h.,  76-78 

Hagerstown,  252,  284 

Haines'  Bluff,  165,  199 

Halleck,  Gen.,   148,   149,   152-154, 

158,  161,  167,  168,  179,  196,  aio 
Hamilton,  A.,  87 
Hampton,  Wade,  216 
Hancock,  Gen.,  178 
Hanging  Rock,  84 
Hanover  C.-h.,  180,  181 
Hardee,  Gen.,  207 
Harlem,  19,  23,  25,  70 
Harper's  Ferry,  219,  241,  242,  260, 

283,  284,  317,  318,  333,  347,  348 
Harrisburg,  296 
Harrison,  Gen.,  98,  121 
Harrison  burg,  220 
Harrison's  Bar,  240,  241,  274 
Hatcher's  Run,  306 
Hawes'  Shop,  217 
Haxall's  Landing,  216,  217 
Heintzelmann,  Gen.,  237,  353 
Hell  Gate,  22 
Heth,  Gen.,  299 

Hill,  Gen.  A.  P.,  297,  298,  327,  330 
Hill,  Gen.  D.  H.,  284 
Hillsboro,  77 
Hobkirk's  Hill,  78,  84 
Hood,  Adm.,  60 
Hood,  Gen.,  205-207,  260,  360 
Hooker,  Gen.,   168,  169,  201,  214, 

247-249,  288-296,  334,  338-341, 

360 

Howard,  Gen.,  205,  250,  341 
Howe,  Adm.,  19 
Howe,  Gen.,  9,   13,   14,   16,   19-26, 

32-39,  42,  44,  45,  50,  68,  71,  72 
Hudson  River,  13,  17,  20,  32,  33,  49 
Huger,  Gen.,  237,  272 


36S 


INDEX 


Hunt,  Gen. ,25 1 
Hunter,  Gen.,  218 
Hurlbut,  Gen.,  201 
Huttonsville,  228 
Hyndman,  Capt.,  115 

Indian  Ford,  147 
Island  Number  Ten,  159 
luka,  153 

Jackson,  Andrew,  biography,  83-96; 
mentioned,  119-121 

Jackson,  Hugh,  84 

Jackson,  Robert,  84 

Jackson,  Stonewall,  see  T.  J. 

Jackson,  T.  J.,  biography,  311-344; 
mentioned,  29,  144,  145,  194,  236, 
239,  242,  247,  248,  263,  266-273, 
275-286,  291-295,  348-350,  353 

Jackson,  Miss.,  160,  163,  164,  168, 
198,  199,  355,  356 

Jamaica,  89 

James  River,  182,  234,  240 

Jeflerson,  T.,  64,  87,  97,  114 

Jesup,  Gen.,  99,  349 

Jetersburg,  223 

Johnson,  Pres.,  190 

Johnston,  Gen.  A.  S.,  149, 150,  152- 
157,  196,  260,  262,  347 

Johnston,  Gen.  J.  E.,  biography, 
345-362;  mentioned,  164,  165, 
167,  192,  202-205,  208,  209,  233- 
239,  260,  262,  263,  265-267,  317- 
320,  322,  324 

Johnston,  Judge  P.,  345 

Jonesboro,  205 

Junkin,  Dr.,  314 

Kalb,  Baron  de,  40,  47 

Kanawha,  228 

Keane,  Gen.,  91,  92 

Kearney,  Gen.,  127,  330 

Kenesaw  Mountain,  203,  204,  358 

Kernstown,  323 

Keyes,  Gen.,  237,  353 

King,  Gen.,  329 

King's  Bridge,  23 

Kingstown,  30 

Kip's  Bay,  23 

Kissimmee,  99 

Knox,  Gen.,  30,  71 

Knoxville,  169,  170,  201,  202 

Knyphausen,  Gen.,  36 


Lafayette,  Marquis  de,  40,  41,  47, 

55-59,  64 
Lambert,  Gen.,  94 
Lancaster,  37,  38 
Laurel  Hill,  228 
Lee,  Agnes,  288,  289 
Lee,  Gen.  Chas.,  17,  46-49,  67,  72, 

73 

Lee,  Custis,  271 

Lee,  Fitzhugh,  216,  224,  260,  341 

Lee,  Sir  H.,  256 

Lee,  Harry,  78,  79,  257 

Lee,  Rich.,  256,  257 

Lee,  R.  E.,  biography,  254-310; 
mentioned,  124,  126,  127,  129, 
145,  174-189,  222-224,  239-242, 
246,  249,  250,  252,  253,  324-326, 
329-342,  345,  347,  352,  354,  360 

Lee,  R.,  Jun.,  271 

Lee,  T.,  256 

Lee,  W.  H.  F.,  271 

Leslie,  Gen.,  75 

Letcher,  Gov.,  347 

Lexington,  Mass.,  9 

Lexington,  Va.,  314,  315 

Lincoln,  Pres.,  130-132,  153,  160, 
161,  170-173,  230-233,  236,  240, 
243,  262,  263,  274,  301 

Long  Island,  19-24,  68 

Longstreet,  Gen.,  169,  170,  201, 
202,  237,  246,  247,  250,  251- 
253,  272,  273,  276,  280,  281, 
284,  297-299,  325,  327,  329~332> 

336,  337.  352 

Lookout  Mountain,  169,  214 
Louis  XVI.,  44,  54 
Louisville,  158 
Lundy's  Lane,  1 1 7 
Lynchburg,  175,  182,  218,  223,  307 

McClellan,  G.  B.,  biography,  224- 
243;  mentioned,  131,  132,  153, 
158,  175,  176,  195,  246,  264-275, 
283-286,  324,  333-336,  351-353 

McClernand,  Gen.,  151,  160,  161, 
163,  167,  198 

McDowell,  Gen.,  212-214,  232,  236, 
237,  246,  265-267,  274,  318-322, 
329,  349,  351 

McGuire,  Dr.,  277 

McLane,  Louis,  346 

McLane,  Lydia,  346 

McLaws,  Gen.,  292,  293,  334 

McPherson,  Gen.,  163,  172,  201,  205 


INDEX 


369 


Madison,  Pres.,  198 

Magruder,    Gen.,    235,    236,    269, 

272,312,313 

Malvcrn  Hill,  240,  272,  273,  325 
Manassas,  29,  230,  278,  318,  319, 

326-329,  349,  351 
Manassas,  Second,   241,   247,    281, 

282 

Mansfield,  Gen.,  334 
Marietta,  203,  204,  357,  358 
Marion,  Col.,  75,  78,  79 
Massena,  21 
Matamoros,  100-102 
Maximilian,  Emp.,  225 
Mayo,  Miss,  120 
Meade,    G.,    biography,    244-255; 

mentioned,    173,    178,    184,    217, 

223,  244,  296-301,  336 
Memphis,  152,  153,  199 
Meridian,  199 
Mexico   city,    103,    104,    106,    123, 

124,  126,  128 
Mifflin,  Gen.,  30 
Millstone  River,  30 
Milroy,  Gen.,  324 
Missionary  Ridge,  169,  201,  214,  215 
Mississippi  River,  153 
Molino  del  Rey,  128,  140 
Mobile,  88,  89 

Monmoulh  C.-h.,  47-49,  72,  73 
Monongahela  River,  6 
Monterey,  103-105,  139,  140 
Montreal,  32 
Morgan,  Gen.,  75,  76,  79 
Morrison,  Miss,  314 
Morristown,  31,  33,  45 
Mount  Vernon,  64,  65 
Mulberry  Grove,  79 
Muhlenberg,  Gen.,  72 
Murfreesboro,  212,  213,  355 

Napoleon,  Ark.,  161 

Nashville,  85,  145-152,  158,  173, 

207 

Natchez,  86,  88 
Nelson,  Gen.,  156,  157 
Newmarket,  220 
New  Orleans,  89-94,  159 
Newport,  34,  36,  50,  54,  57,  73 
New  York,   13,   17,  22,  24,  25,  32, 

33.  45.  49 
Niagara,  114-116 
Ninety-Six,  75 
North,  Lord,  63 


North   Anna,   180,    181,    287,   303, 

304»  3°6 
Nueces  River,  100 

Obispado  Hill,  104,  105 
Okeechobee  River,  99 
Orchard  Knob,  169 
Ord,  Gen.,  224 

Paducah,  148,  196 
Pakenham,  Gen.,  90,  92,  93 
Palo  Alto,  101,  102,  139 
Pamunkey    River,    181,    236,    237, 

240 

Panama,  121 
Paris,  225 

Parsons,  Gen.,  20,  21 
Patterson,  Gen.,  124,  317-319,  348- 

35° 

Paulus  Hook,  19 
Pedregal,  126,  127 
Pegram,  Gen.,  228 
Pemberton,    Gen.,    140,    160,    163- 

167,  199,  355,  356 
Pendleton,  Maj.,  343 
Percy,  Lord,  9 
Perry ville,  212 

Petersburg,  182-184,  305-307 
Philadelphia,  25,  26,  32-40,  44,  45, 

72 

Philippi,  227 
Pickering,  Col.,  74 
Pickett,  Gen.,  251,  299,  307 
Pierce,  Franklin,  130 
Pillow,  Gen.,  125,  149,  151 
Pittsburg  Landing,    155,    157,    158, 

196 

Plan  del  Rio,  124 
Point  Isabel,  100,  101 
Point  Pleasant,  137 
Polk,  Pres.,  100,  122 
Pope,  Gen.,  241,  244,  247,  274-281, 

325-332 
Porter,    Gen.,    239,   245,  246,   269, 

270,  280 

Port  Gibson,  163,  184 
Port  Royal,  180 
Potowomut,  66 
Price,  Gen.,  159 
Princeton,  26-30,  33,  70,  118 
Puebla,  125 
Putnam,  Gen.,  15,  16,  21 

Queenstown,  n 


370 


INDEX 


Quitman,  Gen.,  125-128 

Rail,  Col.,  26,  28,  29,  70 

Raritan  River,  26 

Rawdon,  Lord,  58,  78 

Raymond,  164 

Red  Clay  Creek,  34 

Reed,  Gen.,  28,  30 

Reno,  Gen.,  280 

Resaca,  Ga.,  202 

Resaca  de  la  Palma,  102,  139 

Reynolds,  Gen.,  246-250,  297,  330 

Riall,  Gen.,  116,  117 

Richmond,   176,  181-184,  234,  239, 

241,  267,  305 
Rich  Mountain,  228 
Rio  Grande  del  Norte,  100-102,  122 
Ripley,  Gen.,  118 
Robards,  Mrs.,  85,  86 
Rochambeau,  Gen.  de,  54,  55,  57- 

59 
Rosecrans,    Gen.,    159,    168,    199, 

212-214,  253,  264 
Roxbury,  12,  14,  15 

Sackett's  Harbor,  141 

Sailor's  Creek,  223 

Salamanca,  281 

Salem,  327  ^ 

Saint  Francis  River,  147,  148 

Saint  Simon,  Marquis  de,  59 

Saltillo,  104,  106,  107,  109 

San  Antonio,  126,  127 

San  Cosme,  128 

Sand's  House,  84 

Sandy  Hook,  19,  33,  49 

San  Juan  River,  104 

San  Luis  Potosi,  106,  107 

Santa  Anna,  Gen.,  106-110,  123- 
128 

Saratoga,  32,  40 

Savage's  Station,  240,  272 

Savannah,  Ga.,  207,  208,  360 

Savannah,  Tenn.,  155 

Schofield,  Gen.,  359 

Schuyler,  Gen.,  40 

Schuylkill  River,  34,  37,  38 

Scott,  "\Vinfield,  biography,  113-133; 
mentioned,  103,  104, 106, 107, 140, 
227,  229-232,  259,  262,  346,  347 

Sebastopol,  198 

Sedan,  225 

Sedgwick,  Gen.,  291,  293-295,  339 

Seven  Pines,  217,  237,  238,  263,  353 


Sharpsburg,  284,  285,  333 
Shenandoah  Valley,  218,  220,  222 
Sheridan,    P.    H.,    biography,    210- 
225;    mentioned,    183,    184,    192, 

255>  3°7 

Sherman,  Judge,  193 
Sherman,  W.  T.,  biography,    193- 

209;     mentioned,    155,    156,    160, 

161,  163,  167-173,  214,  321,  356- 

362 

Sherman,  Willie,  200,  201 
Shields,  Gen.,  323,  324 
Shiloh,  157,  158,  196,  197 
Sigel,  Gen.,  330 
Slocum,  Gen.,  205,  208 
Smith,  Gen.  C.    F.,  151,    153,  34? 
Smith,  Dan.,  86 
Smith,  Gen.  G.  W.,  352,  354 
Smith,  Gen.  Kirby,  260,  340 
Smyth,  Gen.,  114 
Somerset,  O.,  210 
Somerset  C.-h.,  N.  J.,  31 
South  Mountain,  242,  247,  284,  333 
Spottsylvania,    178-180,    216,    30:', 

303 

Stanton,  T.,  152,  153 
Stark,  Gen.,  40 
Staunton,  222 
Steuben,  Baron,  43,  44 
Stewart,  Col,  79 

Stirling,  Lord,  20,  21,  33,  47-49,  68 
Stockton,  Capt.,  115 
Stony  Point,  52 
Strasburg,  219,  220 
Stratford,  256 
Stuart,    Gen.,    216,   268,    269,    277, 

280,  285,  294,  300,  320,  327-329, 

332»  335.  340,  342 
Sudley  Springs,  329 
Sullivan,  Gen.,  15,  21,  27,  28,  30, 

35,  67,  68,  71,  73 
Sulphur  Springs,  326,  327 
Sumner,  Gen.,  334,  346,  353 
Sumter,  Col.,  75,  78,  79 
Swede's  Ford,  37 

Taliaferro,  Gen.,  327 

Talladega,  89 

Tallahatchee,  89 

Tarleton,  Col.  75,  76,  84 

Taylor,  Col.,  R.,  97 

Taylor,   Zach.,   biography,   97-112; 

mentioned,  122 
Tccumseh,  98 


INDEX 


371 


Tennessee  River,  147,  149,  153,  154 
Texas,  99,  100,  in,   121 
Tezcoco  Lake,  126 
Thomas,  Gen.,  168,   169,  206,  207, 

212,  214,  260 
Thoroughfare  Gap,  278,  280,  327, 

329»  330 

Tilghmann,  Gen.,  148 
Tippecanoe,  98 
Tohopeka,  89 
Tom's  Brook,  220 
Torbert,  Gen.,  218 
Transvaal,  121 
Trenton,  26-30,  33,  46,  70 
Trevylian,  217 
Trimble,  Gen.,  327 
Troublesome  Creek,  78 
Tweeddale,  Lord,  116 
Twiggs,  Gen.,  124,  125 

Urban  a,  351 

Valley  Forge,  39,  42,  43,  45,  73 
Van  Dorn,  Gen.,  159 
Vera  Cruz,  107,  122-124 
Verplanck's  Point,  52 
Vicksburg,   160-166,    197-200,  355, 

356 
Villere  House,  91 

Wallace,  Gen.  Lew,  151,  155,  156 
Warren,  Gen.,  222,  223 
Washbume,  E.  B.,  144,  171 
Washington,  George,  biography,  3- 
65;   mentioned,  67-70,  72,  73,  75 
Washington,  Martha,  8 
Waterloo,  326,  327 
Waxhaws,  84 


Wayne,  Gen.,  47,  52,  56,  57,  72 

Waynesbo rough,  222 

Webster,  Dan.,  112 

Weedon,  Gen.,  72 

Wellington,  21,  129 

West  Point,  52-54 

Wheeler,  Gen.,  203,  357 

White,  Gen.,  333 

White  House,  181,  236 

White  Oak  Road,  184 

White  Oak  Swamp,  240,  272,  325 

White  Plains,  23,  25,  50,  69 

Whiting,  Gen.,  268,  269 

Whittier,  J.  G.,  333 

Wilcox,  Gen.,  299 

Wilderness,  The,  177,  178,  216,  302 

William  I.,  Emp.,  225 

Williamsburg,  236,  352 

Winchester,  218-221,  317.  318 

Wilmington,  78 

Winsboro,  75 

Wise,  Gen.,  228 

Withlacoochee  River,  120 

Wool,  Gen.,  258 

Worth,    Gen.,    105,    124,    125,    127, 

140,  3*3 
Wright,  Gen.,  218 


Xochimilco  Lake,  126 

Yallabusha  River,  160 

Yazoo  River,  162 

Yellow  Tavern,  216,  303 

York  River,  234,  235 

Yorktown,  5,  58-63,  235,  236,  352 

Zoar  Church,  291 


Bmericans 

A  NEW  SERIES  OF  BIOGRAPHIES 
Edited  by  W.  P.  TRENT 

The  notable  interest  in  American  Biography  has  gener 
ally  been  met  by  two  widely  different  classes  of  publication 
—the  biographical  dictionaries,  and  volumes  devoted  each 
to  an  individual.  The  principal  notable  exception  was  the 
Sparks  Series,  but  that  is  largely  devoted  to  persons  who, 
the  editor  apparently  thought,  had  suffered  unmerited 
neglect;  and  it  never  attempted  a  comprehensive  treatment 
of  leading  men.  There  seems  room  for  a  series  something 
like  Sparks,  but  devoted  to  individuals  in  whose  lives  every 
body  is  interested,  and  systematically  arranged. 

Such  a  one,  to  be  called  "  Leading  Americans,"  is  now 
begun.  It  will  consist  of  large  I2mo  volumes,  each 
containing  from  half  a  dozen  to  a  score  of  biographies, 
classified  by  volumes  according  to  the  pursuits  of  the  men 
treated.  It  will  include  only  those  (not  living)  whose 
names  are  known  to  virtually  all  reading  people,  and  will 
be  written  by  the  most  capable  authors  who  can  be  inter 
ested  in  the  task.  Pains  will  be  taken  to  make  the  volumes 
interesting  and  inspiring,  no  less  than  reliable  and  instruc 
tive. 

The  books  are  designed  not  so  much  to  recount  history, 
as  to  portray  the  men  who,  in  their  respective  departments, 
have  made  history.  It  is  intended  that  in  the  books,  as 
was  lately  well  said  of  a  European  series,  "the  statesmen 
shall  not  be  overshadowed  by  historical  information,  or  the 
poets  by  literary  criticism" — that  the  contents  shall  be  biog 
raphies  rather  than  treatises  on  the  various  fields  of  activ 
ity  in  which  their  subjects  gained  eminence,  or  than  exposi 
tions,  criticisms  or  philosophies;  and  yet  it  is  realized  that 
the  best  biography  must  contain  something  of  each  of  the 
others. 

It  is  not  intended  to  put  the  books  on  a  plane  that  will 
make  much  in  them  unattractive  to  any  boy  of  fifteen  who 
would  care  to  read  biography. 

[OVER] 


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